

PSYCHOLOGY: PERSONAL & SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

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A NOTE TO THE READER

about this book . . .

This book is for the beginning student in psychology. This is as far as we will go in attaching labels to it. It is not just a textbook in introductory psychology. It is not just a textbook in personality adjustment, with the customary emphasis on clinical psychology. And although it draws heavily from social psychology, it is not a textbook on that topic either.

It is, in fact, all of the above. It combines psychology for personal and social adjustment with psychology as a scientific discipline. We address ourselves to you, the beginning student. Our approach is direct, informal, and intimate. We try our best to talk to you, rather than down at you. We try to tell you how people relate to people, how they perceive themselves and each other, how they attempt to understand and to cope with their own problems and those of others, and, to be sure, how they manipulate each other—despite the negative connotation of that term. You, the reader, can place yourself in the role of the perceiver or the object of perception. You may find yourself the initiator of a social interaction or its terminator. You may take on the role of the manipulator and sometimes (unfortunately, perhaps) the role of the manipulated party. At the same time, you will be exposed to the work of many psychologists whose findings can be extended to your daily activities on the job, at home, at study, and at play. Ultimately, we hope, you will use this information for the purpose of personal and social adjustment in order to experience the joys of effective living.

. . . and its style

What we say here is based on empirical evidence gathered from over 700 carefully selected, up-to-date studies published in the most respectable professional journals and books, which are cross-referenced throughout the text. How we say it—well, this is the way we lecture in class. Both of us have written textbooks and articles using the traditional pedantic writing style. We tried to avoid that style in this book because it does not depict the way we talk to people or describe psychology in conversation. As you will see, however, the casual style employed in this book does not mean that we have taken its content casually.

Herbert Harari
Robert M. Kaplan

THE PAYOFF

As a student, you may wish to pose a legitimate question before reading the next 378 pages: What will I get out of this? The obvious answer, as the cliché goes, is what you put into it. We can, however, promise you that after reading this book you will be able to discuss—from the point of view of the psychologist—at least some aspects of the following terms, concepts, and issues. For greater details, see the Subject Index at the end of the book.

abreaction*	goal approach*	prosocial behavior*
adaptation level*	goal avoidance*	proxemics*
adjustment	goal gradient*	psychoanalysis*
affiliation need*	group communications	psychological androgyny*
aggression	group dynamics*	psychotherapy
alcoholism	group productivity	
alienation	guilt	
altruism		racism
anxiety	hallucinogens	rationalization*
assertion training	halo effect*	reaction formation*
attitude	helping	recency effect*
attitude change	humanistic psychology*	reciprocity norm*
attribution theory*	humor	reevaluation therapy*
authoritarianism*	hypnosis	reinforcement*
aversion therapy*		religiosity
	idiosyncrasy credit*	repression*
balance theory*	imitation	responsibility diffusion*
behavior modification*	impression formation	riots
bigotry	ingratiation behavior	risk-taking
biofeedback*	interpersonal attraction	role
		role marginality*
		rural living
catharsis*	leadership	self
classical conditioning*	learning	self-concept*
clinical psychology*	liking	self-control*
cognitive dissonance*	love	self-disclosure*
compliance		self-esteem*
conflict	machiavellianism*	self-oriented role*
conformity	maintenance role*	self-perception
conscience	male chauvinism	self-presentation*
coping	marijuana	sensory psychology*
crowds	marriage	sexism
	mob	sex-typing
dating	moral development	simulation*
daydreaming	moral realism*	social comparison*
defense mechanism*	morality	social perception
deindividuation*	moral relativism*	social power
desensitization*	motivational research	status
divorce		stereotyping
dogmatism*	narcotics	stress
drug abuse	obedience	sublimation*
	operant conditioning*	subliminal advertising*
empathy*		suicide
encounter group	panic	sympathy
ethnocentrism*	penis envy*	
exchange theory*	persuasion	task-role*
existential psychology*	politics	territoriality*
extinction*	popularity	theft
	prejudice	threat
fear	primacy effect*	token economy*
friendship	primal therapy*	
frustration	projection*	urban living
	propaganda	
general adaptation syndrome*	propinquity*	Women's Liberation

PSYCHOLOGY: PERSONAL & SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

PERCEPTION

I

ON JUDGING SELF AND OTHERS

PERCEPTUAL PROCESSES: HOW ONE PERCEIVES

Attribution The Art of Pinning Labels

Balance Peace of Mind—or Else

PERCEPTUAL CONTENT: WHAT ONE PERCEIVES

Physical Effects From Short Shrift to Fancy Clothes

Role Effects From Name to Race

Order Effects From First to Last Impressions

PERCEPTUAL ACCURACY: MISPERCEPTION AND MALADJUSTMENT

Halo Wearers, Stereotypers, and Bigots

In Search of “True” Perception

PERCEPTION OF SELF

The “Me” Self and the “Not Me” Self

Self-Disclosure Telling All

Self-Presentation Looking Good

IN CONCLUSION: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

PERCEPTION



Figure 1-1 What is this boy's IQ?

PERCEPTUAL PROCESSES: HOW ONE PERCEIVES

Before you turn the page, look carefully at the boy in the picture above (Figure 1-1) Then estimate his IQ Write down your estimate

Now turn to page 6 and look at the picture there If you were asked to rate that boy first, do you think you would have assigned a lower IQ rating

to him than to the boy in Figure 1-1? Probably so, even though the boys in both pictures are one and the same. If you have any doubts, ask some of your friends to do the same task. Let some of them rate the first picture, and others the second picture. Take the average rating for each picture and compare.

What made the difference? The glasses, of course. Why? Because it is assumed that people with glasses are more bookish, studious, and intelligent.¹ But are they really? Is there evidence to show that people who wear glasses are more studious than those who do not? Even if it were so, does it necessarily follow that because such people are studious, they are also more intelligent? These are some of the issues we shall deal with when we talk about what one perceives. Later in the chapter we shall have some pictures that you can use to experiment with your friends. But first let us discuss the perceptual process as such.

Historically speaking, the study of interpersonal perception is relatively new. As late as the turn of the century, psychologists concerned themselves primarily with *sensory psychology*. They focused their interest on such issues as the functions of rods and cones in the human eye or the structure of auditory pathways. Individual differences were minimized, and so was any reference to the meaning that individuals attach to their sensory input. Eventually, however, interest shifted to individual differences in the perception of objects. To the extent that such differences were culturally induced, they fell under the label of *social perception*. In a sense, this was a misnomer, because the perception of objects is not the same as the perception of people. Interpersonal perception is a more complex phenomenon than object perception, since it involves additional dimensions such as judgments, decisions, attitudes, and beliefs.

Most of the earlier studies dealt with issues such as: Do we perceive what we like faster than what we dislike? Do we fail to perceive (at least temporarily) what we dislike? Do we perceive what we like as being larger than what we do not like?² Some of these studies were quite interesting. Even though they did not deal with the perception of people, they told us something about the perceiver. For example, 20 years ago Harry Helson and other psychologists developed the notion of *adaptation level* in perception and judgment.³ They postulated that perceivers respond to three types of stimuli: focal, background, and residual. The focal stimulus is what faces the perceiver directly, the background stimulus serves as such for the focal stimulus, and the residual stimulus is a function of the perceiver's past experience with the other two stimuli.

Consider the following numbers as background stimuli:

12 115 1,218 10,986 118,340 1,104,812

PERCEPTION



Figure 1-2 What is this boy's IQ?

Now consider the concept *few* as a focal stimulus. Without hesitation, do the following. Blurt out a number which you consider as being a *few* relative to each background number. What is a *few* for 12? What is a *few* for 115? What is a *few* for 1,218? And so on. Write the numbers down. If your answers are similar to Perceiver A's in Table 1-1, they are in line with most people's

TABLE 1-1 VARIATIONS IN ADAPTATION LEVEL.

Focal/Background	A's perception	% ^a	B's perception	%	C's perception	%
"Few" out of 12 is	3	(25)	3	(25)	3	(25)
"Few" out of 115 is	26	(22)	6	(5)	29	(25)
"Few" out of 1,218 is	100	(8)	6	(5)	315	(26)
"Few" out of 10,986 is	550	(5)	5	(.05)	2,750	(25)
"Few" out of 118,342 is	1,200	(1)	6	(.005)	30,750	(26)
"Few" out of 1,104,812 is	3,250	(.3)	5	(.0005)	300,000	(25)

^aThe focal/background relationship is expressed in approximate percentage scores. For example, if the perceiver says that "few" out of 12 is 3, the percentage score is 25 ($3/12 \times 100$). Variations in the relationship may be indicative of residual stimuli effects rooted in the perceiver's personality and past experience. Perceiver B's rigid perception is almost totally oblivious of the background stimuli (rapid decline of percentage scores). Perceiver C's mathematical precision indicates the importance of background stimuli in his perception (percentage scores kept constant). Perceiver A's response is a common one. Initially, background stimuli are involved (slow decline of percentage scores); however, as background numbers become so large that they cannot be clearly conceptualized, the effect of background stimuli begins to evaporate (rapid decline in percentage scores).

responses. That is, in terms of absolute numbers there is an increase of what is perceived as a few, but in terms of percentages to the background numbers there is a steady decline. Perceiver B pays strict attention to the focal stimulus while largely ignoring the background stimulus. This somewhat rigid perception is sometimes an indication of individual adjustment problems. Perceiver C is most interesting because his perceptions of the focal and background stimuli covary almost perfectly. Perhaps this person is a mathematician, a statistician, or someone familiar with numbers, and thus brings an appropriate residual stimulus into the process. In any event, Perceiver C's fastidiousness and precision tell us quite a lot about him.*

Another set of earlier studies dealt with the effects of past experience on perception in a different manner. A group of psychologists at Princeton University under the direction of Warren Wittreich had set up a specially constructed room. The room was trapezoidal in shape but provided the same image on the viewer's retina as would a rectangular room. Expecting the context of the familiar rectangular room, the confused viewer experienced considerable perceptual distortions (see Figure 1-3). But when the viewer

*The customary generic use of the third-person masculine pronoun (he, his, him) is maintained throughout the book. Please rest assured that this is not intended as a sexist practice, but is merely an attempt to avoid a cumbersome style (e.g., "he and/or she," "him and/or her," etc.).



Figure 1-3. A distorted room demonstration. These three men are actually the same size! (Reprinted, by permission, from McDavid and Harari, *Psychology and Social Behavior* (Harper & Row, 1974), p. 209. Photograph by William Vandivert.)

perceived familiar target persons such as spouses or friends, their sizes remained relatively stable. Familiarity with a perceived person caused the room to distort around that person, rather than vice versa.⁴

Attribution: The Art of Pinning Labels

Imagine the following situation: Two groups are performing calisthenics. One group consists of classmates you like, the other group consists of classmates you dislike. On different occasions, both perform their tasks. Scoring by outside observers indicates that the disliked group performed perfectly. The liked group did not perform well. Unknown to you, they had made intentional mistakes in their performance.

Some time later you are asked to comment about the quality of the performances you had witnessed earlier. Which group, if any, will you remember

as having given a better performance? While you may take pride in your sense of fair play and objectivity, the chances are that you will remember the liked group as having performed well and the disliked group as having performed poorly. As was the case in an actual study, "bad" acts are simply attributed to "bad" people.⁵

In contemporary psychology, most studies on person-perception tend to attribute *causal* ability. It is assumed that what people perceive is governed by their inferences about the other person's intent, ability, power, or moral obligation to act. To this end, numerous theoretical frameworks have been suggested and tested by psychologists. Within the context of this book, a comprehensive discussion of such theories is of necessity limited. A brief discussion of one such theory should, therefore, suffice.

Suppose you see another person stooping to pat a stray dog. You are asked to judge that person. Among other things, you label him as being a dog lover. What are the chances that you will maintain this judgment, which, after all, is based on a single episode?

According to Harold Kelley, a psychologist at UCLA, there are three factors which operate in people's perception: distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus. In the case at hand, Kelley would suggest that you would be most likely to stick to your judgment if the following occurs: You know that the other person is limiting his fondness to dogs and does not extend it to other pets (distinctiveness); you know that he extends this feeling toward all types of dogs over periods of time (consistency); and it is generally assumed that people who display fondness toward dogs are dog lovers (consensus).

What happens to a person's perception when the situation is reversed? That is, when you know that the other person is kind not only to dogs but to animals in general; but that this kindness depends on the person's mood and the situation; and that he seems to be no more interested in dogs than in the people around him. Under these conditions, according to Kelley, you will have a different perception for the identical act of the dog being patted by that person. You will attribute causality to the dog (e.g., "This dog is hungry and wants a handout.").⁶

Balance: Peace of Mind—or Else

One of the most fascinating theories of person-perception has been advanced by Fritz Heider, a psychologist at the University of Kansas. In its simplest form, his theory deals with the smallest interacting unit (a *diad*, or two-person group), but it can be extended to larger units as well. Our main interest is in the interaction between two people: the perceiver and the perceived person.⁷

Heider's theory is based on what he calls "common sense" psychology. He assumes that what a perceiver wants most is logical consistency. If what

the perceiver sees makes sense to him, everything is fine. As far as the perceiver is concerned, the perceptual situation is "balanced." If what he perceives does not make sense to him, the perceiver experiences "imbalance." Imbalanced situations are unpleasant. They are confusing, disturbing, and tension-producing. If he can, the perceiver will do his best to avoid imbalanced situations in the first place. What can he do if he has already experienced imbalance? Heider suggests that the perceiver will change his perception until it fits a balanced situation. In short, peace of mind (i.e., balance) has to be regained if imbalance is initially unavoidable.

Heider's theory is also known as the *p-o-x* model of interpersonal perception because of its three components: *p*, the perceiver; *o*, the other (perceived) person; and *x*, an object, act, or event. The interaction between *p*, *o*, and *x* is governed by *sentiments* and *cognitions*. Sentiments reflect *p*'s regard and affection for the other person, object, act, or event. They are expressed primarily in terms of liking or disliking. In Heider's terminology, liking is represented by the symbol *L*, and disliking by the symbol $-L$. Cognitions are the logical associations between persons, objects, acts, or events. They occur through similarity, proximity, and, especially, through the attribution of causation. The symbol *C* stands for causes (to happen), and $-C$ represents does not cause (to happen). If all this is confusing to you, consider the following in Heider's abbreviated terminology:

SUSAN LIKES JIM. If Susan is the perceiver and Jim the perceived person, we can say that

pLo: The perceiver likes the other person.

SUSAN LIKES STIMULATING CONVERSATION. If *x* is stimulating conversation, we can say that

pLx: The perceiver likes stimulating conversation.

JIM PROVIDES STIMULATING CONVERSATION. As perceived by Susan, we can say that

oCx: Jim (the other person) causes stimulating conversation (the event) to happen.

As far as Susan is concerned, the given situation is definitely balanced. Would you be upset if the person you like causes what you like to occur? Obviously not. But now consider this situation:

SUSAN LIKES JIM. Once again, Susan is the perceiver and Jim is the other (perceived) person, and therefore

pLo

SUSAN DISLIKES TEETH-PICKING. If *x* is the act of picking one's teeth, we have

p-Lx

TABLE 1-2 HEIDER'S *p-o-x* INTERPERSONAL SITUATIONS.

Situation	<i>p-o-x</i> pattern	Description
Type I balanced	<i>pLo, oCx, pLx</i>	Perceiver (<i>p</i>) likes other person (<i>o</i>) who causes what perceiver likes (<i>x</i>).
Type II balanced	<i>pLo, o-Cx, p-Lx</i>	Perceiver (<i>p</i>) likes other person (<i>o</i>) who does not cause what perceiver dislikes (<i>x</i>).
Type III balanced	<i>p-Lo, oCx, p-Lx</i>	Perceiver (<i>p</i>) dislikes other person (<i>o</i>) who causes what perceiver dislikes (<i>x</i>).
Type IV balanced	<i>p-Lo, o-Cx, pLx</i>	Perceiver (<i>p</i>) dislikes other person (<i>o</i>) who does not cause what perceiver likes (<i>x</i>).
Type V imbalanced	<i>pLo, oCx, p-Lx</i>	Perceiver (<i>p</i>) likes other person (<i>o</i>) who causes what perceiver dislikes (<i>x</i>).
Type VI imbalanced	<i>pLo, o-Cx, pLx</i>	Perceiver (<i>p</i>) likes other person (<i>o</i>) who does not cause what perceiver likes (<i>x</i>).
Type VII imbalanced	<i>p-Lo, oCx, pLx</i>	Perceiver (<i>p</i>) dislikes other person (<i>o</i>) who causes what perceiver likes (<i>x</i>).
Type VIII imbalanced	<i>p-Lo, o-Cx, p-Lx</i>	Perceiver (<i>p</i>) dislikes other person (<i>o</i>) who does not cause what perceiver dislikes (<i>x</i>).

p = perceiver
o = perceived other
x = any object or event
C = causes
L = likes

JIM IS PICKING HIS TEETH. As perceived by Susan, Jim causes *x* (teeth picking) to occur. We can say that *oCx*.

Susan has an imbalanced situation on hand. There is something disturbing about Jim, whom she likes, standing around and picking his teeth. It is a logically inconsistent situation. According to Heider, interactions between two people can be condensed into eight basic situations, as shown in Table 1-2.

Let us now examine how people react to imbalanced situations. Imagine Susan being faced with the following situation:

SUSAN HATES JIM, THINKS HE IS A CREEP. SUSAN ALSO WANTS TO BE ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE CLUB TO WHICH BOTH SHE AND JIM BELONG. SHE FINDS OUT THAT JIM IS CONDUCTING A MAJOR CAMPAIGN IN HER BEHALF IN A VERY EFFECTIVE MANNER. EVENTUALLY SUSAN IS ELECTED PRESIDENT.

Common sense dictates that the situation is imbalanced for Susan. She wanted the presidency, but look who has been instrumental in getting it for her: Of all people, Jim, whom she detests. In Heider's terminology, Susan is facing a Type VII situation,

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$$p-Lo, oCx, pLx$$

th p denoting Susan, o denoting Jim, and x denoting the desire to be president

What can Susan say to herself when faced with this unpleasant situation? Put yourself in her shoes and consider how *you* would react under the circumstances. You will be surprised to learn that your reaction is fairly predictable. To get out of your predicament, you will come up with one of the following possible solutions

Solution #1. JIM IS NOT A BAD GUY AFTER ALL! If Susan (or you, for that matter) chooses this way of thinking, she has changed her *sentiment* toward Jim. She likes him now. In other words, $p-Lo$ becomes pLo . The situation has turned into a Type I situation. Susan likes Jim who helped her get the presidency that she wanted. Susan has regained balance.

Solution #2. I REALLY DON'T WANT TO BE PRESIDENT! Choosing this solution entails a change in *attitude* toward the event. Now Susan no longer wants the presidency. Instead of pLx it is $p-Lx$. The situation has turned into a Type III situation. Susan continues to dislike Jim who helped her get elected. But since she does not want the presidency any more, she has no obligation to Jim. Susan has regained balance.

Solution #3. JIM REALLY DID NOT HELP AT ALL. I DID IT ON MY OWN! Choosing this solution entails a change of *perception* in causality. Susan maintains that Jim did not help her get elected. Instead of oCx it is $o-Cx$. Susan now faces a Type IV situation. Since Jim did not help her get elected to the coveted presidency, she can continue to dislike him with impunity. Susan has regained balance.

Solution #4. SO WHAT? Choosing this solution does not alter the original imbalanced situation. Heider would say that Susan has not really solved anything. She says that the situation does not bother her, but she will continue to experience imbalance (and discomfort and tension) until the situation is perceived otherwise. However, it is also possible that this type of reaction implies tolerance of imbalance or that the situation was never perceived as imbalanced from the beginning.

Heider's theory has generated a considerable amount of research, some of it highly critical. For the purpose of this book, we shall discuss only some practical implications of the theory in the area of mental health and adjustment. For example, some studies have shown that the personality of an individual has an effect on the way he chooses to react to imbalanced situations.⁸ To

illustrate the point, let us once more take up Susan's situation after she won the presidency with the help of Jim, whom she dislikes. Suppose you knew something about Susan's personality—for example, that she is support-seeking, or recognition-seeking, or independent, or benevolent. What could you predict about her reaction to the situation facing her?

Support-seeking individuals, facing Susan's situation, tend to change sentiments. You can predict that Susan will begin to like Jim and thus solve her imbalance.

Recognition-seeking individuals in the same situation will change their perception of causality. Susan will deny that Jim helped her. She will attribute her success to her own endeavors and thus solve her imbalance.

Independent individuals in the same situation will change their attitude. Susan will relinquish her presidency, just so she does not have to be obligated to someone she intends to continue to dislike.

What about individuals who can be characterized as displaying leadership behavior, or those who are characterized by benevolence? Strangely enough, they will display identical reactions, even though their reasoning may differ. Both individuals will take a "so what" attitude. In other words, they either tolerate the situation or do not find it disturbing in the first place. The leader may reason something like this: "I won the presidency because I am the best person and everyone (including Jim) has to acknowledge this fact." The benevolent individual's reasons may be based on the assumption that everyone (Jim included) ought to help people who are running for office.

Findings like the above have considerable implications for interpersonal situations in which one person is troubled and seeks out the advice of another. We shall limit our discussion to counseling situations, because counselors are supposed to do more than just give advice. A skillful counselor has the ability to ferret out the root of the problem before making suggestions. More often than not, he can trace his client's problem to interpersonal difficulties (with parents, spouse, friends, etc.). The counselor also has at his disposal various testing instruments to measure the skills and personality traits of his clients.

How, then, can a counselor apply the principles of balance theory to help his clients? If you were the client and your counselor was aware that certain people show a tendency to solve imbalanced situations in a given way, your chances of getting effective advice would increase considerably. For example, if his tests show that you are a support-seeking individual, he will focus on changing your sentiments. He might give you the traditional love-thy-neighbor advice by showing you the benefits of getting to know your adversary better, by pointing out that the person you dislike really has good qualities, by appealing to your altruistic nature, and so on.

But what if the counselor has ascertained that you are a highly independent individual or a highly recognition-seeking individual? Under those cir-

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In many instances the traditional love-thy-neighbor advice will be a waste of time. In such cases, you are neither ready nor willing to like the other person. If you are a recognition-seeking person, your counselor will be most effective if he assures you that it is perfectly all right to dislike the other person, particularly since the latter does nothing for you anyway (you are making it on your own). For an independent individual in the same situation, the best advice that your counselor can give is not to accept any help from others if it does not allow you to continue to dislike them. Such advice is unconventional—but since it will help you regain your balance, it is effective advice.

We must remember that people who are habitually placed in the position of advice-givers—be they friends, counselors, or psychotherapists—inevitably must ask themselves: How effective is my advice? Am I doing better than chance? Fortunately, Heider and other psychologists have provided us with basic tools for making certain predictions about people's cognitive processes and emotions. For example, recent studies have shown that normal and delinquent adolescents respond differently to conflict situations. Normal youngsters tend to judge others on the basis of their own moral obligation to act, while delinquents in the same situation make their judgments on the basis of the power of others to act. As a result, a psychotherapist's message to his patients can be varied systematically. With some patients he can let it be known that he is forceful and directive, with other patients, he can assign a minimal role to himself and shift the burden of problem-solving to them. In either case, a lot of guesswork is taken out of who, when, and what to advise.⁹

PERCEPTUAL CONTENT: WHAT ONE PERCEIVES

We shall now consider some of the factors that govern people's perception. For illustrative purposes, here are several 10-point scales:

FRIENDLY	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	UNFRIENDLY
RELIABLE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	UNRELIABLE
INTELLIGENT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	UNINTELLIGENT
POPULAR	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	UNPOPULAR
FORMAL	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	INFORMAL
AMBITIOUS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	UNAMBITIOUS
MODEST	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	CONCEITED
SOCIABLE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	UNSOCIABLE
HONEST	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	DISHONEST
ATHLETIC	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	UNATHLETIC

Ask some of your friends to use these scales in rating the people pictured on page 16. For example, if they consider the person to be very friendly, they circle either 1 or 2. The numbers continue in the direction of unfriendliness. Considerable unfriendliness means circling 9 or 10, a somewhat neutral perception is reflected in circling 4, 5, or 6, and so on.

After your friends have completed their ratings, average their scores for each scale. Now ask another group of friends to do the same thing for the people pictured in Figures 1-12 through 1-19 on page 17. Compare the scores on each scale. If some of them differ considerably, it is probably due to variations in the pictures of the same people. Among such variables are size (Figure 1-12), eye contact (Figure 1-13), posture (Figure 1-14), clothing (Figure 1-15), physical attractiveness (Figure 1-16), first name (Figure 1-17), last name (Figure 1-18), and occupation (Figure 1-19). You can readily see that some of these variables are related to physical effects while others exercise an effect because they are social labels or roles.

Physical Effects: From Short Shrift to Fancy Clothes

Size. The size of a perceived person can have a marked effect on the perceiver. In one experimental study 160 college men were divided into two groups according to their height: tall (6 feet and over), and short (5-feet-8 and less). The subjects' task consisted of guessing each other's height. It was found that both groups of subjects were inaccurate in their perceptions of each other. These results are not surprising. A small person facing a tall person will generally overestimate the size of what appears to him to be a giant. The tall person will generally underestimate the size of what appears to him to be a shrimp. The interesting finding, however, was that the short subjects were significantly more inaccurate than the tall subjects.¹⁰ The most plausible explanation for these findings is that it is somehow more desirable to be tall than small, and that what we see is distorted by our likes and dislikes.

That short men in our society are given short shrift has been shown in a recent UPI dispatch from Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland. In the somewhat tongue-in-cheek report, Saul D. Feldman, an indignant 5-feet-4 professor of sociology, discussed the prevalence of discrimination on the basis of height. "Heightism," according to Feldman, suggests that the ideal man is viewed as tall, dark, and handsome. Impractical people are short-sighted, dishonest cashiers short-change customers, electrical failures are known as short circuits, and individuals with little money, no matter their height, will explain their financial troubles by stating, "I'm short." In political affairs, since 1900 the taller of the two presidential candidates has always won. In business, tall men (6-feet-2 and taller) receive an average starting salary 12.4 percent higher than those men who are under 6 feet. In sports such as basketball, baseball, and football, America's obsession with height is most evident. The only exception is horse racing, but according to Feldman, "in this sport the short jockey is given second place to the horse."

If you do not take Professor Feldman's lament seriously, consider the combined effect of status and size on the perception of people. In a study designed to assess the effects of status on perception accuracy, the same in-




Figure 1-4 Rate this woman



Figure 1-5. Rate this woman



Figure 1-6 Rate this man



Figure 1-7. Rate this man



Figure 1-8 Rate this woman



Figure 1-9 Rate this woman




Figure 1-10. Rate this man



Figure 1-11. Rate this man



Figure 1-12 Rate this woman



Figure 1-13 Rate this woman



Figure 1-14 Rate this man



Figure 1-15. Rate this man



Figure 1-16. Rate this woman



Figure 1-17. Rate this woman



Figure 1-18. Rate this man



Figure 1-19 Rate this man

dividual was introduced to college students at various times as a student, an assistant, a lecturer, or a professor at Cambridge University. After the individual's departure the students were asked to estimate his height. As the status of that person increased, there was a corresponding increase in overestimation of height!¹¹

Hair. Neither is Professor Feldman off base in claiming the good fortunes of the tall, dark, and handsome. Dark-haired men do fare better than their blond or red-headed counterparts. They are perceived as more intelligent, rugged, and masculine.¹² Also, at least in line with current fashions, abundance of hair is quite an asset for males. Men with body hair are perceived as more active and potent than their counterparts, just as bearded men are perceived as more virile than clean-shaven men.¹³

Looks. Good looks is another perceptual asset. Good-looking people are perceived as being more sensitive and stronger than their unattractive counterparts. They are also perceived as leading a more interesting life than others.¹⁴ And that's not all. Essays purportedly written by college women shown in attached photographs were rated higher when the picture showed an attractive woman than a less attractive one.¹⁵ Even teachers get in on the act. When asked to judge students on the basis of report cards that had the purported students' pictures attached to them, attractive children were amply rewarded with favorable predictions by their teachers. Compared to the less attractive children, they were attributed with higher IQs, better peer relations, and better futures in general.¹⁶ (There is much more to say on the topic of physical attractiveness, as you will see in the next chapter.)

Eye Contact. We see with our eyes, but we are also seen and judged by our eyes. There is much evidence to show that how a person uses his eyes has an effect on how that person is perceived. As small a difference as two glances or none can yield considerable influence on the formation of an impression, as demonstrated in a recent study. Subjects rated a person reading aloud a page of experimental directions without glancing up even once as formal and tense. The same person, looking up twice, was perceived as relatively informal and relaxed.¹⁷ Indeed, according to psychologist Albert Mehrabian, if you want to be perceived as friendly, your best bet is to try to increase your eye contact with others.¹⁸ This is good advice—up to a point. Prolonged staring can make people uncomfortable and is more likely to be perceived as hostile.¹⁹ Moreover, you should be aware of the context in which your eye contact occurs. If the situation is distressing or threatening to the other person, the less you gaze at him, the more tact and understanding will be at-

tributed to you ²⁰ Eye contact studies have also been useful in validating some popular beliefs. The old notion of the woman who "modestly averts her glance" evidently does not fit today's modern woman. Systematic observations have shown that women engage in more visual contact than males, regardless of the sex of the person with whom they interact ²¹ On the other hand, the notion of the "sensitive-intuitive" woman may have some validity. Compared to men, women tend to read more into social relationships on the basis of eye contact alone ²²

Posture. Posture is another important factor in what people perceive. You may be surprised at what people can infer about you from your body posture. As a rule, a forward posture communicates an attentive and positive image, while a backward-leaning posture communicates a rejecting and negative image. If you display an expanded chest, an erect or backward-leaning trunk, an erect head, and raised shoulders, you are likely to be judged as conceited and arrogant. If your trunk is forward-leaning, your head is bowed, and your shoulders are drooping, your image is that of depression and dejection. Variations in hand and arm positions yield additional categories of perception. For example, openness of arms indicates warmth, whereas arms akimbo while standing indicates unfriendliness. A relaxed, rather than tense, posture is also an indication of friendliness ²³ Of course, it can also be an indication of bad manners. To a large extent, it depends on the status of the interacting people. Observations of staff conferences in clinical settings, for example, have shown that the most relaxed and casual postures (putting feet on table, etc.) were displayed by the high-status psychiatrists, lower-status participants, such as interns, tended to assume a more rigid body posture ²⁴

Voice. A person's voice is another important factor in the impression he generates. You may be familiar with the story of the Jewish immigrant who came to America from the Old Country (Europe) at the turn of the century. Despite his illiteracy and lack of social graces, this immigrant worked hard at many jobs and was beginning to prosper. One day a telegram arrived from his family, whom he had left behind. Not being able to read, he asked a friend to read the telegram to him. The latter, a rough and uneducated individual, read in a loud and commanding voice: "Things are rough here. Send money immediately!" "Who do they think they are, commanding me to send money immediately," exclaimed the indignant immigrant. He sent no money, of course. Two months later another telegram arrived. This time he took it to a gentle rabbi who read in a pleading voice: "Things are rough here. Send money immediately." "Now they are making sense. They must have learned a lesson," exclaimed the mollified immigrant, and promptly wired the money.

Accent, inflection, pitch, and tempo—all these are critical factors in how a voice generates an image. Studies have shown that *how* a verbal message is delivered has a more potent effect on the listener than *what* is in it. If a person speaks haltingly and his overall delivery is unpolished, he generates spontaneity. As a result, the speaker will be seen as a more credible person than one who speaks evenly and carefully weighs each word.²⁵ Several studies have used taped messages and asked subjects to describe the speaker. In one such study, the same speaker either spoke English flawlessly or displayed a slight Jewish accent. The listeners, non-Jewish and Jewish college students, rated the speaker with the Jewish accent lower in attractiveness of appearance, height, and leadership qualities.²⁶ Similarly, French and English Canadians attributed more positive personality traits to English Canadians.²⁷ In another study it was found that loud voices are attributed to assertive individuals.²⁸ All this may be extended to the way you rate your college professors' performances. One study demonstrated that a lecturer who presented a topic in an active, joke-studded style received very favorable evaluations even though the content of his lecture was meaningless. In fact, observers of this lecturer thought they had learned something even though the logic in the lecture rendered it senseless. Thus, a flashy presentation may create an illusion of learning.²⁹

Clothes. Finally, we come to the issue of clothing. The evidence suggests that people do judge a book by its cover. Put in another way, there seems to be truth to the old adage that clothes make the man—and especially the woman. In judging photographs of fashion outfits, females found little difficulty in attributing such qualities as snobbishness, rebelliousness, liveliness, and shyness to potential wearer of such outfits.³⁰ As a rule, however, variations in clothing as such do not have a significant effect. When they do, it is more likely because such variations are indicative of a person's age or socioeconomic class.

Role Effects: From Name to Race

A person's hair, posture, and voice are attributes. In a sense, so are his name, age, occupation, sex, and race. But the latter are also labels that indicate a person's position among others. Those positions, in turn, generate roles that set up certain expectations. If you are 17 years old, you are expected to (and probably do) display behavior different from that of a 48-year-old. The same applies whether you are a physician or a plumber, a man or a woman, your name is Goldberg or O'Brien, or you are white or black. As we shall see later, some of these expectations are unrealistic, unfair, and based on distorted prejudgments. But it is equally unrealistic to assume that such labels do not generate generalized expectations, thereby affecting a person's perception.

Names. Let us begin with names. How did your friends rate the people in Figures 1-17 and 1-18? College students were asked to rank photographs of 30 women on beauty, intelligence, character, ambition, and general likeability. At the end of two months the procedure was repeated, but this time the photographs showed purported surnames: Jewish (Rabinowitz, Finkelstein, etc.), Italian (Scarano, Grisolia, etc.), and "old American" Anglo-Saxon (Adams, Clark, etc.). The addition of Jewish and Italian surnames to the photographs that they had judged earlier caused a considerable drop in ratings of likeability. To a lesser degree, there was also a drop in ratings of character and beauty! (This is especially noteworthy. One can understand, if not condone, that a certain kind of perceiver likes a woman less because she is Jewish or Italian, it is more difficult to understand why this perceiver also considers the same women less beautiful than before.) In the examples with Jewish surnames, there was also an increase in the attributed characteristic of ambition.³¹

An argument could be made that we are dealing here with prejudice and bigotry, and that the perception of people who are not bigoted will be immune to the effect of names. Assuming that you are one of those people who are immune to prejudice, consider the following three names:

JIM
HERMAN
ADRIAN

Now ask yourself who of the three is athletic, who is stupid, and who is artistic? Unless your own name is on the list and you do not think that you fit the expected category, or unless you know someone by one of the names who does not fit that category, your answers are predictable. To make sure, ask several of your friends. Given that particular choice, they will say that Jim is athletic, Herman is stupid, and Adrian is artistic. Yet you and your friends can hardly be accused of being bigoted in this case.

Age. Age and status frequently combine to change the way a person is perceived. A group of college students listened to a recording of one end of a telephone conversation. The age and status of the speaker were systematically varied so that he was alternatively presented as a college student or as the head of an academic department. In both cases the talker was giving the impression to the listener at the other end (supposedly a college instructor whose reply the subjects could not hear) that he, the speaker, would critically evaluate the listener's teaching abilities. Even though the talker at all times merely said, "I am afraid your teaching has not been . . ." he was subsequently perceived differently by the listening subjects. The young college student was perceived as aggressive, ambitious, and egotistical. The higher-status instructor, acting

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in an identical manner, was perceived as compassionate, hesitant, and indecisive³²

Occupation. A person's occupation generates expectancies and impressions that can overshadow other personality attributes. In our society physicians enjoy high status and are perceived as intelligent, calm, and confident. So are lawyers, but they are also attributed with a degree of selfishness and manipulateness. College professors are perceived as sensitive and intelligent, but also as radical and not particularly flexible. Schoolteachers are perceived as intelligent, unselfish, and sensitive, but lacking in confidence. Business executives are perceived as powerful, conservative, assertive, and selfish. Accountants are perceived as conformist, cautious, conservative, and generally cold individuals. Artists are perceived as highly sensitive but moody, impulsive, and attention-demanding individuals.³³

Race, Religion, and Sex. Last, but by no means least, a person's race, religion, and sex have a profound effect on how he perceives and is perceived. Such perceptions are frequently associated with prejudice, bigotry, and discriminatory practices. We shall deal with these issues later in this chapter, as well as throughout the book. In fact, the effect of one's sex on the perceptual process is so significant that we have dedicated an entire chapter (Chapter 2) to this issue.

Order Effects: From First to Last Impressions

Do you judge others on the basis of first impressions? If you do, you adhere to what is known as the *primacy effect* in interpersonal perception. Consider the following description of a young man named Jim:

Jim left the house to get some stationery. He walked out in the sun-filled street with two of his friends, basking in the sun as he walked. Jim entered the stationery store, which was full of people. Jim talked with an acquaintance while he waited for the clerk to catch his eye. On his way out, he stopped to chat with a school friend who was just coming into the store. Leaving the store, he walked toward school. On his way out he met the girl to whom he had been introduced the night before. They talked for a short while, and then Jim left for school.

On the basis of this description, do you perceive Jim as an outgoing, extroverted person? Or do you consider him to be more of a withdrawn, introverted person? When psychologist Abraham Luchins presented this description to a group of subjects, a majority (79%) judged Jim to be extroverted (sociable, friendly, outgoing, popular, and happy), while a minority (14%)

judged him to be introverted (shy, quiet, reserved, lonely, unpopular, and unfriendly) These findings show that most people agree in their perception of a given situation, but that there are some who differ radically from the majority and still others (17% in this case) who either cannot make up their minds or who come up with no clear-cut judgments

Now consider this description of Jim, given to the second group of subjects

After school Jim left the classroom alone Leaving the school, he started on his long walk home The street was brilliantly filled with sunshine Jim walked down the street on the shady side Coming down the street toward him, he saw the pretty girl whom he had met on the previous evening Jim crossed the street and entered the candy store The store was crowded with students, and he noticed a few familiar faces Jim waited quietly until the counterwoman caught his eye and then gave him his order Taking a drink, he sat down at a side table When he had finished his drink, he went home

A great majority (73%) agreed that Jim was introverted, even though some (16%) thought he was extroverted and others (11%) fell in the undecided category

Two remaining groups were presented with descriptions of Jim that combined introversion and extroversion, but in reversed order The third group was presented with the extroverted character description first, followed by the introverted description, the fourth group was presented with the introverted description first and then the extroverted description When the first description indicated extroversion, Jim was subsequently perceived more often as extroverted (52%) than introverted (36%) On the other hand, when the first description indicated introversion, he was perceived more often as introverted (56%) than extroverted (34%)³⁴

First impressions evidently do last Bear in mind, however, that with a sizable minority the process is reversed This phenomenon (where last impressions are significant in one's perception) is known as the *recency effect* The recency effect increases considerably when perceivers are forewarned of the fallacies of first impressions or when contradictory descriptions of the person are separated by unrelated activities³⁵

PERCEPTUAL ACCURACY: MISPERCEPTION AND MALADJUSTMENT

Halo Wearers, Stereotypers, and Bigots

You may have realized by now that not only are people's perceptions, inferences, and judgments governed by what is perceived, but that such perceptions are frequently inaccurate Good-looking people are considered interest-

ing and competent, people who wear glasses are perceived as intelligent and industrious. It appears that there is a tendency to blur one characteristic into another based on some speculative associations. This tendency is known as the *halo effect*. A person may convincingly display a certain socially desirable or valued characteristic as, say, kindness, or dependability. His attributed halo allows for inferences that are by no means justifiable. He is kind, and therefore also trustworthy, he is dependable, and therefore intelligent, he is good-looking, and therefore interesting, and so on. Of course, not all halos are positive. He is dirty, and also unreliable, he is lazy, and also stupid, are examples of negative halo effects.

While halo effects may be harmless in most daily interactions, they can become devastating under certain conditions. Think about what they can do when a person's job future depends on the evaluation of his superiors, or when his academic success depends upon the evaluation of his instructors. The evaluators, of course, will always maintain that they perceive objectively on the basis of performance. Unfortunately, the halo effect may operate so subtly that the perceiver-evaluator is not even aware of it. If you were a teacher about to grade two papers of equal quality (as established by several outside objective judges), could you withstand the halo effect? That is, if one paper is delivered in a plastic cover, neatly typed by an electric typewriter on crackling bond paper, while the other is a handwritten, grease-stained, frequently erased production—would you grade them equally? The temptation to deduce that the one writer is neat *and* intelligent *and* a good student must be great, just as it would be hard to resist the perception that the other is dirty *and* flighty *and* not a very good student. Some may even go as far as to suggest this is one of the reasons why in our sexist society girls (especially in elementary and junior high schools) often receive better grades than boys. After all, it is more enjoyable for the teacher to receive a neatly written paper accompanied by an occasionally pressed flower than a grease-stained paper accompanied by an occasional frog.

Inaccurate perception of and by people is generally associated with the process of *stereotyping*. It refers to a relatively rigid and oversimplified perception or conception of an aspect of reality, especially of persons or social groups. The perception of "bankers," or "women," or "Irish," in general and without discrimination (except possibly for a particular banker, or woman, or Irishman), is known as stereotyping. The term comes from printing—it is difficult to make changes once the metal *stereotype* is cast.³⁶

Given the human tendency to make such statements as "Women are . . ." "College students are . . ." "Blacks are . . ." and so on, it is not too surprising that stereotyping is intimately linked with prejudice and bigotry. If the term *prejudice* refers to rendering a judgment on the basis of limited and incomplete information, then stereotyping is indeed related to prejudice. If the term

prejudice implies bigotry (as it generally does, and as we shall refer to it henceforth), stereotyping begins to assume more complex dimensions. But then the entire issue of prejudice and bigotry is complex and highly sensitive. Perhaps a better way to deal with the problem is to ask ourselves the following questions:

Is stereotyping invariably related to bigotry? If so, how? If not, where do the two terms differ?

Are stereotypes based on truth? If so, can they be eliminated, changed, or reduced?

What are the practical results and effects of stereotyping in interpersonal perception?

The relationship between prejudice and stereotyping can be summed up best by the following dictum: *People who are prejudiced stereotype, but people who stereotype are not necessarily prejudiced*. In a study appropriately entitled "Race and Belief: An Open and Shut Case," it was shown conclusively that the major differentiating factor in the perception of others was belief similarity (e.g., the other person was perceived more positively if he resembled the perceiver in academic status, or in his interests), rather than race. Only when information about belief was lacking did race become the major differentiating factor. Presumably this happened because the perceivers were forced to fall back on partial information supplied by racial stereotyping.³⁷ In another study white subjects presented with photos of blacks persisted in stereotyping their features as "black" as long as the blacks were recognizable as such. The process continued regardless of the extent to which Caucasian physical features were discernable. Still, there were so many individual differences in the kind of attributes being judged as characteristic of blacks that the investigators had to conclude that in addition to stereotyping by consensus, many individuals have their own personality theories by which they judge others.³⁸ Some of these "theories" may be of such obscure origin as to be virtually undetectable. How can one explain *why* Adrian is perceived as artistic, Jim as athletic, and poor Herman as stupid?

Are stereotypes based on truth? This is a critical question, considering that so much racial and ethnic prejudice involves stereotyped perception. The answer, alas, is that there is a kernel of truth in stereotypes. It is possible to show that many (*never* all) blacks are educationally inferior by pointing to their inferior performance on IQ tests.³⁹ It is possible to show that Jews are over-achievers and overrepresented in the college population.⁴⁰ It is possible to show that many men display high levels of career achievement, while many women display the lack of same.⁴¹ It is, however, a serious mistake to assume that these relationships are invariant, or "fixed." They are merely the product

of social training that produces behavior that validates social expectations generation after generation. For example, among American farmers and infantry soldiers, the percentage of Jews is probably exceedingly small, whereas among American business executives their percentage is relatively large (referring to small retail businesses rather than industries such as oil, steel, and automobiles). To understand this phenomenon, one must know something about the history of the Jewish people. Centuries of persecution and denial of opportunities for jobs and land inevitably take their toll. Jews were forced to fall back on their own meager resources—to live by their wits, so to speak. The ensuing reverence for knowledge, learning, and the entire educational process is, therefore, not too surprising. A rabbi is revered for his knowledge, he is a learned man rather than a middleman between congregants and God. The intrusive Jewish mother who trains her children to revere education is an inevitable by-product of such a milieu. The proud Jewish mother who tells her neighbor, upon being asked how old her children are, that “the lawyer is 7 and the doctor is 9,” is far from atypical. Little wonder, then, that the evidence consistently shows that Jewish children are overachievers in school.

The fact of the matter is, however, that all of the above is not a “fixed” characteristic of Jews wherever they are. Could the American-Jewish stereotype of the unadapting farmer, poor soldier, and shrewd business executive be applied to the Jew in Israel? Obviously not. Each of these stereotypes is, in fact, reversed in Israel. The stereotype there (once again, based on a kernel of truth) is of the Jew as a first-class farmer and fighting soldier. The constant bankruptcy facing that country certainly does nothing to further the image of its inhabitants as efficient and affluent business managers.

The moral of the above example should be obvious. As conditions change, so do stereotypes. Those who discriminate and those who are objects of prejudice can do much to change conditions, which in turn will change the direction of stereotyping. But it is difficult to expect the impetus for such change to come primarily from those who discriminate. Such expectations may be based on strong ethical foundations, but they are hardly realistic. People who exercise their privilege to discriminate are often reluctant to give up this practice. Only if the objects of discrimination actively do something about the conditions that breed prejudice does stereotyping take a different direction. The impressive results achieved over the past decade by the so-called power movements (blacks, Chicanos, native Americans, Asian-Americans, women, gays, and senior citizens) have already radically changed the content of many common stereotypes.⁴²

In their zeal to combat injustice, however, many of the power movements do not always exercise wisdom in the manner in which they allocate their meager resources. Too often, they spend more time and effort fighting the stereotyped image rather than the actual conditions that gave rise to it in the

TABLE 1-3 THREE GENERATIONS OF STEREOTYPES
AS OLD ONES FADE AWAY, NEW ONES EMERGE

	Percentage of attributed traits		
	1933	1951	1967
AMERICANS			
Industrious	48	30	23
Intelligent	47	32	20
Materialistic	33	37	67 ^a
Ambitious	33	21	42 ^a
GERMANS			
Stolid	44	10	9
Aggressive	—	27	30 ^a
IRISH			
Pugnacious	45	24	13
Extremely nationalistic	21	20	41 ^a
ITALIANS			
Artistic	53	28	30
Passionate	37	25	44 ^a
JAPANESE			
Sly	20	21	3
Industrious	43	12	57 ^a
JEWS			
Shrewd	79	47	30
Mercenary	49	28	15
Ambitious	21	28	48 ^a
BLACKS			
Superstitious	83	41	13
Lazy	75	31	26
Musical	26	33	47 ^a

^aNewly emerging stereotypes

Adapted from Karling, Coffman & Walter, 1969

first place. Both types of action are important, but without changing conditions stereotyping will persist. As long as people are aligned with an identifiable social entity there will be stereotyping. Old stereotypes never die. They just fade away—but new ones emerge immediately ⁴³ (see Table 1-3).

The saddest and most disturbing effect of stereotypes is that they are based on *self-fulfilling prophecies*. If you throw a person in the gutter and forcibly hold him there for some time, you will be telling nothing but the truth: if you label him dirty. Coupled with the fact that you will continue to treat him as a dirty person, there is little wonder that the person in the gutter begins to accept this label as a fact of life. Many eminent clinicians have pointed out that a patient with the label of, say, schizophrenic, causes all others to treat

him according to certain expectations, until this person resignedly becomes what the label implies.⁴⁴ Nowhere has the devastating effect of the self-fulfilling prophecy of expectations been better demonstrated than in the area of education. In their classic experiment psychologists Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson demonstrated an effect they appropriately called "Pygmalion in the Classroom." After selecting a group of children randomly from several classes, their teachers were told that these children were "intellectual bloomers who will show unusual intellectual gains during the academic year." And they did! The teachers *expected* them to do better and therefore treated them accordingly (e.g., spoke to them more often, listened to them more often, presented them with more challenging tasks, etc.).⁴⁵ It seems that if teachers have certain expectations about the poor academic performance of ghetto children, their treatment of them will result in poor academic performance. If a student is expected to go to trade school, the chances are that his academic performance will justify such expectations.

Discriminatory practices in the United States that arose as a function of widely believed stereotypes about black inferiority may have produced an inferior subculture into which blacks continue to be assimilated. The social consequences can even be powerful enough to resist perceivers' expectations. A recent study involving white teachers-in-training showed, as expected, that when interacting with supposedly gifted white students, the teachers bestowed upon them the most favorable preferential treatment. Surprising—and disturbing—was the fact that supposedly gifted black students got the worst treatment (even worse than the ordinary black students). These findings are significant even though (or perhaps because) the description of the supposedly gifted black students did not fit the conventional negative stereotype of the black student.⁴⁶

The negative by-products of stereotyping are reflected most dramatically in racial, ethnic, and sexist discriminatory practices. The next chapter will describe in greater detail some of the perceptions that men and women have of each other. At this point we would like to demonstrate stereotyping in seemingly harmless and innocuous areas remote from potential prejudice and bigotry.

A name is a label and as such generates certain expectations. Names such as Jim, Herman, Adrian, Michael, Elmer, Susie, or Bertha generate certain expectations. Could these expectations carry with them serious consequences for the bearers of those names? Unfortunately, the answer is yes.

To begin with, there is evidence that grade school children with unattractive names are less popular than those with attractive names. To rule out the possibility that these findings were a result of the children's attitudes toward their classmates rather than vice versa, ratings for the names were also taken from children in other classes. The results were the same. Whether merely

names or people, Adelle, Elmer and Sanford were rated lower than Jim, Karen, and Michael⁴⁷ As if being unpopular with their classmates were not enough, bearers of unattractive names also face trouble from their teachers Names of students can lead to nondeliberate bias in teachers' judgments of academic performance, as shown in an experiment involving blind grading of essays by fifth-grade teachers The essays were linked to fifth-grade authors by first names only The same essays were randomly associated with four names stereotyped by teachers as attractive and favorable (David, Michael, Karen, and Lisa) and four regarded as unattractive and unfavorable (Elmer, Hubert, Bertha, and Adelle) Even though the same essays were associated with different names for different teachers, those reported to be authored by favorable names were graded a full letter-grade higher than those reported to be authored by unfavorable names⁴⁸

What does all this mean? Are people called Elmer, or Hubert, or Bertha losers who are doomed to fail? Not necessarily A name is just a label, and along with the other labels attributed to us, they can constitute either assets or liabilities As a rule, a first name is a relatively small asset or liability A person called Ebenezer can still be the most popular person with his peers and teachers and display no sign of stress By way of analogy, a thoroughbred race horse can be handicapped with additional weights and still come in first time after time But not all horses are thoroughbreds, nor are all people perennial winners Just as some horses will fall behind as the weight on them increases, so will people who carry various labels that handicap them Sometimes a small handicap like an unattractive name can assume major proportions in a person's adjustment problems, just as the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back The evidence shows, especially among males, that common names are more positively evaluated than uncommon names, and that people who dislike their first names have less positive attitudes toward themselves than people who like their first names Studies of clinical institutions have shown that people with uncommon names (e.g., Horace and Allison) tend to have more severe problems than those with common names⁴⁹ A recent study has shown that males named after their fathers (Jr., II, or III) perceive their fathers as dominant and controlling⁵⁰

Despite this, the problem of names and their consequences should be kept in perspective Since stereotypes are not constant, neither are name preferences They change with time and location Senator Hubert Horatio Humphrey has been quoted as saying, "My name has never been a problem to me"⁵¹ This is probably true, considering his age and midwestern origin But will it be true of his grandson, Hubert Horatio IV? The real problem is that in the process of naming their offspring parents often succumb to what is a fad at the time, the need to be original, or the desire to be cute One has only to glance at the following actually documented names to perceive parental folly

Adam Apple
 Hard Ware
 Quick Silver
 Sunny Rainday
 Pansie Pickenpaugh

In addition, there are such first names as Dink, Congolia, Rhebus, Derwin, Fourth-of-July, Halloween, and Gonzetta ⁵² Can you imagine the childhood of these people before they had the good sense (and authority) to change their names?

Changing the handicapping name is probably the best solution, even though some people prefer to fight back, as "A Boy Named Sue" did in Johnny Cash's famous song. In any event, if you are dissatisfied with your name but intend to keep it, you may be heartened to know about the activities of the Harvey Liberation Movement. Cartoons, TV, movies, and sometimes advertisements have made the name "Harvey" the symbol of the fumbling and inept male. In the spring of 1965 Harvey Edwards organized 150 prominent Harveys for support in a campaign to end this denigration of the good Harvey name. As a result, three television commercials were retired by their ad agencies ⁵³ This is Harvey Power!

In Search of "True" Perception

Do you consider yourself an accurate perceiver? The evidence, on the whole, does little to support the notion that the ability to read character is a stable, measurable attribute of an individual. There are simply too many variables involved. Chief among these are the characteristics of the perceiver, the characteristics of the perceived person, and the situational context in which the perception takes place.

Before we deal with these issues, there remains the problem of what constitutes "true" perception. Since we are talking about accuracy of perception, it would imply that there is some absolute standard by which we can gauge people's perception. Unfortunately, there are no absolute standards. At best we can say that "true" perception is a joint function of the degree to which the perceiver approximates the way others perceive a target person and the latter's perception of himself. The following study is a good illustration of how psychologists obtain "true" perception criteria.

In order to study the effects of training and experience on perception accuracy, subjects were presented with 25 hypothetical situations and asked how they would react to them. At the same time their close friends indicated how they thought these individuals would react. Subjects who showed the greatest consistency in their replies and whose friends judged them most accurately were subsequently chosen as target persons to be perceived. Judging

these target persons were graduate and undergraduate students majoring in psychology, classics, and the natural sciences. Their task was to respond to the same 25 situations as if they were the target person, after the latter gave a 10-minute speech about labor relations. The actual responses of the target persons, which were already on record, thus served as a criterion. Accuracy of perception was measured by counting the number of times the friend's responses agreed with those of the target person.

The findings of the study suggested that there are relatively few people with high perceptual accuracy. Only 14 percent of the judges showed relatively high accuracy in their estimates of how the target person would react. Training and experience did not seem to be a critical factor. Graduates were no more accurate than undergraduates, nor was any group of majors superior over others. It appears that some people are simply more accurate than others, but that this ability is limited to relatively few individuals.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, it is possible to pinpoint some characteristics and attributes affecting a perceiver's accuracy. Most studies show that emotionally well adjusted people show greater perceptual accuracy than their maladjusted counterparts.⁵⁵ However, people who are sociable, secure, and show a high degree of self-acceptance often fall into a "leniency effect" trap that distorts their perception. They judge others too benevolently along the same dimensions that characterize them as perceivers. For example, upon presentation of 200 photographs of persons to be judged either favorably (warm) or unfavorably (cold), perceivers rated as "very secure" made significantly more positive judgments than perceivers rated as "very insecure."⁵⁶

Intellectually dull individuals tend to judge others inaccurately, but intellectual brilliance is no guarantee of accurate judgment. At best, perceivers who are above average in their intelligence are more accurate than others in their judgment of people's intellectual abilities.⁵⁷

Probably the most intriguing attributes in person-perception relate to the sex or race of the perceiver. While earlier studies have suggested that there are essentially no differences between the perceptual accuracy of males and females, more recent studies have shown differences in the way the sexes perceive each other. We shall deal with this issue at great length in the next chapter. When the effects of sex and race are combined, the results clearly favor race. In one study, 160 college students were equally divided by race and sex and asked to judge the emotions (anger, happiness, surprise, fear, disgust, pain, and sadness) portrayed by several black and white professional actors of both sexes. Black perceivers, regardless of sex, were more accurate than their white counterparts. The experimenters concluded that these results could be expected because blacks have developed a cultural sensitivity to emotional nuances during their long history of oppression in the United States.⁵⁸

Accuracy in perceiving emotions does not necessarily mean that blacks

are more accurate in perceiving the *attitudes* of whites. In one recent study, black, Mexican-American, and white high school students were asked to fill out an attitude questionnaire concerning such issues as aggression, impulsiveness, and sex-roles. Some of the people in each racial group simply replied to the questions and received no special instructions. Others filled out the questionnaire while playing the role of someone in one of the other racial groups. For example, some black students filled out the questionnaire as themselves, other black students filled it out as they thought white students would fill it out, still other black students filled it out as they thought Mexican-American students would, and so on. The results were then examined to see how accurately the various groups were able to play the role of the students in the other groups (this was done by comparing each group's scores when they were playing a role with the scores of the group that was filling out the questionnaires as themselves). The results showed that white students were the most accurate in their perceptions and black students were the least accurate. The black and Mexican-American students were quite inaccurate in playing the white role, and the white and black students were fairly accurate in playing the Mexican-American role. The results, however, may be merely indicative of the fact that the white role is more ambiguous. After all, the label "white" applies to groups as diverse as Jews, Italians, Irish, and others.⁵⁹

In any event, a word of caution is due because of the suggestion that oppressed minorities are more sensitive, and therefore more accurate, in their perception. Prejudice is a two-way street, and prejudiced individuals are notoriously inaccurate perceivers. In clinical settings, for example, black patients tend to indiscriminately label black therapists as servile collaborators of the white power structure, while white therapists are labeled in the same manner as patronizing reinforcers of the "Uncle Tom" tradition. Black therapists are no more accurate than their white counterparts. Depending on their attitudes toward whites in general, black therapists are either exceedingly punitive or permissive toward their white patients. White therapists, on the other hand, blanket-label their black patients as hostile and uncommunicative.⁶⁰ Actually, contrary to popular belief, extreme and bigoted individuals are inaccurate even in their perception of the objects of their prejudice. The highly anti-Semitic individual, for example, will attribute the label "Jew" indiscriminately to others, just as the political extremist will attribute others with the undeserved label of "Red" or "Fascist."⁶¹

The characteristics of the perceived person are equally important in assessing perceptual accuracy. As we shall see later, the most important variable in perceptual accuracy is the willingness of the perceived person to expose himself to others and the manner in which he does this. But there are other factors that are independent of one's willingness to be exposed. We have already seen that the perceived person's physical attributes, as well as anything



Figure 1-20 What are this man's emotions? Pain? Passion? Anger? Elation? Determination? Meanness?

that labels him (name, occupation, etc), can generate expectations and faulty perceptions. The perceived person's sex is just as important as the perceiver's sex as a factor in perceptual accuracy. There is evidence that females are more accepted than males as expressors of emotion because our society is more tolerant of such behavior in females than in males. As a result, females are generally judged more accurately than males.⁶²

Sometimes the perceptual situation as such can have an effect on perceptual accuracy. How would you interpret the emotions of the man pictured on this page? Pain? Passion? Anger? Elation? Determination? Meanness? Now turn the page and look at the picture there. It shows a man running in a track race. His face is the same one you were asked to judge on the previous page. Since you are now aware of the context of the situation, your judgment is more precise. You are likely to perceive determination or pain rather than anger or passion. Several experiments have shown that additional knowledge of the situational context in which facial expressions occur will increase perceptual accuracy.⁶³



Figure 1-21 What are this man's emotions? (Compare with Figure 1-20)

PERCEPTION OF SELF

The "Me" Self and the "Not Me" Self

The term *self* is widely used in psychology. It is frequently combined into composite terms such as self-concept, self-insight, self-esteem, self-acceptance, self-image, and so on. We believe that in order to achieve clarity in the usage of these terms, it is best to present you with two basic approaches to the notion of self.

The first approach to the self is rooted in the history of personality theory. Its primary aim is to account for the unique organization of behavior within each individual. Sigmund Freud used the term *ego* to refer to this organized aspect of personality. Regardless of terminology, this conceptualization of the self minimizes the role of others in the process of what the individual considers as "me." Each individual is presented as an active agent who selectively guides admission of new experiences into conceptual categories. Individual adjustment is perceived as a function of acting flexibly. If, for example, you have filtered into your cognitive system sufficient information to perceive yourself as a straight-A honor student, you should be able to take the informa-

tion that you have just earned a C grade in stride. But if your filtering system is rigid, you will probably engage in various defensive maneuvers to deny the occurrence of what you consider a formidable blow to your self-image, or you may accept it and become depressed. Either way, you will have a problem. All this does not mean that flexibility in information-filtering is a cure-all. If every time you earn an A you perceive yourself as a genius and every time you fail a test you consider yourself hopelessly stupid, you obviously lack a stable and serviceable estimate of yourself. You are, in fact, displaying what Freud would call "low ego strength," which is detrimental to coping with effective long-range planning and decision-making.

As described so far, the term *self* emphasizes the role of the perceiver. There is, however, another approach which suggests that the perceiver is not only concerned with what is "me," but also with what is "not me." The notion of a social self implies that what each of us perceives as "me" is simply the sum total of what *others* think of us. Notice that each individual continues to be an active agent and evaluator, but whatever information is filtered is primarily dependent on the action of others. The more important and significant these others are to the perceiver, the greater their impact on how he perceives himself.

The idea that the self is a product of the perception of others was developed at the turn of the century by sociologist Charles Cooley,⁶⁴ and some time later by sociologist George Mead.⁶⁵ It was largely ignored by clinical psychologists, who at the time were fascinated with Freud's notion of "ego function." Social psychologists, on the other hand, eagerly accepted the idea of the social self. Moreover, they transferred many of Cooley's and Mead's ideas into workable research hypotheses. In a now-classic study psychologist Melvin Manis arranged to assess the self-concepts of a number of young men prior, during, and after a series of social interactions. The subjects were 101 male freshmen between the ages of 17 and 19 who were strangers to one another before they came to the University of Illinois. They were divided into 8-man groups and housed in adjacent dormitory rooms for about 11 weeks. By comparing each subject's description of himself to others' descriptions of him, Manis was able to demonstrate the existence of the social self. He showed that as time went on each subject's self-concept and the average concept held of him by others tended to converge. More importantly, Manis found that this "meeting of the minds" or compromise between what people think of themselves and what others think of them was largely a one-sided affair. The subjects' descriptions of themselves changed more often in the direction of the descriptions that others had made of them than vice versa. This strong influence of others on individual self-perception was particularly evident when the subjects initially viewed themselves less favorably than the group viewed them. The reasons for this are obvious. It is relatively easy for a person to re-

vise his self-concept in line with others' conception of him if it involves a change for the better. The same person would understandably be reluctant to accept changes for the worse in order to meet whatever expectations others may have of him.⁶⁶

Consider the implications of the Manis study for clinical practice. "Acting-out" patients, especially those engaged in antisocial activities, are generally perceived as more suitable candidates for group psychotherapy than patients who are shy, withdrawn, and socially isolated.⁶⁷ One possible reason for this preference is that groups composed of "acting-out" patients tend to resemble what psychotherapy groups *should* look like. In such groups tempers fly, tears are shed, and psyches are bared. In groups composed of social isolates, nothing much seems to happen. Whatever social interaction occurs is interrupted by prolonged periods of silence. But it is precisely this type of patient who will benefit most from group psychotherapy, clinical tradition notwithstanding. The "acting-out" patient often displays an unreasonably high self-concept bolstered by bragging, boasting, and lying. As the Manis study implies, it is very difficult to bring this self-concept down to realistic levels because of the patient's reluctance to change for the worse. The self-concept of the "withdrawn" type of candidate for the group is so low that even minimal support from the others will create a change for the better in him.

The social self is part of the vicious cycle that stereotyping generates. Any time a person is treated on the basis of class membership, discriminatory action is inevitable, since the perceiver ignores individual differences. If the discriminatory practices are painful to the target person, the ensuing adjustment problem is obvious. If you are an aging and physically unattractive used-car salesman called Harvey Glook, you will be the recipient of rather harsh treatment. Whether such treatment is justified is beside the point. Like so many self-fulfilling prophecies that operate in members of oppressed minorities, your self-concept will be low. What about the flip side of the coin? If you are a young and physically attractive physician called Michael West, your self-concept is more likely to be high because of the more positive evaluation of you by others—sometimes too high, as a matter of fact. Since all young Dr. Wests are *not* alike, you may find it difficult to live up to undeserved judgments. This, too, can create adjustment problems.

Self-Disclosure: Telling All

What can people do to avoid adjustment problems resulting from faulty interpersonal perception? Not much, really. Just as stereotyping is going to be with us forever, so are some of the problems caused by misperceptions. One possible remedy is to educate perceivers to refrain as much as possible from making judgments of others on the basis of categorized classes. Another solution is to urge people to disclose more about themselves. One could argue

inaccurately, since those who perceive them will have to rely less on stereotyping

The problem is that the term *self-disclosure* is rather complex. As originally coined by psychologist Sydney Jourard, it refers to any information about himself which person A communicates verbally to person B. For purposes of measurement, person B is often presented as person A's mother, father, best opposite-sex friend, and same-sex friend. Information items to be measured deal with person A's attitudes and opinions, tastes and interests, work or studies, money, personality, and body. Items are scored as 0 (no disclosure to person B), 1 (disclosure in general terms only), and 2 (full and complete disclosure) ⁶⁸ With increasing interest in the topic among psychologists, several other measures of self-disclosure have been developed ⁶⁹

The major problem in the measurement of self-disclosure is that it is not enough to find out how much people are willing to disclose about themselves. Of equal, and possibly greater, importance is the kind of information they are willing to disclose. For example, the evidence is generally inconclusive whether there is a difference between how much men and women disclose about themselves, but women disclose more intimate information about themselves than men do (especially to same-sex friends) ⁷⁰ Along similar lines, cross-cultural studies have shown that compared to Germans, Americans disclose a lot about themselves, but the friendships the Americans form are rather superficial in nature, Germans do not disclose a lot about themselves, but they form intimate relationships with others, nevertheless ⁷¹

One of the nice things about self-disclosure is that it begets self-disclosure. The more you tell about yourself, the more others will tell about themselves ⁷² As an extra bonus, you will also be perceived as more trustworthy and likeable in general ⁷³ The entire encounter group movement is, in fact, based on the premise that all of us will benefit from being maximally open with another. This may be so, but a word of caution is due nevertheless. Have you ever been part of an encounter group? Many participants in such groups have been turned off by excessive demands to "tell all." If they refuse to go all the way in disclosing information about themselves, they come under heavy fire. A prominent advocate of the encounter movement has labeled these withholders of information as "hermits, prudes, paranoids, or rascals" ⁷⁴ If such views prevail we may very well have on our hands what some psychologists call the "tyranny of openness" ⁷⁵ Under such conditions individuals will have very little freedom to harbor private thoughts that they may cherish. Psychologist Paul Cozby suggests the following hypothesis on the basis of recent research

Persons with positive mental health (given that they can be identified) are characterized by high disclosure to a few significant others and medium disclosure to others in the social environment. Individuals

*who are poorly adjusted are characterized by either high or low self-disclosure to virtually everyone in the social environment*⁷⁶

Like so many other things that affect our lives, self-disclosure is most beneficial when practiced in moderation

Self-Presentation: Looking Good

Regardless of how one practices self-disclosure, there is little doubt that social interaction involves self-management. Sociologist Ervin Goffman likens the participants in social interaction to actors trying to maintain behavior appropriate to the situation at hand. It is a form of constant self-monitoring aimed at presenting oneself in the best possible light. People do this because of their need to be approved and liked, even if they practice very little self-disclosure. For example, if you want to be perceived as the strong-and-silent type of person, you probably have in your repertoire many facial expressions and body postures to present yourself successfully.⁷⁷ Psychologist Mark Snyder has developed an interesting measuring device for social presentation.⁷⁸ His scale, which has been used for self-presentation in social situations, is shown in Table 1-4.

IN CONCLUSION. PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

Problems of personal and social adjustment are closely linked to personal perception, if only because the process of perceiving people is obviously different from that of perceiving objects. It is possible, though not very likely, that you and your friend could look at the same chair and yet perceive a different object. But when both of you look at another person you are much more likely to see different aspects of that person. Moreover, person-perception generally involves some sort of interaction. You look at each other, or you ignore each other, or you speak to each other. Whatever the nature of that interaction, it will in turn affect your subsequent perception of and behavior toward the other person, the other person's perception and behavior toward you, your subsequent perception, and so on and on.

Are you a successful person? If not, what makes you different from those who succeed? One process that distinguishes successful from less-successful individuals is the tendency to attribute the outcome of experiences to ability, effort, task difficulty, or luck. According to psychologist Bernard Weiner, you are most likely to attribute causes to one or more of the four factors listed above⁷⁹ (there are, of course, other ways to attribute causes to what is perceived—see Attribution: The Art of Pinning Labels, pp. 8-9).

Following Weiner's model, highly motivated individuals tend to attribute their successes to ability and their failures to lack of effort. Both ability and

TABLE 1-4 THE SELF-MONITORING SCALE

- 1 I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people
- 2 My behavior is usually an expression of my true inner feelings, attitudes, and beliefs
- 3 At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like
- 4 I can only argue for ideas which I already believe
- 5 I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information
- 6 I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people
- 7 When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of others for cues
- 8 I would probably make a good actor
- 9 I rarely need the advice of my friends to choose movies, books, or music
- 10 I sometimes appear to others to be experiencing deeper emotions than I actually am
- 11 I laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than when alone
- 12 In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention
- 13 In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons
- 14 I am not particularly good at making other people like me
- 15 Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good time
- 16 I'm not always the person I appear to be
- 17 I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone else or win their favor
- 18 I have considered being an entertainer
- 19 In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what people expect me to be rather than anything else
- 20 I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting
- 21 I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations
- 22 At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going
- 23 I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up quite so well as I should
- 24 I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end)
- 25 I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them

Scoring True for items 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 24, 25 False for items 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 12, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23

1 point for each correct answer The higher the score, the higher your social sensitivity and ability to look good to others

Adapted from Snyder, 1974

effort are descriptive characteristics Ability, however, is stable, you cannot change it from one situation to the next Effort, on the other hand, is unstable, or dependent upon the situation If you attribute your failures to lack of effort, you can remedy these failures by trying harder in the next situation

What about individuals who are less successful? Evidence suggests these people attribute success either to task difficulty (i.e., an easy test) or to luck. In other words, they attribute their successes to factors over which they have no control. Their failures are attributed to ability, which is both a personal characteristic and an unchangeable attribute. Unlike effort, ability cannot be changed from one situation to the next. Hence, there is no need to try.

Your adjustment problems begin if you *consistently* attribute success or failure to any of the above factors or a combination thereof. For example, psychologist John Nicholls has shown that in their perception some people consistently use the process of "self-defense," while others use the process "self-denigration."⁸⁰ If you are self-defensive, you consistently attribute your success to ability and/or effort and your failure to lack of effort and/or bad luck. If you are self-denigratory, you consistently attribute success to good luck and/or ease of task and failure to lack of ability. The net result of such perceptions is that you lock yourself into a position that leaves you with little, if any, maneuverability. Since your inflexible perception of the situation may have been off-base to begin with, you are obviously headed for trouble. For example, if you are self-defensive, how would you feel if it begins to dawn upon you that your success so far has been due merely to good luck, but your failure has been primarily due to lack of ability?

All this does not necessarily mean that maneuverability and flexibility guarantee accurate perception of self and others. As psychologist Fritz Heider has pointed out (see pp. 9-14), people are prone to pursue (not always successfully) peace of mind at all cost. Thus, if you perceive something or someone and get the feeling that it does not make sense, you are likely to engage in all sorts of mental acrobatics to either avoid the imbalance (discomfort) which comes with the loss of peace of mind or regain balance. If you reread the section on Heider carefully (the example of Susan and Jim), you will have at least a fighting chance of making an educated guess at what is going on in the other person's mind. That knowledge is one aid to social adjustment.

As to the content of your perception—that is, *what* you perceive rather than *how* you perceive—we have mentioned numerous factors that could make significant differences in the way you perceive others and, in turn, how they judge you. We grant you that the knowledge that posture, voice, hair, name, occupation, size, age, sex, race, looks, and so on influence perception may be interesting, but it is not necessarily related to personal and social adjustment. Hopefully, however, we provided you with more than mere information. We also attempted to show you precisely the direction, intensity, and amount of change that these variables produce. Knowing what images your name or age or occupation raise in the minds of most people can help you try to

overcome or change these images (should you desire so) Should you apply the dynamics of stereotyping, halo effects, impression formations, and the like, you have an excellent chance to achieve the changes you desire

We suggest, however, that you do not fall into the trap of dismissing the process of stereotyping as being inaccurate, of doubtful validity, or merely another weapon in the arsenal of the bigot True, bigots do stereotype ("all Jews all blacks all women drivers all young people all old people are—or do—this or that") Yet people who stereotype are not necessarily bigoted Usually it is because of lack of information or some vague feelings from past experience Moreover, the sad but true fact is that practically all stereotypes have a kernel of truth in them The reason may be that there is a self-fulfilling prophecy causing those stereotyped to fit their image Usually, what society wants it gets—unless there are some individuals willing to fight for certain principles If society decides that a woman's place is in the kitchen (or that blacks belong on the plantation), then the subsequent (stereotyped) perception of woman as coffee brewer is not a figment of the imagination It is problematic, it causes adjustment problems, but it is the truth—unless conditions change This change, whether fostered upon society or accepted voluntarily as time goes on, will eliminate the coffee-brewer stereotype It will *not*, however, eliminate stereotyping Old stereotypes never die, they just fade away—while new ones emerge (see Table 1-3)

What, then, is the relationship between stereotyping and adjustment problems? Recall that stereotyping is essentially a labeling process Recognition of the label (e.g., underachievement in women, overachievement in Jews, etc.) is, in itself, not necessarily harmful It may hurt some, especially if the label is derogatory But it is, after all, perception of reality By way of analogy, if some bully constantly throws you into the gutter and then labels you dirty, it would do you no good to pretend that you are spotlessly clean *You are dirty!*

Your adjustment problem begins with your willingness to admit that you are *born* dirty, *deserve* to be dirty, and *will be* dirty for the rest of your life Thus the real danger in stereotyping, as we hoped to show you, is that too many individuals believe that their race, or class, or role membership justifies how they are labeled and perceived If you are one of those individuals, you are not merely feeding the mills of existing stereotyping but are likely to experience severe adjustment problems throughout your lifetime

Finally, there is the indisputable fact that most people not only stereotype but also garnish and embroider their perceptions in line with their own personality traits and beliefs We dwelt at length on the fact that the characteristics of the perceiver and/or the perceived person can lead to distorted perception, such as, for example, halo effects ("he is honest, therefore intelligent," or "she is dirty, therefore stupid") Thus, even the successful over-

coming of common stereotyping is no guarantee for stemming the potential flow of adjustment problems that distorted perceptions carry with them

Nevertheless, remedies are available. Knowing that your self-concept and self-esteem can change with the perception of others of you (p. 36) should encourage your quest for social adjustment. At the very least, it may allow you to influence others your way. How to do this will be discussed at length in subsequent chapters, but even the present chapter can offer some helpful suggestions. We have provided you with some clues for better self-management (p. 40). Granted, the practice of self-management consists to a large degree of what sociologist Ervin Goffman describes as "acting in front of others" to maintain behavior appropriate to the situation at hand. Do you consider this bad? After all, to borrow a phrase from Shakespeare, "All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players."

Even if "acting" turns you off, remember that self-management is only one of the available options in your quest for personal and social adjustment. You may, for example, wish to adopt the policy of self-disclosure (p. 38). Honesty about yourself is good policy. Moreover, one of the nicest things about self-disclosure is that it begets self-disclosure from others. The more you tell about yourself, the more others will tell about themselves. Participants in encounter groups and growth centers will readily attest to that and to how it helped them get themselves together and become more sensitive to the needs of others. But then again, we also pointed out the dangers of excessive self-disclosure (p. 39). Some people are just better off if they refuse to go all the way in providing information about themselves. Like so many other things that affect our lives, self-disclosure is most beneficial if practiced in moderation.

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2

ON WHAT MEN THINK WOMEN THINK—AND VICE VERSA

SEX-TYPING

The Battle of the Sexes

What Men Think Women Think—and Vice Versa

MALE CHAUVINISM

Monkeymen and Women

The Body Watchers

"Breast Men," "Butt Men," and "Leg Men"

WOMEN'S LIBERATION

Women's Lib Begins in the Crib

Is Anatomy Destiny?

ADJUSTMENT PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

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SEXIST GAMES

Will Anne Succeed in Medical School?

Who Was That Doctor?

Who Does the Housework?

IN CONCLUSION: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

EX-TYPING

The Battle of the Sexes

Nicolas Chauvin was a French soldier and a follower of Napoleon. After the fall of Napoleon, Chauvin became known for his grotesque gestures of attachment to his deposed leader, including extreme discrimination against any foreigners, in the belief that the French were superior. Little did Chauvin know that a few hundred years later his name would be included in a phrase people use to refer to men they believe to be obnoxious. As Chauvin believed the French were all-powerful, some people believe the male sex is superior. The term *male chauvinist* has come to refer to a man who holds the belief that women are creatures inferior to men.

From Nicolas Chauvin, let us turn to Bobby Riggs. On September 20, 1973, Bobby Riggs faced Billie Jean King in a tennis match which was billed as "the battle of the sexes." The 55-year-old Riggs had received considerable attention in the press for being a hustler and self-proclaimed male chauvinist. He claimed women were not fit to compete against men. King had also been in the public light. She had been cited both for her excellence on the tennis court and for her leadership in the establishment of equal rights and rewards for female tennis players. As the date of the event approached, the match took on a more symbolic meaning. The Riggs image became synonymous with the attitude that women should know their place and should not be allowed to compete in a man's world, while King's image became that of Women's Liberation.

Social psychologists like to take advantage of real-life events, and this tennis match seemed like a good chance to collect such data. The study that was subsequently designed operated under the reasonable premise that preference for Riggs might be a good index of male chauvinism and preference for King might reflect feminist beliefs. It was a real opportunity to study what men thought women thought (and vice versa) about a well-known, controversial issue.

A reciprocal role-play method for the study of intergroup perceptions was chosen as the method of investigation, requiring some students to play the role of an average classmate of the opposite sex. Since subjects were responding as average males or females, the measured perceptions could be considered an index of intersex stereotypes. The reciprocal role-play method thus allowed for the assessment both of the nature and the accuracy of intergroup stereotypes.

On the day of the match, 18 male and 18 female college students were asked (1) to predict the outcome of the match, and (2) whom they preferred to win. They were also asked how strongly they felt about their beliefs and preferences. Half of the male and half of the female respondents answered the questions as themselves, the others played the role of a member of the

opposite sex when responding. After the match subjects chose a reason for King's victory.

The results of this study indicated that men and women differed in their attitudes and beliefs about the King-Riggs tennis match. Both men and women answering wanted King to win. Women, however, had stronger preferences for King. Compared to the average man, the average woman was viewed by both sexes as being more supportive of Billie Jean King. This was apparent from attitudes about the preferred victor in the match, predictions about the outcome of the match, and postmatch attributions about the cause of King's victory.

Another aspect of the study dealt with *sex-typing*. If you have ever heard people's behavior described as "typically male" or "typically female," then you know what sex-typing means. It is the tendency to assess behavior on the basis of expectations derived solely from the fact that people are male or female. Men are commonly sex-typed as being more traditional and less flexible than women on the issue of sex roles. If this is true they can be expected to engage more frequently in sex-typing than women. This somewhat circular reasoning was not supported by the results of the study. Contrary to expectations, the women perceived the greatest dissimilarity between the men and the women in terms of whom they preferred to win the match.

The study also suggested that men can play the role of women with greater success than women can play the role of men (see Figure 2-1). Such a finding may point to an accomplishment of the women's movement, at least among college men. By letting people know where they stand, women have educated men about their beliefs and attitudes.

What about the question the Riggs-King match brought to public attention in the first place: Does Billie Jean King have the ability to compete against a man? Although the data from the study did not permit this question to be answered directly, some speculations about the opinions of college men and women can be made. Most college students would say yes to the question. Agreement by women, however, would be more frequent than by men. Furthermore, the men appeared to be more aware of the women's position in the matter than the women were of the men's position.¹

What Men Think Women Think—and Vice Versa

In what ways do you think women are affected by what men think? If you are a college woman, do you think you are making important decisions in your life completely on your own? Or do your decisions rely upon what important men in your life think you should do? Peggy Hawley, a counseling psychologist, has provided evidence that what women think men think may make a difference in what women choose to do with their lives.






Figure 2-1 Intersex perception and the Riggs-King tennis match. On the day of the match, male and female college students were asked to indicate whom they preferred to win. In addition, some were asked to estimate the preferences of average members of the opposite sex. (Negative scores on the vertical axis represent strength of preference for Riggs. Positive scores represent strength of support for King.) As can be seen from the graph, female respondents perceived more dissimilarity in the preferences of males and females than did male respondents. In terms of stereotype accuracy, men can evidently play the role of women with greater success than women can play the role of men (as evidenced in the graph by the proximity of the points above "average woman," and the distance between points above "average man"). From Kaplan, 1975.

Hawley developed a 35-item questionnaire dealing with attitudes toward women's role in society (see Table 2-1). From these questions five key areas were determined:

- 1 Woman as Partner. Division of responsibility, power, and labor between the sexes in work and the conjugal relationship.
- 2 Woman as Ingenue. Woman in her most dependent state, as a possession, a decorative item, and a sex symbol.
- 3 Woman as Homemaker. Emphasis on the traditional role as keeper of the home.

- 4 Woman as Competitor Woman's right to compete with implications for the man-woman relationship
- 5 Woman as Knower Appropriate ways of knowing, for instance, the assumption that women are naturally intuitive and men naturally rational

As a first step, Hawley asked college women to indicate the degree to which they thought significant men in their lives would agree or disagree with the items in the questionnaire. Next Hawley found out what sort of careers the college women were planning and what they were studying in college.

The results of the study showed that women who were studying mathematics or science thought that significant men in their lives saw little difference in what men's and women's roles ought to be. For example, these women felt that significant men in their lives did *not* think women should just hang around the house and do the dishes. Their men did not think women should be traditional and they were not planning traditionally feminine careers.

How about the women whose men believed women should stay in their place? According to the study, these women were not planning to rock the boat. They were more likely to be planning occupations in traditional female occupations such as teaching or housekeeping.²

It is not clear whether traditional men influence their women to become traditional or whether traditional women consider traditional men to be the most influential. Nevertheless, the relationship exists. What women think men think does make a difference.

Since female views of male perceptions concerning femininity were found to be so important, other psychologists (among them one of the authors of this book) decided to investigate the flip side of the coin. Hawley had already studied what women think men think. But did they really know what the men thought? To take it a step further, are men more accurate in their perception of women's beliefs than women are in their perception of men's beliefs?

The initial interest in this issue was purely methodological. It was an attempt to find a proper technique to examine what men thought women thought and what women thought men thought. The investigators also wanted to determine how accurate each sex was in these perceptions.

The first step was to invent a role-playing game. A revised form of Hawley's questionnaire was given to 102 male and female students at the University of California in Riverside. About half the male students and half the female students responded to the questionnaire as they believed the average male student would. The others responded as they believed the average female student would respond. To summarize the experimental design, four groups of college students answered a series of attitudinal items about women's role in

TABLE 2-1 ATTITUDES TOWARD WOMEN'S ROLE IN SOCIETY

Instructions Indicate the degree to which you disagree or agree with the statements using the following scale (circle the appropriate number for each item) Then score ^a

1 = strongly disagree 2 = disagree 3 = neither agree nor disagree 4 = agree
5 = strongly agree

1	1	2	3	4	5	Men and women should share both the responsibilities and privileges of life equally
2	1	2	3	4	5	Women should be the "power behind the man" and not the one "out in front"
3	1	2	3	4	5	Women should let the man believe he is the dominant one even if this is not true
4	1	2	3	4	5	Women should always be honest when they are asked an opinion, even if this opinion is in disagreement with a man
5	1	2	3	4	5	There should be a division of labor between the sexes, as women and men have different abilities
6	1	2	3	4	5	Women should be paid the same salary as would be paid to a man in the same position
7	1	2	3	4	5	Men should make the decisions regarding important financial matters and women should make decisions regarding home and children
8	1	2	3	4	5	Women expect to be slightly illogical
9	1	2	3	4	5	Women should be helpless because this is flattering to men
10	1	2	3	4	5	Women who are easily impressed and somewhat naive are especially feminine
11	1	2	3	4	5	Men like women who use "feminine wiles" to accomplish their aims
12	1	2	3	4	5	Men dislike women who act like "sex pots" in every situation
13	1	2	3	4	5	The one single most important thing a wife can do to insure a good marriage is to subordinate her own needs to those of her husband
14	1	2	3	4	5	It is extremely important to marry a woman who is physically desirable in the eyes of other men
15	1	2	3	4	5	Women should never let outside interests or activities interfere with their domestic duties
16	1	2	3	4	5	The best way for women to express their love for their families is to perform the small services, e.g., lay out clothes, cook favorite dishes, etc
17	1	2	3	4	5	It is possible for women to handle both a home and an outside career and do justice to them both
18	1	2	3	4	5	Women do not belong in business and professional life because they act inappropriately, for example, they burst into tears when things go wrong, they demand equal treatment with men in some cases and insist on their feminine prerogatives in others
19	1	2	3	4	5	Women who engage in activities outside the home are more interesting than those who do not
20	1	2	3	4	5	Women are naturally "people-centered" and men are naturally "idea-centered"
21	1	2	3	4	5	Women's place is in the home

society One group of male students and one group of female students answered the questions as themselves (representatives of their own sex) The other two groups of male and female students responded to the items as they believed members of the opposite sex would respond to them These students were told to try to match their own responses to those of the subjects participating as representatives of their own sex

TABLE 2-1 (Continued)

22	1	2	3	4	5	Modern woman is too competitive
23	1	2	3	4	5	Women should be able to follow any vocation or profession they wish, even if it violates tradition
24	1	2	3	4	5	Women should not compete for top-salaried positions
25	1	2	3	4	5	Men do not want women to be highly successful in areas where their own egos are deeply involved
26	1	2	3	4	5	Women can be competitive in all endeavors without appearing masculine
27	1	2	3	4	5	Women should never be placed in positions of authority over men, even if they are qualified
28	1	2	3	4	5	The relationship between husbands and wives can be good even if both are competing in the same area
29	1	2	3	4	5	The intellectual capacity of men and women is equal but different
30	1	2	3	4	5	It is more important for a truly feminine woman to be beautiful than to be intelligent
31	1	2	3	4	5	Women should limit themselves to friendships with other women
32	1	2	3	4	5	Men think it is just as important to educate their daughters as to educate their sons
33	1	2	3	4	5	It is important for a woman to be articulate and verbally fluent
34	1	2	3	4	5	It would be perfectly appropriate to have a woman president of the United States if she were qualified
35	1	2	3	4	5	There are no genetically-based differences in the way men and women think

*Scoring Directions For items 1, 4, 6, 12, 17, 19, 23, 25, 26, 28, 32, 33, 34, and 35 you must change your answer using the following transformation 1=5, 2=4, 4=2, 1=5 (if your answer was 3 leave it as it is)

There are five subscales You can get your score for each one by adding up your responses to the items which make up the scale The subscales are

- | | |
|-----------------------|-------------|
| 1 Woman as Partner | items 1-7 |
| 2 Woman as Ingenue | items 8-14 |
| 3 Woman as Homemaker | items 15-21 |
| 4 Woman as Competitor | items 22-28 |
| 5 Woman as Knower | items 29-35 |

(The subscales are fully described in the text)

Now compare your scores to the averages obtained from students at the University of California, Riverside

SUBSCALE	AVERAGE SCORES	
	Men	Women
1 Woman as Partner	19 00	14 65
2 Woman as Ingenue	18 62	17 13
3 Woman as Homemaker	20 54	15 86
4 Woman as Competitor	21 16	17 04
5 Woman as Knower	20 66	17 08
Higher scores indicate more traditional attitudes		
Adapted from Hawley, 1972, Kaplan & Goldman, 1973		

As expected, one finding of this study was that men and women both indicated that men held more traditional views than women. However, a more interesting pattern of results also emerged, and these findings are shown in the graph below (Figure 2-2)

What can be concluded from these data? For one thing, the details suggest that women are more aware than men of different attitudes toward




Figure 2-2 What men think women think—and what women think men think. The vertical axis represents traditionality in stereotyping (the perception of the "average" man or "average" woman). The horizontal line represents role-played preference. Notice that both male and female respondents expected the average man to be more traditional. From Kaplan & Goldman, 1975.

the sexes. In other words, women have a better perception of reality. Some people may even see this as supporting the notion of women's innate power of intuition. Considering the nature of the sample in question, it is more likely that the results reflect the increased sensitivity of college women to women's changing role in society.*³

MALE CHAUVINISM

Monkeymen and Women

Men and women are different. They have different appearances, different preferences, and different life-styles. Some of the differences between men

*An amusing postscript to this study reflects some current popular beliefs and stereotypes about psychologists as scientists. The study was first presented at a meeting of the Western Psychological Association in 1973 under the title "Sex Roles: What Men Think Women Think and What Women Think Men Think." Even though the study focused primarily on methodology, its catchy title led to a predictable event. A few days before the meeting, a reporter from the *Los Angeles Times* called and asked for an interview with the authors, who subsequently showed up with graphs, numbers, figures, and other statistical data. After going over the data for a while, the bored reporter wearily asked, "What does all this mean? Does it show that women have penis envy?" Taken aback at this sudden turn of the conversation, the authors pointed out that penis envy was not exactly what they had been trying to investigate. The reporter replied, "Well, Freud didn't need all those statistics to find things out." On that point, there was no argument.

and women are clearly anatomical and physiological. Others are more difficult to attribute to hormones or body structure. Until recently, feminine psychology was often the subject of jokes. Men would simply imply that women were impossible to understand. For example, Harry Harlow, a well-known and respected psychologist, included the following poem in one of his research articles:

*No one really understands
The females' head or heart or glands
Perhaps it's just as well for us
That they remain mysterious*

Of course feminists were angered by Harlow's poem. But then Harlow has never gotten along well with supporters of the feminist movement. The dispute goes back to 1959, when Harlow reported a very interesting set of experiments designed to determine whether infants gain attachment to their mothers because the mothers provide food and oral gratification. (Remember that Freudian psychologists believe that oral stimulation is the most important form of gratification for a young infant.) Harlow set up a laboratory situation in which young rhesus monkeys were raised with artificial mothers. One of the mothers was a structure covered with soft terry cloth, cuddly and warm, called the cloth mother. In addition to the cloth mother, there was a wire mother. The wire mother was simply a wire frame with a head. The two types of mothers are shown in Figure 2-3.

In Harlow's experiment some of the infant monkeys were fed by the cloth mother and others were fed by the wire mother. Feeding was accomplished by placing a milk bottle on the chest of the surrogate mothers. The results of the experiment clearly showed that the monkeys developed an attachment for the cloth mother, regardless of which mother fed them. Moreover, when the infant was placed in a frightening environment, he would cling to the cloth mother for security. All this suggested that contact-comfort is more important than oral gratification in the development of mother-infant relationships.

What would happen if there were no cloth mother? Harlow tested this, too. He found that young monkeys raised with just a wire mother or alone in plain wire cages turned out to be severely disturbed animals. These monkeys became *autistic*. They would sit in their cages and rock back and forth, often banging their heads against the sides of their cages, they rarely showed appropriate sexual responses as adults. Later experiments showed that although infants raised with cloth mothers fared a little better, inadequate experience with other live monkeys during the first six months of life had disastrous effects upon social development.⁴

All this tells us that monkeys who do not grow up under normal circum-




Figure 2-3. Artificial mothers The first picture shows the wire and cloth mothers used in Harlow's experiments. Even though he is fed by the wire mother, the infant monkey prefers to cling to the cloth mother (second picture). In addition, the cloth mother provides security. When she is nearby, the infant may feel safe enough to explore strange objects (third picture). From Harlow & Harlow, 1965.

stances grow up to be maladjusted. But what does it have to do with the dispute between Professor Harlow and the feminists? The answer, basically, is that feminists feel that Harlow is pushing the notion that infants need full-time mothers. That is, mothers must spend time providing contact-comfort for their infants—not working or developing themselves as unique individuals. Many modern women reject the notion that women are created to be mothers. Instead of confining themselves solely to motherhood, they strive also for fulfilling careers.*

The Body Watchers

Zoologist Desmond Morris has provided us with extensive speculation about characteristics of female anatomy in two books, *The Naked Ape* and *Intimate Behavior*. Morris was particularly interested in the evolutionary significance of certain anatomical features—for example, female breasts. It is clear that our culture associates breasts with sexuality. There is also historical evidence that some cultures have recognized the strong sensuality associated with breasts and, for puritanical reasons, tried to discourage what they considered unacceptable thoughts by keeping breasts confined. Early English Puritans used a tight bodice to flatten breasts completely, seventeenth-century Spaniards put lead plates across the chests of young girls to prevent their bosoms from developing. In our culture a person engaged in such medieval practices would be considered weird or crazy. In fact, now pieces of clothing are often used to expose breasts by pushing them up, pushing them together to accentuate the cleavage, or clasping them so that they stick out rather than droop.

Another feature of the anatomy that has been of some concern in our culture is female buttocks. This region is more pronounced in females than males and seems to be a uniquely human feature that does not protrude in any other primate species. Many sexual connotations are associated with the buttocks. Some men are stimulated by a woman whose gait accentuates the sway of her buttocks. The effect of protruding buttocks is also thought to be stimulating.

In addition to breasts and buttocks, legs are also believed to be a symbol of sexiness. Female thighs have greater fat deposits than do male thighs, and at various times in history the thickness of thighs has been considered a

*Actually, the dispute between supporters of the feminist movement and Harlow runs deeper. Harlow's argument is that men and women differ and women will never be able to do many men's jobs. Even Harlow's explanation of his idea for the cloth and wire study sounds somewhat sexist. He claimed that he got the idea for the experiment while on a plane flight from Washington, D.C. to Wisconsin. "Somewhere over Detroit I realized I was sitting next to a cloth surrogate mother—an inanimate female with a wire body covered by terry-cloth."⁵

symbol of sexiness. Morris points out that long legs, characteristic of adolescent maturation, have been associated with sexual appeal, since the young, maturing female is thought to be sexy. This may be a reason, albeit an unconscious one, that many women are disposed toward making their legs look longer by wearing high-heeled shoes, which tilt the foot down and make the leg appear longer.

Morris has lots of theories about why parts of the female body have evolved as they have. One of these concerns the evolutionary significance of female breasts. Our male ancestors (typically monkeys and apes) approached their mates from the rear during sexual intercourse. The female's buttocks were the real sexual stimulus. When hunting societies developed, Morris argues, it became more important to form stable pair (male-female) relationships. This was accomplished by making sex more personal. The personalness came with face-to-face exposure. Females with a chest which reminded the male of buttocks were selected because they were more sexy in a face-to-face confrontation.⁶

Most psychologists would not put much faith in what Morris had to say. Psychology is an empirical science and usually likes to base its generalizations on more solid evidence. And how can we study a theory that sounds as far out as what Morris has proposed? The answer is that we cannot. We can, however, study how males are attracted to parts of the female anatomy.

"Breast Men," "Butt Men," and "Leg Men"

We seem to have many cultural beliefs about the personality characteristics of men who prefer different parts of the female anatomy. For some reason it is assumed that men who prefer large breasts are more dependent than men who prefer small breasts. Surprisingly, a study designed to investigate this common notion showed just the opposite to be true.⁷

A few years ago psychologists Jerry and Nancy Wiggins and J. C. Conger decided to do a systematic study of male preferences for female anatomy. They presented 95 male college students with pairs of nude female silhouettes such as those shown in Figure 2-4. The silhouettes were systematically varied to include five sizes of breasts, buttocks, and legs.

The male students who participated in the study came to the laboratory twice. The first time they rated the attractiveness of each of the silhouettes. During their second visit (which they believed was for a different experiment) the men filled out a variety of personality tests. In addition, they answered a detailed questionnaire about their personal habits and backgrounds. Finally, they rated the concepts of buttocks, legs, and breasts on semantic differential scales (semantic differential scales are designed to measure meaning along the dimensions of potency, activity, and evaluation). The results of the study were described in the following passage.




Figure 2-4. What's your preference? An example of a stimulus pair (in this case, breast size difference) used in the study of heterosexual somatic preference. Similar comparisons of legs and buttocks were found to be associated with certain behaviors and personality characteristics. From Wiggins, Wiggins & Conger, 1968.

When the subjects' preference ratings for the various sizes of breasts, buttocks, and legs were related to the background and personality characteristics, a number of interesting and significant correlations emerged.

Large breasts Men who preferred the figure with the largest breasts included in the study were found to be readers of *Playboy* magazine.

They tended to date frequently, to have masculine interests, and to read sports magazines (It was found that) large-breast preference was related to needs of independence, heterosexual contact, exhibitionism, and a tendency to be non-nurturant. Large-breast, related to endurance. Those who preferred large figures saw all female body parts as "strong" and "good."

Small breasts Those who preferred the smaller breasts tended to rate breasts as "weak" and legs as "passive." Preference for small breasts was negatively related to the consumption of alcoholic beverages. Those who preferred the small breasts tended to hold fundamentalist religious beliefs and to be mildly depressed. In social relations, those who preferred small breasts tended to be nurturant and lacking in achievement motivation.

Large buttocks Those who preferred the figure with the largest buttocks employed in the study were characterized by a need for order (neatness, organization, orderliness). They tended to rate buttocks as "passive." They tended to be business majors and were not psychologically minded. In social situations, those who preferred the large buttocks were found to be dependent and given to self-abasement (guilty, self-blaming). (The authors called attention to) the similarity to the "orderliness-frugality-obstinacy" syndrome of the anal character described by Freud and later psychoanalytic writers.

Small buttocks Those who preferred the small buttocks tended not to be self-abasing. They were high on the need for endurance and low on the need for exhibition. An unexpected finding was that those who preferred small buttocks reported that they were breast-fed as infants.

Large legs Those who preferred large legs tended not to consume alcoholic beverages. to be non-aggressive and self-abasing. characterized by a slow personal tempo. In general, the personality pattern associated with large-leg preference suggested one of inhibition and restraint in social situations.

Small legs Those who preferred small legs were characterized by needs for nurturance, affiliation, and exhibitionism. Such individuals are helpful to others, feel a need for social participation, and like to be the center of attention in social situations. Those who preferred the small legs were socially dependent and tended to be low in endurance. This preference was associated with smoking, but not drinking, and the reading of sports magazines rather than *Playboy* magazine. Whereas preference for large legs appeared to be associated with social inhibition and restraint, preference for small

legs appeared to be accompanied by a strong need for social participation

To summarize these results, some men in fact are "breast men," some are "butt men," and others are "leg men." Also, personality and background characteristics are related to preferences for parts of the female anatomy.⁸

WOMEN'S LIBERATION

Do you strongly believe that men and women differ in their attitudes, values, interests, and behavior as well as in their anatomy? If so, you are probably right. Your opinion will probably earn you some unflattering comments, such as "male chauvinist" or "Aunt Jemima" (the oppressed-female counterpart of "Uncle Tom") from outraged peers. Despite the outcry, you will not find it difficult to provide empirical evidence that this difference between the sexes does indeed exist.

After the furor dies down, you can point out to your indignant friends that the real issue is not the existence of sex differences. What is really at stake is first, to what extent are such differences inculcated into our value system by the society in which we live? The answer is that we are exposed to this from birth to maturity to death. Second, what are the implications of such practices? The answer is that they lead to discriminatory actions toward individuals of both sexes who do not fit society's value system, but that most of all they lead to wholesale discrimination toward one sex. Women's Lib should begin in the crib, because it is there that discriminatory practices begin.

Women's Lib Begins in the Crib

Do you realize that you were subjected to discriminatory practices as early as six weeks after your birth? There is evidence that even at such an early age girls are talked to more often than boys and boys are handled more often than girls.⁹ By the time you were six years old, the accumulated effects of socialization practices must have left their mark on your self-concept. Like so many other children of that age who were shown pictures of "animals that are like you," you chose a tiger if you were a boy and a lamb if you were a girl.¹⁰ As an adult you agreed that males are stronger, more aggressive, and more daring than women. You probably also agreed to what does not necessarily follow from such comparisons, namely, that males are less inadequate, more mature, and more competent than females.¹¹

All this happened to you provided you were subjected to typical North American socialization practices. If you happened to be born into one of the Latin American cultures stressing *machismo* (a tradition that accords practically no autonomy to women), the process would be shorter and less com-

plicated As a man, you would "own" a woman, who would be an object for your personal use (unless she belonged to another man), and as a woman, you would have no right to do anything about it ¹²

Is Anatomy Destiny?

We have seen that what society values can lead to different destinies for men and women This is not to say that anatomical differences as such must lead to different destinies for men and women During the past decade many enlightened people have rejected this notion, as well as the second-class citizenship for women that it usually entails

Historically speaking, though, psychology has fostered and tolerated chauvinistic beliefs Sigmund Freud, the father of psychoanalysis and insight-therapy, believed that there were psychological consequences of the anatomical distinction between men and women Thus the implication arises that anatomy *is* destiny Of course, one obvious physical distinction between the sexes is that women do not have penises During the stage in development that Freud referred to as the phallic stage (which occurs around age 5), the child discovers his or her sexual organs According to Freudian theory, little girls recognize at this stage in their lives that their sexual apparatus is simple—not fancy like that of their fathers They envy their fathers, but, recognizing they cannot be like them, they identify with their mothers and take on behaviors and attitudes characteristic of females Freud referred to this process as penis envy From these beliefs Freud derived the notion that both men and women regard the female as an inferior being

Karen Horney, a former disciple of Freud, departed from him on the issue of penis envy She believed that neurotic problems in women were not rooted in envy over genitals, but rather in overdependencies on love relationships ¹³ Feminine psychology was born in Horney's writings

Politically, too, it was inevitable that many women would embrace the concept of consciousness-raising and initiate action to put an end to the injustices of discrimination Women's organizations such as the National Organization of Women (NOW) and the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC) point out that while over one-half of the 63 million women in the United States between the ages of 18 and 63 are working, only one-third are married to men who theoretically could support a family The majority of working women are separated, widowed, or divorced (many of them with children), and are underrepresented (three times less than men) in full-time jobs that pay more than \$5000 annually To add insult to injury, women occupying the same jobs as men are usually given different titles and lower pay, and their professional skills are generally underutilized ¹⁴

Common belief holds that the status of women in the labor force is rapidly changing for the better Is this true? Not exactly, according to a recent

survey of women having professions between 1870 and 1970. The results indicated that the number of women in professions reached a high in the 1930s, and then declined for the next two decades. In the last decade the number of women in professions went up again, but not to the 1930 high.¹⁵

Most psychologists were not too surprised by the findings in the survey. The evidence shows that even supposedly enlightened college students of both sexes find it difficult to shed latent prejudices. A recent study asked a sample of college students to rate the status of several highly prestigious professional titles: architect, professor, lawyer, and physician. Some of the students were also given the information that these professions are increasingly open to women. To those students, this small bit of additional information was sufficient to produce a marked decrease in their prestige ratings of these professions!¹⁶

One of the reasons women may have had difficulty gaining acceptance as workers is that men *and* women assume that work done by women is inferior. If enough people make this assumption, women will have greater difficulty in getting jobs. There is convincing evidence that people do indeed devalue female performance.

One of the first studies in this area was done by psychologist Philip Goldberg. The study involved getting college women to rate professionally written articles for such considerations as value, competence, style, and convincingness. The articles were put in booklets, each of which featured one of six technical topics: linguistics, law, art history, dietetics, education, and city planning. Goldberg arranged the books so that, for each article, half of the subjects were told the author was a male (for example, John T. McKay) and others were told the author was a female (Joan T. McKay).

Goldberg was not surprised to find that articles about traditionally masculine endeavors (law and city planning) were judged to be better if the subjects thought they had been written by men. He was, however, surprised to find that articles about traditionally female domains (dietetics and education) were also seen as better if the female subjects were told they had been written by men.¹⁷ Psychologists Sandra and Daryl Bem repeated this study with their students at Stanford University and found that both men and women regard the writings of female authors to be inferior to the writings of male authors—even when the articles are about things society expects women to know more about. As the Bems point out, these studies suggest that college students of the twentieth century subconsciously agree with what Aristotle claimed 2300 years ago—that “we should regard the female character as afflicted with natural defectiveness.”¹⁸

Actually, things are somewhat more complex than the Bems suggest. Earlier, psychologist Gail Pheterson had failed to replicate Goldberg's findings when she presented articles purportedly authored by either males or females

to groups of uneducated middle-aged women. In contrast to Goldberg, she observed that if the author of the article was purportedly female, the women rated it as good or better than if it had been written by a male.¹⁹ Why? Perhaps it was because Pheterson told her subjects that the article had been published. The female subjects may have thought that if a woman can get something published, she must be really outstanding—even better than an average man who can get his work published!

In order to reconcile the differences between the two previously cited studies, Pheterson and some associates conducted another study. They asked 120 students from an eastern women's college to play the role of judges in an art contest. Each subject saw slides of eight paintings and in each case read a biographical sketch about the painter. For each painting, half the subjects were told it had been painted by a male artist and the other half that it had been painted by a female artist. For example, the artist in one case was identified as "Bob (or Barbara) Soulman, born 1941 in Cleveland, Ohio, teaches English in a progressive program of adult education." For each subject, half of the paintings were described as entries in a contest, while the others were described as winners of the contest.

The results clearly showed that if the painting was identified as an entry in a contest it would receive higher ratings if the artist was identified to be male. Just the opposite occurred if the painting was supposed to be a winner of a contest. In this case, the same painting was judged to be better by subjects who thought it had been painted by a female than by subjects who thought it had been painted by a male.²⁰ Does this odd finding make sense? Yes, it may. It seems that females will discriminate against other females when the others are just ordinary people. Once a woman "makes it," however, she will probably gain the respect and admiration of other women. Perhaps they believe that such a woman deserves respect for transcending all the barriers.

Another example of selective discrimination was demonstrated in a study of male and female undergraduate students at the University of South Florida. They were shown videotapes of other undergraduates who were being trained as psychological experimenters. The subjects' task was to give their impressions of the person they saw on the videotape.

Supposedly, the person on the tape was conducting an experiment about people's physiological reactions to stress. There were several versions of the tape. In one version the student-experimenter appeared competent—relaxed, calm, and self-assured. In another version the experimenter seemed incompetent. He or she started the experimental session late, had the wrong list of subjects' names, did not have chairs for the subjects to sit on, and did not know how to operate the equipment. Some of the subjects saw a male experimenter on the videotape, others saw a female.

If an experimenter is competent, does sex make a difference in judgments about the quality of their work? According to this study, it does not. But what happened when the experimenter appeared to be less competent? In this case, women were perceived to be less competent than men who had engaged in identical behavior.²¹

ADJUSTMENT PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

Healthy for Women—Sick for Men

Several years ago a group of clinical psychologists set out to study whether traits that were characteristic of females were judged to be as healthy as those that are characteristic of males. The research group consisted of Inge K. Broverman, Donald M. Broverman, Frank E. Clarkson, Paul S. Rosenkrantz, and Susan R. Vogel. The purpose of the study was to determine whether people in the helping professions maintained a double standard with regard to ideal concepts of mental health. The researchers did this by comparing the professionals' ideal concept of mental health for a mature adult whose sex was unspecified with their ideal concept for either a man or a woman.

The subjects in the study were 79 psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers—all clinically trained and working in clinical settings. All subjects responded to a questionnaire with 122 short descriptions of traits. The trait descriptors were made up of two words that were opposite in nature, one designed to represent the male stereotype and the other designed to portray the female stereotype. Of these descriptors, 38 were either male-valued or female-valued traits considered to be of particular importance. Male-valued items were ones for which the male "pole" (category) was seen as most socially desirable (very aggressive or very logical). Female-valued items were those for which the female pole was seen as most desirable (very gentle, very quiet). The items are shown in Table 2-2.

About a third of the clinicians were given the questionnaire and asked to indicate which side of the trait descriptor fit the "mature, healthy, socially competent adult male." Another third of the clinicians was asked to do the same for the "mature, healthy, socially competent adult female." The final group was asked to do the same for the "mature, healthy, socially competent adult." For this last group, the sex of the target person was unspecified.

The results of the study showed that people playing active roles in the mental health professions have different values with regard to what is healthy for men and what is healthy for women. The healthy man and the healthy adult with sex unspecified were judged to be about the same. Traits considered characteristic of the healthy adult were more often attributed to the healthy male than to the healthy female. In fact, traits that were considered healthy for females were judged as neurotic for males.²² All this is strong evidence that

TABLE 2-2 STEREOTYPIC TRAITS.

Feminine pole	Masculine pole
Male-valued items ^a	
Not at all aggressive	Very aggressive
Not at all independent	Very independent
Very emotional	Not at all emotional
Does not hide emotions at all	Almost always hides emotions
Very subjective	Very objective
Very easily influenced	Not at all easily influenced
Very submissive	Very dominant
Dislikes math and science very much	Likes math and science very much
Very excitable in a minor crisis	Not at all excitable in a minor crisis
Very passive	Very active
Not at all competitive	Very competitive
Very illogical	Very logical
Very home oriented	Very worldly
Not at all skilled in business	Very skilled in business
Very sneaky	Very direct
Does not know the way of the world	Knows the way of the world
Feelings easily hurt	Feelings not easily hurt
Not at all adventurous	Very adventurous
Has difficulty making decisions	Can make decisions easily
Cries very easily	Never cries
Almost never acts as a leader	Almost always acts as a leader
Not at all self-confident	Very self-confident
Very uncomfortable about being aggressive	Not at all uncomfortable about being aggressive
Not at all ambitious	Very ambitious
Unable to separate feelings from ideas	Easily able to separate feelings from ideas
Very dependent	Not at all dependent
Very conceited about appearance	Never conceited about appearance
Female-valued items ^a	
Very talkative	Not at all talkative
Very tactful	Very blunt
Very gentle	Very rough
Very aware of feelings of others	Not at all aware of feelings of others
Very religious	Not at all religious
Very interested in own appearance	Not at all interested in own appearance
Very neat in habits	Very sloppy in habits
Very quiet	Very loud
Very strong need for security	Very little need for security
Enjoys art and literature very much	Does not enjoy art and literature at all
Easily expresses tender feelings	Does not express tender feelings at all

^aClinically trained psychologists, psychiatrists and social workers value some behaviors as healthy for men but not for women. The "male-valued" items are traits for which the masculine pole was judged as descriptive of a mentally healthy man. The "female-valued" items are traits for which the feminine pole was judged as descriptive of a mentally healthy woman.

From Broverman, Broverman, Clarkson, Rosenkrantz, & Vogel, 1970

if a man and a woman in the same state of functioning go to a clinician for help, the woman is systematically judged to be *less* well-adjusted. Mental health, like physical health, is often infused with value-judgment diagnoses.²³

Another serious problem facing women is in the area of professional accomplishment. Since this is undoubtedly a source of personal satisfaction or dissatisfaction, studies relating a woman's competence to her femininity seem to be especially interesting. The results, alas, are far from encouraging. It has been shown that when women are judged as competent, they are viewed as less feminine. When they engage in incompetent behavior, their ratings of femininity go up.²⁴ Thus, when a woman achieves competency in a chosen field, she may do so at the cost of decreasing her appeal to members of the opposite sex. Perhaps this is the reason women are more likely than men to drop out of graduate school²⁵ and are sparsely represented on the faculties of prestigious educational institutions.²⁶ Perhaps the most shocking evidence of all concerns the suicide rate among women professionals. Women psychologists, for example, commit suicide about three times as often as women in the general population. Cited among the reasons for this tragedy is that successful women scare men and, therefore, have troubled personal affairs.²⁷

The Solution Psychological Androgyny

By now it must be apparent to you that while sex may be fun, sex roles and sex-typing can be the root of much unhappiness. Yet, incredible as it may seem, most of the solutions offered to alleviate the situation contain elements that in themselves bring about unhappiness.

The reasoning behind those solutions goes something like this. Little girls should play with dolls, wear pretty dresses, and act quietly around the house. When they grow up they should love children, be susceptible to flattery, and above all, be understanding. After all, that is what being a woman is all about. Boys, on the other hand, should play with footballs and frogs, and engage in rough-and-tumble play. When they grow up they should be competitive, forceful, and make instant decisions. If a little boy enjoys girlish activities he is a sissy most likely to turn into a "fag," while his female counterpart is a tomboy most likely to become a "dyke."

You may find the above paragraph funny or even absurd. It is, nevertheless, the essence of a commonly advocated solution for better adjustment. It suggests that it is healthy for men to act masculine and women to act feminine. Moreover, this view is by no means limited to the man on the street. Until recently, psychologists by and large tended to divide the world into male and female subsections. Sigmund Freud, of course, had already stated this belief that men should be masculine and women should be feminine. In fact, he maintained that if sex roles were not played "correctly," something was

wrong. Many current forms of psychotherapy also emphasize the need for adjusting the person to his or her assigned sex role.

Despite such good advice, men and women continue to experience unhappiness about their respective sex roles. The question thus arises whether we may have been incorrect in our assumptions about the benefits of the male and female roles. An increasing amount of evidence tends to support such doubts. For women, high scores on "femininity" measures were found to be related to poor self-esteem, low acceptance by others, and high anxiety.²⁸ Extensive studies by Eleanor Maccoby of Stanford University have shown that boys and girls who identify strongly with their own sex roles tend to be *less* intelligent and creative than children who identify less rigidly with members of their own sex.²⁹ While there is some evidence that during high school years the more masculine males are the better adjusted boys,³⁰ there is also evidence to show that sex-typed identification among adult males is associated with low self-acceptance, high anxiety, and neuroticism.³¹ In short, grown men who still feel that they must prove themselves on the football field have problems.

If you do not identify solely with members of your own sex, what else is there? Androgyny, for one thing. To be androgynous literally means to be both male and female at the same time. Our interest, of course, is in individuals who are *psychologically* androgynous—those who do not identify exclusively with either the male or the female sex role. In order to make any such statements, we must first find a way to measure psychological androgyny. Considerable progress in this direction has been made by psychologist Sandra Bem of Stanford University.

Bem began her studies by developing a psychological measure for masculinity, femininity, and androgyny. The common assumption has always been that masculinity and femininity were mutually exclusive terms. If you were a feminine person, for example, you could not be masculine. In constructing her measures, Bem disregarded this assumption of inverse relationships between the sex roles. Instead, she asked a group of Stanford undergraduates which traits would be more desirable in American society for men, and which for women. Table 2-3 shows some of the traits so judged.

In summarizing her research Bem concluded that psychologically androgynous people are capable of adapting their behavior to either masculine or feminine situations. In other words, they behave appropriately to a given situation without regard for what is considered correct for a member of their sex to do.³² To demonstrate this, Bem performed two experiments. The first study was about conformity and was similar to many other experiments on that topic (see Chapter 8). Typically, in such studies males are found to be less conforming than females. To be less conforming is also assumed to be indicative of better personal adaptation and adjustment. In Bem's conformity study, the androgyny-

TABLE 2-3 MASCULINITY AND FEMININITY
TRAITS JUDGED AS DESIRABLE OF THE SEXES

Masculine items	Feminine items
Acts as a leader	Affectionate
Aggressive	Cheerful
Ambitious	Childlike
Analytical	Compassionate
Assertive	Does not use harsh language
Athletic	Eager to soothe hurt feelings
Competitive	Feminine
Defends own beliefs	Flatterable
Dominant	Gentle
Forceful	Gullible
Has leadership abilities	Loves children
Independent	Loyal
Individualistic	Sensitive to the needs of others
Makes decisions easily	Shy
Masculine	Soft-spoken
Self-reliant	Sympathetic
Self-sufficient	Tender
Strong personality	Understanding
Willing to take a stand	Warm
Willing to take risks	Yielding

From Bem, 1974

nous men and women behaved just as the masculine subjects did. They showed independence when under pressure to conform. In the second study, Bem gave her subjects the opportunity to engage in feminine behavior—playing with a little kitten. In this situation the androgynous male and female subjects responded more like the feminine subjects and proceeded to play with the kitten. Together, these experiments demonstrate that people who do not identify exclusively with either the male or the female role can adapt themselves more comfortably than others to a variety of situations.³³

SEXIST GAMES

Some men and women freely admit their sexist attitudes and biases. Should you ask them about their adjustment problems, they will strongly deny any link between such problems and sexist biases. Then there are men and women who are truly liberated from sex-typing practices and beliefs. You are likely to find that their adjustment problems, if any, are not related to sexist biases. Finally, there are those who *profess* liberation from sexist bias. The main problem of these people is their inability to recognize in themselves sexist attitudes,

since they are not consciously aware of them. To solve the problem, here are some word games which may be of help.

Will Anne Succeed in Medical School?

This game was developed by Martina Horner of Radcliffe College. She asked college women, most of whom were heading for professional careers, to complete the following story:

*"After first term finals, Anne finds herself at the top of her medical school class."*³⁴

Before we look at Horner's results, go ahead and complete the story yourself. Write anything that comes to your mind about Anne, her feelings, her future, and so forth.

Now for Horner's results. In her study, she examined the stories about Anne for internal conflicts about success and failure. You may wish to compare your results with Horner's findings of women's "fear of success." This fear was evident when the story depicted Anne at the top of her medical school class, but not when the story depicted *John* in an identical situation. The bulk of Horner's evidence has been summarized by psychologists Sandra and Daryl Bem:

The most common "fear-of-success" stories showed strong fears of social rejection as a result of success. The women in this group showed anxiety about becoming unpopular, unmarried, and lonely.

Anne starts proclaiming her surprise and joy. Her fellow classmates are so disgusted with her behavior that they jump on her in a body and beat her. She is maimed for life.

Anne is an acne-faced bookworm. She studies twelve hours a day, and lives at home to save money. "Well, it certainly paid off. All the Friday and Saturday nights without dates, fun—I'll be the best woman doctor alive." And yet a twinge of sadness comes through—she wonders what she really has.

Although Anne is happy with her success, she fears what will happen to her social life. The male med students don't seem to think very highly of a female who has beaten them in their field. She will be a proud and successful but alas a very lonely doctor.

Anne is pretty darn proud of herself, but everyone hates and envies her. Anne doesn't want to be number one in her class. She feels she shouldn't rank so high because of social reasons. She drops to ninth and then marries the boy who graduates number one.

In the second “fear of success” category were stories in which the women seemed concerned about definitions of womanhood. These stories expressed guilt and despair over success and doubts about femininity and normality.

Unfortunately Anne no longer feels so certain that she really wants to be a doctor. She is worried about herself and wonders if perhaps she is not normal. Anne decides not to continue with her medical work but to take courses that have a deeper personal meaning for her. Anne feels guilty. She will finally have a nervous breakdown and quit medical school and marry a successful young doctor.

A third group of stories could not even face up to the conflict between having a career and being a woman. These stories simply denied the possibility that any woman could be so successful.

Anne is a code name for a nonexistent person created by a group of medical students. They take turns writing for Anne. Anne is really happy she's on top, though Tom is higher than she—though that's as it should be. Anne doesn't mind Tom winning. Anne is talking to her counselor. Counselor says she will make a fine nurse. It was luck that Anne came out on top because she didn't want to go to medical school anyway.

By way of contrast, here is a typical story written not about Anne, but about John.

John has worked very hard and his long hours of study have paid off. He is thinking about his girl, Cheri, whom he will marry at the end of med school. He realizes he can give her all the things she desires after he becomes established. He will go on in med school and be successful in the long run.

Nevertheless, there were a few women in the study who welcomed the prospect of success.

Anne is quite a lady—not only is she top academically, but she is liked and admired by her fellow students—quite a trick in a male-dominated field. She is brilliant—but she is also a woman. She will continue to be at or near the top. And always a lady.

Hopefully the day is approaching when as many "Anne" stories as "John" stories will have happy endings ³⁵

With regard to this game, one note is worth adding. It concerns a problem with Horner's definition of success ³⁶. Bessie Stanley wrote in 1904, "He has achieved success who has lived well, laughed often, and loved much." It is not clear that this includes the ability to solve anagrams or to end up first in a medical-school class. In short, we must clearly specify what we mean by success and fear of it.

Who Was That Doctor?

See if you can solve this riddle. The correct answer is in the footnote on page 76.

A boy and his father are in an automobile accident. The father is killed, and the boy is seriously injured. The boy is rushed to the hospital and taken into the operating room. A few minutes later, the surgeon comes out of the operating room and says, "I cannot operate on this boy, he is my son." Justify this set of facts.

Regardless of your own ability to solve this riddle, how many people do you think can solve it? And who do you think these people are? These are some of the questions that Karen Folmar, a student at the University of California in San Diego, tried to answer. She presented the riddle to a wide array of male and female students on campus. Of the total responses obtained, 12.5 percent were correct and 87.5 percent were inaccurate to varying degrees and therefore incorrect. Amazingly, not a single male was able to solve this riddle. All the correct responses were given by females!

Folmar also presented students with two similar riddles, as shown below.

Second Version

A girl and her father are in an automobile accident. The father is killed, and the girl is seriously injured. The girl is rushed to the hospital and taken into the operating room. A few minutes later, the surgeon comes out of the operating room and says, "I cannot operate on this girl, she is my daughter." Justify this set of facts.

Third Version

A girl and her mother are in an automobile accident. The mother is killed, and the girl is seriously injured. The girl is rushed to the hospital and taken into the operating room. A few minutes later, the surgeon comes

out of the operating room and says, "I cannot operate on this girl, she is my daughter." Justify this set of facts

The third version was included to test whether a riddle of this nature is comprehensible. As you can see, it is about a girl and her mother and allows for the surgeon to be a male. With this version, *all* respondents gave the correct answer. The surgeon was expected to be a man, and the correct answers came to the respondents naturally.

Now look at the second version of the riddle. The correct answer to this version is still that the surgeon is a woman, but it shows that the accident involves a girl and her father. Although this version should be equally as difficult to solve as the original one, the inclusion of a female (the girl) evidently provided the respondents with a hint for the correct solution. Upon presentation of this riddle, 30 percent of the respondents came up with the correct answer. Once again, female respondents provided the correct solution more often than did the male respondents.

So far, then, the experiment had shown that the availability of feminine clues increased the likelihood of a correct response to the riddle. There were also other factors related to responding correctly. For example, the occupation of the respondents' mothers was associated with correct responses. About half of the sons or daughters of professional women were able to give a correct response to either one of the first two versions of the riddle, whereas only 15 percent of the offspring of housewives could do so. Children of professional women are evidently more attuned to the fact that a woman can perform the role of a surgeon.

Folmer also analyzed the various types of incorrect responses. She found the marital status of the respondents' parents to be a related factor, suggesting, perhaps, that coming from a broken home may open one's mind to the possibility of female professionalism in a male-oriented society. For example, the incorrect responses of those who had grown up with both natural parents usually involved a complete denial that the riddle had a correct solution. On the other hand, the incorrect responses of those whose parents had been divorced were often justifications for suggesting alternatives to the male surgeon, such as stepfathers, priests, or adopted fathers.³⁷

Who Does the Housework?

Here is another game you can play. Read the following passage describing the relationship between two people of equal status:

Both my wife and I earned college degrees in our respective disciplines. I turned down a superior job offer in Oregon and accepted a slightly less desirable position in New York where my wife would have more

opportunities for part-time work in her specialty. Although I would have preferred to live in a suburb, we purchased a home near my wife's job so that she could have an office at home where she would be when the children returned from school. Because my wife earns a good salary, she can easily afford to pay a housekeeper to do her major household chores. My wife and I share all other tasks around the house equally. For example, she cooks the meals, but I do the laundry for her and help her with many of her other household tasks.

Does the marriage described in this passage imply interpersonal equality? Is everything divided in a manner that each partner makes a fair and equal contribution? There is a rather simple way to find out if the passage portrays a truly equalitarian relationship. Switch the partners' roles around! If they are of equal status to begin with, it should not sound funny when the roles of husband and wife are substituted for one another.

Both my husband and I earned college degrees in our respective disciplines. I turned down a superior job offer in Oregon and accepted a slightly less desirable position in New York where my husband would have more opportunities for part-time work in his specialty. Although I would have preferred to live in a suburb, we purchased a home near my husband's job so that he could have an office at home where he would be when the children returned from school. Because my husband earns a good salary, he can easily afford to pay a housekeeper to do his major household chores. My husband and I share all other tasks around the house equally. For example, he cooks the meals, but I do the laundry for him and help him with many of his other household tasks.

Somehow it sounds different, and yet only the pronouns have been changed to protect the powerful! Certainly no one would ever mistake the marriage just described as equalitarian or even very desirable, and thus it becomes apparent that the ideology about the woman's "natural" place unconsciously permeates the entire fabric of such "pseudo-equalitarian" marriages. It is true the wife gains some measure of equality when she can have a career rather than a job and when her career can influence the final place of residence. But why is it the unquestioned assumption that the husband's career solely determines the initial set of alternatives that are to be considered? Why is it the wife who automatically seeks the part-time position? Why is it *her* housekeeper rather than *their* housekeeper? Why *her* household tasks? And so forth throughout the entire relationship.³⁸

Answer to the riddle on p. 74: The surgeon is the boy's mother.

IN CONCLUSION PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

This chapter was about sex-role behavior and sexism. Certainly sexism has been the cause of many adjustment problems. As we strive to become a less sexist society, we can expect new and different adjustment problems to arise.

Think of your own life. Surely you must recall more than one instance when your behavior was influenced by the process of sex-typing. In other words, you acted manly in situations that supposedly tested your bravery as a male or tenderly in situations that supposedly tested your warmth and understanding as a female. On those occasions you let your behavior be influenced by the expectations of others, or perhaps even by the expectations of society at large. You also may have harbored some resentment at the time. You may have felt that you should have been judged by others on the basis of your qualities as a *person*. Why, then, did you behave the way you did? Most likely because sex-typing is an unfortunate fact of life. It is difficult to eradicate, because apart from anatomical differences between the sexes, there are also many documented differences in attitudes, interests, beliefs, and behavior patterns.

So what? We submit to you that the existence of such differences is not necessarily the crucial issue here. What one should really ask is, first, to what extent are such differences inculcated into our value system by the society in which we live? Second, what are the implications of the existence of such differences?

The answer to both questions is quite clear, as the evidence presented in this chapter shows. Society is the primary force that sets in motion, and then zealously guards, the process of sex-typing. From birth through maturity to death, in fact. The unfortunate individuals of both sexes who do not fit this process are usually subjected to discriminatory treatment. In other words, the feminine male and the masculine female are headed for trouble. The straight-jacket of sex roles that society bestows upon us is so tight and so oppressive that even those who follow the rules have problems. The feminine female and the masculine male have their own share of troubles in living up to expectations.

Whatever your degree of adherence to expected sex roles, you are more likely to encounter discrimination as a female than as a male. Women's Liberation should really begin in the crib, because it is as early as then that discrimination starts (see p. 63).

What have psychologists and other social scientists contributed to our knowledge of this problem? Quite a lot, as you can gather from this chapter. The numerous studies that we have presented may be regarded as more than mere evidence for the existence of sexism in the form of male chauvinism. They are, in fact, an indictment of the entirely male-dominated society in which

we live * We also hope that this knowledge can be of considerable value to you, whether or not you consider yourself a victim of sexism. It is an issue of interest to every fairminded member of society who is sensitive to the needs of others.

The studies keep pouring in. Psychologists have practically been falling over themselves in their crusading zeal to expose the evils of sexism. At the time this is being written, the damning pile of evidence for male-chauvinistic discriminatory practices has increased to gigantic proportions. Most of the studies, however, have ignored the issue of *what to do* about sexism. They simply report the lamentable facts without offering solutions.

Lately, we have been wondering if all this mounting evidence may not constitute a classic cause of overkill. If so, those studies may in a way be a disservice to those who are trying to work out their sex-role adjustment problems. Those unfortunate people are presented—in fact, bombarded—with what they have known and experienced most of their lives. Consider, for example, what happens if you are a female victim of the system. Initially, that there is now solid evidence to show that you are being discriminated against solely because you are female is supportive and reassuring. You say to yourself: Now *they* know what I have known all along. After a while, however, the novelty wears off. You begin to get tired of hearing how oppressed you are. You want solutions. If none are forthcoming, despair, desperation, and depression are sure to follow †

The oppressor, on the other hand, soon becomes immune to the avalanche of damning evidence. All he has to do is weather the shock and guilt he experiences upon first being confronted with that evidence. In the absence of any offered solution and plan of action, even men most sympathetic to feminism will shrug their shoulders and return to the sexist fold and its comfortable payoffs. (Perhaps they never left the fold. Many feminists are justifiably suspicious of liberal and sympathetic males who ease their guilt through words rather than action.)

We may, of course, not have been entirely fair in our criticism. After all, sex-typing is just another form of stereotyping. It appears that psychologists have offered some solutions to *that* problem (see Chapter 1). Perhaps, too, it is

*Still, we would have liked to see more studies on the damaging effect of sexism on *males*. If sexism affects women, it must also affect the men who share their society and who live according to equally rigorous societal dictates.

†We do not mean to imply that presentation of information about sexist practices is not important. It is a necessary first step of great educational value, particularly since many of the oppressors and the oppressed are not even aware of their status (e.g., the sexist games in this chapter). We believe, however, that one can raise consciousness without taking action only up to a certain point before despondency and apathy set in.

not always the task of social scientists to offer solutions along with their research findings. It may very well be the task of legislators, organizers, or political activists.

It is precisely because of such considerations that psychologist Sandra Bem's research (p. 69) is so meaningful. Her findings clearly show that *despite* societal sex-typing and sex-role pressures, psychologically androgynous individuals show the greatest sex-role adaptability. Becoming androgynous may not be easy, however, particularly if you are male. A recent study showed that college students felt a woman performing a masculine task was more deserving of a reward than a man performing the same task. Men, however, were not seen as more deserving of rewards than women for performing feminine tasks.³⁹ Striving for androgyny is not a simple solution, but we feel it is a good one.

Bem's research actually offers a solution of sorts. You can consult Table 2-3 and try to incorporate into your value system *both* types of featured items. If you do this sincerely and consistently, you may very well be on the way of joining, as Bem puts it, "a distinct class of people who can be appropriately termed androgynous, and whose sex-role adaptation enables them to engage in situationally effective behavior without regard for its stereotype as masculine or feminine."⁴⁰ In a nutshell—personal and social adjustment.

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- 40 See note 39

INTERACTION

3

ON POPULARITY, LIKING, AND LOVE

POPULARITY AND LIKING

Popularity Moving in (the Right) Circles
Exchange The Interpersonal Marketplace
Exposure Familiarity Makes the Heart Grow Fonder
Propinquity The Folks Next Door
Similarity Birds of a Feather Flock Together
Self-Perception If The Adrenalin Flows, It Must Be Love
Climate Cool Temperatures and Hot Passions

DATING AND MATING

The Winners Beautiful and Adored
The Losers Homely and Ignored
The Trophy Lots of Love but Little Data
The Game Plan The Girl Next Door Who Plays Hard-to-Get

MARRIAGE PROBLEMS

Traditional The Law of Infidelity
Unusual The Marry-Go-Round
Divorce The End of the Road

IN CONCLUSION: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

From time to time there are outcries of public indignation about government inefficiency and wastefulness. Such protestations are part and parcel of the democratic process and more often than not are based on solid facts. That in such cases politicians are eager to pounce on every possibility to garner newspaper headlines is also part of the democratic process. The unfortunate aspect of such headline-hunting, however, is that sometimes worthwhile projects and individuals are victimized.

The National Science Foundation (NSF) is one of the most vulnerable targets for criticism. Many funded research projects are no more than a collection of segmented efforts to reach an understanding of a larger, overall problem. Project titles are often couched in professional jargon that facilitates communication among researchers, but may alienate outsiders. Also, the very nature of a good portion of ongoing research precludes its immediate applicability. It is, therefore, quite easy for a critic to take a project out of context and submit it to public derision. Not too surprisingly, many politicians find it useful to boost their own popularity by "viewing with alarm" the financial excesses of the scientific community (while undoubtedly pointing with pride at their own frugality).

Recently, Senator William Proxmire made headlines by scolding the NSF for funding costly research projects on "why people like one another," or "why people fall in love." The gist of Proxmire's criticism was that studying something that everyone knows intuitively is a waste of resources. Moreover, Proxmire argued, it is best to leave the present mystery of liking and loving undisturbed. The romantic reasoning of this argument may appeal to many, but it is still only a subjective value judgment by Senator Proxmire. The very nature of science, after all, is to shed mysteries and mystiques.

What about Proxmire's argument that *everyone* knows intuitively what there is to know about loving and liking? Take the following example. Your friend has just graduated with honors and received his Ph.D. in psychology. You ask him about one of his career highlights so far: his doctoral dissertation. What was it all about? What did you discover? Somewhat reluctantly (he may have become pompous in the process of getting his education) he mumbles something about "effects of propinquity on interpersonal attraction." You press him further, and he cites observations, statistical inferences, critical ratios, analyses of variance, and (the ultimate!) computer cards. But suppose you are one of those pesky individuals who never give up. You force him to tell you, in a nutshell and in layman's terms, what his research was all about. After some hedging he tells you that he found out that the more people are separated from each other, the more their liking for each other increases.

Now you are really stunned. Not only by the innocuousness of this ordinary problem, but by the fact that your friend had been spending a seemingly endless time in graduate school poring over books, journals, abstracts, com-

puter printouts, to come up with—this! Moreover, you and probably a million others already *know* that absence makes the heart grow fonder

Before you condemn your poor friend, the fallen idol, consider for a moment that while you and others *said* that you know that absence makes the heart grow fonder, your friend went out and *did* something about it—just in case you're from Missouri and want to be shown. Your knowledge is no more than a speculation that has to be proven, unless you agree that knowledge of what is going on in this world should be based on the speculations of our predecessors during the Middle Ages. Those venerable individuals, you might recall, spent considerable time trying to establish how many angels were able to dance on the head of a pin.

There is, however, an even more compelling reason why your friend deserves credit for his findings. Suppose he would have come up with the opposite results. Would he have impressed you then? Probably not. You and a million others *also* know that out of sight is out of mind. In fact, all of us know that

You are never too old to learn *and* You can't teach an old dog new tricks
Clothes make the man *and* You can't judge a book by its cover
Look before you leap *and* He who hesitates is lost

Well, which is it—one, the other, or both? Even a cursory observation of daily activities will show us that *all* these assertions are justified. But the psychologist who studies these topics by the scientific method can at least come up with a good estimate of which type of behavior, under what conditions, is more likely to occur than the other. In other words, psychologists predict the probability of the occurrence of a given behavior (this, incidentally, is where statistics enter the picture, as you will find out as you progress in your study of psychology).

In any event, Senator Proxmire found out that "nobody is as good as psychologists at fighting dirty" when the recipient of one such NSF grant made pointed references to the Senator's own rocky marriage.¹ But politicians like Senator Proxmire have only to look at their own political back yards to find out the value of research on what it is that attracts different breeds of people to one another. As we reflect on recent political history, we find many political associations to be most perplexing. Because of the controversy surrounding former President Nixon, the working relationship of members of a White House staff was exposed to public scrutiny for the first time. The public was surprised to learn about the characteristics and backgrounds of some of the men close to the President. Of particular interest was a group of young men who appeared to be strange bedfellows for a president of the United States. These men seemed to have a few things in common. First, they each

had a passion to be in the center of the political arena. Second, before their involvement with Nixon none had been close to top-level politics. Many people wondered why Nixon had picked these less-experienced (and sometimes marginal) men to occupy top-level positions.

As the profile of the President was gradually revealed, a possible reason began to surface. The President, it seemed, was an insecure man who demanded loyalty of his followers. Well-known political figures had minds of their own and could not be trusted to be true-blue to the President. These younger men owed their political debut solely to Nixon, and if he dismissed them their dreams of public glory would be ruined. Thus, the curious attraction between the President and his men turned out not to be confusing at all. Each was able to give something that the other wanted. The President wanted loyalty, the men wanted to be in the public light. The resultant relationship was based on a fair exchange. As will be seen later in this chapter, psychologists have not only developed an extensive theory about the nature of such exchanges, but have ample research evidence to back up the theory.

POPULARITY AND LIKING

Popularity: Moving in (the Right) Circles

Popular people are generally liked (although sometimes merely admired or respected). Popularity, however, differs from friendship. To be *liked*, one must be liked *by someone*, to be *popular*, one must be regarded collectively as attractive *by the members of a group*. Friendship always involves interaction between people. Popularity may or may not involve such interaction.

What makes some people more popular than others? It would be futile to attempt to find out what causes popularity. At best, we can talk about popularity correlates. For example, it has been clearly demonstrated that popularity is inversely related to accident-proneness. First aid records of school nurses show that highly unpopular children sustain the most injuries, just as steelmill workers with low status among their peers display the greatest number of industrial accidents.² It is, however, not quite clear whether these unpopular individuals have such high rates of accidents because they are rejected by others, or whether they are rejected because they tend to sustain so many accidents.

Because of the circularity of the problem, we can only present you with a brief list of what it takes to be popular (but not necessarily how to go about it). In general, your chances of being popular increase as

- You stay with people similar to you in socioeconomic status
- Your family relationship is marked by harmony
- You have physical skills
- You are relatively free from accidents

You display scholastic achievement *
You have a moderate (as opposed to high or low) self-concept
You have a common name
You are physically attractive ³

Exchange: The Interpersonal Marketplace

George Homans and Peter Blau, two well-known sociologists, have developed a theoretical framework for human interactions. Relationships between and among people are assumed to be based on fair exchanges. If I like to talk and you like to listen, we will get along fine—we have a fair exchange. But if I like to talk and you do not like to listen, we no longer have an even exchange. Your life is essentially a series of such exchanges. You put up with school and teachers in exchange for a degree, you refrain from yelling at your boss in exchange for the chance to keep your job, and so forth ⁴

As Harvard psychologist Zick Rubin points out, you should not be surprised if you encounter a beautiful young woman draping her arms around a short, balding, but successful businessman. Each has something the other desires. She has beauty, and he has the capacity to take her to glamorous places and buy her nice things. Both parties are aware of their offerings and have negotiated a fair trade ⁵

When you buy something in the marketplace you usually know the limits of your spending capacity. The more money you have, the more lavish you can be. Your dollars provide you with a precise estimate of your buying power. In the interpersonal marketplace you must appraise your own buying power. There are no loans, and if you try to buy something beyond your assets, you may be flatly turned down. Psychologists use the term *self-esteem* to describe your appraisal of your own market value. Through a series of exchanges with other people, you eventually come to recognize your worth.

For women, physical attractiveness may be a quality that greatly enhances marketability. An important quality for men may be occupational status. Such sexist finances may be deplorable, but this is what occurs even in supposedly enlightened interpersonal marketplaces such as universities and colleges. In a recent study female university students were rated as to their physical attractiveness. These women were asked in turn to rate how acceptable men in various occupations would be as dates. Most of the women felt that men in high-status fields would be acceptable. These high-status occupations included doctors, lawyers, and chemists. Almost all of the college women thought that men in the low-status occupations of janitor or bartender

*Brilliance alone may not be sufficient to earn popularity, but, more clearly, intellectual dullness is no asset among young Americans whose social groups are often closely related to scholastic settings. On the other hand, it is more likely for a highly intelligent student to be unpopular than for a student of low intelligence to be popular.

would be unacceptable as dates. Attractive and unattractive women differed in their ratings of acceptability for medium-status occupations. The attractive women felt that electricians, bookkeepers, and plumbers would not be acceptable dates. The unattractive women felt that men in these occupations would be moderately acceptable. Thus the women in this study had assessed their own market value in terms of physical beauty and had judged the acceptability of middle-status men according to their own "buying power."⁶

As long as we are using the marketplace analogy, we may as well deal with such phenomena as rewardingness and loss-gain. In the interpersonal marketplace you are trying to sell something. In order to get the most in exchange, you must be able to enhance your *rewardingness*. The day-to-day trading activity does not necessarily involve such traditional offerings as appearance or wealth. A simple exchange of friendship can be quite rewarding, such as verbal comments like, "You look nice," "You are doing a good job," "I like you," or even a mere smile of approval (actually, these seemingly innocuous gestures can become potent weapons when applied systematically, see pp. 280-283).

Sometimes we like people just because they are involved with a situation which is rewarding for us. For example, psychologists Albert and Bernice Lott had children play games in small groups. Some of the children were given model cars in exchange for their participation. It was observed that these children liked the other group members more than children who did not receive rewards.⁷ Other studies have shown that uncomfortably hot rooms can cause negative emotional responses that generalize to cause less attraction to those in the room.⁸ These cases show the effect of rewards which do not come directly from a rewarding source.

The most powerful rewards, however, are based upon what people say. Equipped with a little background in behavioral psychology (see Chapter 9), you might be ready to flatter everyone in sight. Dale Carnegie, author of *How to Win Friends and Influence People*, recommends just such an approach. The Carnegie style is to use flattery and praise continuously. The advice is: Be ingratiating—flattery will get you anywhere!⁹

Traditional folk wisdom, however, also teaches us that flattery will get you nowhere. In fact, many people shy away from flattery. One reason for this is that such praise may cause the receiver's head to swell. In response to a highly laudatory introduction, Adlai Stevenson once wryly remarked that "flattery is all right, as long as you don't inhale it." The Dale Carnegie approach of flattery could also be faulted because you might suspect that someone who praises you lavishly is out to manipulate you. The nice comments directed at you may be merely devices to get your money, your time, or your body.

The sad fact is that flattery *will* get you nearly everywhere. Psychologist

Edward Jones has performed several experiments on *ingratiation* behavior. His findings generally support the notion that flattery will get you somewhere. After reviewing several of his own experiments, Jones found himself admiring the candor of Lord Chesterfield who said

Vanity is, perhaps, the most universal principle of human actions. If my insatiable thirst for popularity, applause, and admiration made me do some silly things on the one hand, it made me, on the other hand do all the right things I did. With the men I was a Proteus, and assumed every shape to please them all. Among the gay I was the gayest. Among the grave, the gravest, and I never omitted the least attention to good breeding, to their least offices of friendship, that could either please or attach them to me. ¹⁰

Keeping the market analogy in mind, let us now turn to the *gain-loss phenomenon*. Many a nervous investor in stocks has found out that there is nothing stationary about his investments. His fortunes wax and wane, ranging from dizzying gains to abysmal losses. The interpersonal marketplace is no exception. The varying impact of interpersonal rewards was clearly demonstrated in an experiment by psychologists Elliot Aronson and Darwyn Linder.¹¹ In discussing the study Aronson described it as analogous to what happens at the scene of a cocktail party.¹² According to the familiar script, you attend a party and talk to someone. After talking to you, this person wanders off and talks to someone else about you. On many occasions, you may actually hear yourself discussed as you listen to the snatches of conversation around you.

Place yourself now in each of the following conditions: (1) You overhear a person praising you at seven different cocktail parties (gain), (2) The same person praises you at the early parties, but at later parties he becomes more negative (gain-loss), (3) He speaks negatively about you at early parties, but gradually becomes more positive (loss-gain), and (4) He continues to be negative about you throughout the parties (loss). Under which of these four conditions are you going to be most attracted to that cocktail party gossiper?

In the Aronson and Linder experiment, the cocktail-party circuit was simulated by giving each of the subjects (college women) a chance to eavesdrop on a conversation between another subject (an experimental confederate) and the experimenter over a period of seven meetings. The confederate, asked by the experimenter to give her reactions about the subject for a purported study on how people form impressions, described the subject differently in each of four series of meetings. In the positive-positive conditions, the subject heard herself described favorably (e.g., intelligent, likeable) throughout the seven meetings. In the negative-negative condition, the subject heard herself described unfavorably (e.g., dull, ordinary) during the seven



"Jane can sometimes be boring, don't you think so?"



"Overall, I think Jane is a really nice person"



"Jane is nice"



"Jane is so intelligent"



"In my opinion, Jane is not very likeable"



"Jane is boring, period"



"I think Jane is a nice person"



"Jane is absolutely dull"

Figure 3-1. The cocktail party gossip How does Jane feel about her?
(Refer to Table 3-1)

TABLE 3-1 GAIN-LOSS PHENOMENON IN LIKING

Experimental condition	Average liking ^a
Negative-positive	+7.67
Positive-positive	+6.42
Negative-negative	+2.52
Positive-negative	+0.87

^aThe ratings are given by subjects who overhear another person (the evaluator) speaking of them. When the evaluation changes from negative to positive, the evaluator is liked more than when the evaluation is consistently positive. When the evaluation changes from positive to negative, the evaluator is liked least (see also Figure 3-1).

From Aronson & Linder, 1965

meetings. In the negative-positive condition, the subject heard a negative evaluation throughout the first three meetings, but from the fourth meeting on the evaluations became more positive until, in the seventh meeting, they became entirely positive. In the positive-negative conditions the subject heard herself described positively during the first three meetings, but from the fourth meeting on the evaluations became increasingly negative until, in the seventh meeting, they became entirely negative.

At the conclusion of the experiment, each of the subjects was asked to give her gut response about the person they overheard. The average responses (on a scale ranging from -10 to +10) of the subjects in the various conditions are shown in Table 3-1. As can be seen from the data, the most remarkable gains occurred in the negative-positive condition. Apparently, hearing a gossip's few negative comments can, so to speak, "ripen" you, so that his subsequent positive comments increase your liking for him.

Exposure Familiarity Makes the Heart Grow Fonder

A few years ago, one of the authors of this book lived in a house with several other people. One of the roommates used to play the same acid-rock record over and over again. At first the record got on the nerves of everyone in the house. "How can he listen to that junk?" they would indignantly ask one another. Gradually, however, something unexpected happened. The others actually began to like the ear-piercing rock music. As it turned out, those who were around most when it was played were also the ones who became most fond of the record. In fact, when this writer moved out of the house, he found himself going to the local music store to buy the same record.

A few years later he was not surprised to learn that the same thing had happened to some very cultured rats. The rats, who grew up in a laboratory at Texas Technological College, were exposed to fine music for 12 hours daily

while they spent 52 days in laboratory confinement. One group of rats listened to the soothing sounds of Mozart. Their listening diet included *The Magic Flute* as well as Violin Concerto no. 5 and Symphonies no. 40 and 41. A second group of rats heard a different sort of classical music. These animals heard atonal sounds created by Schoenberg, including *Pierrot Lunaire*, *A Survivor From Warsaw*, *Verklärte Nacht*, and *Kol Nidre*. A third group of rats was used as a control and thus was not exposed to any music.

After hearing concert music for 52 consecutive days, the Texas rats were given 15 days of quiet and then tested for their musical preferences. To achieve this end, a preference test appropriate for rats had to be devised. Switches were rigged up in the cages which a rat could easily step on to activate a Mozart or a Schoenberg concert. The rats soon learned to use the switches. Since both switches were available in each cage, the rats could play whichever composer they preferred. The only catch was that these recordings contained different selections from the concerts that the rats had heard previously (although by the same composers).

Which music did the rats play most? It depended on what they were exposed to the most. Those raised on Mozart liked Mozart. Those who had grown up on Schoenberg preferred his compositions.^{*13} What happened to the rats and the writer with the acid-rock roommate was essentially the same thing. Both came to like the music they were exposed to most. According to psychologist Robert Zajonc, these results should not be surprising. Zajonc has been studying the effects of exposure for quite some time. Psychologists have always been aware that people begin to like things more after repeated exposure. It was not until 1968, however, that Zajonc formally presented the notion of "mere exposure." The principle is simply that repeated exposure to a stimulus is a sufficient condition to enhance a person's attitude toward it.¹⁴

One reason people come to like each other may be no different from the principle which makes rats like a certain composer. That is, you may like most those to whom you are most frequently exposed. In Robert Zajonc's study, pictures of men were taken from the Michigan State University Yearbook and shown to University of Michigan students for periods of 2 seconds. Some pictures were shown for more 2-second periods than other pictures. When asked how much they might like the person in the picture, the students tended to display more favorable attitudes toward the men whose pictures were displayed most frequently.

*Should you ever argue with your friends about who is the greatest composer of all time, we suggest (somewhat tongue-in-cheek) that you cite the following facts. The preference for Mozart among Mozart-reared rats was stronger than the preference for Schoenberg among Schoenberg-reared rats. In addition, rats raised without music tended to prefer Mozart. Thus, even rats are aware that Mozart created more likeable sounds.

A more recent study showed that mere exposure also enhanced attraction when the stimuli were people (instead of pictures). Women from the University of Michigan signed up for an experiment purportedly dealing with the psychophysics of taste. While the women were being ushered from room to room to taste various liquids, the experimenters carefully arranged to allow each subject to be exposed to other subjects in the experiment. In fact, the room shuffles were planned so well that each subject encountered one person 10 times, another person 5 times, a third person 2 times and a fourth person once. After the tasting sessions the women were brought to a large room, where they filled out questionnaires. Most of the questions concerned reactions to the tastes (which was of no interest to the experimenters). The experimenters also snuck in some questions about how much the women liked other subjects in the experiment (which was what the experiment was really about). Even though the women had never seen each other before the experiment and were not allowed to talk to each other while it took place, they tended to like most those whom they had been exposed to most. The less frequently they had seen a particular person, the less likely they were to like her.¹⁵

Who will be exposed to us is often dictated by circumstances beyond our control. An example of such a setting is the Training Academy of the Maryland State Police. At the academy men are assigned to rooms and seats in the classrooms according to the alphabetical placement of the first letters in their last names. As a result of this procedure, men with last names starting with the same letter have more exposure to each other than men with last names beginning with different letters. As the theory of mere exposure would have predicted, the alphabet influenced attraction. When asked to name their friends, men at the academy tended to choose people whose last names came from the same part of the alphabet as their own names.¹⁶

Before we leave the area of mere exposure, it is appropriate to relate the true story of a student who attended classes at Oregon State University covered by a big black bag. When the Black Bag came to class and sat on a small table at the back of the classroom, only his bare feet would show. At first other students reacted with hostility to the Bag. As the Bag continued to appear in class, however, the other students' hostility turned to curiosity and eventually to friendship.¹⁷

Proximity: The Folks Next Door

If the theory of mere exposure is correct, we should become most attracted to those we are exposed to most often. This means that your friends are most likely to be the people who live near you. Research has demonstrated

**Moral: If you must wear a black bag and you still want friends, just expose yourself (that is, your black bag) frequently.*




Figure 3-2 Love thy neighbor! The building shown in the drawing is one of the Westgate Buildings studied by Festinger and his colleagues. Distance between dwelling units was the most important determiner of friendship formation in this complex. Also important, however, was the "functional distance" of the living arrangement which caused people to pass each other or come face-to-face with each other. In order for occupants of several apartments to get upstairs, they must pass by apartment 1. The stairs on the other side are near apartment 5, as are the mailboxes for upstairs occupants. Consequently, people living in apartments 1 and 5 had more friends upstairs than those who lived in the other first-floor apartments. From Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950.

that if other things are equal, *propinquity* (proximity) is the most important determiner of friendship-formation¹⁸ More than a quarter-century ago psychologists Leon Festinger, Stanley Schachter and Kurt Back conducted a study which took place in two large university housing projects at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The residents in the complex were typical married graduate students. The students were assigned to housing units when they became available. All of the housing units faced a grassy court except the end units, which faced the street (see Fig. 3-2).

When the psychologists examined who became friends with whom, they found two things to be important. The most important determiner of friendship was how far apart people lived. The second factor was the direction in which the house faced. Those residents whose apartments faced the street had only half as many friends as those whose homes faced the grassy court. These results suggest that you become friends with people you see most often.¹⁹ The seeds of friendship are planted when you are taking out the garbage, sitting on the porch, getting your mail, and so on. The more exposure you get, the more seeds get planted.

Following the original study by Festinger and his associates, Robert Priest and Jack Sawyer, two sociologists, studied the formation of friendship in college dormitories at the University of Chicago. If you are familiar with campus life, you know that college dorm rooms are close together. Over the course of a school year you should, therefore, get plenty of exposure to most of the people on your floor. Nevertheless, Priest and Sawyer still found that

friendships were most likely to spring up between next-door neighbors. In interpreting their findings, Priest and Sawyer suggested that *perceived* distances influenced choice of friends more than inches, feet, or miles of physical distance. Perceived distance is based upon the number of people who live in between. If you live in the country, your next-door neighbor may live a mile down the road. Even so, you perceive the people down the road as your neighbors because there are no others who are closer.

One of the reasons you may become friends with those you perceive to be close neighbors is that contact with them is more acceptable. If you live in a dormitory, you might feel perfectly comfortable borrowing some notebook paper from the person next door. If you walked six doors down the hall to get the paper, you might feel awkward. After all, everyone has notebook paper. Why, then, did you not borrow some from the person who lives next to you? Moreover, you might not feel comfortable just taking the paper and going back to your own room. After asking for the paper you rap for a while and, in the meantime, become friends.²⁰

At this point you are probably convinced that architecture influences friendships. Consequently, you may be ready to design new apartment buildings which have five or six front doors opening onto a common patio. Before you change your major to urban planning, you should stop to examine the other side of the coin. If you have to be exposed to others in order to like them, you may also have to be exposed to them in order to dislike them. If your next-door neighbor plays his stereo full-blast at three in the morning, you will dislike him regardless of the number of times you see him in the hall.

In one recent study choices of friends and enemies were studied among residents of a middle to upper-middle income condominium complex near Irvine, California. As was observed in the studies discussed above, friendships were most common among people who lived close together and among people who had the most face-to-face contact. It is important to remember, however, that studies such as these merely describe statistical relationships between variables. Although neighbors tend to be friends, we do not mean to say that all neighbors will be friends. In the Irvine study, people who were disliked were most often cited as such by their near neighbors. In fact, physical distance was a better predictor of disliking than liking. Frequency of face-to-face contact was unrelated to disliking. The psychologists who conducted this study suggested that liking and disliking may be the consequences of different social processes. Liking seems to result from mere exposure. Disliking, on the other hand, occurs when a specific person engages in behavior which makes the living environment less desirable. The closer you live to someone who spoils the living environment, the more you will be affected by his spoiling behaviors.²¹

Similarity: Birds of a Feather Flock Together

Several years ago a social psychologist named Theodore Newcomb rented a large house adjacent to the Ann Arbor campus of the University of Michigan. For each of two semesters Newcomb offered college men the opportunity to live in the house. No rent was required; instead, the men spent several hours a week providing experimental data for the psychologist. All of the men chosen by Newcomb were transferring to the University of Michigan as juniors or sophomores, and no one knew anyone else before the study. None of the men had chosen a college major, and they were evenly distributed between the Colleges of Arts and Sciences and of Engineering. All of the men were white, eight of them were Protestant, four were Catholic, and five were Jewish.

The data provided by the men in this experiment concerned a variety of personality characteristics, attitudinal similarity, and interpersonal attraction. Newcomb was trying to determine whether interpersonal attraction was systematically related to similarity of attitudes between people. The results of the study showed that attitudinal similarity was the best predictor for eventual friendship. Those men for whom preacquaintance attitudinal similarity was high were more likely to be attracted to each other after living in the house than those for whom attitudes were dissimilar before their acquaintance. After about the second week of living together, friendships had already begun to form on the basis of attitude similarity. These preferences remained stable over the remainder of the 15-week experiment. People who were strongly attracted to one another tended to overestimate the strength of their attitudinal similarity. That is, they indicated that they were more similar than they actually were. Perceived rather than measured similarity seemed most related to friendship choice.²²

The experimental commune created by Newcomb clearly demonstrated that birds of a feather flock together. Perhaps your personal experience has already told you this. The psychologists studying this flocking phenomenon over the last quarter-century also started with the belief about birds of a feather, but many of them wanted to get a more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon. Once they were sure that birds of a feather flock together, they wanted to know why they flock together and under what circumstances they do not.

A question examined in Newcomb's study of the experimental commune concerned the nature of the functional relationship between interpersonal attraction and attitudinal similarity. Do people just assume that their friends are similar to themselves, or do they eventually become attracted to those they assume are similar to themselves? Newcomb's experience suggested that the latter is true. As time passes, people become attracted to those who are attitudinally similar to themselves.

But what if you are similar to people on some attitudinal issues and dis-

similar to them on other issues? Psychologist Donn Byrne and his colleagues have shown that interpersonal attraction is “a linear function of the proportion of similar attitudes”—which means that the greater the proportion of similar attitudes people share, the more they will be attracted to one another ²³

When you are choosing friends you will probably pay more attention to some issues than to others. When you are looking for a new boyfriend or girlfriend, you might pay more attention to prospective dates’ attitudes toward religion, politics, and sex than you would to their attitudes on checkers and television shows. Although the sheer number of similar attitudes influencing friendship choices is staggering, it has been observed that similar attitudes on some issues are more important than similar attitudes on other issues ²⁴. For example, to find out whether some attitudes were more important than others in the process of selecting and appreciating dates, one psychologist set up a computer dating system in which students were deliberately matched or mismatched with regard to sexual or religious attitudes. Some of the couples were paired up because they had similar opinions about sexual permissiveness, other couples were paired because they had dissimilar views of permissiveness. Still other couples were formed on the basis of similar or dissimilar religious values. Finally, some couples were formed at random. Which matches were most successful? As you can see in Table 3-2, the most important issue for men was not the most important issue for women. For men, sexual attitudes seemed to be most important. Men liked their dates most when the dates had similar beliefs on sex and liked them least when they had dissimilar sexual attitudes. For women, the most important factor affecting attraction was similar religious attitude ²⁵.

Several experiments have attempted to determine whether racial or attitudinal similarity is the most important determiner of friendship. In these experiments subjects rate how much they would like hypothetical others who are either of the same race or of a different race. In addition, some of the hypothetical others have attitudes similar to those of the subject and some have attitudes dissimilar to those of the subject. Most (but not all) of these experiments suggest that attitudinal similarity influences attraction more than does skin color ²⁶.

Before we uncritically accept these findings, however, we must look at the differences between these experiments and behavior in the real world. Studies comparing the relative importance of race and attitudinal similarity are a case in point. Most college students know that it is “uncool” to dislike someone just because of skin color. They take this into consideration when they fill out questionnaires, but when it really comes down to interacting with people of another race, their responses may be different. People will say that they would be attracted to someone described on paper but when faced

TABLE 3-2 BIRDS OF A FEATHER FLOCK TOGETHER—UP TO A POINT!^a

Type of attitudinal match	Attraction of male subjects toward date	Attraction of female subjects toward date
Random	9.51	9.78
Similar in sexual attitudes	11.33	10.23
Dissimilar in sexual attitudes	7.47	9.42
Similar in religious attitudes	9.97	11.22
Dissimilar in religious attitudes	8.93	9.07

^aThe scores reflect the degree of attraction dating college students felt for one another. Overall, similarity in attitudes was related to attraction. Males, however, put major emphasis on similarity in sexual attitudes while females put more emphasis on similarity in religious attitudes.

From Touhey, 1972.

with situations requiring them to interact with, live next door to, or marry someone of another race, the subtle forces of discrimination go into operation. For this reason studies in which subjects are only required to rate someone they have never met are often held suspect. Unfortunately, much of our research on interpersonal attraction does not deal with people actually interacting with one another. As this chapter continues, however, we will be looking increasingly at situations in which people are involved with one another.

Self-Perception: If the Adrenalin Flows, It Must Be Love

Can you imagine the following scene? You look up from behind your buttered popcorn only to see your hero on the screen having his nose cut off by a bad guy. The people in Hollywood have really done a good job this time. The blood looks real and you can almost feel the pain yourself. In anguish your heart begins to pound. Suddenly you drop your box of popcorn and reach for your date's hand. Your heart is beating faster now, and then it hits you: You are in love!

Does all this make sense? Can one suddenly find love during a blood and guts exhibition? The answer is yes. In a book offering advice to first-century Roman males, Ovid suggested that taking a woman to a gladiator match was a good way to arouse passion. Ovid was in the business of giving advice, but did not get bogged down in how his principles worked. He simply knew that going to the gladiator matches got things going.²⁷

Nearly 2000 years later social psychologists began to explain why Ovid made sense. Several years ago Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer performed an experiment in which some subjects were injected with a substance which aroused them emotionally. These subjects were then placed in a room with either a happy or an angry experimental confederate. Schachter and

Singer observed that those who were exposed to the happy confederate felt happy and those exposed to the angry confederate felt angry. However, for those subjects who understood that it was the shot which had made them emotional, the presence of confederates had little bearing on how they rated their own moods.

These results are not nearly as confusing as they seem to be. When people do not clearly understand what is making them emotional, they tend to search for reasons to explain their emotional state. As they become less certain about what their bodies are telling them, they begin to seek information from the world outside their bodies to account for their internal state.²⁸ If the external world seems happy they label their own emotions as happy, and vice versa.

Let us now go back to Ovid at the gladiator arena—and you at the show. When you (and your date) begin to experience a change in heartbeat rate, you may not immediately attribute your bodily changes to the gory movie you have seen. In this case, not understanding your internal state, you may begin to look for external clues to explain what is happening to you. Turning to your partner and realizing the racing pace of your heart, you might conclude that it's love that has made your heartbeat change.

Several years ago psychologist Stuart Valins collected a group of college men and had them view some slides of seminude women. A microphone was taped to the heart of each man so that he could hear his own heartbeat while he was watching the slides. In actuality, the men did not hear their real heartbeats. Valins had rigged the system so that he could control the beat rate fed back to the men. When some of the slides came on, Valins made it sound as though the heartbeat rate had increased. When other slides came on, he made it sound as though the heartbeat rate decreased. With still other slides the heartbeat rate was made to stay the same. Based on their own ratings of their liking of the women in the pictures, the men were most attracted to the women they thought had caused their hearts to either speed up or slow down. They were least attracted to women they thought had not “moved” them (by affecting their supposed heartbeat rate). The preference for women associated with heartbeat rate change persisted as long as four weeks after the experiment.²⁹

Climate: Cool Temperatures and Hot Passions

Sometimes we engage in elaborate behaviors in order to stay warm. If it gets too cold we put on more clothes, ignite heaters, build fires, and sometimes try to get close to other people. The last in this list of behaviors is probably of greatest interest to social psychologists.

Folklore tells us that cool temperatures ripen affections. We have all heard what happens on long, cold winter nights, or how young lovers behave

during the crisp, cool days of springtime. The suggestion is that cool temperatures cause hot passions. On the other hand, folklore also tells us that hot temperatures are associated with instant attractions. These stories glorify the hot-blooded Italian lover who uses the Mediterranean sun as an ingredient of his own charm. Romantic vacation spots include Hawaii, the Caribbean, Tahiti, and other tropical locations.

What do we know about the effects of heat upon attraction? Well, not much. Psychologist William Griffitt, however, has provided us with some preliminary data on the topic. Griffitt had subjects dress in cotton shirts or blouses (to reduce the effect of clothes on heat sensations) and then sent them into either a cool (67.5°F) or a hot (90.6°F) room. After a 45-minute exposure to these environments, Griffitt showed the subjects an attitude scale which had been completed by a "stranger." The scale revealed that the stranger had either similar or dissimilar attitudes to the subject. When the subjects rated their attraction for the stranger, it was found that those in the hot environment were less attracted to the stranger than those in the cooler surroundings. This finding was particularly strong for those strangers who were attitudinally dissimilar to the subjects.³⁰ Although research in this area is currently incomplete, it appears that hot environments detract from interpersonal attraction.

DATING AND MATING

The Winners. Beautiful and Adored

Do physically attractive people get all the breaks? They do. As we have pointed out in Chapter 1, the benefits of beauty accrue early. Beginning with nursery school, beautiful children are liked more by adults and classmates, get away with mischievous behavior, and are attributed with a host of positive personality characteristics. They are even perceived as more competent than their less attractive counterparts.

In view of all this, how does physical appearance affect the dating and mating process? Before we examine the evidence, a word of caution is due. There are few areas of human interaction where hypocrisy is practiced as often as in the area of dating and mating. What they really like and what they say they like is far apart whenever people are interrogated about their dating patterns. If you ask your college friends about what they are looking for in a girlfriend or boyfriend they will probably tell you that their first priority is to find someone who is intelligent, friendly, and sincere. Take it with a grain of salt. When confronted with real-life situations, these same people are most likely to base their dating choices on physical rather than on personality characteristics. Perhaps they were just fooling themselves. More likely, college students think that if they judge someone by their looks they will be regarded as superficial people. Even though they are judging books

by their covers, they are embarrassed to admit it³¹ One study on physical attractiveness and dating preference involved a computer dating dance Freshmen at the University of Minnesota purchased tickets to a dance for which a computer would find them a date Actually, there was no computer and the students were paired randomly When the students picked up their tickets, the physical attractiveness of the subjects was rated by a panel of judges In the middle of the evening the band was stopped in order for the social psychologists to pass out questionnaires The questionnaires asked how well the students liked their dates and whether they wanted to see the date again Both men and women who had attractive dates liked them most and wanted more future interaction with them³²

This finding came as a surprise In dating situations you might expect people who are *equally* attractive to pair up In the computer dating study this is not how things worked out, everyone wanted to pair up with the more attractive participants Perhaps the reason that the subjects did not prefer dates with appearances they judged equal to their own was because there was no possibility of rejection In the real world there may be a greater chance of being turned down if you pursue the homecoming queen than if you ask out the girl next door To check out this notion a second computer dance was set up This time the subjects had the chance to meet their dates before the dance and to indicate how much they were attracted to their prospective dates They also knew that their prospective dates would be rating them When the possibility for rejection existed, preferences tended to be greatest for people of equal attractiveness³³ Although we are most attracted to the most beautiful members of the opposite sex, we *can* assess our own attractiveness and pursue someone who is equally as attractive as we are³⁴

The Losers: Homely and Ignored

What happens to those not blessed with physical attractiveness? A study by psychologists Dennis Krebs and Allen Adolfs investigated the relationship between physical attractiveness, personality, and social relations among 60 male and 60 female student-dormitory residents As expected, physical attractiveness in women was associated with frequency of dating For men, appearance was unrelated to dating frequency Evidently, men who date attractive women run the gamut of physical attractiveness

One interesting finding in the study concerned the reactions of residents in the same dormitory (who were of the same sex as the subjects) The most attractive males and females were *rejected* most often by their dormmates Evidently, there are some limits even for beautiful people Perhaps they evoked jealousy in the others, or may have become aloof as a result of being so desirable All this, however, is scarcely a consolation for those who are homely The fact that only *some* attractive people were rejected

(moderately attractive people were in fact most accepted) did not mean that the least attractive persons were accepted with open arms. Contrary to expectation, these homely people were not even rejected. They were simply ignored. Although we cannot say for sure, it is reasonable to assume that the indifference shown by peers can cause these unfortunate people to turn inward and become social isolates.³⁵

The unhappy lot of homely people is aggravated by the fact that they are caught in a bind. Because they are ignored they become isolates whose self-esteem is low. Ironically, this may cause them to try even harder to associate with the beautiful people, since this is one of the ways by which people can raise their self-esteem. Men like to be seen with beautiful women and women like to be seen with handsome men. One possible reason for this is that the attractiveness of a partner may be taken as an indication of one's own worth.

Along these lines, psychologists Harold Sigall and David Landy wondered if beauty "radiates." In other words, can the beauty of one person radiate to persons associated with him or her? In one experiment they had college students form impressions of a young man. When the students saw the man he was always with the same woman, who was described in some cases as his girlfriend and in other cases as someone unassociated with him. Half of the time the woman was made to look very attractive. The rest of the time she was made to appear quite unattractive. The man was evaluated most favorably when he was believed to have an attractive girlfriend. When just seen with (but not associated with) a woman, her attractiveness seemed not to make much difference.

The experiment above tells us what other people will think of us when we are seen with attractive or unattractive partners. Another factor which may contribute to our desire to find attractive partners is that we think more highly of ourselves if we have attractive mates. To demonstrate how this process might work, Sigall and Landy asked college men to help them in an experiment in which they would be introduced to another student as the boyfriend of either an attractive or an unattractive woman. The men met their partners and were then asked to predict what sort of impression another student would have of them. As expected, the men thought they would be evaluated most favorably if they posed as the boyfriend of an attractive woman and least favorably if they posed as the boyfriend of an unattractive woman.³⁶ Clearly, part of the reason for our desire for attractive partners is to enhance our own status and self-esteem.

The Trophy: Lots of Love but Little Data

As the frenzy of the mating and dating games continues unabashedly around us, it seems somewhat naive to ask what it really is all about. The obvious

answer, of course, is love and romance. Throughout history, men and women have written about and sung about love more than any other topic. The index of *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations* shows that love is the second most commonly referred to term ("love" is cited 769 times, "man" is cited 843 times)³⁷ All this preoccupation with love has not, however, led to a better understanding of what it really is. Perhaps it is something we can feel but not necessarily understand well enough to describe in a definite way.

All of us have romantic ideals. Some regard love as feelings of togetherness. The poet Shelley proclaimed, "Soul meets soul on lover's lips." Erich Fromm points out the complexity of this togetherness: "In love the paradox occurs that two things become one yet remain two."

For other people, feelings of love seem to be related to the love they get in return. An old Turkish proverb says, "All women are perfection, especially she who loves you." This need for reciprocation seems to be prevalent across cultures, as suggested by the German adage, "Love unreciprocated is like a question without an answer."

Still other people seem to feel love most intensely when they are faced with the possibility that their lover might be taken away. According to G. K. Chesterton, "The way to love anything is to realize that it might be lost." Finally, some have questioned whether love exists. Ernest Hemingway asked, "Is love possible? Every man knows that for himself. For me it is."³⁸

As scientists we have almost completely neglected the topic of love. Few studies have gone beyond asking what people think love is. Since we have never been quite certain what love is, we have never been able to measure it. In the words of folk singer Joan Baez, "Love is just a four-letter word." Few of us would have trouble measuring the length of a table because we know exactly what the table is. In addition, our measurement of the table length would be fairly constant from one measurement to the next, despite the fact that tables are often spilled upon, pounded on, and pushed around.

Contrast this with love. We do not know exactly what love is, we have no yardstick with which to measure love. And even if we could measure love, different situations might affect the outcome of our measures.

A few years ago Zick Rubin became the first psychologist to make a serious attempt at the measurement of romantic love. The technique he used is called *construct validation*. Construct validation is used to develop measures of poorly understood psychological concepts. When we use construct validation we simultaneously define a concept and develop an instrument to measure it.

In order to prepare his measure, Rubin read extensively about love. To get a feel for the diversity of statements about love that Rubin encountered, consult Table 3-3. The most succinct statement is probably that by Elizabeth Barrett Browning, who once said, "How do I love thee? Let me count the

TABLE 3-3 WHAT IS THIS THING CALLED LOVE? SOME FAMOUS STATEMENTS

Author	Quotation
Elizabeth Barrett Browning	"How do I love thee? Let me count the ways "
Erich Segal	"Love is never having to say you're sorry "
Voltaire	"There are so many sorts of love, that one does not know where to seek a definition of it "
William Shakespeare	"Love is a spirit all compact of fire "
Samuel Daniel	"Love is a sickness full of woes "
Erich Fromm	"Love is the active concern for the life and growth of that which we love "
Harry Stack Sullivan	"When the satisfaction or the security of another person becomes as significant as one's own satisfaction or security, then the state of love exists "
David Orlinsky	"Love is when attachment and caring form a dual feeling of impulse "

Adapted from Rubin, 1973

ways " Indeed, after reading the many diverse views of love, Rubin hardly knew where to begin counting One thing, however, was clear in his mind All the people who had written about love were probably talking about something different from what had been studied in the psychological laboratory

Rubin began his study by condensing conventional wisdom about loving and liking into sets of statements to which people could respond on a scale ranging from disagreement to agreement Some of the items were intended to measure love while others were supposed to tap liking Next, he gave the pool of items to 198 students from the University of Michigan Each of the items had a blank in which a name could be filled in The students responded to the questions twice, one time filling in the name of their boyfriend or girlfriend, and another time filling in the name of a platonic friend ³⁹

The data from these scales were subjected to several statistical procedures which helped to discriminate between responses of girlfriends, boyfriends, and platonic friends, and eventually led to the establishment of two measures (a love scale and a liking scale) The items making up the love scale were composed of three components attachment (e g , If I were lonely, my first thoughts would be to seek _____ out"), caring (e g , "If _____ were feeling bad, my first duty would be to cheer him (her) up"), and intimacy (e g , I feel that I can confide in _____ about virtually everything) The items on the liking scale focused on favorable aspects of the other person along such dimensions as adjustment, maturity, good judgment, and intelligence

Now that measures of liking and loving were available, it was necessary

to determine whether they were really measuring what they were supposed to measure. One study, using dating couples, suggested that loving and liking were not necessarily related. There was a modest relationship between scores on the two scales, which was weaker for women than for men. This suggested, especially for women, that it is possible to love someone whom one may not particularly like.

There were several indications that the love scale really was measuring "love." For example, men and women scored higher on the love scale when they filled in the names of their boyfriends or girlfriends than when they filled in the name of a same-sex friend. There was also a substantial correlation between love scale scores and estimates of the likelihood of marriage. The greater the love score, the more probable marriage was considered to be.

Finally, some of the dating couples were separated into strong love (high love scores) or weak love (low love scores) groups. From behind a one-way mirror the researchers noted how much eye contact the lovers had with one another. Strong lovers, it was observed, spent more time simply gazing into each others' eyes than did weak lovers. When paired with a strong opposite-sex lover from another couple, mutual eye contact was no greater than it was for people who were weak lovers.

This, then, is the yeoman's work of psychologist Zick Rubin, which finally allowed the elusive concepts of love and liking to be measured.⁴⁰ Some examples of items from the Love and Liking Scales are given in Table 3-4.

We do not want to leave you with the impression that psychologists have found the definition of love. Indeed, Rubin's work is only a beginning. Some people feel that the Love Scale measures infatuation rather than love. An adult couple, after years of partnership, may feel very much in love. Their scores on love scale items, however, may not be very high, and it is unlikely that they would spend long periods of time simply staring into each other's eyes. Does this mean that they do not love each other? Of course not. It only means that the Love Scale emphasizes the aspects of love characterized by Hollywood movies and deemphasizes aspects of love experienced by many mature couples in the course of ongoing relationships.

Since the Love and Liking Scales are only in their infancy stages of development, Rubin has been cautious in recommending that people use them. He warns that they are currently research instruments and they should not be used as self-administered "test-your-love" measures. Before we can use the scales as clinical tools, we will need many more studies.

Over the course of time, we hope an empirical bridge will be built between these scales and the vague theoretical notions of love.

The Game Plan: The Girl Next Door Who Plays Hard-to-Get

Dating and mating being a fact of life, is there a game plan best suited for successful mate selection? Regardless of your political orientation, you are

TABLE 3-4 EXAMPLES OF ITEMS FROM RUBIN'S LOVE AND LIKING SCALES^a

Love scale items

I feel that I can confide in _____ about virtually everything
I would forgive _____ for practically anything
I feel very possessive toward _____

Liking scale items

I think _____ is unusually well-adjusted
I would recommend _____ for a responsible job
_____ is one of the most likable people I know

^aIf you were responding to the items, you would fill the blanks with the name of your boyfriend or girlfriend. Then you would read each statement and indicate your agreement or disagreement on the following scale

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Strongly disagree				Neutral		Strongly agree		

Items reproduced by permission of Zick Rubin

probably pleased by one characteristic of American society—you have the freedom to marry someone of your own choice. In India, or in Japan, marriages are still frequently arranged by families.* These cultures, however, put less emphasis on romantic ideals of love and more on companionship.

Most of us would disapprove of someone else choosing a marriage partner for us, especially if your parents do the choosing. Interestingly, however, most of us choose marriage partners who generally meet with the approval of our parents. We often hear about interracial marriages, but such marriages are rare indeed. Whites intermarry with whites (99.8%) and blacks with blacks (99%). Common religion is also a characteristic of contemporary marriages. In 93.6 percent of American marriages, husband and wife belong to the same major religious group. In some of these cases, however, one spouse may have been brought up in another religion and converted to the same religion as her or his partner.⁴¹

Religion and race are just two things that people who choose each other as partners have in common. Sociologist Eloise Snyder examined attitudes of couples who would later become married. Their pre-dating attitudes were available from high school records and the like. Fourteen areas of behavior were investigated: attending dances, attending church, loafing,

*Since each of these cultures is becoming more westernized, prearranged marriages are becoming less common.

dating, divorce, social drinking, smoking, playing cards, staying out late, going to Sunday movies, working on the sabbath, doing badly in school, spending money, and using makeup. As you might have predicted from what you learned earlier, birds of a feather flock together. Those couples who eventually married had considerably more similar attitudes than could have been expected by chance.⁴²

With all the people in the world, where do you find someone so similar to yourself? You might try next door. The folklore image of the girl or boy next door is someone who has the same values as your parents. In fact, he or she probably does. People intentionally buy homes in areas where the neighbors share common values. This insures that their children will make the "right" kind of friends. Add to this the effects of propinquity and mere exposure, and the boy or girl next door are no longer unlikely selections. In one analysis of 5000 marriage license applications 35 years ago, sociologist James Bossard found that a third of the applicants were couples who lived within five blocks of one another.⁴³ Although automobiles have made us more mobile in recent years, it is still most likely we will marry someone who lives nearby.⁴⁴

In America parents do not choose mates for their children. Not directly, anyway. By sending you to certain schools, giving you certain skills, and instilling certain values in you, they may be doing the same thing. How many of you would not submit your prospective bride or groom to your family for approval?

There are, however, cases where parents can exert too much influence. In the famous and touching love story, *Romeo and Juliet*, parental opposition was used to try to squelch the flame of true love. Perhaps the parents used the wrong substance to put out the fire. Psychologists Richard Driscoll, Keith Davis, and Milton Lipetz found evidence that parental opposition can make the flame grow stronger. In their study married and unmarried (dating) couples were studied over a period of up to 10 months on their degree of expressed romantic love and parental interference. Parental interference was defined as the perception that the parents are a bad influence, are hurting the couple's relationship, take advantage of the woman, do not accept the man, try to make the man look bad, and so on. In both married and unmarried couples, parental interference was strongly related to mutual feelings of love. Moreover, the relationship grew progressively stronger over time, akin to the classic *Romeo and Juliet* situation, in which parental opposition only served to strengthen the love relationship.⁴⁵

In his study on dating couples, Zick Rubin also observed the "Romeo and Juliet effect." Couples of different religions showed higher love scores than those who had the same religious affiliations. This was only true, however, for couples who had recently started dating. Among long-term couples,

including most sets who intended to marry, love scores were higher for same-religion pairs

Several alternative explanations can be given for these results. One is that the parental pressures were successful in extinguishing the flame of romance. Another, and perhaps more likely, explanation is that parental pressure actually provided the energy for the love relationship. When parental pressures were overcome, there was no fuel left for the fire.⁴⁶ In any case, parental opposition seems to have a unifying effect. This effect becomes weaker when parents are not around. Had Romeo and Juliet been able to elope and escape the influence of their folks, they might have had at least the chance for a divorce!

In these days of sexual liberation, it is not too surprising that the effectiveness of parental pressure is on the decline. Parents may set the stage for the selection of someone next door, but the rest is assumed to be up to their offspring. Ordinarily, this would mean that it is up to you to devise a proper strategy to attract your mate. The trouble is that such strategies are often based on popular misconceptions. A case in point is the strategy of the woman who plays hard-to-get.

If there is one thing that Ovid, Terence, the *Kama Sutra*, and Dear Abby agree upon, it is that women should be hard-to-get. Easy women are not considered much of a prize. Ovid summed it up as follows:

*Fool if you feel no need to guard your girl for her own sake, see that you guard her for mine, so I may want her the more. Easy things nobody wants, but what is forbidden is tempting. Anyone who can love the wife of an indolent cuckold, I should suppose, would steal buckets of sand from the shore.*⁴⁷

As social psychologists often do, Elaine Walster, William Walster, Jane Piliavin, and Lynn Schmidt decided to look into the phenomenon of playing hard-to-get in order to see if there is any truth behind this maxim.

Before they entered into a series of experiments, Walster and her colleagues asked a group of college men why they preferred women who were hard-to-get. They found that men preferred hard-to-get women because a woman in this category was presumably more valuable, could afford to be choosier because of her good looks, and would give prestige to a man who could get her to go out with him. The woman who was easy-to-get was seen as making too many demands or being too desperate for a man. Some of the men saw the easy women as even more of a threat. They feared she would want to get serious too soon, or even (believe it or not) have a "disease." In short, most of the men seemed to agree that a woman who is hard-to-get should be prized and that a woman who is easy-to-get should be avoided at all costs.

Walster and her associates were still not entirely convinced, so they decided to put the issue to a real-world test. They recruited 71 male summer-school students at the University of Wisconsin and told them they were going to be in a computer dating experiment. The men were told to come to the computer dating center in order to choose a date from five potential candidates.

All of the men had filled out questionnaires giving their own backgrounds. When they came to the computer dating center, they were given five folders which contained questionnaires filled out by five women. Actually, the questionnaires had been filled out by the experimenters and the women were fictitious. In the folders of three of the five women's folders were date selection forms. These women, it was explained, had already had the opportunity to study the men's folders and to select with whom they wanted to go out. The selections for the other two had not yet been made. For those who had filled out the date selection forms, each of five men was rated on a numerical scale which ranged from -10 (or "definitely do not want to date") to +10 (or "definitely want to date"). These forms allowed the experimenters to manipulate the elusiveness of the woman.

By controlling the elusiveness of the woman, Walster and her colleagues were able to give the young men choices between women who differed in difficulty to get. First, there was the woman who was uniformly hard-to-get. Her questionnaire showed that none of her choices turned her on—although she would go out with any of them. All of her choices were given a rating of between +1 and +2. The male subject always found himself rated as a +1.75.

In contrast to this hard-to-get woman, there was a woman who was easy-to-get. This woman wanted to go out with everyone and anyone. In her folder all of the five men were rated high (from +7 to +9), including the subject, who always got +8.

Which of these women do you think was chosen for a date most often? Would it be the hard-to-get woman with all of her charms and mystique, or the easy-to-get woman who would boost egos and probably provide a hassle-free evening? As it turned out, neither of these women were chosen very often.

What we have not told you thus far is that the men had some other choices. Most important of these was the woman who was *selectively* hard-to-get. This woman was hard to get for everyone except one person. And who do you think that one person was? You guessed it—the subject. This alleged woman gave the subject a fantastic +8 rating, and rated everyone else below +3. In turn, these selectively hard-to-get women were chosen almost four times as often as the other women!⁴⁸

The application of these findings is entirely up to you. If you are like some people, you will be glad to know that the proven-effective strategy for a

woman to attract a man is to acquire a reputation of being hard-to-get, and then, by her behavior, to make it clear to the intended man that she is attracted to him. If you are like some other people, all this will leave you indifferent because you feel that there is something demeaning in deliberate tactics and game plans to "catch" a mate.

MARRIAGE PROBLEMS

Traditional The Law of Infidelity

Infidelity is one of the greatest threats to the marital bond. Each time an act of infidelity comes into the open, people begin to speculate about the morality (or immorality) of the people involved. Psychologist Elliot Aronson, however, has a new insight into this perplexing phenomenon. He explains infidelity in terms of simple social rewards and exchanges (see also pp. 89-93).

To illustrate the "law of infidelity," consider the following example. A husband who loves his wife tells her time and again that she looks nice. She knows he loves her and expects these comments. When she hears what she expects, the comments fail to boost her ego. The exchange value of her husband's comments has been discounted. When another man makes the same comments, she is caught by surprise. She does not expect to hear these things. She is flattered. Thus, the same compliments are more potent if they are given by someone other than the husband.

Since the husband's love is expected, negative comments made by him may have a more harmful impact than when the same criticisms are made by someone else. In some relationships a hurt person may work hard to reestablish admiration (offsetting Aronson's Law). Other people want to avoid those who can hurt them. So the loving husband is really in a bind. By saying the same things, he can reward less and hurt more than someone else. Infidelity often follows.⁴⁹

Infidelity, of course, is only one of many symptoms of a troubled marriage. Sociologically speaking, people with less education and income are particularly susceptible to marital unhappiness. People presently raising children report more dissatisfaction than people whose children have already left home or people who have never had children. Marital satisfaction seems to be related to a positive view of one's own health. Those with physical disabilities report more dissatisfaction than physically healthy individuals. Marital happiness is also associated with job satisfaction and is less common among those who drink heavily.⁵⁰ Finally, there is evidence that the marital relationship might be strengthened when both partners are working.⁵¹

Although there is extensive literature on marriage counseling and intervention techniques,⁵² psychologists have devoted little study to the behavior of those involved in marital discord. Most of the available literature includes case studies and attitudinal studies.⁵³ These studies do not include systematic

observations of those involved in the conflict, nor do they show how the conflicts develop. In marital situations verbal reports are often unsatisfactory because the people involved are so close to the situation that their emotions shade their reports.

One recent attempt by psychologists to systematically study marital discord at the behavioral level was conducted in Oregon. Newspaper advertisements explained that the University of Oregon was looking for couples experiencing marital distress, and happily married couples for a marriage research project. Self-report measures and observation interviews were used to confirm that the couples were indeed either distressed or nondistressed. Overall results showed that nondistressed partners tended to engage seven times more often than distressed partners in pleasing behavior (agreement, approval, humor, smiling) as opposed to displeasing behavior (complaints, criticism, putdowns, inattentiveness). Nondistressed couples also engaged more often than distressed couples in mutual recreational activities.⁵⁴ (There is also general evidence that people become critical of each other as they become more intimate).⁵⁵

Unusual: The Marry-Go-Round

The traditional one-man-to-one-woman concept of marriage may not be the most appealing arrangement for all people. In recent years people have been experimenting more and more with alternative forms of marital relationships. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the public seemed to show great interest in these experimental forms of marriage. As this is being written, the public interest appears to have subsided somewhat.

In order to describe alternative forms of marriage, we must alter our definition of the term *marriage*. In these new marital arrangements people rarely become married in the legal sense of the term. Rather, they feel an emotional bond of commitment, which leads to the perception that they are married, and for the purpose of this discussion we will say that they are married. Thus, couples who have lived together for years and say it is just like they are married are, in some sense of the word, married.

A *multilateral marriage* is a marriage between at least three people, in multilateral marriages each partner has a commitment to at least two other people. Social workers Larry and Joan Constantine studied 26 multilateral marriages involving 104 adults who ranged in age from 23 to 60. The multilateral marriages tended not to last as long as traditional marriages (median of 1½ years as opposed to a median of 7 years for traditional marriages).⁵⁶ We must consider, however, that the multilateral marriages are severely condemned by many segments of society. Strong social forces applaud the dissolution of a multilateral marriage and condemn the dissolution of a traditional marriage.

Group marriages are a form of multilateral marriage involving at least two men and two women. The typical group marriage involves four persons, although group size may vary greatly. When questioned about their motivation for entering into such relationships, members of marital groups tend to name the same reasons as people entering traditional two-person marriages, such as love, security, sex, child-rearing, and companionship. There are no simple answers, and there are as many reasons for entering into these nontraditional marriages as there are people in these situations. Group marriages tend to be intense, encounter-grouplike experiences in which participants cannot escape to the seclusion of their own homes.

Opponents of group marriages originally attacked these relationships with the assertion that they existed solely for sexual experimentation and promiscuity. The available evidence does suggest that group marriage often means the exchange of sexual partners. Although sex is a component of the group marriage process, however, it does not seem to be the major reason for joining or for remaining with the group.⁵⁷

Other nontraditional relationships are based solely on sexual exchanges between members. Married people who exchange sexual partners are the so-called swingers. Twenty years ago swinging, or mate-swapping, was indeed rare. When the public would get word of such activity, it was certain to be scandalized. By the 1970s swinging had become a common suburban phenomenon. Popular movies such as *Bob and Carol and Ted and Alice* only demonstrated an already existing practice. If you live in a large metropolitan area, your city probably has several clubs, bars, and newspapers which can be used to locate swingers.

Since swinging is not a usual behavior, you might expect mate-swappers to be unusual people. Early research suggested that this was not so. In fact, similarities between swingers and nonswingers greatly outnumbered the differences.⁵⁸ More recent evidence is beginning to show differences between those who decide to swing and those who do not. Data collected by psychologist Brian Gilmartin shows the typical swinger to be someone who once attended church and then stopped going. In comparison to nonswingers from the same socioeconomic class, swingers reported that they had less happy childhoods and more distant relationships with their parents. In addition, nonswingers appear to have come from homes in which parents were less happy together.

Many swingers are people who broke away from their families early. In contrast to their socioeconomic equals, they tended to feel parental authority too strongly during childhood (even though their parents were reported to be less restrictive). A sign of their independence is that they went steady earlier, had sexual intercourse sooner, and married younger than their comparison group.

Can a marriage among mate-swappers survive? According to research

evidence, swingers typically have sound marriages. On measures of intimacy, affection, and communication between spouses, swingers scored unusually high. Despite their involvement with many other sexual partners, swinging couples had sex with one another more often than did nonswingers. Swingers did not differ from controls on measures of occupational satisfaction, appreciation of motherhood, boredom, or use of alcohol.

These findings suggest that swingers are very much like other happily married people. Along with accepting that their partners have lunch or play tennis with someone else, swingers extend this acceptance to sexual intercourse. On the other hand, most swingers do report disapproval of things going on behind their backs. Indeed, swingers insist that their partners be emotionally faithful. Honesty permits them to engage in adultery yet maintain feelings of fidelity. Thus, swinging might be called "faithful adultery."⁵⁹

People often feel the need to involve themselves in nontraditional marriages or with extramarital partners because traditional marriages are likely to be closed systems. Closed systems create closed marriages that stifle growth and change. Anthropologists Nina and George O'Neill have invited concerned couples to try a new life-style they call *Open Marriage*. Their reasoning

*Couples in our society are not educated for marriage or the requisites of a good human relationship, nor are they of the psychological and myriad other commitments that the typical marriage contract implies. The expectations of closed marriage—the major one being that one partner will be able to fulfill all of the other's needs (emotional, social, sexual, economic, intellectual and otherwise)—present obstacles to the growth of attitudes that foster conflict between partners. Awareness of these expectations and a realignment more in accord with a realistic appraisal of their capabilities are fundamental to instituting change and to solving their problems in the relationship.*⁶⁰

Divorce: The End of the Road

When conflict gets too severe the option of ending the marriage is still available. Today more people than ever before are exercising that option.

Divorce has been available as an option for quite some time. When it was introduced to Protestant populations in Europe, centuries passed with only a few people pursuing legal separateness. Divorce was something sinful, which only the rich and powerful dared to risk. In the early nineteenth century the American divorce rate was maintained at around one (1) percent. Since then, the divorce rate has steadily risen. Today, two out of three California couples currently taking their vows will someday face the divorce court judge (for the nation at large the divorce rate is about one in three marriages). Half of all divorces occur within the first eight years of marriage. By the fifteenth year, three-quarters of the couples who will separate have done so.⁶¹

With the increase in divorce has come an increase in the acceptability and desirability of changing social life-styles. Most bookstores carry books such as *Creative Divorce*, *The World of the Formerly Married*, and *How to Do Your Own Divorce in California*.

Divorce is no fun. It is a major shake-up which cannot be shrugged off as no big deal. It *is* a big deal. Divorce can affect every aspect of your life. The newly divorced person will rapidly find out that this new status will make changes in what one thinks, with whom one sleeps, with whom one eats, where one goes, and what the future holds. Just as physical collisions may cause broken bones and tissues that prevent proper functioning, emotional collisions leave their own brand of wounds. But, like bones and tissues, emotional wounds heal quickly in most cases. As divorce has become more acceptable, an increasing number of people have begun to find divorce a positive experience which stimulates personal growth. Mel Krantzler, the author of *Creative Divorce*, describes this process in terms of his own divorce:

Today I look back on the last three years as the most personally enriching period in my life. Through a painful emotional crisis, I have become a happier and stronger person than I was before. I learned that what I went through was what all divorced people, men and women, go through to a greater or lesser degree—a period of mourning, and finally a slow, painful emotional readjustment to the facts of single life. I experienced the pitfalls along the way—the wallowing in self-pity, the refusal to let go of the old relationship, the repetition of old ways in relating to new people, the confusion of past emotions with present reality—and I emerged the better for it.

Learning about dating for newly separated people is often difficult. Because of their age and accumulation of experiences, the formerly married become more selective than they had been in their youth. There is a tendency to search for someone who has had common experiences. For instance, most prefer to date people who have also been divorced. Among more mature people, emotional and physical involvement seem to advance more quickly than during adolescent courtship. After some exposure to the world of the formerly married, and some readjustment to life, most people are once again ready to enter into a marital bond.⁶²

IN CONCLUSION: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

*There is a law that man should love his neighbor as himself. In a few hundred years it should be as natural to mankind as breathing or the upright gait.*⁶³

Thus spoke the famous psychologist, Alfred Adler, who may have overstated his case. Not everyone is *that* loving. On the other hand, there are plenty of people who are loving but who are not exactly lovable. Adler was, nevertheless, on the right track. At least the *need* to be loved is critical to our personal and social adjustment.

We started this chapter by pointing out the correlates of popularity—correlates, if you remember, not causes. That is why, in our opinion, anyone who is in the business of advising you how to be popular displays either arrogance or ignorance, or both. While we do know that popularity and good adjustment go hand in hand (and vice versa), we simply do not know which one of the two states causes the other. The best we could do was to furnish you with a brief list of popularity correlates (pp. 88-89), hoping that you may find it interesting and useful. In any case, popularity is primarily a transitory state and as such probably less important to your well-being than the liking and loving part of friendship and marriage.

The studies on liking and loving which we presented to you were in the context of interaction with others, such as between and among friends. Those studies were also more conclusive than the ones on popularity. We hope that they provided you with enough information to equip you for an intelligent appraisal of your interactions with others. They may not help you become an overnight hit with everyone in sight (you may be that popular anyway), but could help you achieve greater harmony with those who interact with you (i.e., social adjustment). Among the advocated moves for being better liked which we mentioned were interest similarity, high visibility (exposure and propinquity), and rewardingness in exchange situations (including the highly effective ingratiating behavior, although you may wish to draw the line there).

From liking to loving, the plot thickens. It takes no genius to realize that dating and mating are probably the most sensitive areas to any person past the onset of puberty. Not surprising, although perhaps disturbing, is research suggesting that beauty *is* more than skin deep. Physically attractive people seem to get most, if not all, the breaks. Attractive women in particular seem to get more than an even break.

It must be pointed out, however, that beauty is not the ultimate ticket to success and popularity, particularly with members of one's own sex. New evidence suggests that women regard highly attractive women as vain, egotistical, materialistic, snobbish, and more likely to have marital troubles.⁶⁴ Such prejudicial judgments create a host of stereotypes which undoubtedly affect the adjustment problems of attractive people.

The brunt of adjustment problems, however, is still shouldered by the less attractive people. Regardless of our subjective judgments, some people

are simply less attractive than others. Unfortunately, these people are neither accepted nor rejected by the majority of people—they are simply ignored! In turn, many of the less attractive people are beset by adjustment problems. Some of them may even resort to the plotting of game plans aimed at catching a mate. We presented one such plan (pp 107-112), but personally believe it is demeaning and inappropriate. Yet people engage in these games, and often they do work.

On the bright side, remember that all those studies dealt with an elusive concept. When the concept "love" was finally nailed down (Table 3-4), it excluded such significant forms as parent-child, geriatric, and homosexual relationships. Most of the studies we cited were based on young, middle-class adults who are heavily committed to the dating game. Since you may be involved in the dating game, the love scale (Table 3-4) may provide you with useful information. Still, we advise caution in drawing conclusions from studies about a particular kind of love.

Love, after all, is something that should be experienced rather than taught to be used as an exploitative weapon. Love relationships may change, but they are omnipresent and satisfy vital needs. This goes for *any* love relationship, including the more unusual and informal ones which we mentioned in this chapter.⁶⁵ In fact, as was pointed out, in terms of personal and social adjustment, even divorce is not necessarily the end of the road.

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4

ON BEING NASTY TO OTHERS

AGGRESSION DEFINED

Outcome, Intent, Means to an End, and Plain Meanness

AGGRESSION DETERMINANTS

Organic Bad Brains, Mean Genes, and Instincts

Psychological Feeling and Thinking

Learning Conditioning and Imitation

AGGRESSION PREDICTION

From Birth to Maturity

AGGRESSION REDUCTION

Catharsis Let It All Hang Out!

Cognition Think Cool!

Empathy Have Mercy?

Humor Laugh It Off!

Recognition Identify Yourself!

IN CONCLUSION: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

AGGRESSION DEFINED

Remember the 1960s when many scientists, spearheaded by Paul Ehrlich, considered the population explosion the most serious problem in our culture?¹ Yet during the past decade the crime rate in America alone grew around ten times as rapidly as the population! Table 4-1 is based on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports on violent crimes between 1960 and 1970

Although FBI statistics have been held suspect by some (e.g., police records are sometimes doctored to scare taxpayers into supporting law enforcement),² these data are quite alarming

What is causing all this violence and aggression? Psychologists have several possible explanations which we will look at shortly. But first, we must decide what types of behavior should be called aggressive

Outcome, Intent, Means to an End, and Plain Meanness

Most of us would agree that aggression is behavior that results in harm to another person. But what if we hurt someone whom we did not intend to hurt? Have we been aggressive? Confusion often results from situations that result in injury to an individual although injury had not been the original goal. Consider the football lineman who, while attempting to block a punt, lands on the kicker, breaking his leg. Here, the *intent* of the behavior was to block the kick, not to harm the kicker. If we had defined aggression as behavior which results in harm, then this incident would have been classified as aggression. Employing the intent definition, the incident would not have been called aggression.

On the other hand, there are situations where there is intent to injure yet no injury occurs. For example, suppose a young boy throws a rock at a school

**TABLE 4-1 INCREASES IN VIOLENT
CRIMES BETWEEN 1960 AND 1970 ^a**

Crime	Percentage of increase
Murder	44
Forcible rape	93
Aggravated assault	79
Robbery	146
Overall crimes of violence	130
Rate of increase of violent crimes	104

^aFigures take population increase into consideration

From Johnson, 1972

rival but the rock misses its mark. Here there is intent to harm, yet no harm results. Whether or not the rock throwing incident is aggression depends upon which definition of aggression is employed. But if we stress only *outcome* (harm), we exclude behavior which could be identical to that which has destructive consequences. Suppose the young boy throws two rocks at his school rival. The rival ducks and avoids the first rock but the second one hits him. The rock thrower's behavior would only be called aggressive for the second toss even though his behavior was the same on both occasions.

Intent definitions have also met with criticism. It is so difficult to observe what other people intend to do that some psychologists have written detailed treatises arguing that aggression cannot be defined. For the purpose of this discussion we will follow those who refer to aggression as "behavior designed to result in harm to a person or his property."³

The question of outcome and intent is not the only problem facing research on aggression. A distinction has to be made between *instrumental* and *hostile* aggression. Instrumental aggression is aggressive behavior as a means to an end. This type of aggression is used to obtain a "nonaggressive goal" such as money, power, or sexual enjoyment. In pure cases of instrumental aggression, anger and hostility are at a minimum. A wife who kills her husband solely to cash in his life insurance policy or a boxer who fights for titles and prizes may be exhibiting instrumental aggression. The act of injuring someone else is not what sustains or motivates this aggressive behavior. The behavior is sustained by some other reward or the expectation of one.

Sometimes people act aggressively just because they are mad. This is hostile aggression. Instead of aggression being an instrumental act to obtain nonaggressive goals, it occurs because people are furious or plain mean and are rewarded when the person they are mad at gets hurt. The goal is the infliction of pain or injury on another person, group, or object. For example, each year hundreds of murders are committed by jealous lovers. Such acts exemplify hostile aggression.

Most aggressive acts contain elements of both hostile and instrumental aggression. Although it is rare when either type occurs in its pure form, psychologists have found it useful to keep these concepts separate.⁴ In any event, the definition of aggression is at least partially a matter of value judgment. Different communities can hold different opinions about the nature of aggressive behavior. This was demonstrated by psychologist Robert Kahn, who works at the Institute of Social Research at the University of Michigan. Part of the Institute, the Center for Survey Research, frequently conducts national surveys. In one such survey a sample of 1400 white and black American men were asked what behavior they would consider violent. The results showed that black and white men differ considerably in their perception, as illustrated in Table 4-2.

TABLE 4-2 WHITE AND BLACK VIEWS ON VIOLENCE

Situation	Percentage of white men classifying situation as violent	Percentage of black men classifying situation as violent
Police beating students	52	82 ^a
Police shooting looters	32	59 ^a
Police stopping people to frisk them	13	34
Denying people's civil rights	46	70
Looting	87	74
Burglary	64	70
Student protest	39 ^a	23
Sit-ins	23	15
Draft-card burning	59	51

^aBlacks are more likely than whites to view police assertiveness as aggressive. Whites are more likely than blacks to perceive assertive behavior by middle-class college students as violent.

From Kahn, 1972

The survey demonstrates that aggression, as most people use the term, is in part a value judgment.⁵ Different people may have different values. For the purposes of this book, however, we will stick to behaviorally related definitions.

AGGRESSION DETERMINANTS

Organic: Bad Brains, Mean Genes, and Instincts

In 1966 a University of Texas student named Charles Whitman killed his wife and mother. The next day he got up, took his rifle, climbed the University tower, and for 90 minutes blasted away at everything that moved. He hit 38 people (14 of whom died) and even got one airplane.

Before this bizarre incident Whitman had not been a particularly brutal person. What could have been responsible for this outrage? In his case we may have an answer. It appears that Whitman suffered from an organic brain tumor. Experiments with animals have shown that several areas of the brain seem to be associated with aggressive behavior. When these brain centers are damaged or stimulated the animals will behave violently. When these areas are damaged in a human brain, the person can become violent or even a killer.

Charles Whitman was just such a case. He had some damage in his brain which produced uncontrollable impulses to destroy and kill. He was aware that something was wrong. This awareness is apparent in the note

Whitman wrote, which described his problem and his unsuccessful attempt to get help

*I don't quite understand what it is that compels me to type this letter
Perhaps it is to leave some vague reason for the actions I have recently
performed [At this point Whitman had harmed no one, his wife and
mother were elsewhere in the city, still alive]*

*I don't really understand myself these days I am supposed to be an
average, reasonable and intelligent young man However, lately (I can't
recall when it started) I have been a victim of many unusual and irrational
thoughts These thoughts constantly recur, and it requires a tremendous
mental effort to concentrate on useful and progressive tasks In March
when my parents made a physical break I noticed a great deal of stress,
I consulted a Dr Cochrum at the University Health Center and asked
him to recommend someone that I could consult with about some
psychiatric disorders I felt I had I talked with a Doctor once for about
two hours and tried to convey to him my fears that I felt overcome [sic]
by overwhelming violent impulses After one session I never saw the
Doctor again, and since then I have been fighting my mental turmoil
alone, and seemingly to no avail After my death I wish that an autopsy
would be performed on me to see if there is any visible physical
disorder I have had some tremendous headaches in the past and
have consumed two large bottles of Excedrin in the past three months*

*It was after much thought that I decided to kill my wife, Kathy,
tonight after I pick her up from work I love her dearly, and she
has been a fine wife to me as any man could ever hope to have I
cannot rationally pinpoint any specific reason for doing this I don't know
whether it is selfishness, or if I don't want her to have to face the
embarrassment my actions would surely cause her At this time though,
the prominent reason in my mind is that I truly do not consider this
world worth living in, and am prepared to die, and I do not want to
leave her to suffer alone in it I intend to kill her as painlessly as
possible*

Later in the night he killed both his mother and wife, and then wrote

*I imagine it appears that I brutally killed both of my loved ones I was
only trying to do a good thorough job*

*If my life insurance policy is valid please see that all the worthless
checks I wrote this weekend are made good Please pay off all my
debts I am 25 years old and have never been financially independent
Donate the rest anonymously to a mental health foundation Maybe
research can prevent further tragedies of this type ⁶*

Whitman's mass murders occurred the day after this second note had been written. According to his request, an autopsy was performed on Whitman's brain. The autopsy revealed a huge tumor in an area of the brain that had been identified in animal studies as associated with aggressive behavior.⁷

Psychiatrists estimate that as many as ten million Americans have obvious brain damage and another five million may have some form of brain disease which is not detectable. Some experts believe that we can help certain violent people by subjecting them to brain surgery. Such surgery, however, can turn a functioning individual into a vegetable. Therefore psychosurgery techniques have become very controversial in recent years.⁸

Genetically speaking, most of us have 46 chromosomes. These chromosomes come in pairs. We have 23 pairs, half from our fathers and half from our mothers. Of these 23 pairs of chromosomes, one pair determines our sex. For this pair, females have two chromosomes which look like Xs. Females are referred to conventionally by the label (XX). Males have one chromosome which looks like an X and another shorter one that looks more like a Y. Males, therefore, are referred to by geneticists as (XY). The short Y chromosome seems to be associated with male hormones, male sex organs, and the behavior commonly related to those structures.

Sometimes the process of forming normal males and females gets fouled up. For example, sometimes there will only be one X chromosome and nothing from the other parent (XO). This is called *Turner's Syndrome* and people with these syndromes are females who develop abnormally. The other side of the coin is *Klinefelter's Syndrome*, where there is an extra X chromosome. People with Klinefelter's syndrome (XXY) have male genitals but also may develop many female characteristics, such as breasts.

Recently it has been shown that a certain genetic disorder, the (XYY) or "supermale" syndrome, may be associated with violent behavior. These men have the regular genetic characteristics of males along with an additional Y or male chromosome, and often are physically strong, sometimes display homosexual tendencies, and frequently exhibit severe behavior problems.⁹ A recent review of the literature of the XYY syndrome estimated that about 13 in every 10,000 newborn males have this chromosomal condition,¹⁰ while criminal males are much more likely to have this abnormality. In fact, criminals are 15 times as likely to have the XYY pattern. It has also been shown that inmates in several institutions for the criminally insane displayed XYY abnormalities more than 20 times as often as samples from the general population.

Does this mean that all violent criminals have the XYY problem? It does not. In fact, most violent acts are more likely to be caused by something in the environment, as we shall see later on. Nevertheless, some biologically oriented scientists still feel that aggression is an instinct. Sigmund Freud,

for example felt that there is a drive in all individuals to behave aggressively—but he did not feel this way in his early writings (before 1918) when he believed that aggression was a way of expressing frustration. After the First World War, however, during which he saw people killed or mutilated without good reason, he decided that man must have an innate drive to destroy himself and that this drive is expressed through aggression.

Like Freud, European ethologists (students of animal behavior) such as Konrad Lorenz believe that aggression has an instinctive base. Lorenz thinks that aggressive impulses build up until they can be released. To curtail violence, Lorenz thinks we should engage in aggressive rituals as animals do.¹¹ (We will talk more about Lorenz's idea when we discuss catharsis later in this chapter.)

Psychological Feeling and Thinking

Have you ever thought that you behave differently when nobody around knows who you are? Would you be more impulsive if you felt nobody would be able to identify you? The conclusion of some prominent psychologists is that you would.

Psychologist Philip Zimbardo has shown how anonymity can be related to aggression. He claims that people can lose their feelings of identifiability when they become members of a large group or mob. Without their feelings of personal identity, they no longer feel responsible for their own behavior. They are *deindividuated*. Arousal produced by the excitement of a crowd, by drugs, or by alcohol is a case in point. Under these conditions, a person does not evaluate his own behavior or feel bound by guilt, shame, or consistency with things done in the past.

In order to test some of these ideas, Zimbardo conducted an experiment in which college women served as subjects. Half of the women were made to feel a sense of identifiability by being met at the door and given large name-tags to wear. Another group was made to feel anonymous. During the experiment, these women wore large lab coats (size 44) and hoods over their heads. All the women then heard tape recordings of another woman who seemed to be either nice (accepting, sweet, and altruistic) or obnoxious (self-centered, conceited). The women were then placed in a situation where they would have to give electric shocks to the nice or the obnoxious woman. The women who had been allowed to feel anonymous gave longer shocks to the victim than the women with a sense of identifiability. The obnoxious victim also received longer punishment from them. The individuated group gave shorter shocks, and it made little difference if the victim was obnoxious or nice.¹²

Zimbardo feels that his theory describes much of the aggression we see in our everyday lives. He suggests that Army uniforms, Ku Klux Klan




Figure 4.1 Deindividuation and aggression On the left side is a picture of deindividuated subjects in an experiment college women dressed in baggy lab coats head hooded and never referred to by name On the right side is a graph depicting the duration of electric shocks administered (as part of the experiment) to these anonymous subjects as opposed to individualized subjects (college women in ordinary clothing wearing name tags) Clearly aggression towards obnoxiously acting subjects increased over time More important however is the fact that as a group the deindividuated subjects were given more shocks than their counterparts From Zimbardo 1969

outfits, and police uniforms are all covers which make people lose their feelings of identity Other things which might make people feel deindividuated could be the stresses of urban life and the breakdown of the primary family (See also the concept of *alienation* in Chapter 11)

Other psychologists have made use of the term *catharsis* Catharsis is a Greek word that, translated into English, means 'purification' or 'cleansing' Within the study of social sciences however, catharsis has taken on a much more specific meaning It refers to the process by which a person exhibits an emotion and is thereby purged or cleansed of it The most frequent reference to catharsis is in relation to aggressive behavior It is widely believed that expressing aggression or hostility makes an angry person less angry and thus reduces his drive to behave aggressively

Leonard Berkowitz, a noted authority on aggression research, points out that the validity of the catharsis concept is widely accepted by both the man on the street and the social scientist¹³ A close look at experimental and theoretical treatments of catharsis however, would suggest that a blanket acceptance of the concept may not be justified It has in fact, become a controversial issue among psychologists because some maintain that catharsis, rather than reducing aggressive behavior actually increases it

The dispute over the existence of 'emotional purges' is not really new It dates back to the fourth century B.C., when catharsis was discussed in terms of the effects of observing emotion-laden plays Aristotle believed that watching tragic drama 'operates psychologically to relieve us of the oppressive

emotions of pity and fear just as a catharter purges the body of excessive humor. Aristotle's mentor, Plato, had a different view on the effects of tragic drama. He believed that plays 'arise violent emotions and stir men to all sorts of passions.' Plato contended that artists were deceitful, dangerous, and deserving of censorship.¹⁴

Plato and Aristotle disputed catharsis nearly 2300 years ago. In contemporary psychology, the concept of catharsis was introduced via psychoanalysis. Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud used the term in their discussions of hysteria, which were originally published between 1893 and 1895. Hysteria is a condition in which people complain about physical symptoms for which there are no physiological reasons. The problem usually involves guilt. Breuer and Freud originally viewed hysteria as the result of a repressed traumatic event. They found that the event could be recalled under hypnosis, and that such recollection was accompanied by an intense reproduction of the original emotion. Following the emotional reexperience, the symptoms disappeared. This therapeutic process was labeled *abreaction*. Catharsis was the name given to the method.¹⁵

It can be readily seen that the Greek philosophers and Freud were talking about the same thing but referring to different processes. The Greek philosophers perceived catharsis as an emotional purge brought on by vicarious experiences, such as witnessing others involved in emotional upheaval. Freud postulated that catharsis was an intrapsychic process—something originating within the person himself. Most subsequent descriptions of catharsis have been more similar to the Freudian than to the Aristotelian definition.

Some psychologists, psychiatrists, and ethologists have found it more useful to define the concept of catharsis by way of analogy. In proposing a 'hydraulic model' of aggression, the somewhat crude but effective analogy is that of the process of urine storing up in the bladder. It is a process which gradually builds up until release has to occur. The assumption here is that in a similar manner, a drive to aggress can build up until aggression is expressed. Releasing the aggression (catharsis) then returns the drive to a lower level. Typical of such thinking is the monograph entitled *Frustration and Aggression* published in 1939 by a group of psychologists at Yale University headed by John Dollard.¹⁶ Their work has been the prime instigator of aggression research over the last 30 years. The major reason for their impact was that the Yale researchers' statement of hypotheses was couched in testable terms. The publication of *Frustration and Aggression* was clearly a turning point in the study of catharsis and aggression because it stated the problem in a form which could be adapted for experimental tests.

In their discussion of aggression, Dollard and his co-workers generally follow the 'hydraulic model' explanation. They suggest a circular process

which works somewhat like this: Aggression (or the drive to aggress) is a direct function of frustration. Inhibiting aggressive behavior merely serves to increase the drive to aggress, which in turn facilitates the expression of aggression. The expression of aggression, in turn, reduces the chances for aggression to continue, or, as the Yale group put it, "the occurrence of any act of aggression is assumed to reduce the instigation of aggression." This instigation to aggress represents catharsis, or a "cathartic effect."¹⁷

In summary, here is what these various theoretical frameworks suggest: Aristotle's theory is simple. You become less nasty after watching others acting nastily. Freud and Dollard and his Yale colleagues say that catharsis is good for you. The Yale group says that when your frustrations build up you release them by means of aggression, and chances for further aggression are reduced. Freud says essentially the same thing, except that he feels that aggressive behavior has to be an emotional reexperience. The only trouble with these theories is that they tend to classify as aggressive such diverse behaviors as acts of physical violence, spreading rumors, masochism, or aggression in dreams. Many researchers since then have followed this line of reasoning without first determining whether it is justifiable to lump everything together in one equivalent package. As a result there have been some glaring inconsistencies in many studies of catharsis.

Then there are psychologists who do not accept the concept of catharsis in the first place. In fact, they suggest that expressions of aggression, anger, or hostility lead to increases rather than decreases in aggression.¹⁸ One explanation of such views fits within the *theory of cognitive dissonance* (see pp. 240-242). Briefly, it assumes that expressing hostility toward someone may or may not involve emotional upheaval, but is virtually certain to be accompanied by cognitions (thoughts, judgments, etc.) within the aggressor. For example, did you ever wonder whether the target of your anger may be a good and reasonable person who really should not be attacked? Or weren't you ever surprised that a peaceful and friendly person like yourself could be engaged in an act of aggression? In such cases, your judgment of the situation is simply dissonant (inconsistent) with the behavior you are displaying. The resulting doubts can be quite disturbing to your self-perception.

The theory of cognitive dissonance suggests several ways out of this cognitive fix. For example, if you are convinced that the target of your aggression *deserves* punishment, you are off the hook—after all, that is precisely what you are doing. Finding reasons to justify your attack by denigrating or putting down your victim thus becomes common practice. Once denigrated, a person or group is obviously even more likely to be attacked than before. They 'deserve' to be attacked. Not too surprisingly, evidence tends to show that disliked persons or groups are the most likely targets for continuing aggression. The dissonance view can be summed up by the dictum that

'violence does not reduce the tendency toward violence violence breeds more violence

Learning Conditioning and Imitation

Do you remember how in elementary school some of the kids were always tougher than others? And when the tough kids got mean they would get their way. It didn't take them long to learn that if the teacher wasn't around they could get what they wanted by being tough. Thus the tough bully got rewarded for his aggression and he learned to behave aggressively on future occasions.

Let us now examine some of the ways in which the expression of hostility or acts of aggression may make it more likely that further aggression will occur. Once again it is the notion that violence breeds more violence.

Psychologist Seymour Feshbach of UCLA believes that an aggressive drive can produce a motivation to injure others.¹⁹ If we hurt someone we want to injure it may be rewarding. In learning terms the *reinforcement* of the hostile behavior increases the strength of a hostile habit. As a result hostile behavior is more likely to reoccur on future occasions.

Another psychologist Arnold Buss also believes that aggressive behavior, especially in males is often reinforced leading to strengthened aggressive habit strength. In his paper entitled *Aggression Pays* Buss noted that aggressive acts often enhance the status and position of the aggressor. As examples Buss mentioned that aggression is reinforced by (1) organized crime where destruction of property and murder are rewarded with money (2) national myths and war legends which make heroes of those who kill on a mass scale during battles, and (3) the model for the masculine role in society, which emphasizes dominance, competitiveness and aggression. In short aggression is often rewarded with money prestige and status.²⁰ The evidence that aggressive behavior can be increased by rewarding aggressive response is overwhelming.²¹

Another model to account for the learning of aggressive behavior among young children has been proposed and developed by Albert Bandura and other psychologists at Stanford University. Bandura's views are couched in terms of his theory of social learning and imitation. According to the theory, a child learns some behavior (in this case aggressive behavior) by observing a model. He may then imitate or reproduce the behavior to a lesser or greater extent, depending on whether it leads to or is expected to lead to reward or punishment. If the consequences of the observationally learned behavior are rewarded the behavior is expected to recur with greater frequency. If they are punished, the behavior will be expressed to a lesser extent.

In order to test this theory Bandura and his associates had preschool children observe an adult aggressive model either live or on film. A third




Figure 4-2 Imitation of aggression After witnessing an adult behave aggressively children will imitate the aggression In the sequence shown on the top row an adult attacks a large Bobo doll In the sequences shown in the next two rows children are shown imitating the aggressive attacks on the doll From Bandura Ross & Ross 1961

group watched a film of an aggressive cartoon character No film was shown to a control group In the live and film conditions, the young boys and girls watched an adult model attack a large Bobo-doll while screaming, "Sock him in the nose hit him down throw him in the air and 'Pow!'" Children in the cartoon test group watched *Herman the Cat* assault a Bobo doll as the adult had done in the other conditions (see Figure 4-2)

The children were then led to another room, where they found the Bobo-doll and the instruments the model had used to attack it The experimenter mildly frustrated her subjects by giving them some fancy toys to play with and then taking the toys away The results showed that children can learn aggressive behavior by just watching a model Children who had observed an aggressive model attack a Bobo-doll were nearly twice as likely as all other groups to aggress against the doll in an identical or similar manner A second experiment revealed that the children's aggression was likely to be expressed when they had observed a model who was rewarded than if they had seen a model who was punished for his aggression

In summary Bandura's imitation theory holds that once an aggressive response is acquired it is not weakened or strengthened simply by the act of expression Only the consequences of expression are important The response is held in reserve for situations in which it may be reinforced Ac-

cording to Bandura, aggression by children often leads to positive consequences and therefore aggression often is followed by more aggression²²

One of the most important theories of catharsis is that of Leonard Berkowitz a psychologist who proposes that impulsive responses may become conditioned to situational stimuli in a person's environment²³ Aggression functions as a conditioned response to certain stimuli provided such stimuli are associated with violent scenes the individual has encountered previously This process known as *classical conditioning* can lead to heightened hostile reactions For example by associating names with unpleasant words psychologists were able to condition students to dislike certain names Each student then participated in a discussion with two other students (actually confederates of Berkowitz) one of whom actually possessed the name associated with the conditioning Ratings demonstrated that the students showed greater hostility toward the person who bore the disliked name than toward the confederate having a neutral name The unpleasant effect which had been conditioned to the name had been generalized to the person bearing the label²⁴

The classical conditioning model implies that stimuli having aggressive meaning should be capable of eliciting aggressive responses from people who for one reason or another are ready to act aggressively²⁵ To demonstrate this principle a confederate of Berkowitz delivered either one or several shocks to each of a group of college students The students were then allowed to administer shocks to the confederates While they were administering the shocks some of the subjects saw weapons on the table near the shock machine Half of the subjects were told that the weapons were left there by the confederate, and the other half were told that the weapon had been left by the previous experimenter As controls, some angered and non-angered subjects returned the shocks when no weapon was present Another group of angered and nonangered subjects returned the shocks in the presence of a badminton racket and shuttlecocks

The angered subjects gave more shocks than the nonangered subjects The subjects who delivered shocks in the presence of a weapon gave more shocks than those with either a neutral object (badminton racket) or no object present The students believing that the weapon belonged to the confederate did not give reliably more shocks than the subjects believing that the weapon had been left by a previous experimenter Thus the hypothesis that angered subjects will shock their provokers more in the presence of weapons was supported²⁶

In another study a confederate who was introduced as a boxer or a college speech major either insulted or did not insult a group of college students Half of these students then watched a boxing film and the others watched a nonaggressive control film When given an opportunity to shock

the confederate, more insulted subjects showed aggression toward the confederate who had been introduced as a boxer. It was argued that the association between the filmed boxer's aggression and the label of 'boxer' for the confederate was responsible for these increases in aggression.

Extensions of the Berkowitz studies showed that subjects would give more shocks to a confederate who bore the same name as one of the filmed boxers²⁷ and that even more shocks would be administered to a confederate who bore the same name as the filmed victim rather than the filmed victor.²⁸

According to Berkowitz, then, anger arousal is the energizer for aggressive behavior and creates a readiness to respond aggressively. In order for aggression to occur, stimuli associated with a present or a previous anger instigator must be present. These aggressive cues activate the angered person's aggressive thoughts or aggressive behavior.

AGGRESSION PREDICTION

From Birth to Maturity

Parents are notorious in exaggerating the virtues of their children. Yet all parents will sooner or later agree that there are little devils around who justly deserve to be labeled aggressive. Is there a parent, though, who has not wondered what kind of adult his four-year-old will turn into, especially when this precious child consistently tends to strike his parents, throw temper tantrums, attack other children physically or verbally without provocation, or display uncontrollable destructive activity?

Psychologists can provide some answers to such parental worries. One way of looking into the future is based on *cross-sectional* research. By studying large samples of children at various ages, it is possible to arrive at some typical behavior for that age. Parents can thus obtain an authoritative book on 'The Child at 5, The Child at 10, or The Child at 14,' from which they can learn whether their child displays normal behavior and whether this kind of behavior is likely to be maintained as the child grows older.

Another way of making predictions about children is to follow the behavior of the same children over a long period of time. This is known as *longitudinal* research, which is costly, difficult to carry out and therefore, rarely conducted. The advantages, however, are obvious. The psychologist observes the child at the age of say, 2, and makes certain predictions about him or her. The *same* child is then observed at the age of 4, or 10, or 13, or 16—in fact, right into adulthood. With each observation it is possible to verify the extent to which the previous prediction was accurate.

One of the classical longitudinal studies, appropriately labeled *Birth to Maturity: A Study in Psychological Development*, was conducted between 1929 and 1954—a period of 25 years! As reported by psychologists Jerome Kagan and Howard Moss, careful observations and interviews with the sub-

jects were conducted during periodic visits at home at school at play, and at work over that entire period. The children—subsequently the adults—were checked for a variety of behavior patterns among them: passivity, dependency, achievement, and aggression.

The major finding of Kagan and Moss was that if we want to make predictions about the future behavior of children, the safest bet is to rely on the traditional definition of sex-appropriate behavior. In other words, since society tolerates, or in fact encourages, aggressive behavior in boys, it is a safe bet that aggressive boys will turn into aggressive adults. When it is not tolerated or is discouraged, as in the case of girls, it is far more difficult to predict the stability of the child's initial behavior. In Kagan and Moss's study, at least, the findings were quite stable for boys. Those boys who during their childhoods showed such behavior patterns as aggression toward peers, tantrums, rage reactions, and low levels of frustration tolerance turned into excessively aggressive and irritable adults. Many of the excessively aggressive girls, on the other hand, failed to show such behavior as adults because of the continuous pattern of reward and punishment by parents, teachers, friends, and, in fact, our entire culture, which discourages such behavior.²⁹

While the above study shows that aggressive boys are likely to turn into aggressive men far more often than aggressive girls into aggressive women, a word of caution is due. Let us not forget that cultural norms do change, and what was sex-appropriate between 1929 and 1954 is not necessarily sex-appropriate between 1975 and 1999! Undoubtedly the behavior of many young girls and women today would have then been labeled aggressive and therefore inappropriate for females (just as a lot of accepted behavior for males nowadays would have then been labeled dependent and inappropriate). But the current liberation of the sexes does not really invalidate the basic findings of Kagan and Moss. What society wants is what society gets. Parents attempting to make a prediction about their child's future behavior should always bear that in mind.

AGGRESSION REDUCTION

Without carefully detailed operational definitions, aggression as a concept may lose all meaning. With such definitions included, it becomes possible to separate aggressive behavior which is socially acceptable, perhaps even desirable (e.g., in sports or business) from that which is not. Most aggressive behavior falls in the latter category and is not socially approved. Throwing tantrums, insulting others, physically attacking others, or just being plain nasty to others is frowned upon. It is also destructive, even self-destructive. The reduction of aggression thus becomes a vital issue in interpersonal adjustment and mental health. Few psychologists or psychiatrists will dispute this point. Where they differ, however, is on the clinical approaches and techniques to achieve aggression reduction.

Catharsis Let It All Hang Out!

As pointed out earlier Sigmund Freud and other noted psychoanalysts made extensive use of abreaction, or emotional reexperience. They felt that an intense reproduction of a person's original emotion, say aggression, would lead to its reduction with subsequent benefit (e.g., guilt removal) to the person expressing that emotion. Since effective abreaction in psychoanalysis must occur only at a particular point in time during the charted course of psychotherapy, it often becomes part of a time-consuming process.

In contemporary psychotherapy there are several approaches that consider the expression of emotion essential but unlike psychoanalysis are less time consuming and complex. These approaches seem to be quite adequate for those who neither are nor should be candidates for psychoanalysis. Most of us fall under this category.

Reevaluation therapy is based on the premise that effective functioning is obstructed by psychological distresses. The distresses can be removed through emotional discharges. After the distress has been discharged, reevaluation can take place. In the case of anger, the anger blocks a rational evaluation of the arousing incident. Anger expression during counseling leads to discharge, which in turn leads to reevaluation of the anger-arousing incident.³⁰ The implication applies, therefore, to noncounseling situations as well: kick a can, pound a door, or break a dish—and only *then* will you be able to effectively evaluate the situation which led up to this behavior.

Psychologist Arthur Janov advocates an even greater return to basics. *Primal therapy* maintains that severe psychological disturbances become repressed.³¹ The prescription (somewhat oversimplified) for getting rid of this repression: find yourself a therapist who will make you aware of your repressed feelings and scream at the top of your lungs! Janov maintains that this violent emotional discharge facilitates the eventual recognition of the disturbance, and as such becomes the core of the healing process.

It is important to note that in both reevaluation therapy and primal therapy, anger need only be expressed. It need not be directed toward a particular person or instigator. Several approaches to psychotherapy based on a cathartic model, especially those involving marriage counseling, take a different approach. Controversial psychologist George Bach claims that the expression of anger is not enough; it must be directed against another person or instigator. Partners are taught to allow each other to vent their hostility in the context of a fair but harmless fight. For example, you and your spouse may grab pillows or 'batacas' (pillow-type clubs—see figure 4-3) and by mutual agreement beat each other mercilessly, with little danger of incurring physical damage. After all is over, both of you will feel great. The assumption is that the expression of aggression will exercise a purging effect.

But that is not all that venting your anger in such harmless fashion does for you. Think of what it means in terms of improvement in communication.

According to Bach, while belting one another both you and your partner have considerable control over the location duration and intensity with which you express your aggressive behavior. The manner in which you or your partner dish out punishment provides subtle clues that are not lost. Many partners who either will not or cannot communicate effectively with one another via speech or gentle touch suddenly find that they get the message this way.³²

Cognition Think Cool

Psychologist Seymour Feshbach has described three processes through which anger and aggressive drive can be reduced.³³ The first involves the infliction of injury upon the anger instigator—a form of displaced aggression. This modality of reduction is similar to the previously discussed catharsis models.

The second mechanism which Feshbach proposes is similar to the previously discussed reevaluation therapy but does not necessarily call for the expression of emotion. The assumption is simply that anger-hostility reduction involves a rational reevaluation of the threat value of the anger-producing stimulus. For example, suppose a college student is intentionally insulted during a psychology experiment. As many students do, the insulted subject may see through the guise of the experiment and realize that the insult scene was contrived. The insult no longer being a threat, the initial anger reaction to the attack will dissipate.

Feshbach's third approach to the reduction of anger and aggression is the most intriguing one. It minimizes the role of emotion (and hence the cathartic approach) by focusing almost entirely on mental events. To demonstrate this principle experimentally, subjects read a case history about a juvenile delinquent with an extensive record who had attacked an elderly man with brass knuckles and taken the man's money. Different groups of subjects were then given different information about the delinquent's family background. The severity of the criminal sentence that the subjects recommended for the delinquent was used as a measure of hostile behavior. The lightest sentences were prescribed by subjects who believed that the delinquent had been the victim of bad circumstances and had come from a broken home. In this case a hostile response (recommended punishment) was diminished by the strengthening of a nonhostile thought (sympathy).³⁴

Does this mean that a deliberate effort to 'think cool' can be effective in reducing hot anger? Apparently so. At least Feshbach believes that reduction in the anger-hostility impulse constellation (in addition to aggressive behavior) involves the thoughts or fantasies which work in opposition to aggressive drive or anger. For example, anger-hostility reduction may be accomplished by facilitating anger-inhibiting cognitions such as 'anger breeds destruction,' or 'love thine enemy.' These thoughts may result in behaviors such as withdrawal or pacification.



Figure 4-3 Get it out of your system! Partners engaged in a fair and harmless fight by means of *batacas* (pillow-type clubs) thereby reducing aggression and hostility

Empathy Have Mercy?

Sometimes when you are mad at others you may want to see them get hurt. But what would happen if they really had to experience agony? Would you feel sorry for them? Perhaps so. Strangely enough, there is evidence to suggest that merely witnessing the agony of people who have angered you is likely to reduce your own aggressive drive even though their grief was caused by someone else.³⁵ Moreover, you do not have to show compassion and mercy at the time!

In one study subjects were insulted by a confederate and then allowed to overhear another person insult the confederate. After overhearing someone insult their provoker, subjects were less hostile toward him than a control group who had not heard the confederate being insulted.³⁶ In a similar group of studies, subjects appeared to become less hostile after watching the anger instigator suffer. For example, male college students heard a tape recording of an experimenter who had just insulted or not insulted them. The tapes were purported to be made while the experimenter was a subject in a drug study. Each of the three groups heard a different version of the tape. One group heard the experimenter experiencing a euphoric reaction to the drug. The second group heard a neutral reaction; the third group heard the experimenter suffering miserably. In comparison to the other two groups, those who had heard the experimenter suffer were subsequently less punitive when rating the experimenter on verbal scales.³⁷

Another type of abuse involves financial damage. One experimenter had his confederates insult the subjects. Some of the subjects then watched as the experimenter took money away from the confederate in the context of an experimental task. In comparison to subjects who had not watched the money being taken away, those who had witnessed the financial abuse were less aggressive as measured by the number of shocks they would give to the confederate.³⁸

Each of the previously described experiments demonstrates a decrease in hostility and aggression after the witness of abuse. It does not appear, however, that such reduction in aggression is tied in with a cathartic draining off of emotion. At best, it shows some sort of understanding on the part of the witness (perhaps this is what is meant by "it takes one to know one"). This is the process of *empathy*, which is the capacity "to view events from the standpoint of others and experience vicariously others' emotions."³⁹ As such, empathy has come to be recognized as an important inhibitor of aggressive behavior.

Humor Laugh It Off!

People like to laugh. We laugh at parties when we are with our friends and in general associate laughing with having a good time. Laughter may also be

a way of helping us avoid certain personal problems, and can provide us with at least a hint about how to control aggression

Psychologists Robert Baron and Rodney Ball conducted a unique experiment about humor and aggressive behavior. They created two groups of male college students and had an assistant anger one group and not anger the other. Half of the students in each of these groups were then exposed to humorous cartoons. The other half were shown pictures of furniture, abstract art, and other nonhumorous scenes. After they had seen the pictures, all of the students were given the opportunity to give electric shocks to the confederate. Interestingly, Baron found that angry subjects become less aggressive after seeing funny cartoons than subjects who had seen neutral pictures.⁴⁰

What does this tell us about the control of aggressive behavior? Well, it may suggest that it is good to be able to laugh things off. It may also tell us that other things which take our minds off an angering incident may help us become less prone toward aggression. There is even some evidence that neutral activities in general are effective in controlling aggressive behavior.⁴¹

Recognition Identify Yourself'

Psychologist Philip Zimbardo has suggested that one way to keep people from being aggressive is find ways to make them recognizable (see p. 129). If this is so, the implications are enormous. For example, consider the problem of abuse of power by authority figures. If people are less aggressive when they feel that they are identifiable, perhaps we should ask police to wear their names on their backs the way baseball players do. In fact, perhaps all of us should be thus attired if it helps to reduce aggression. In any event, Zimbardo suggests that we should not allow ourselves to be identified with student or code numbers rather than by our names. He also suggests that we fight urban developments which take the human character away from neighborhoods. The spirit of belonging helps to control aggression.

IN CONCLUSION PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

Will it benefit your personal and social adjustment if you get rid of your aggressive impulses? Society speaks with a forked tongue on the acceptability of expressing aggression. Aggression is not exactly the ideal method for winning friends and influencing people. Aggression connotes impulsivity, violence, and even cruelty. On the other hand, we worship (at least in our TV and film preferences) war heroes, tough executives, and mean football players.

At this point we are also confronted with our first problem. There are numerous subtle differences among the linguistic labels attached to the term. To be known as an aggressor (violent? war-like?) is somewhat different from being known as aggressive (defiant? forceful?). A considerable portion of this chapter was devoted to defining the term.

There are problems with definitions which stress intent as well as those which focus only on outcomes. A compromise was reached and we labeled as aggressive behavior *designed* to result in bodily and/or material harm. We also distinguished between hostile aggression (rooted in anger) and instrumental aggression (a means to an end).

Another problem pertains to the matter of choice. To debate whether one should be aggressive implies that people have a free choice in the matter. To a certain extent, they do. But then you may have been raised in a society (or even a more circumscribed environment such as home and family) which taught you that one cannot and should not be pushed around by others and that in any event it is best to do your own pushing first and ask questions later. You may be locked in an occupational role that puts a premium on aggressive behavior (e.g., bouncer, football player, business executive). You may be a stickler for the traditional sex roles which spell out different degrees of "permissible" aggressive behavior. Even an organic impairment such as that experienced by the unfortunate Charles Whitman (p. 126) cannot be ruled out.

In view of the above problems, it may be best to rephrase the original question. While aggression, however defined, is a fact of life, the way society reacts to it depends on the situational context in which it occurs. Under some conditions it is approved (e.g., one football player assaulting another on the field during a game) while under other conditions it is disapproved (e.g., one citizen assaulting another citizen in the street). It seems more appropriate to speculate *how* one can best get rid of aggressive impulses should you choose to do so in particular situations.

In this chapter you were presented with the opinions of eminent psychologists about the nature of aggression, including ways to reduce such behavior. You may also be justifiably confused upon being confronted with so many convincing experts, each an advocate for a different procedure. We shall make a valiant effort to clarify matters.

In the broadest sense, there are two schools of thought about displays of aggression: violence breeds violence and 'let it all hang out because it is good for you.' If you were impressed by the studies of Buss (p. 133) or Bandura (p. 133) you are likely to belong to the first school of thought. As presented by those psychologists, it does not take long to realize that displays of aggression can have a detrimental effect on oneself and others. If you model violence to others, it should come as no surprise to you that others will do the same thing to you. Justifying your behavior by attacking deserving victims (see also p. 315) may provide you with temporary relief from guilt, but in the long run such behavior will do little to improve your social adjustment.

All this may be true, say the 'let it all hang out' theorists, but it does

not provide an answer to the problem of what to do about aggressive impulses. They believe that bottling up your aggressive impulses is even more detrimental. You must be allowed to express your feelings because 'the occurrence of any act of aggression is assumed to reduce the instigation of aggression' (p. 131). Reduction of aggression is especially advocated by psychologists engaged in clinical practice.

Where these experts differ is on the question of *how* to express your aggression. Most of them do not advocate physical violence directed against others, although one of them (Bach, p. 138) comes close to it. Psychoanalysts who follow the teaching of Sigmund Freud, the principal advocate of emotional discharge (p. 138), also function as "lightening conductors" to their patients, absorbing much of their anger and hostility. Others, such as advocates of reevaluation therapy (p. 138) and primal therapy (p. 138), feel that anger need only be expressed, but not necessarily directed toward a particular person or instigator. The implication is that kicking a can, pounding a door, or screaming out pent-up emotions is often sufficient to ease a person's plight. Even George Bach, who does advocate physical aggression against others for better adjustment, limits it to mutual consent under circumstances where no physical harm is likely to result (Figure 4-3).

Lately, some social psychologists have expressed views which contrast somewhat with those held by traditional clinicians. While they agree that the reduction of aggression is a necessary therapeutic goal, these psychologists propose ways that do not necessarily involve the expression of aggression. Among the offered suggestions are "thinking cool" (p. 139), developing empathy (p. 141) or laughing it off (p. 141). These solutions may appear to be simplistic, but they are backed by solid research evidence.

What is best for you? Only you have the answer. We pointed out at the beginning of this section that while you may have relatively little choice in the matter of displaying aggression, you do have a choice in deciding how to get rid of it when it becomes a personal adjustment problem. The important thing is to know what your options are. We presented some of them. Good luck!

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5

ON BEING KIND TO OTHERS

HELP: A MATTER OF DEFINITION

The Prosocial Altruist

WHEN HELP IS NEEDED

People in Distress

Ripped-Off Institutions

WHEN HELP IS GIVEN OR WITHHELD

Clarity Social Comparison

Responsibility Diffusing It

Reciprocity Mutual Backscratching

Imitation Following the Leader

Reinforcement Cost and Reward

Location Urban and Rural

HELP-GIVERS AND RECEIVERS

Race To Each His Own?

Sex Is Chivalry Dead?

Life-Style Is Hipness Kindness?

Request Style Accentuate the Positive

IN CONCLUSION: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

HELP A MATTER OF DEFINITION**The Prosocial Altruist**

The willingness to express concern and care for others is a deeply ingrained humanistic value. When translated into action it can become a source of satisfaction to the one who cares in many ways. That is why it is important to draw a distinction between *altruism* and *prosocial behavior*. Both behaviors are socially desirable and benefit others. The term *altruism*, however, describes helpful acts for which nothing is expected in return. A volunteer who spends a great deal of time and effort aiding the handicapped is regarded as a selfless altruistic individual. He does not expect something tangible in return. (Of course there is an intrinsic payoff of sorts. In a sense the helper is rewarding himself by gratifying his own needs.)

Contrast such altruistic behavior with the *prosocial behavior* of the donor to a charity foundation for the purpose of changing his tax bracket or of the doctor who stops to help an accident victim and then presents him with a hefty bill. Clearly both individuals have been helpful. But because they expected something tangible in return for their help their behavior can hardly be characterized as altruistic.

WHEN HELP IS NEEDED**People in Distress**

A French proverb proclaims: "We must assist one another, it is the law of nature." These words of wisdom are not always heeded. On March 26, 1975 the *Los Angeles Times* carried the following story:

Hundreds of carnival-goers looked on as six young thugs pummeled, stabbed and fatally shot the father of five at a crowded church fair in the Bronx. But police say they can find only three or four people who are willing to admit they saw anything. All are co-workers of the victim.

Bartolo Rivera, the victim in this instance, could have been helped by any of the hundreds who witnessed the murder. He was not. Only his co-workers, who had passively witnessed the murder, took the time to describe the incident to the police. If you are shocked by this bystander-apathy, prepare yourself for some more disturbing examples.

A man bursts into an office, grabs the switchboard operator and proceeds to beat and rape her. She temporarily escapes. Naked and bleeding, she runs into the street and begs for help. A group of 40 people stops to check out the situation. Not one of them tries to stop the assailant, who recaptures the girl and attempts to drag her back into the office. Finally two policemen stumble upon the incident and arrest the assailant.¹

A young woman by the name of Kitty Genovese returns at 3 00 A M to her home in the Kew Gardens area of New York City Just outside the building she is attacked by an assailant with a knife But Kitty does not give up without a fight Her screams and cries attract the attention of 38 neighbors who come to their windows listen and watch as Kitty fights with her attacker for more than a half-hour Finally Kitty Genovese is dead Not one of her 38 witnessing neighbors has even bothered to pick up the telephone to call the police

The above incidents are not fictitious scenes from Hollywood movies they are real incidents involving ordinary people Why is it that the witnesses did so little to help someone in an emergency? To what should we attribute this? Is it alienation, apathy, indifference future shock breakdown of the family, or lack of religion? All of these have been proposed as explanations at one time or another but as we shall see, psychologists have come up with other explanations as well

Ripped-Off Institutions

People in distress need help As we have seen they do not always get it Institutions sometimes need help too they are even less likely to get it For one thing, there is something impersonal about institutions and organizations How can you help a department store that is systematically looted by shoplifters? Some people even pose the question Why help the store at all (see p 318)? The fact remains however, that thievery is on the rise Stores get little help from customers who witness the most brazen forms of shoplifting The "rip-off" (which sounds infinitely better than theft) is blithely ignored (in the long run, of course this is self-defeating since the customer ultimately pays for all losses incurred)

A typical example of the above was provided by psychologist Max Dertke and his associates at a bookstore in a Southern university Shoppers were observed while browsing in the paperback book section of the campus bookstore Each of the 129 male and 111 female shoppers were at one time observed alone (i.e. no other shoppers within 50 to 60 feet) in a particular section of the store When that occurred an experimental confederate approached the spot and staged a theft in full view of the observed subject The thief reached in front of the subject picked up a book and placed it inside his or her shirt and then retreated to another area of the store Another confederate dressed as a bookstore employee, then moved to within 3 to 4 feet of the subject, either waiting for the subject's report or (if none was forthcoming) questioning him or her about the theft

As expected, there was a significant difference between reporting the crime spontaneously (without prompting) or confirming it (prompted by questioning) In either case, however, the rate was extremely low No subject

spontaneously reported the theft and only 67 percent did so upon prompting.² Evidently the institution of the campus bookstore is generally regarded as a rip-off (having an excessive profit margin) to be ripped-off in return. Similar studies have shown a rate of reporting ranging from 23 percent (in variety-drug stores)³ to 65 percent (in discount beer stores).^{*}

WHEN HELP IS GIVEN OR WITHHELD

We do not want to leave with you the impression that nobody would help if you were left bleeding by the side of the road somewhere. People help each other out all the time. We donate blood, contribute to charity, help each other move, and so on. The list of helping behaviors is virtually endless. But why is it that helping people like us will sometimes abandon a Kitty Genovese when she so desperately needs help? Does helping depend on the situation at hand, upon the characteristics of the helper, or upon the characteristics of the victim?

We shall attempt to answer some of these questions from the point of view of the psychologist. Unlike the mass media, which can blithely attribute such incidents as the Kitty Genovese case to apathy, indifference, dehumanization, and loss of concern for our fellow man, psychologists cannot accept value judgments. In assigning collective responsibility to society, the media representatives often sound as if they are moral isolates in a sea of moral bankruptcy. A growing number of psychologists, on the other hand, find it much more useful to carefully study the issue under highly controlled conditions. Some of them have gone so far as to create a model of the outside world inside the laboratory before studying helping behavior (this artificial approximation of the outside world is known as *simulation*).

Clarity Social Comparison

Psychologists Bibb Latané and John Darley simulated situations analogous to the Kitty Genovese incident in order to discover why bystanders do not intervene in emergencies. In their first experiment they invited male students from Columbia University to discuss some of the problems associated with student life at an urban university. While the subjects were filling out questionnaires

^{*}The psychologists who conduct such studies have to plan their studies as craftily as experienced criminals do their planning. It takes some planning (and audacity to say the least) to rob a liquor store,⁴ to steal a portable radio on a public beach, or to repeatedly lift a suitcase from a public place.⁵ While the information from witnesses of this behavior may be of interest to the American public, some people are puzzled or even disturbed by such capers. Upon reading Dertke's study on the campus bookstore rip-off in a psychology textbook, an indignant British bookstore owner wrote the publisher that such examples of social behaviour are a little irresponsible. The book, no doubt, will be read by psychology and sociology students throughout the U.K. and will only serve to give them further ideas as to a standard behavioural pattern. One would have thought that your editorial staff might have been slightly more responsible in the U.S.A.⁶

and waiting to be interviewed in a small room smoke was pumped into the room through a wall vent Not all of the subjects faced this crisis under the same circumstances In one condition the subject was in the room by himself In a second condition the subject was with two experimental confederates (employed by Latane and Darley) who remained nonreactive during the incident That is, as the smoke came into the room they just shrugged their shoulders and turned their attention back to the questionnaires If the subject asked about the situation the confederates were instructed to reply "I dunno" Then they would wave away some smoke and continue to fill out their questionnaires In the final condition three naive subjects who did not know one another were in the room The smoke was pumped into the room as the two-page questionnaire had been completed The experimenters then observed to see how many of the subjects left the room to report the smoke within a 6-minute period

Subjects left alone acted very reasonably in this situation Typically they would act a bit startled check out the situation, and calmly go to report it Out of the 24 people in this condition, 75 percent reported the smoke within 6 minutes Subjects placed with the two nonreactive confederates acted differently Latané and Darley were surprised to find that under these circumstances helping occurred only 10 percent of the time The subjects coughed choked brushed smoke away from their faces but did not report the emergency

The most interesting findings concerned the three naive subjects One could expect, under these conditions that the crisis would be reported on almost all occasions If three out of four subjects reported it when they were alone, the chances of reporting the incident should be three times as great when the three subjects were together In fact it turned out just the opposite If three naive people were available to report the incident it was less likely that any one of the three would do so In only 38 percent of the cases did even one member of a three person group get up to report the incident Thus it seems that the more people available to report an emergency the less likely it is that anyone will report it But why? There are several explanations One is that people become less fearful in the presence of companions Another is that people want to hide their fear from others so they will not be perceived as "chicken" 7

Later experiments showed that neither of these explanations was correct Rather it seems that we depend upon the reactions of others to clarify the situation for us As we become less and less certain what is going on we depend increasingly on others to clarify the situation for us This is what psychologist Leon Festinger calls *social comparison theory* (see Chapter 6)

While the smoke-filled room may have been an ambiguous situation which prevented help being offered, nonambiguous situations evoke con-

siderable help. In one study subjects heard a maintenance man fall and cry in agony. In this situation *all* of the subjects (either alone or in two- or five-person groups) offered help. When subjects heard an identical fall but without the verbal cues of pain, only 30 percent offered help. Presumably the latter situation was more ambiguous. In another set of experiments, 96 percent of the subjects (regardless of the number of subjects around) helped in non-ambiguous situations. When the same situations were made slightly more ambiguous, only 29 percent of the subjects offered help.⁸ In short, if other people make you think the incident is not serious (as the nonreacting confederates did in the above experiments), then you might interpret the situation as not being serious enough to get involved.⁹

To demonstrate how people depend upon each other's reactions, Bibb Latane and Judith Rodin created situations in which there was no danger for the helper and someone other than the helper required assistance. Subjects were recruited and brought to a testing room by a pleasant young woman. The woman (actually a confederate) left the subjects to fill out some questionnaires while she went into the next room to work. Then an emergency was created. From their room the subjects could clearly hear the woman climb on a chair to reach something on top of a bookcase. Then they heard a loud crash of the chair collapsing. The woman, after crashing to the ground, could be heard moaning: 'Oh my God, my foot. I can't move it. Oh my ankle. I can't get this thing off me.' She continued to moan over the course of the next 2 minutes, gradually becoming subdued. Finally, she could be heard pulling herself to her feet and exiting. Clearly, the woman was in distress. The question was whether the subjects in the next room would do anything about it. More specifically, *under what circumstances* would the people in the next room do something about the emergency?

The subjects, in fact, did not hear this event under the same circumstances. There were four experimental conditions which varied the relationship between the subjects and the others in the room with him. The subjects heard the incident in the company of either a friend, a stranger, a stranger who was an experimental confederate (preprogrammed not to react to the emergency), or nobody (the subject was alone).

Now, in which case was the woman most likely to receive help? First let us look at the situation in which she was least likely to get help. When the subject waited with a nonreactive stranger, only 7 percent helped. When two naive subjects were together, the woman got help from *either* person in 40 percent of the cases. Her chances of receiving help increased considerably when two friends were together. In that case, *and* when the subject was alone, help was offered in 70 percent of the cases.¹⁰ Although the conditions involving friends and those in which subjects were alone appear to have yielded the same results, we must recognize that in the 'friends' condition

twice as many people were available to act. In both this study and the smoky room experiment, people were more likely to act if they were by themselves. In both cases the presence of a passive confederate greatly inhibited intervention. Their behavior defined the seriousness (or rather lack of seriousness) of the situation for the potential helper.

In another study psychologist Leonard Bickman demonstrated that people will help in the same situation if the victim's need is clarified. The arranged situation was similar to the one just described. In this experiment, however, the subject was always with one confederate who interpreted the incident in one of three ways. In one condition the confederate clearly acknowledged the emergency (she must really be hurt). In a second condition a possible emergency was acknowledged (she might be hurt). In the third condition the confederate interpreted the fall as not serious (well, I guess it's OK).^{*} Subjects in this experiment responded much sooner when the confederate clarified that the woman was hurt.¹¹

Responsibility Diffusing It

Imagine driving down a crowded country road. You are cautiously watching for other cars with one eye and for police cars with the other. As you scan for radar traps, you spot a distressed motorist. He clearly needs help. But then there are so many other people who could do something. After all, you think to yourself, with my meager knowledge of auto mechanics, this person is better off waiting for someone else. Feeling little, if any, guilt, you pass on.

Now imagine driving on the same country road. There are no other cars in sight. When you come upon the distressed motorist, you recognize that there is nobody else available to render help. You think about passing by, but as you do, you are overcome by feelings of guilt—so you stop.

If these scenarios are accurate in describing how we behave, they suggest that the more people are available to help, the less likely it is that anyone will.

The effects of 'diffusion of responsibility' were demonstrated by psychologists John Darley and Bibb Latané. In this simulation, subjects were brought to the laboratory to discuss problems associated with urban living. They were put in individual rooms so that they could say whatever they wanted without getting embarrassed. The subjects listened through an intercom as a confederate (presumably another subject) spoke about his experiences in New York City. With obvious embarrassment, he mentioned that he was prone to seizures when under the pressures of school. Then several other

^{*}Think of the incongruity of this statement. You have just heard a woman fall, crash to the ground, and moan in pain. Then someone you don't know tells you, 'It's OK.'



Figure 5 1 What are this person s chances of getting help? (Refer to p 156)



Figure 5 2 What are this person s chances of getting help? (Refer to p 165)

subjects (actually prerecorded voices) talked for 2 minutes. Finally the real subject was given the opportunity to talk last.

The experimenter had explained that he would not listen to the introductory comments and that a switching device regulated the discussion. The device switched on a different microphone every 2 minutes. When the microphone was switched back to the student with a history of seizures, a voice which gradually became louder and more incoherent muttered: "because-er-er a-cause I-er I-uh I've got a one of the-er sei—er er things coming on and and I could really er use some help so if somebody would-er give me a little h-help uh er-er-er-er- c could somebody er-er help uh-uh-uh (choking sounds) I'm gonna die er er I'm gonna die er-help er-er seizure-er (chokes then quiet)

There was little question about this person's need for help. The major factor varied by the experimenters was the number of people who the subject was led to believe also heard the distressed voice. The major measure was the time which elapsed between the beginning of the seizure until the subject left the cubicle in which he was seated in order to help. In settings in which the subject believed that she alone knew about the seizure, the incident was typically reported before the victim's voice was cut off. Conversely, less than one-third of the subjects helped this quickly if they believed that there were four others available for help. Comparing groups which the subject believed to consist of one, three, or five subjects, it was found that the more people the subject thought were available to help, the less likely did she take prompt and decisive action. There seemed to be a diffusion of responsibility. As the number of potential helpers increased, the personal responsibility felt by any one subject decreased.¹² The old notion that there is safety in numbers may not be correct. In fact, you may be safer with fewer people around.

Reciprocity Mutual Backscratching

The movie hit *The Godfather* opened with a scene in which a mortician comes to Marlon Brando, who played the role of gangster Vito Corleone in the film, asking for a favor. Brando agrees to help the man but makes it clear that someday he will expect a favor in return. Favors are exchanged throughout the film and into *Godfather II* (the sequel to *The Godfather*). Eventually, when favors are no longer traded, the Mafia family tumbles.

The old adage, "I'll scratch your back, you scratch mine," describes what psychologists call the *reciprocity norm*. People, businesses, and nations expect returns for their favors. If you receive too many favors without reciprocating, you will develop a social debt. In other words, you will owe favors. An experiment demonstrating the reciprocity norm was conducted by psychologists Richard Goranson and Leonard Berkowitz at the University of Wisconsin. In the experiment, college women were required to work for someone who had

previously either refused volunteered or was forced to assist them. The results showed that the women worked hardest to assist peers who had previously helped them of their own free will. When asked why they had worked hard for someone who had aided them, the women explained that is what people *ought* to do.¹³ Thus, one reason for helping could be due to feelings of social obligation.¹⁴

Although godfathers and other gangsters deal in the exchange of favors, this does not mean that all people do. Certain life circumstances make some classes of people more dependent upon exchanges of favors than other classes. Consider, for example, some differences between members of the entrepreneurial middle class (in business for themselves), members of the bureaucratic middle class (working for others), and the working class. People of the entrepreneurial middle class are involved in business and thus depend on the exchange of favors. Members of the bureaucratic middle class and members of the working class do not have the same need to exchange favors. They work for the government or for strong businesses which do not depend on anyone's whims. People from each of these social strata have been used in experiments on receiving and giving help. As you might expect, members of the entrepreneurial middle class are more apt to help someone who has just helped them. In other words, these business-oriented people know how to return a favor. Representatives from the bureaucratic middle and the working classes tended to give help when they thought help was needed. Their helping was less dependent on whether the person they were helping had previously helped them. Instead of operating on a norm of reciprocity, the bureaucratic middle- and working-class people seemed to use a *norm of responsibility*.¹⁵

Imitation Following the Leader

People around us give all sorts of hints about the way we should behave. As we have seen in the previous chapter, people can learn vicariously by observing a model. If we are already capable of performing a response, observing a model may increase our motivation to perform the same response. Ample evidence suggests that people are more likely to help if they have recently observed someone else helping.¹⁶ Two examples of this modeling influence on helping behavior were provided in natural settings. In one study, a young female was put in a situation that implied the need for help. She was stationed by a 1964 Ford Mustang with a flat left rear tire and an inflated tire leaning on the left side of her car. The model situation consisted of a 1965 Oldsmobile located about 400 yards behind the first car, raised by a jack, and a girl watching a man changing a flat tire. Of 4000 cars that passed, only 93 (virtually all makes) stopped to help the woman fix her Mustang. There were, however, almost twice as many offers of help from those who had passed the Oldsmobile than when it was absent.

The second study was conducted around Christmas when Salvation Army kettles were placed on the sidewalk in various shopping centers. The solicitors were two females who rang the Salvation Army bell at regular intervals but did not engage in verbal pleas or eye contact with the shoppers. Once every minute a male dressed as a white collar worker approached the kettle from within the store and contributed a nickel. The 20-second period following the model's return to the store was designated as the observation time for the number of people who made a donation. Donations were made by 112 out of 365 people with about twice as many donations made when the model was present than when he was absent. Subsequent studies that varied the sex and race of both solicitor and model produced essentially the same results except for a tendency for black solicitors to elicit a lower percentage of donors than whites.¹⁷

Although we are influenced by models not all models have an equal effect. Probably you will be most influenced by a model you respect or one which is similar to you. This was demonstrated by Harvey Hornstein, Elidra Fisch, and Michael Holmes, social psychologists who chose the streets of Manhattan as their laboratory and used wallets full of money as their props. The subjects were unsuspecting New York pedestrians who discovered a wallet half protruding from an envelope, lying on the sidewalk. If they picked up the envelope they also found a note from someone who had found the wallet and was returning it to the owner. To summarize the scene the subject found an envelope containing a wallet and a note. The note led them to believe that someone else had found the wallet before they had and then lost it again. The note purportedly written by the first finder served as a model to the subject. One-third of the people who found the wallet also found a note which made positive and courteous comments about being able to help. Another one-third encountered a note which contained negative comments and complaints about helping. The remaining subjects found a note with neutral comments about helping.

In order to determine the age, sex, and other characteristics of the people who picked up the wallet the experimenters stationed spies nearby. Then they waited to see how many people actually returned the wallet and the money in it. Nearly two-thirds of the wallets were returned when the note-writing model made positive or neutral comments about helping. When the model made negative comments about helping only 10 percent returned the wallet.

Now we come to the part concerning the similarity between the subjects and the model. The results we have just reported are for notes which were written in plain, clear English. For example, the neutral note read, "I found your wallet which I am returning. Everything is here just as I found it." But would people copy the behavior of neutral or positive models if they were unable to identify with the model? To test this Hornstein and his associates

created some notes as though they had been written by a visitor to the United States. For example, one read: "I am visit your country finding your ways not familiar and strange. But I find your wallet which I here return. Everything is here just as I find it." Since the note appeared to have been written by someone dissimilar to the subjects, we might not expect the subjects to imitate the model's behavior. In fact, this is what the researchers observed. When the note had apparently been written by a foreigner, it had no more effect when it was positive or negative than it did when it was neutral. Thus models have an effect on helping behavior—when they are similar to us. When they are dissimilar they may not influence our helping behavior.¹⁸

The best model, of course, is someone who is an acknowledged leader. Helping in emergencies requires quick and decisive action. Studies have shown that groups headed by assertive leaders take more rapid decisive action than groups headed by a leader who was arbitrarily picked by the experimenter. Under the latter form of leadership, groups often had to re-define leadership before they could take the appropriate action.¹⁹ This slow process of transitory leadership could be costly to a needy victim. In emergencies, he who hesitates is lost.

Reinforcement Cost and Reward

When approaching a situation which may require your assistance, your actions may depend upon the consequences of your helping. According to learning theory, you will help when your action is followed by positive events. You will not help if there are negative consequences for your intervention. In the case of Kitty Genovese, neighbors may have avoided direct intervention because the cost was too high. Perhaps they feared that the assailant might turn his knife upon them. The negative consequences of helping may have outweighed the positive benefits.

A demonstration of these cost and reward considerations was conducted by two psychologists who used the streets of Dayton, Ohio, as their laboratory. The subjects in the experiment were unsuspecting citizens who, while walking along the street, were approached by a female confederate who asked for directions to a local department store. After the unsuspecting citizen had given the directions, the confederate responded in one of three ways. Sometimes she gave the positive reply, "Thank you very much, I really appreciate this," and rewarded the subject with a smile. On other occasions she would give the negative reply, "I can't understand what you're saying. Never mind, I'll ask someone else," and frown accordingly. To some subjects she gave the simple neutral reply, "Okay."

After this incident, the subject continued down the street about 75 feet. Here he encountered a second confederate. This confederate looked in a

store window as the subject approached. When the subject was about 6 feet away, she turned and walked toward him. As she approached, a small paper bag fell to the ground and the confederate continued on as though she hadn't noticed. The results showed that almost all of the subjects who had received positive or neutral feedback for helping the first confederate also helped the second confederate. Among those who had received negative feedback for their prior efforts to help, only 40 percent offered their assistance to the second confederate.²⁰

Success in particular is a rewarding experience which seems to increase helping behavior. This was demonstrated by psychologist Alice Isen, who had schoolteachers take perceptual and psychomotor skill tests. Isen told her subjects that she was measuring the relationship between psychomotor skills and creativity. Then she told some of the teachers they had done extremely well and others that they had done very poorly. A third group was given no feedback about their performance. The type of feedback was determined randomly—it had nothing to do with actual performance.

After their experiences with success, failure, or no feedback, the teachers were given an opportunity to anonymously contribute money for an air conditioner to make the school library more comfortable. Those who had been told they had succeeded on the tests donated an average of 46 cents. Those who believed they had done poorly gave an average of 7 cents. In a similar study, college students who thought they had succeeded on a task were more likely to offer assistance to another person who was struggling with an armload of books. It seems therefore that 'the warm glow of success' can make you a more helping person.²¹

There are, however, certain circumstances under which even failure can induce helping. This happens when a person fails to maintain a positive self-image. In one study, personality tests were administered to college students in introductory psychology courses. These were followed by a 50-item multiple-choice test in psychology, which purportedly served as a self-improvement program for those courses. Each subject was assured that the test would not affect his course grade unless he made a very high score. In half the cases, an experimental confederate posing as a student who had already taken the test gave each subject the chance to cheat by disclosing that most of the correct answers were choice B (which in fact they were not). Half the subjects were also given bogus feedback designed to bolster their self-images. As the subject was about to conclude his multiple-choice test, he was given a written interpretation of his performance on the personality test that was highly complimentary (e.g., saying that he was poised, self-assured, resourceful, flexible).

In all conditions, each subject was then asked to comply with a request for help that involved the scoring of a stack of about 500 tests. The highest



Figure 5 3 What are this person s chances of getting help? (Refer to p 165)



Figure 5 4 What are this person s chances of getting help? (Refer to p 165)

rate of helping behavior was displayed by subjects who cheated but had received no bogus feedback. The offered explanation was that a person's act of cheating is inconsistent with his positive self-image and by complying with a request he can restore that image. The subjects who received the bogus feedback prior to the request for help had their positive self-images restored that way and thus did not feel the need to comply.²²

Not only does success cause good moods and warm glows but it also causes feelings of competence. Perhaps telling people that they have succeeded on a test may make them more helpful merely because they feel that since they are more competent, they are also more able to give help.

To explore this issue, psychologists Alice Isen and Paula Levin decided to manipulate mood in a way that did not effect people's feelings of competence. To create a good mood, individuals studying in several university and college libraries were given cookies. After a while a person came into the libraries and asked the students to volunteer as assistants in an experiment. As experimental assistants they were given the choice of playing either a helpful, positive role or a distracting, negative role. Those who had received cookies volunteered most often for the helpful role; those who had not received cookies volunteered more frequently for the distracting role.²³

If nothing else, Isen and Levin established the first empirical link between cookies and kindness. More specifically (and seriously) they showed that mood, not just feelings of competence, can produce altruism. But there are still alternative explanations. Perhaps cookies cause kindness because subjects may have been imitating an altruistic cookie-dispensing model. To eliminate this alternative explanation, Isen and Levin created an on-the-spot laboratory in telephone booths of San Francisco and Philadelphia shopping centers. Half of the people who came to use the phones found a dime which had been planted by the experimenters in the coin-return tray. The other half did not find a dime. This situation allowed for people to have an unexpected pleasant surprise without being exposed to an altruistic model. As the subjects left the phone booth, a female confederate approached and dropped a folder full of papers in his path. Those who found dimes were more likely to help the experimenter pick up her papers than those who had not found dimes. This study shows that, in the absence of altruistic models or manipulated feelings of competence, a positive mood can make helping more likely. A little bit of cheer always helps!

Location: Urban and Rural

Psychologist Stanley Milgram has spent the last few years studying the psychological consequences of living in big cities. One such consequence, according to Milgram, is that people are continually exposed to the needs of

others. In order to protect their own private lives, people in big cities learn to tune out the needs of other people. They engage in self-protecting maneuvers which minimize their involvement with others. This does not mean that the city folks would not be truly concerned if they got involved. If somehow, they are forced to help, the social and psychological forces of genuine warmth and concern will take over. In other words, city dwellers may not volunteer to help as often as rural people. When they do help, however, the quality of their help may be no worse.²⁴

An experiment conducted on the streets of Cambridge, Massachusetts demonstrates how some city dwellers will avoid helping if they can get away with it. The situation in the experiment was natural and realistic. As people walked down a city street, someone (actually a confederate of the experimenters) collapsed on the street. In one condition the confederate collapsed right in the path of an oncoming person. Under these circumstances escape is difficult—it is hard to pretend you have not observed what is happening. In another condition the confederate collapsed on the other side of the street. Here escape is easy and it is no problem to pretend that you did not see what happened. In the experiment, observers from a car made sure that everyone they counted as a subject had at least noticed the victim. If a subject approached the victim he was requested to place a call to the victim's roommate. In contrast to those who had an easy escape, those for whom escape was difficult were more likely to approach the victim and the probability that they would place the phone call was more than five times as great.²⁵ Perhaps one way to get an increase in the amount of helping behavior is to make it hard for people to escape from the situation.

As a postscript to this section, let us briefly discuss the circumstance under which kindness and help, although offered, is rejected.

If people do favors for you, they will probably become more attractive to you.²⁶ There are occasions, however, when people try so hard to persuade with favors that their efforts have just the opposite effect because they are seen as manipulative and insincere.

Psychologists Jack Brehm and Ann Cole demonstrated this type of reaction. In their experiment, college students sat in a room with another student (actually a confederate) about whom they would soon be asked to give their first impressions. While they were waiting, the confederate asked permission to leave the room. In some cases he returned to the room carrying a Coke for himself and one for the subject (to whom he was a complete stranger). In other cases he simply returned and took his seat. When asked to help the confederate to perform a dull task, it was observed that those who were given the Coke were less likely to help than those not given a Coke.²⁷ Presumably,

the subjects in this experiment thought the gift of a Coke was being used as a means of manipulation. Perceived as such, the act of kindness had the opposite effect.

HELP-GIVERS AND RECEIVERS

Who helps whom? Psychologists have addressed themselves at length to this question but have been less than successful in coming up with the answer. Numerous studies have been conducted in which the sex, race, or age of the helpers and the helped were varied. The net result of these studies has been a mixed bag of findings which makes it almost impossible to make generalizations. At first glance it appears that people of the same race help each other more often than people of different races; that men are more helpful than women; and that women are helped more often than men. But then the plot thickens. The same-race tendency to help occurs when the victim is drunk, but not when he is seriously ill. It also occurs more often among the politically conservative than among liberals. Black men are more helpful than black women, while white men and women do not differ in their willingness to help. Men help people similar to themselves more often than women do. Whether women are helped more than men depends on geographic locations. And so on.

Evidently, it is easier to find out why people help each other than who helps whom. We are nevertheless going to cite some studies on who helps, be it only because some of the techniques used by the investigators are interesting or even amusing. But you will have to draw your own conclusions about exactly what the results mean.

Race To Each His Own?

Who is the Good Samaritan? Psychologist Jane Piliavin and her associates conducted an extensive study in which about 4450 men and women who traveled on a New York subway during a 9 week period were observed. The particular train was chosen because it typically carried a composition of riders that was 55 percent white and 45 percent black. On different occasions each of four informally dressed young men (three whites and one black) simulated emergency situations that called for help. About a minute after the train passed the first station, the 'victim' staggered forward, collapsed, and remained supine on the floor looking at the ceiling. To simulate the effect of intoxication, he smelled of liquor and carried a liquor bottle tightly wrapped in a brown paper bag. On other occasions illness was simulated by having the victim carry a cane. On several occasions each of four young white men acted as models who administered immediate or delayed help. Observers noted the race, sex, and location of every person who helped the victim and of every person who was in an adjacent area to the victim, and in all cases

tried to elicit comments from these people. Helping behavior occurred with rather high frequency (about 60%) and was mostly exhibited by males, with a same-race tendency to help when the victim appeared drunk. The victim who appeared ill received help more frequently than the one who appeared drunk. The number of bystanders had little effect on the speed of helping and the impact of models dissipated the longer the emergency lasted without help being offered.

Despite the complexity of the results, Piliavin and her colleagues agreed that the extent of help given can best be measured by the anticipated result for the helper: praise, censure, self-blame, effort, embarrassment, disgust, possible physical harm, and so on. The major implication of this view is that positive, altruistic behavior is largely governed by a selfish desire to rid oneself of unpleasant emotions.²⁸

For another study on the effects of the race of the victim, a wrong-number research method was developed. Two groups of New York-registered voters (230 Liberal Party members and 217 Conservative Party members) were matched as closely as possible on their election districts and types of dwelling units. Each subject received an apparent wrong-number telephone call in which the caller (a male or a female posing as a stranded motorist) asked for help in an easily identifiable white or black accent. The caller asked for Ralph's Garage and immediately informed the subject that he was stuck on the parkway. Upon being informed that he had the wrong number, the caller then indicated that he was out of change to make an additional call and asked the subject to relay the message to the garage. The frequency of calls to the number provided by the stranded motorist (actually to a telephone manned by the experimenter) served as the measure for helping behavior.

Who helped whom? Males tended to render assistance more frequently than females did, but females were not assisted more frequently than were males. In all cases, whites received more help than blacks, but the extent to which blacks were helped less than whites was greater among conservatives than among liberals.²⁹

To complicate matters further, let us combine race and sex. Suppose it is Friday evening and you are ready for a weekend of fun. Before you get going, you have to stop at the store for some groceries. As you head for the front of the store, the bottom of someone's grocery bag breaks right in front of you and the contents spill onto the ground. Question: Will you help? A further question: Will you be affected by the race and sex of the person with the broken bag?

In one study, black and white experimental confederates of both sexes dropped bags of groceries in the paths of subjects of both races. Black men, it was observed, helped more than black women. White men and women did

not differ in the degree to which they helped. Women of both races were more likely to ignore someone of their own race. Overall, white women received no more help than black women, and whites helped no more than blacks.³⁰

More recently, a group of psychologists from Florida State University arranged for black or white motorists to have engine trouble in neighborhoods which had either predominantly black or predominantly white inhabitants. Distressed female motorists were helped much sooner than male victims. The black motorists were helped sooner in areas housing primarily blacks, while the white motorists got the fastest help in white neighborhoods. In most cases, the helpers were male and of the same race as the victim. The results differed, however, when the scene shifted to areas surrounding college campuses. On that occasion, white motorists got help sooner near a predominantly black college than near a white campus. Conversely, black students received help faster near campuses with predominantly white students.³¹

Sex Is Chivalry Dead?

Is chivalry dead? What about the days in which gentlemen were expected to help ladies, and ladies were expected to accept the assistance with a curtsy and a blush? The trend for change in sex roles has led some to speculate that chivalry is no longer with us.

To check on the health status of chivalry, psychologist Bibb Latane arranged to have men and women drop coins in public elevators in a southern city (Atlanta), a western city (Seattle), and a midwestern city (Columbus). Observations were made to determine how often these coin-dropping men and women would get assistance from members of the opposite sex. In Columbus, women helped men almost as often as men helped women. In either case, helping was uncommon. In Atlanta, men usually helped women, but women rarely helped men. Seattle fell in between the two extremes.³² These results suggest that chivalry is alive and well in Atlanta, choking and coughing in Seattle, and almost dead in Columbus.

Life-Style Is Hipness Kindness?

Birds of a feather flock together, as was pointed out in Chapter 3. Since we are attracted to people like us, we might expect to get more help from similar people than from people who are dissimilar. To investigate this issue, three psychologists at Purdue University defined criteria to identify some students as hippies and others as straights. They then had hippies and straights of both sexes go up to students who fell into the same four categories and say:

Excuse me, could I borrow a dime for a long distance phone call? It's kind of important. Both male and female subjects tended to help someone similar to themselves. This trend, however, was more evident for men than for women.




Figure 5-5 Is chivalry dead? If judged by the degree males helped females to retrieve dropped pencils or coins, chivalry is alive and well in Atlanta, choking and coughing in Seattle, and almost dead in Columbus. From Latané 1972.

In general, women helped men more often than they helped women. Straight women were also more willing than straight men to give help to hippie men.³³

The reluctance of straights to help hippies was demonstrated in a recent study completed by our colleagues Richard Graf and Jeanne Riddell. The scene once again involved a stranded motorist (hippie or straight, male or female, black or white). Helping responses among blacks, hippies, and military personnel were then compared. The results indicated that blacks and hippies were helpful to all. The military people, on the other hand, only helped distressed motorists who had 'acceptable' (nonhippie) physical characteristics.³⁴

Request Style: Accentuate the Positive

If you needed help, how would you ask for it? You could use a positive approach and tell the person how nice it would be if he would help. Or you might try a negative approach and explain what a bad guy he would be if he refused to help.

Psychologists Mitchell Kriss, Eugene Idenbaum, and Frederick Tesch investigated this issue using the previously described 'wrong number' method.

To refresh your memory. If you were a subject, your phone would ring, and when you picked it up, someone would say, 'Hello, Ralph's Garage?' Most likely, you would then explain that you were not Ralph's Garage and that the caller had reached the wrong number. Before you could hang up, however, the caller would say, 'Oh, I'm sorry to have disturbed you. Oh, wait a minute! That was my last dime and I'm stuck out here. My car has broken down and I think it's really serious.'

Now comes the caller's appeal for help. What type of request will be most likely to elicit your help? Let us look at three possibilities.

Negative appeal Look, think how you would feel if you were in a similar position and you weren't helped. So would you please call my garage for me?

Positive appeal If you help me, I'd appreciate it and you'd know that you helped someone out of a really tough spot. So would you please call my garage for me?

Neutral (simple) appeal 'Would you please call my garage for me?'

Which of these calls would get you to call the garage for them? According to Kriss and his colleagues, positive and simple appeals evoked more helping than negative appeals. The results, however, were complicated by the curious finding that the type of appeal only has an effect when the caller's status is unknown or when his status is opposite that of the receiver of the call.³⁵

If you need help, you can focus your appeal in at least two ways. You can emphasize your own need for help, or you can direct attention to your potential helper's feelings of duty and obligation. In other words, it is either 'I need help' or 'You should help me.' Recent research has shown that victim-centered ('I need help') appeals were most effective when the requested favor was legitimate (e.g., victim is injured, asks letter to be mailed) but ineffective when the favor was not seen as legitimate (e.g., victim is in a hurry to go shopping, asks letter to be mailed). Helper-centered appeals ('you should help') were found to be only moderately effective in all cases.³⁶

IN CONCLUSION: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

Whatever the phrase 'milk of human kindness' conveys, it seems to aid people in attaining personal and social adjustment. For how can you lose? Everything points to the fact that to give is as rewarding as to receive. Even if you give without expecting anything tangible in return, you are ahead of the game. You are simply rewarding yourself by satisfying your own needs (altruism involving helpful acts for which nothing is expected in return is, alas, a rare phenomenon).

Things are really not that simple. Wherever there are rewards, there is

also a potential for loss. The ominous concept of cost will begin to make its presence felt. It seems that as long as their personal ledger shows profit (or at least an even balance between giving and taking), people help each other out all the time. We donate blood, contribute to charity, help each other move, and so on. The list of helping behavior is virtually endless. But it is conceivable that when the situation contains potential costs which might upset this delicate balance, people are tempted to think more in terms of charity begins at home than of what the Good Book says.

The shocking, apparently selfish, behavior of bystanders to people in distress such as in the Kitty Genovese case (p. 149), seems to bear out the cost concept. The mass media too have been bombarding us with explanations attributing this lack of willingness to help to such causes as cynicism, apathy, breakdown of the family, and lack of religion. Several psychologists have come up with the notion of the norm of reciprocity. This mutual back-scratching procedure, in which people expect returns for their favors, has been well documented (p. 155).

The norm of reciprocity does not, however, offer a convincing explanation of why Kitty Genovese was abandoned. Granted, for any of the bystanders to rush out of their homes and come to Kitty's aid was a dangerous thing to do. The cost for the helper was potentially high, since Kitty's assailant could very well have injured or even killed anyone who came to the rescue. But to lift the telephone off the hook and dial the police for help (which nobody did) involved practically no cost at all, unless those bystanders were already thinking of costs such as time to be spent in identifying the assailant in a police lineup, court appearances, and the like. If this were so, then the callousness of the bystanders was indeed shocking, considering that what they witnessed was a deliberate murder of another human being.

Fortunately, psychologists have come up with different explanations for this nonhelping behavior. We hope that many of the studies cited in this chapter convinced you that people are *not* necessarily indifferent, apathetic, or dehumanized. People who refrain from helping others often do so because they lack clarity of the situation (p. 150), because they believe somebody else will help (page 153), because the social cost of helping is too high (p. 158), or simply because they imitate an acknowledged leader (p. 156). When they clearly understand the distress situation and realize that nobody else will be available, people *will* help.

It is quite obvious that there will always be individual differences among care-givers. Some will help more and some will help less. In addition, there are such factors as geographic location (p. 160) and life-style to be considered (p. 165). On the whole, however, the picture is encouraging. People have a great respect for the norm of responsibility (p. 156). If you need help from those around you, your chances of getting it are quite good. If you

adhere to the more pessimistic view of the mass media and decide to withdraw into your shell because of the futility of it all you are likely to bring adjustment problems on yourself

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6

ON JUST BEING WITH OTHERS

GROUP FORMATION

Diads, Triads, and Small Groups in General
The Joiners Anxious Curious or Just Shopping Around
Role, Position, and Status
Group Communication Circles, Chains Wheels and Y s
Proxemics Getting Too Close

GROUP OUTPUT

Size How Many Cooks Spoil the Broth?
Composition To Mix or Not to Mix?
Climate Autocratic, Democratic or Doing Your Thing
Style Cautious or Risky?

CROWDS, MOBS, RIOTS, AND PANIC

LEADERSHIP

Leadership and Personality Are Leaders Born or Made?
Effective Leadership The Contingency Model
Leaders and Followers Banking Idiosyncrasy Credit

IN CONCLUSION PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

GROUP FORMATION**Diads, Triads, and Small Groups in General**

Being with others can refer to your membership in a formally established organization or just being a part of a crowd, a mob, or an audience. In each case your behavior will be markedly affected as a result. The main purpose of this chapter is to focus on small, informal groups. Such groups constitute an integral part of the daily activities of virtually every one of us. Whether at home, at work, or at play, we are all group members. There are family groups, work groups, classroom groups, social groups, encounter groups, therapy groups—the possibilities are limitless.

Despite their diversity, *all* groups share some common characteristics, or 'dynamics.' You can be sure, for example, that as the size of any group increases there is a corresponding increment of talking done by fewer and fewer members—as the size of the group increases, its leader inevitably becomes more autocratic and directive. Social psychologists in their studies of *group dynamics* have made extensive observations of such small, informal groups.

How small is small, then? Obviously, the smallest group is a two-person group or a *diad*. Much of our previous discussion on aggression and helping behavior (see Chapters 4 and 5) involved primarily one-to-one relationships and thus was diadic. But for the purpose of exploring the effects of being with more than one other, diads simply won't do. Even three-person groups or *triads* have properties that diads lack. For example, two members can form a coalition and gang up on the third member, or one member can mediate conflicts between the other two members. Obviously, the larger the group, the more complex the interaction possibilities. Although there are no hard and fast rules set by psychologists about the size of the groups they study, they usually range from five to nine persons in membership.

The Joiners: Anxious, Curious, or Just Shopping Around

Suppose you have just volunteered for a psychology experiment—be it for credit, grades, money, or sheer curiosity. On a given day you arrive at the assigned location on time. The room looks like something out of a science fiction movie, with electronic paraphernalia and other laboratory equipment strewn around. As you are waiting with other students, you almost expect the 'mad scientist' to enter the room momentarily. And, indeed, a stern figure in a white smock appears and introduces himself with a heavy foreign accent (always sinister!) as Dr. Gregor Zillstein of the medical school, department of psychiatry and neurology. He thanks all of you for agreeing to undergo a series of electric shocks while having your pulse rate taken. Some of the shocks are intense, he suggests, but they won't hurt—not much, anyway. Besides, there is no danger of permanent tissue damage. He then announces

a ten-minute delay to set up the equipment and he gives each of you the chance to wait either in a private room alone or in another classroom with some of the other students in the experiment

What would your choice be? Would you have preferred to be alone or with a group of other individuals who are essentially strangers to you? The chances are that you would prefer to wait with the others. At least, that is what psychologist Stanley Schachter found when he subjected female undergraduates at the University of Minnesota to the above condition.¹ Two-thirds of his subjects had become highly anxious after Dr. Zillstein's appearance. Somehow joining others in the same predicament may help alleviate anxiety. At least, this is what the subjects may have had in mind. When a similar group of subjects were met by Dr. Zillstein acting in a far less alarming manner (and presumably causing little or no anxiety) two-thirds of the subjects preferred either to wait alone or did not care one way or another. It seems that misery loves company or to be more accurate misery loves *miserable* company!

Despite Schachter's dramatic findings, there is no unanimity of opinion among psychologists who have conducted similar experiments. While their findings generally support those of Schachter especially in the case of first-borns (who show the highest degree of affiliative tendencies), the underlying motivation has not as yet been clearly established.² Whether threats of electric shock really induce anxiety is debatable since joining others may have occurred either to fulfill the experimenter's expectation or perhaps, out of curiosity.

If people join others out of curiosity the question arises: curiosity about what? As early as 1954 psychologist Leon Festinger had proposed that being with others provides individuals with "social reality." In his theory of *social comparison* Festinger suggested that groups can convey feedback to those who join them, and thus provide them with a better understanding of the world around them.³ In the case of Schachter's subjects they may have been not so much anxious as uncertain about what was going on, hoping subsequently to get more information from the reactions of others. At least one study which largely replicated Schachter's but varied the subjects' certainty about their own reactions (by making a supposedly accurate gauge fluctuate wildly during physical measurements) clearly established that the greatest need to affiliate occurred among those subjects receiving the most uncertain feedback.⁴

It seems that both Schachter and his critics are on the right track. People may join groups merely because they are curious about others, perhaps even hoping to be stimulated by new associations. But the process of getting one's kicks from new acquaintances seems to be tempered with a heavy dose of anxiety. In a study purporting to engage in dream research, each of 160 col-

lege students who enlisted for the experiment was told that he had been assigned (as the only outsider) to another work group. Prior to joining the other group was described to the subject as either similar or dissimilar to him. Three additional experimental conditions were then established. In the first condition no further information was given to the subject, presumably evoking in him concern about whether or not he will be liked by his new group. In the second condition the subject was told that, for plausible reasons, he would be introduced to his new group in a most favorable manner. It was assumed that the subject would thus have little or no concern since he had been assured of being liked. In the third condition the subject was told that, for plausible reasons, he would be introduced to his new group in a rather unfavorable manner, thus increasing his concern for being disliked.

Given the choice of joining which group do you suppose was most frequently cited by the subjects? The obvious answer would be groups with members similar to the subject. We already know that birds of a feather flock together from previous studies of attitudinal similarity and interpersonal attraction (see Chapter 3). But similarity does not always breed content. As expected, when the subjects were concerned about being liked by members of the group they were about to join (conditions 1 and 3) they chose similar groups. However, the subjects who were assured of being liked (condition 2) showed a marked interest in joining *dissimilar* groups.⁵ Apparently with anxiety out of the way people are curious and willing to take their chances with strangers.

Finally, there is the matter of difficulty in joining. Did you ever try to join a fraternity or a sorority, an athletic team, a religious group, or social club? Obviously people join groups for many reasons. But there is one reason so paradoxical that it almost defies explanation. It seems that as it becomes harder for some individuals to join the group of their choice they not only increase their efforts to join but their liking for the group as well! The explanation of this phenomenon is rooted in the cognitive process of individuals as postulated by the theory of *cognitive dissonance* (see Chapter 8). In their classic experiment psychologists Elliot Aronson and Judson Mills subjected college women who volunteered to participate in discussion groups to three kinds of initiation. Those who underwent severe initiation were required to read aloud to a male experimenter some embarrassing material prior to joining the group. In the mild initiation condition the subjects were required to read aloud some material which was not embarrassing, whereas in the third condition (the control) they were not required to read anything. Each subject then listened to a tape recording of the group she was about to join and then evaluated the group and its discussants. The subjects who underwent severe initiation judged their respective groups as significantly more attractive than did those who underwent mild initiation or no initiation.⁶

According to the theory of cognitive dissonance this choice was to be expected since the subjects had to justify the pain and effort they had experienced during the severe initiation. Of course there are other possible explanations besides cognitive dissonance. Perhaps the subjects were pleased with themselves for mastering such a difficult task and thus chose the group that offered them this challenge. One way or another it seems that for some joiners roadblocks thrown by the group provide a certain attraction.

Role, Position, and Status

To understand the effect of groups on individuals it is important to know how the group is structured. Many psychologists have addressed themselves to this task by coming up with descriptions of the individual's role, position, and status in the group. Unfortunately, these concepts are frequently used in a vague, nebulous, and confusing manner.⁷ Let us be as specific as possible. *Position* refers to a specific slot occupied by a particular individual in a group while the term *role* is reserved for the behavior displayed by an individual in a certain position. For example, a family consisting of parents and two children is a group in which the position of the female parent is that of a mother. So we have a mother position, a father position (also a husband position and a wife position), and a child position (or a son position, daughter position, etc.). The typical pattern of behavior of the occupant of the position is his or her role. The dominant father, the caring mother, and the obedient child display the typical *father role*, *mother role*, and *child role*.

Do they really? What about the father who is not dominant, the mother who does not care, and the child who is not obedient? Obviously *role* needs further definition. Suppose you are a friend of the family and also consider yourself an objective observer. You describe the father's behavior as somewhat meek and subdued. This would refer to the father's actual behavior or *enacted role*. But this may or may not coincide with the way the other members of the family, including the father himself, perceive the same behavior. If the mother considers the father to be meek and henpecked (and thus essentially agrees with you) while the father considers himself a dominant John Wayne type, we can safely assume that there is quite a difference in the *perceived role* of the father. But this is not all. Take the case where the mother's actual behavior as assessed by objective observers (and hence enacted role) and as perceived by her family (and hence perceived role) shows callousness and indifference toward her children. The enacted role and the perceived role of the mother are thus identical. But such behavior is contrary to the expectations that most people hold concerning the mother position. Thus the mother's enacted role and perceived role differ considerably from her *prescribed role*, or, in other words, what society says her behavior ought to be. Given a great deal of information about the mother's past behavior, we

can even speak of a *predicted role*. That is, if we know that she has been arrested many times for child neglect or child abuse and has shown no significant attempts to change her callousness toward her children is not too surprising.

Finally, the term *status* refers to an evaluation of the contribution of particular roles to the welfare of the group. In the family group example, the prescribed role for the man in the husband-father position is to be the bread winner and provider. This may differ from his enacted role if he is lazy, unambitious, and unemployed. His perceived role depends on who does the judging. In his own eyes, he may think that he does more than his share in providing for his family, but his family, however, views him in line with his predicted role, which is based on his past record as an inadequate provider. The net result is low status within the family for the father (though he may not even be aware of it).

While these examples were designed to clear up the confusion in the usage of the term *role*, there is a serious real-life problem due to role confusion. All of us display a variety of role behaviors because of the many positions that we occupy at home, at work, and at play. We have already seen that sex roles involve different perceptions and sometimes different expectations for and by men and women (see Chapter 2). The same holds true for practically every role, often resulting in confusion and stress for the individuals concerned. Experimental studies have shown that minor neuroses can originate from such role conflicts as those between homemaker and career woman, military chaplain and officer, or black and middle-class black.⁸ Fortunately, under normal conditions, role confusion tends to be minimal, since most individuals can control their voluntary participation in various groups. Men or women who belong to the Knights of Columbus, a Catholic organization, are not likely to become participants in the Planned Parenthood League, which advocates contraception and birth control. Furthermore, since an individual is ordinarily engaged in one group at a time, only one set of roles is dominant at a given occasion, reducing the chance of conflict even more.

Clearly defined positions and roles are not always a hedge against role confusion. They often degenerate into a rigid format which only increases defensive behavior and stress. A recent study on the role behavior of professionals in mental institutions is a case in point.⁹ This study showed the close relationship which exists between role rigidity and interdisciplinary squabbles. Social workers in such institutions have lower status than psychologists because they usually do not hold a doctoral degree. As a result, they attempt to enact the role of psychologists by increasing their usage of standard psychological jargon. Psychologists keep developing a new mystical professional jargon to differentiate themselves from the social workers. Psy-

chologists also zealously guard what they consider their own professional domain (psychotherapy and testing). Enjoying top status as physicians, psychiatrists tend to draw on the secret magic of both psychology and medicine so that when challenged by an expert in one discipline they can always use counterarguments involving the jargon of the other discipline. General physicians' initial perceived role and status are high, but subsequent enacted role behavior shows that they are assigned routine jobs that most nurses can and do handle as well. The inevitable result—loss of status and the emergence of stress among the general physicians. Altogether, not a very happy scene.

Even when positions and roles are not clearly spelled out, they emerge anyway. Studies of small, informal groups show that sooner or later members display systematic patterns of role behavior even though their positions are not clearly defined. For example, in a discussion group with no formally assigned leader, some members will show task-oriented behavior while others will show maintenance-oriented behavior. Group *task roles* are directed toward solving the group's problems and involve such behavior as initiating new ideas, providing useful information, or coordinating the efforts and contributions of individual members of the group. *Maintenance roles* are concerned with group morale and involve such behavior as encouraging others, promoting general harmony, and catering to individual members' problems. In addition, there are instances of what psychologist Bernard Bass calls *self-oriented roles*, individual roles that are primarily self-centered in nature and perhaps irrelevant to the group's task or maintenance (e.g., the behavior of a recognition-seeking playboy).¹⁰ Bass believes that it is possible to make certain generalizations about the personality characteristics of people on the basis of role behavior (to be described later on), but this brings up the thorny issue of role and personality.

Have you ever noticed that college instructors are pompous individuals? Before you enthusiastically endorse this proposition—beware! You may be expressing bias, prejudice, or, at best, some harmless stereotyping. But suppose that, with the aid of objective observers, you had conducted careful observations of a wide array of college instructors and, using a good operational definition for 'pomposity,' you found that college instructors *are* pompous. You are then immediately faced with the circular question of whether role affects personality or vice versa. In other words, since the expected (and probably enacted) role of the instructor makes him the important dispenser of knowledge and grades, is it really surprising that such omnipotence takes its toll and creates a pompous individual? On the other hand, perhaps individuals who are pompous begin with gravitate toward those professions which allow, and in fact maximize, role behavior that is pompous. These circular questions permeate practically every occupational field. One could argue, for example, that most psychotherapists are themselves neurotic. But




Figure 6 1 Roles generate behavior This sequence of pictures shows scenes from the by now classic experiment of simulated prison conditions by psychologist Philip Zimbardo At the beginning of the study the young men were randomly assigned to their respective roles of prisoners and guards In the end roles were played well enough as to affect the men s personalities So well in fact that the study had to be discontinued before it ran its originally planned course (see text) From Zimbardo 1973

is it because of the toll-taking constant emotional involvement in the delusional system of their patients or is it because they actively seek out a profession where they can express their neuroticism freely and legitimately?

Because of the circularity problem few studies have been conducted on the relationship between role and personality. One investigator asked rank-and-file workers in an appliance factory to respond to an attitude questionnaire dealing with management and union. During the year 23 of the respondents were promoted to foremen and 35 were elected union stewards. Fifteen months after taking the first test they took the test once again as did a control group consisting of workers who had not been promoted. Those whose positions had changed also underwent systematic shifts in attitude whereas those who experienced no change in position displayed little or none in attitude. The foremen's attitudes toward management became more favorable while that of the union stewards more favorable toward the union.¹¹ It is possible that the change in positions and roles demonstrated the influence of roles upon attitudes rather than the selection of people for a position on the basis of their attitude. But despite this suggestive study the question still remains unanswerable. The choice of people who became foremen or union stewards (or a choice of no promotion for that matter) was probably not made in an arbitrary manner. Conceivably those people may all along have displayed abilities, attitudes, and general personality characteristics compatible with the position in which they eventually landed and were therefore chosen accordingly.

Nevertheless some psychologists believe that roles can generate attitudes and behavior. One of the most concrete examples of roles changing personality comes from a fascinating study about prisons. The experiment, known as the Stanford County Prison experiment, was conducted by psychologist Philip Zimbardo and his students at Stanford University. A mock prison was created in the basement of the Stanford Psychology Building. Earlier the subject population consisting of normal middle-class college men had been randomly assigned as guards or prisoners.

The experiment itself started in a way that took the prisoners by surprise. Without warning they were picked up at their homes and taken to the police station to be searched, fingerprinted, and booked. Then they were blindfolded and taken to the simulated prison. The prison was not a literal replication of prison conditions but it contained many elements which made it similar to a real prison. It had no windows or clocks and it forced the prisoners to be almost totally dependent upon their guards. The guards were told to maintain strict law and order. They carried billy clubs, wore khaki uniforms, had access to handcuffs, blew their whistles, and wore sunglasses to hide their emotions.¹²

The experiment was originally scheduled to last for two weeks. After only

six days however it had to be halted because the subjects became too much involved in the roles to which they had been randomly assigned. The prisoners became dehumanized, lacking all sense of unity and self-esteem. Only their hatred for the guards somehow kept them hanging on. As the prisoners became more passive, the guards became more assertive. They greatly increased the frequency of their commands, insults, and other incidents of debasing behavior. It was not uncommon for them to use threats and to actually enjoy bullying the prisoners into controllable behavior. One guard expressed his feelings this way:

*I was surprised at myself. I made them call each other names and clean toilets out with their bare hands. I practically considered the prisoners cattle and I kept thinking that I have to watch out for them in case they try something.*¹³

Remember, at the beginning of the study the young men were randomly assigned to their respective roles of prisoners and guards. In the end, they played their roles too well. So well, in fact, that the study had to be discontinued before it ran its originally planned course.

Some psychologists have gone even further. They believe that entire populations show personality, attitudinal, and behavioral characteristics as a function of their particular roles. Psychologist Bernard Bass, reviewing about 60 studies in which his *Orientation Inventory* (ORI) had been employed, suggested that maintenance role behavior is displayed by *interaction-oriented* individuals whose personality is marked by a strong need to be accepted and to share things with others. Women, younger persons, Baptists, Catholics, student teachers, counselors, hospital attendants, and social workers tend to be interaction oriented. *Task-oriented* individuals show high degrees of persistence, confidence, and tolerance. They are predominantly men, older persons, Unitarians, engineers, managers, people with fewer personal problems, and weight lifters (!). Finally, *self-oriented* people are portrayed as easily irritated individuals striving for extrinsic rewards, as expecting to be endorsed by others on the basis of past performance rather than future potential, and as being concerned more with their own needs than with those of others. According to Bass, self-oriented individuals are predominantly northern students as opposed to southerners, high-level supervisory personnel as opposed to lower level foremen, and football players and beauty queens.¹⁴

Despite Bass's extensive research, most of his reasoning remains circular. It is, however, not necessarily problematical. In the case of our clinician who displays neurotic behavior (enacted role), it may not be a professional handicap—at least if you believe in the adage, "It takes one to know one."

Group Communication Circles, Chains, Wheels, and Y's

One interesting aspect of role behavior and status is that certain modes of communication emerge accordingly. In formal organizations, such as the military or the world of big business, modes of communication are spelled out quite clearly. A person knows when, where, what, and how to communicate with his superiors or subordinates. Observe the resplendent boxes, squares, and intersecting lines in organizational flow charts tended to by loving bureaucratic hands. What they really do is spell out with whom and how organization members are to communicate.

If you think that small, informal groups are not burdened by such limitations in communication, you have a big surprise coming. As soon as you join such a group, you become part of a relentless process in which your role relationship with others defines your mode of communication with them. Psychologist Harold Kelley observed many such groups and found that who says what depends to a large extent on the status or prestige of the member involved. High-status members not only feel freer to make negative comments about the group but, when dissatisfied, tend to communicate primarily to other high-status members. Low-status members address themselves to high-status members more often than to members of their own level.¹⁵ In fact, there is even a relationship between where you sit with others and how you communicate! In a study involving five-person groups, seating arrangements were observed from behind a one-way mirror as follows: Member 1 sat on the left side of the table near the door; members 2, 3, and 4 along the long side of the table opposite the mirror; and member 5 on the right side, farthest from the door. The members opposite each other (1 and 5) and the member in the central position (3) were recipients of the most communications and also did most of the talking. Members who chose seats 1 and 5 showed role behavior marked by an orientation toward the group's task, whereas member 3 displayed a marked tendency to limit his role to the social-emotional aspects of maintaining group morale. The more inhibited and somewhat anxious members, who avoided the 'high-talking seats,' chose seats 2 and 4. When the situation was purely social, most of the communications occurred between members in adjacent seats.¹⁶

Being with others in small, informal groups does not therefore imply spontaneity or arbitrariness in communication. In fact, one can observe and experiment with such groups in order to make certain predictions about more formal occasions. Studies of mock juries are a case in point. Subjects drawn from a regular jury pool who engaged in mock jury deliberations concerning an auto negligence case showed marked sex differences in their role behavior. Male jurors tended to be active and task-oriented, whereas the female jurors were reactive and maintenance-oriented. Female jurors also tended to




Figure 6-2 Who talks to whom? It depends where you sit. Seats 2 and 4 are low talking seats occupied by the more inhibited group members. Occupants of seats 1 and 5 tend to be task oriented. Occupants of seat 3 usually attend to the problems of group morale. The behavior of the group members is recorded by observers from behind a one way mirror.

be less competent than males in discussing issues of negligence and damages¹⁷ an enacted role behavior that may have been the result of a prescribed role—which nowadays many women reject.

What it all amounts to then is that once people get together even informally, their role relationships tend to define stable channels of communication. Among the most frequently studied communication networks are the circle, the chain, the Y, and the wheel. In the circle, A talks to B, B to C, C to D, D to E, and E to A. There is a whole lot of talking going on under this arrangement. In the wheel network, on the other hand, only A does the talking. In the general sequence from circle to chain to Y to wheel networks, the circle example is related to activity and more enjoyment by the members—but also to lack of leadership and direction. The wheel at the other extreme




Figure 6-3 5 person group communication patterns. In the circle, there is a lot of talking and enjoyment—as well as a lack of direction and leadership. The wheel, at the other extreme, shows the opposite characteristics. The chain and the Y are compromise arrangements.

shows the opposite characteristics¹⁸—which boils down to the fact that a lot of talk may be enjoyable, but not necessarily productive.

Fortunately, the dynamics of the group are such that as time passes communication networks settle into a pattern which is most conducive to the goals of the group. If you join a group of people with a definite task in mind, sooner or later the communication network will have to assume some central characteristics (such as the Y or the wheel) or the group will never realize its goal. On the other hand, if you are with a group of people whose only goal is to enjoy one another socially, the communication pattern is going to be more flexible. It may even begin as an all-channel network with everybody talking to everyone else and enjoying it. Eventually, however, even in such happy, egalitarian groups, positions, roles, and status emerge, resulting in a communication network which is more restricted.

Proxemics Getting Too Close

In discussing group formation the emphasis so far has been on joining. Just being with others, however, can also lead to an entirely different pattern of behavior. On certain occasions people will avoid others by literally fleeing from them. They do this without any evidence of threat of violence to them. Others are avoided simply because people cherish their own *personal space*.

You, too, have your personal space. If you are a white, middle-class North American, the chances are that when another person who is talking to you stands closer than 5½ feet from you, you will feel uncomfortable. If you are a black American or a Latin American, this is not likely to bother you.¹⁹ An interesting study of the interaction between Arabs and Americans showed that the Arabs' preference for standing close to the Americans caused considerable anxiety in the latter. The Arabs' touch, voice level, and warm, moist breath caused discomfort for the Americans and led to numerous attempts on their part to extricate themselves from the position.²⁰

The term *proxemics* has been coined to describe the manner in which people structure and organize their personal space.²¹ Obviously, this process involves several types of behavior. If people may have to defend their personal space, there must be other people bent on invading it. All of us have been guilty of the latter at some time or another. In the language of proxemics, we have displayed *territorial behavior*. Territoriality is the act of staking out psychological and physical space, ranging from national boundaries to the habitat of communities, right down to the personal space of each and every individual. Territoriality spells out a message to the invader: Stay out—unless given permission!

When the territorial markers are clearly and legally defined, such as in the case of national boundaries or an individual's home, unauthorized intrusion will most likely be met with an active defense. When it comes to less structured markers, however, the overwhelming reaction is to flee the intruder. Psychologists Nancy Russo and Robert Sommer clearly demonstrated this phenomenon when they studied individuals' reactions to the intrusion of personal space in a university library (see Figure 6-4).²² Studies conducted in settings such as cafeterias, public beaches, and other public places have shown similar results.²³ In short, people like being with other people, but not too closely.

There is, however, one aspect of proxemics which, if carried out properly and systematically, actually *increases* human interaction. It is the aspect dealing with architected space organization. For example, it has been shown that furniture arrangements in homes, bus depots, theaters, hotel lobbies, hospital recreation rooms, and so on can be detrimental to positive social interaction. But a few corrective measures, such as removing couches from along the wall and replacing them with small tables around the room, or




Figure 6 4 Flight! This figure shows what happened to victims in a study hall of a university library when an experimental confederate invaded their personal space. It shows the percentage of people remaining in the hall after condition 1 (maximum intrusion—confederate takes seat less than 15 inches from the victim) conditions 2 through 5 (four less intrusive arrangements) and control condition (no intrusion—observed person stays and leaves at will). (Redrawn from Russo and Sommer 1966 by permission of the Society for the Study of Social Problems.)

introducing conversation pieces (e.g., abstract sculpture) can lead to dramatic changes.²⁴ Even in the dreariest places just being with others can then become once again a pleasurable experience.

GROUP OUTPUT

What constitutes a good group? One way of answering this question is to measure how effective the group is in attaining its task-related objectives. Measures such as the quantity or quality of articles produced by a group of factory workers, the number of puzzles solved by a problem-solving group in a laboratory investigation, or the ingenuity of new ideas produced in a meeting of advertising executives—all would constitute measures of group effectiveness. Another way of evaluating group performance is to measure the extent to which a group satisfies the needs of its members. Such measures as the extent to which the group satisfies individual needs, the degree to which group members like each other and the activities of the group, or the amount of interest in remaining in the group voluntarily would provide evaluation of group satisfaction.

These two dimensions of evaluation of group performance (production and satisfaction) are largely though not completely independent. It is possible to have an effective but dissatisfied group in the sense that members can be forced to produce while participating unhappily in a group. It is even possible to have a satisfied but ineffective group that has little success in achieving task-related goals: a well oiled machine that never squeaks but produces nothing. However, research evidence clearly shows that each limits the other. Even in highly successful groups individual members do not remain indefinitely attracted to the group when their own personal needs are not satisfied; similarly, people do not remain attracted to a group that chronically fails in all its efforts.

Size How Many Cooks Spoil the Broth?

Are two heads better than one, or do too many cooks spoil the broth? In evaluating group output, both rather different adages are, paradoxically, true. There is evidence that two heads are indeed better than one in problem-solving.²⁵ Simple logic, however, will convince you that any such increase in the quality or quantity of group output is only good *up to a point*. For example, if one person can solve a problem in 50 minutes, two men may require 20 minutes (rather than 25) and three require 15 minutes (rather than 10). Eventually, however, a point of no further gain may be reached, so that the addition of even an infinite number of members may produce no further increment in group output. In fact, there is evidence that under some circumstances the group may become so large and unwieldy and require so much investment of its energy in communication and maintenance of morale that the solution may require an even greater amount of time. Psychologist Jack Gibb studied groups ranging in size from 2 to 96 members and found that with increment in group size there were progressively smaller increments in the number of ideas produced for the solution of the problem. Not too surprisingly, he found out from postexperimental questioning that as the group increased in size many members began to experience feelings of threat and inhibition, which in turn created obstacles in the completion of tasks in the larger groups.²⁶

It is therefore, impossible to state categorically the exact number of group members needed to achieve maximum effectiveness in group output. At best, we must adopt what some experimenters call the *principle of least group size*, which states that the optimum group size for the performance of an interactive task is the minimum number of individuals required to make available to the group all of the resources required for the execution of its task.²⁷ Still, most findings point out that as compared to larger groups, smaller groups are more creative, express more ideas, show more mutual influence,

need less guidance from higher authority and display greater morale and productivity²⁸ Too many cooks *do* spoil the broth!

Composition To Mix or Not to Mix?

Do you prefer to be with friends or with strangers? This seems like a silly question because the answer seems so obvious. Of course you want to be with friends. You like your friends and (hopefully) they like you. Remember, however, that the question at hand deals with evaluating group output. As we shall see, being with friends does not always lead to beneficial results.

Groups composed of friends frequently display a high degree of satisfaction and productivity. But it is not necessarily friendship as such which accounts for this happy state. Rather, it is the probability that friends are likely to be compatible on a wide range of interests, attitudes, and most likely, abilities and personality characteristics as well. As every hostess knows, compatible people make happy groups. And happy groups deliver, as demonstrated in a study by psychologist William Schutz while working with naval trainees. He divided his subjects into five-man groups and asked them to compete against one another on a series of experimental tasks. The groups were composed of either 'personal' members (who preferred close and intimate relations with others), 'counterpersonal' members (who preferred to keep others at a distance), or mixed types. The results showed that groups compatible in terms of member-need (all of the same type) were more productive than were incompatible groups (mixed type).²⁹

Schutz's study seems to suggest that it is not advisable to mix different types of individual at least as far as group output is concerned. Indeed, at work, people do prefer to be with others who are compatible in terms of belief, age, race, seniority, and marital status.³⁰ Moreover, on simple tasks which require speed, such as on an assembly line, compatible groups show the highest morale and productivity. On the other hand, once compatibility leads to the formation of friendships on the job, there is always the risk that increased talking and sociability may interfere with productivity.³¹

The notion of compatibility in itself is quite complex. Take the matter of ability grouping. You may remember the times in grade school when the teacher divided the class into reading groups euphemistically labeled Bluebirds, Blackbirds, Redbirds, and so on. Of course, she never fooled her students. You asked a youngster who he was, and he would say, 'I'm a dumb Bluebird' or, 'He's a smart Blackbird.' Whether such ability grouping was beneficial to the individual student is not quite clear. Neither is the evidence in terms of group output. In a recent study, respondents were divided on the basis of their scores on a standard intelligence test into three categories: high (H), medium (M), and low (L) intelligence. Three-person groups based on

combinations of compatibility (e.g. MMM LLL) were then compared on a cognitive task with groups based on combinations of possible incompatibility (e.g. HML). To nobody's surprise (considering the nature of the task) the compatible group of highly intelligent members (HHH) achieved the highest score. In all other combinations, however, the supposedly incompatible groups did better (e.g. HML did better than MMM) ³²

To mix or not to mix with others? By all means mix, but first decide on your goal. If your aim is simply to join others in a context of sociability, mix with people of your own kind. Joining such compatible groups will bring you the greatest amount of satisfaction. But if you want something done beyond a simple task, such as a nonroutine activity requiring creativity and originality, mix with people differing in ability and opinion as often as you can ³³. In fact, you are better off mixing with the opposite sex. In a study of same-sex and mixed sex groups, subjects were presented with a series of problems involving logistics (getting a group of people across a mined road), finances (distributing \$3000 to a group of students) and human relations (settling an argument between two group members). The quality of problem solution was scored for all male groups, groups composed of three males and one female, and groups composed of two or three females and one or two males. On all three problems, mixed-sex groups performed better than same sex groups ³⁴.

Climate: Autocratic, Democratic, or Doing Your Thing

When a group of people meet, be it for purely social purposes or for tackling a specific problem, the climate in which the group operates can become a critical factor in the group's productivity and the satisfaction of its members. To a large extent the social climate in a group is initiated by its most prominent members (see subsequent section on leadership) but it takes the response of the entire membership to set the social climate in its totality.

One of the most famous studies on the social climate of groups was conducted by social psychologist Kurt Lewin, beginning as early as 1938 and continued by his associates throughout the 1950s. Using groups of ten-year-old boys as subjects, they varied the leadership style of the adults in charge of an after-school hobby club to which the group members belonged. Three conditions of leadership shifted from group to group every six weeks and were aimed at generating the following respective climates: *autocratic*, *democratic*, and *laissez faire*. In the autocratic condition, the supervising adult dictated all work tasks and assignments, tended to be highly personal in his praise or criticism, and generally remained aloof from active group participation except when demonstrating. In the democratic condition, all policies were set by group discussion, members were free to work with whomever they chose, criticism or praise was objective, and the leader attempted to be more

of a group member than a task imposing authority. In the laissez faire condition, members were essentially doing their own thing, complete freedom for groups or individual decision, with neither praise or criticism offered.

How did the groups respond to the social climates thus generated? In terms of productivity, the autocratic group scored highest—but only when the leader was in the room. The democratic group, on the other hand, maintained high work motivation and steady productivity throughout. The laissez faire group showed poor productivity both in quantity and in quality. The most dramatic differences occurred in group morale and satisfaction. In the democratic group, there was little discontent, few dropouts, and a great deal of friendliness and spontaneity. In the autocratic group, members were either hostile and destructive or meek and submissive. In both cases, morale was low and discontent was high. In the laissez faire condition, there was a lot of horsing around but little satisfaction, as witnessed by the members' preference for democratic leadership.³⁵

Does this mean that democracy is the best system for getting things done and keeping people happy? Perhaps so, at least in our society, which is preconditioned to a democratic social climate. Some psychologists have even extended Lewin's findings to the American educational system, advocating a change from the traditional teacher-centered classroom climate to a more democratic learner-centered climate.³⁶ Nevertheless, Lewin's findings are far from universal. In a more recent study of preadolescent Hindu boys living in northern India, which was closely modeled after the original American study, the autocratic social climate elicited greater productivity and satisfaction than did the democratic social climate.³⁷

Style Cautious or Risky?

Mr. A, an electrical engineer who is married and has one child, has been working for a large electronics corporation since graduating from college 5 years ago. He is assured of a lifetime job with a modest, although adequate, salary and liberal pension benefits upon retirement. It is very unlikely that his salary will increase much before he retires. While attending a convention, Mr. A is offered a job with a small, new company that has a highly uncertain future. The new job would pay more to start and would offer the possibility of a share in the ownership if the company survived the competition of the larger firms.

Imagine that you are advising Mr. A. Listed below are several probabilities or odds of the new company's proving financially sound. Please decide the *lowest* probability that you would consider acceptable to make it worthwhile for Mr. A to take the new job.

- 1 The chances are 1 in 10 that the company will prove financially sound
- 2 The chances are 3 in 10 that the company will prove financially sound
- 3 The chances are 5 in 10 that the company will prove financially sound
- 4 The chances are 7 in 10 that the company will prove financially sound
- 5 The chances are 9 in 10 that the company will prove financially sound
- 6 Mr A should not take the new job no matter what the probabilities

What is *your* choice given the above situation? If you regard the new job as acceptable under choice 1 you are obviously more of a risk-taker than if you had picked choice 2 and even more so had you picked choice 3. If you are a cautious person who refuses to take *any* risk your choice would obviously be the one advising against taking the new job regardless of the odds (choice 6).

Individual choices however differ from group choices. Regardless of size, composition and social climate the manner or style of a group's decision-making differs from that of the individuals who comprise it. A considerable body of research has shown a consistent tendency of groups to make decisions by consensus which, compared to individual decisions, are characterized by being more risky. This phenomenon is known as *the risky shift*.

Why is it that people who are *less* willing to express unorthodox ideas or opinions as individuals are *more* willing to do so collectively in the name of the group? At the time of this writing no clear-cut answer can be provided. Some psychologists contend that when people get together there is a "diffusion of responsibility." That is, since the individual group member knows that the responsibility for the decision is spread among several others, his own sense of personal responsibility diminishes and he can therefore advocate a riskier course than he would ordinarily.³⁸ Other explanations for the risky shift phenomenon suggest familiarization (group discussion reduces individual uncertainty), pluralistic ignorance (erroneously having assumed that others are cautious) or leadership (the leader's ability to persuade individual members).³⁹ Some psychologists point out that responses to risk-taking questionnaires (as in the case of the hypothetical electrical engineer) only indicate what one *thinks* he will do rather than what he will *actually* do.⁴⁰ This is known as the Walter Mitty effect, which is named after James Thurber's fictional hero who lived a sedate life but in his fantasies engaged in risky adventures.

In summary, it is quite possible that when a group of people come up with a risky decision they may not necessarily act accordingly. But then again they may. The implication that decision-making groups are prone to take greater risks than their individual members can scarcely be ignored when

world leaders and their advisors gather to make vital decisions under the shadow of nuclear threat

CROWDS, MOBS, RIOTS, AND PANIC

We shall now address ourselves briefly to another aspect of being with others. Unlike groups or organizations, crowds imply a minimum of individual interaction with others. In fact, the frequently repeated phrase, the faceless crowd, suggests individual anonymity. Nevertheless, under certain conditions being part of a crowd can have a significant impact on the individual. Many findings, however, tend to dispel commonly held stereotypes and old adages.

Take the notion of the madding crowd, for instance. What is the effect of people being crowded in relatively small areas? Perhaps not as bad as you may think. Psychologist Jonathan Freedman and his associates varied density by placing people in rooms of 160, 80, and 35 square feet. Groups of five to nine subjects were placed in the rooms and given various tasks (e.g., group discussion, cross-out task, memory task). In the extreme density condition, where nine subjects were seated in chairs with desk-type arms in the 35-square foot room, there was just enough space for the subjects not to touch each other. Regardless of density, the productivity and quality of the output of the various groups did not differ significantly.⁴¹

You could disagree with Freedman's contention that the crowd is not so maddening after all, considering that his study was conducted under laboratory rather than real-life conditions. But even real-life observations of various aspects of crowd behavior tend to dispel some commonly held notions. For example, it is generally assumed that when a crowd panics, irrational behavior in the form of "every person for himself" occurs, with disastrous results. There is evidence that the severity of the fires in the Iroquois Theater in Chicago in 1903 and the Coconut Grove Nightclub in Boston in 1942 was so slight that it was altogether unnecessary that nearly one thousand persons died from trampling and asphyxiation. Yet there is also ample evidence that in natural disasters such as tornadoes, floods, or large explosions there is little panic during and immediately after the disaster, and any such occurrences are grossly exaggerated.⁴² One problem that plagues studies on panic behavior under real-life conditions (as opposed to laboratory conditions) is that they are primarily based on interviews conducted after the disaster had occurred. These are of limited value because of possible distortion in perception or memory, or unwillingness to recall details on the part of the survivors.

There is, however, little doubt that crowds have drawing power and are thus frequently precursors to riots. To demonstrate the drawing power of crowds, a group of psychologists observed 1424 pedestrians on a busy New

York City street who passed along a 50-foot length of sidewalk. At a signal flashed from the sixth-floor window of an office building, confederates of the experimenter gazed up at the window from the street. The signal was given for a period of 60 seconds. The confederates were designated as a stimulus crowd, and the number of pedestrians who stopped and looked up or merely looked up was recorded at various times. The stimulus crowd consisted of 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, or 15 persons. As the stimulus crowd increased in size so did its drawing power. One person induced 42 percent of the passersby to look up (4 percent stopped) while a stimulus crowd of 15 persons induced 86 percent of the passersby to look up (40 percent stopped).⁴³

Peaceful crowds can instantly turn into ugly mobs bent on rioting. The precipitating event by itself may be rather insignificant, but the underlying feelings of discontent, outrage, restlessness, or futility are not. A study of 76 race riots in the United States from 1913 to 1963 showed that many occurred as a result of black men being searched by white policemen or holdups of white women by black men.⁴⁴ The most encouraging news about these sordid happenings is that psychologists and other social scientists are increasingly turning from the study of the causes of riots to their prevention—with considerable success.⁴⁵

LEADERSHIP

Leadership and Personality: Are Leaders Born or Made?

It is a beautiful day in the city of Linz, Austria. The year is 1896. Mrs. Alois Schickelgruber, six months pregnant, is on her way to the market. As she crosses the street, she slips on a banana peel and falls. Later, in the hospital, she is given the sad news that she suffered a miscarriage. The result? Adolf Hitler would have never existed.

Would the course of history have been altered? Could it be that in the absence of that spellbinding demagogue, Germany and the rest of the world would have been spared the agonies of World War II and genocide? If you think so, consider yourself a *great man* theorist on leadership.

Or do you think that it really would have made no difference, since the time was ripe in the 1920s and 1930s for someone like Hitler to appear? Do you believe that the German national character, the humiliating experience of losing World War I, and the economic chaos prevailing at that time would have spouted a Schultz or a Krantz, or some other *fuehrer* (leader) who would not differ significantly from the original product? If so, consider yourself a *zeitgeist* (ironically, a German word denoting spirit of the times) theorist on leadership.

It boils down essentially to the question of whether leaders are made (*zeitgeist*) or born (*great man*). Like so many other maddening problems in human behavior, it poses a circular question which is almost impossible to

answer Yet psychologists have spent an inordinate amount of time and effort on this question, and their findings, as you may very well guess depend to a large extent on their original stance Most of the studies have focused on the personality characteristics of leaders and are thus prone to support the great man notion A comprehensive review of such studies revealed that certain personality variables show a consistent relationship with displays of leadership higher intelligence, large physical size, greater sociability and friendliness more self-confidence and self-assurance and greater will and energy ⁴⁶

Effective Leadership The Contingency Model

While it is possible that there are certain personality characteristics associated with leadership it is not a fruitful avenue of research Apart from the circularity of the great man-zeitgeist problem, there is ample research evidence to show that leadership is a function of personal traits of the leader as *perceived by the follower* As the situation changes, so do the perceived traits of the leader ⁴⁷ Ask any politician who suddenly discovers that his charisma is gone!

Current studies on leadership take a more productive avenue of research They focus on the contingent circumstances of the situation in which effective leadership is displayed Psychologist Fred Fiedler first focused on the relationship between the leader and his *least* preferred group member in a variety of settings, such as infantry squads, bomber crews steel shops basketball teams and church groups Leaders who described their least preferred co-workers in relatively unfavorable terms (low LPC-scorers) tended to be more controlling, directive, active punitive task-oriented, and relatively uninterested in furthering good interpersonal relations ⁴⁸

In his subsequent *contingency model* of leadership Fiedler clearly spelled out the circumstances which particularly influence effective leadership affective relationships (liking) between leader and followers task structure (or ambiguity) in which the group is involved and power of position—the legitimacy—or lack of it—of the leader's power Extensive studies of a variety of groups and organizations have shown the consistency of effective leadership patterns When things are going well for the group or when things do not go well the leader who is a task-oriented low LPC-scorer is most effective In the first case because the group has no reason to reject him and in the second case because only his directive leadership saves the group from falling apart However when things are going neither very well nor very badly for the group (moderately favorable) then the socially oriented high LPC-scoring leader becomes the most effective one ⁴⁹

Leaders and Followers Banking Idiosyncrasy Credit

As we have seen earlier, leadership is to a large extent a function of followers perception Studies in this area show an amazing degree of latitude

on the part of followers in tolerating their leader's transgressions. People will allow their leaders to get away with murder figuratively speaking—but only after the leaders have given ample evidence of their competence. This odd phenomenon has been thoroughly investigated by psychologist Edwin Hollander, who labeled it *idiosyncrasy credit*. Idiosyncrasy refers to a quality or habit peculiar to an individual. Hollander suggested that leaders who are initially perceived as conforming to the group's expectancies and subsequently show competence are awarded 'credits' in the form of positive impressions by the group. These credits accrue over time until the leader reaches a point where he can engage in idiosyncratic behavior—even though such behavior may be at odds with the norms of the group. In short, once established, the leader can do his thing—and get away with it!

To demonstrate how leaders can cash in on idiosyncrasy credit bestowed upon them by their followers, Hollander had 12 groups of subjects engage in a choice task requiring 15 trials. Each of the four-person groups first agreed on certain procedures which would constitute the group's norms—such things as majority rule, order of choices, and the manner in which winnings would be divided. A confederate subject in each group contrived to be correct on all but 4 trials, thus reflecting considerable task competence. To achieve this competence, however, the confederate systematically violated practically every procedure to which the group had previously agreed upon. Despite such lack of conformity, the confederate received increasingly higher positive ratings by the others in his group.⁵⁰

The fact that higher status group members are allowed to nonconform with relative impunity has been demonstrated in many studies.⁵¹ Not everyone is so lucky, though. An interesting experiment by psychologists Harvey and Consalvi showed what happens to conformity in a status hierarchy. Groups of delinquent boys were asked to estimate the distance between two simultaneous flashes of light in a dark room. Unknown to the subjects, the leader and either the second highest or the lowest member in status were exposed to two flashes 48 inches apart, as compared to the two flashes 12 inches apart observed by the rest of the group. To increase motivation, group rewards for accuracy were promised to the subjects. Under the assumption that all were seeing the same light, verbal pressure against those who strayed in their judgments occurred since the judgments were made aloud. As expected, the leader strayed considerably. He simply called out what he saw, despite possible punishment by the group. Perhaps not too surprisingly, so did the lowest-status member (after all, what did he have to lose?). The second-in-status member did not dare to stray from the group's expectations and conformed accordingly.⁵² No wonder that Number 2 in many a group or organization is so uptight—he simply has to try harder to meet the group's norms!

IN CONCLUSION PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

To live alone, one must be either an animal or a god

Aristotle in *Politics* 350 B C

Social behavior is as old as mankind. So are the speculations that try to explain it. Perhaps as Aristotle suggested, people get together simply because they share a gregarious instinct. Then again, as suggested by another ancient philosopher, it could be because of practical considerations. No one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. (Plato in *The Republic* 350 B C) Perhaps too, being with others alleviates what psychologist Carl Rogers calls the prevailing inner loneliness in all of us.⁵³ Whatever brought it on in the first place, this much is certain: Togetherness is here to stay.

So are potential adjustment problems that come in the wake of togetherness. Earlier in this book we presented several possible approaches to the study of the self (p. 36). The 'personal' approach suggests that in your judgment of 'what is me,' you are taking on an active role. The more 'social' approach suggests that your judgment is primarily based on what you believe others think of you. Either way, misperceptions can result in personal and social maladjustment. We therefore hope that our somewhat cozy title for this chapter (*On Just Being with Others*) does not obscure its formidable array of topics, including crowd behavior, proxemics, and group dynamics. The latter, dealing with the psychology of small groups, is particularly important because it is virtually impossible for anyone to escape the effects of such groups as the family, working teams, social cliques, etc.

We now digress briefly from the area of group dynamics in order to clarify a point. You may have noticed that relatively little space in this chapter was devoted to the encounter group and human growth movements. You may have wondered about this apparently glaring omission in a book purporting to deal with human interaction and social adjustment problems. If you believe, as psychologist Carl Rogers does, that the encounter movement is "the most rapidly spreading social invention of the century and probably the most potent," you may even be outraged by our omission.

There is no denying that encounter groups and growth centers are currently going strong. In fact, this is just about the only thing upon which the supporters and detractors of the encounter movement seem to agree. They strongly disagree about whether encounter groups are here to stay and how much, if at all, they achieve what they claim they can do (the claims range from vague promises of beneficial change for those who join to the ultimate solution of all personal and social adjustment problems).

Carl Rogers the eminent supporter of the encounter movement has provided us with some clues on what goes on in the 'basic encounter'. His vivid description lists in detail the benefits for those who join an encounter group beginning with the breakdown of their initial resistance and ending with the helpful group providing individual serenity and self-acceptance.⁵⁴ Among the detractors are social psychologists such as Kurt Back, eminent in his own right, who cite potential dangers of what they consider to be essentially a fad ('cocktail parties are out, encounter groups are in').⁵⁵ Then there are psychologists such as John Campbell and Marvin Dunnette who bemoan the fact that encounter groups are based on ill-defined concepts which make any meaningful assessment of such groups virtually impossible.⁵⁶

We chose not to enter this controversy for several reasons. For one, there remains very little that has not been said about the topic. Jumping into the fray will not bring on a solution (we can assure you, however, that the debates among the above-mentioned scholars are interesting and provide fascinating reading). We did mention encounter groups on several occasions, primarily within the context of self-disclosure (Chapter 1). Above all, we believe that encountering others is a highly personal experience. These experiences vary so much that any attempt to put them into a uniform experimental framework (as follows from Campbell and Dunnette) is doomed to fail. If you have not done so by now, we suggest you try joining an encounter group, but do so with a 'let the buyer beware' attitude.

In studying group dynamics, we can make some strong statements based on uniform expectations. *Every group (encounter groups included) has norms. Every group has a communication network. Every group generates role behavior. Every group has an output which depends on its size, composition, climate, and style.* All these variables have been studied well enough by psychologists and sociologists to derive some principles. Not only do we know why people join others (p. 172) but also how a group develops its communication network (p. 181), when it becomes too unwieldy in size (p. 186), how it should be composed to be maximally effective (p. 187) and how its decisions differ from that of the individuals in it (p. 189). We also devoted considerable space to the dynamics of leadership that apply to all groups (including encounter groups, whether in the form of an appointed leader, i.e., the 'facilitator,' or emergent leader, i.e., some other group member). If you want to know more about the psychology of small groups, we strongly recommend the short but comprehensive *Group Dynamics* by Marvin E. Shaw.⁵⁷

We now return full circle to the problem of group dynamics and personal and social adjustment. If you read the section on roles, position, and status (p. 175) you can easily see how maladaptive behavior can develop. If

you seem to have difficulties in getting along with others (and vice versa), perhaps a careful analysis of the roles involved is in order. Whether your problem is at home, at work, or at play, it can eventually be traced to differences among roles that are enacted, perceived, prescribed, or predicted. The analysis presented on page 175 (father-mother role) can easily be extended to any position you may occupy (spouse, friend, peer, colleague, student, manager, worker, man, woman, young person, old person, etc.).

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MANIPULATION

7

ON CHANGING ATTITUDES

ATTITUDES AND PROPAGANDA

Persuasion, American Style

CHANGING ATTITUDES

The First Step Arousal and Attention

The Second Step Presentation of Arguments

The Third Step Knowing Your Audience

The Fourth Step Gaining and Maintaining Credibility

The Final Step Immunization Against Counterpropaganda

IN CONCLUSION: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

ATTITUDES AND PROPAGANDA**Persuasion, American Style**

This chapter is a hybrid creation. At one time we doubted whether it was necessary to write it at all. When we finally decided that it should be written it was hard to decide where it belonged. The reason for our misgivings was that even though the term *attitude* is frequently mentioned by psychologists, it is also an extremely ill defined term. Some psychologists ignore the term altogether, other psychologists include in it just about every aspect of human behavior. Moreover the idea of changing attitudes evokes the notion of *manipulation*, a term which has some very unpleasant connotations. To be labeled as a manipulator is not exactly a compliment. If you are perceived as manipulative you are likely to encounter scorn and contempt (of course if you are perceived as influential or persuasive you earn mostly respect and admiration). In any event, we shall do our best to explain to you why we finally decided to combine the ambiguous (attitudes) with the obnoxious (manipulation) into one brief chapter.

We can make short shrift of the argument that manipulation is bad. At the risk of burdening you with what might seem to be a well worn cliché we shall flatly state that life is a continuous process of manipulation. Parents do it. Children do it. Spouses do it. Friends do it. Bosses do it. Employees do it. In every type of human interaction—at work, at home, or at play—there is at least someone who (wittingly or unwittingly) manipulates someone else. In turn, the manipulated party can easily become the manipulator when the proper circumstances arise. To make you feel better, you can gild the lily by referring to the process as influencing, persuading, begging, cajoling, flattery, requesting, asking, demonstrating, or probing. In the final analysis, it all boils down to manipulation. Even if you honestly believe that you would never stoop so low as to manipulate others, the next three chapters should still be of value to you—the knowledge of how *others* manipulate can put you on guard.

The concept of attitude presents greater difficulty. The dictionary defines attitude as "a state of mind or conduct of a person regarding some matter." This is precisely where the rub is. Is an attitude a state of mind, such as a cognitive structure in our heads? Or is it some conduct or behavior, or at least a predisposition to act in a given way? If it is both a state of mind and a form of conduct, as the dictionary suggests, then the assessment of attitudes would be an efficient and inexpensive way of predicting behavior. But if the two are not necessarily one and the same, what good does the study of attitude do to the process of understanding human behavior? Why study what a person *says* or *thinks* (attitude) if it has little or no relation to what that person *does* (behavior)?

Psychologists have addressed themselves at length to the problem of possible discrepancies between attitudes and behavior.¹ We shall also address

ourselves to this issue in this and the next two chapters since changing attitudes and/or behavior invariably involves some aspects of manipulation and power-play. In the meantime we are proceeding from the reasonable assumption that people who express strong attitudes are likely to act accordingly. There is in fact some (but by no means conclusive) evidence to support our assumption.² But regardless of their predictive value, attitudes and opinions are existing phenomena and therefore deserve to be studied. Like the two chapters that follow it, this chapter will describe an aspect of human manipulation by exploring attitudes in familiar contexts: propaganda, advertising, and public opinion.

The term *propaganda* is derived from the seventeenth-century Catholic College of Propaganda, which trained priests in missionary work for the propagation of the Christian faith. Despite its illustrious origin, the term generally evokes visions of manipulation, conniving, and half-truths. Propagandists are aware of the negative connotations of the term, and even the most callous of them refer to their product as education. Once again, semantics seem to exercise undue control in this matter. Any attempt to influence the development of attitudes or to change them may properly be called propaganda. Education, though it sounds infinitely better, is just another form of propaganda.

The basic function of propaganda is the activation of dormant attitudes in a certain direction, with the hope that these attitudes will ultimately convert into manifest behavior such as buying, voting, or choosing.³ Advertising is probably the most blatant case in point. It is essentially an exercise in persuasion and attitude-change, since the assessment and manipulation of attitudes toward certain products and services is the basis of every advertising campaign. Following the assessment of consumer attitudes and habits, these research findings are translated into policy decisions concerning the naming of products, their packaging and presentation in stores, and their advertising through mass media such as newspapers, magazines, radio, and television. In effect, without several decades of research in the social psychology of attitudes, there would be no contemporary legend of 'Madison Avenue.' At the same time, the very relationship between propaganda (a term infused with negative connotations) and advertising has frequently been cited by critics as evidence of unethical and manipulative aspects in current American advertising practices. The proponents of such practices, on the other hand, are generally quite willing to concede that the aim of advertising is to persuade the consumer. But they also see advertising as the American way, which ultimately benefits the consumer in better products (see Figure 7-1).

CHANGING ATTITUDES

From here to the end of the chapter we will focus on five broad approaches for the effective achievement of attitude change in others: arousal and atten-

Ever notice how
when products compete
with each other,

they get better.



BRAND NAMES FOUNDATION INC

Figure 7-1 Extolling the American way via advertising




Figure 7-2 What does it say? Put the above to a mirror and see. It is an awkward way to get a message across—but it arouses curiosity and attention.

tion presentation of arguments knowing the audience gaining and maintaining credibility and immunization against counterpropaganda. The ordering of these approaches is quite arbitrary. You do not have to follow the listed sequence to achieve effective attitude change. You can employ these approaches in any order or manner you wish and still be an effective propagandist. Moreover, these five approaches by no means exhaust all the possibilities for achieving attitude change. Both Chapters 8 and 9, in slightly different contexts, will acquaint you with many additional ways and means to achieve changes in attitudes and behavior.

The First Step: Arousal and Attention

Do you know what Figure 7-2 means? It spells out a message: EAT JOE'S BEEFBURGER! You could not tell at first glance because it is printed backwards, as seen in a mirror. Even if you knew that, it would still be difficult to get the message because the letters are bunched together in an uncharacteristic fashion. If this is Joe's message to you, he certainly chose an awkward way to induce you to buy his product. But he did capture one essential ingredient in his attempt to persuade you—your attention.

Shocking messages, large splashes of color, elaborate and unusual lettering, loud jingles, and catchy tunes are all part of the hard-sell approach aimed at capturing your attention. What worries the persuader, however, is that in the process of capturing your attention you might inadvertently be distracted from the message itself. You may be paying too much attention to the format of the message rather than to its content.

To the delight of the hard-sell persuaders, evidence from earlier studies showed that distraction actually *increased* the persuasive impact of a message.⁴ A possible explanation for this effect was audience sensitization.

which assumed that arousal and distraction prevent the recipients of a persuasive message from forming counterarguments to its content. According to this logic, if you were hungry and faced with a straight message from Joe to buy his beefburger, you could eventually come up with several reasons for not buying. There are cheaper places nearby, eating now will spoil your appetite for later, beef has too much cholesterol, and so on. On the other hand, if Joe presented you with an arousing message that captured your attention, you would be so busy enjoying the catchy tune or unscrambling the shocking message (with hunger gnawing at you all the while) that you simply would have no time to formulate reasons for not buying.

Subsequent studies somewhat dampened the enthusiasm of the proponents of arousal and distraction. In one of these studies, subjects were presented with a persuasive message while being positively distracted (watching sexually provoking slides). Another group of subjects was neutrally distracted (watching slides of ordinary scenery). Still another group was negatively distracted (watching slides showing gory details of dismembered limbs). The positively and neutrally distracted subjects changed their attitudes in the direction of the persuasive message more often than did the negatively distracted subjects.⁵ The implications for the persuader are clear. Don't overdo! Some of your arousal techniques can be so unpleasantly distracting as to decrease the effect of your message.

Some persuaders discount the effect of attention altogether. Since attention is related to awareness and consciousness, these persuaders emphasize arousal and communication at a subconscious level instead. Probably the most controversial and frequently criticized method of manipulating buying behavior is the one commonly known as *motivational research* (MR). The basic assumption of psychologist Ernst Dichter, President of the Institute for Motivational Research, Inc., and his associates is that a person's buying behavior is based on deeply ingrained needs of which he may not even be aware. In order to find out the true nature of such needs, MR employs a variety of clinical tools, such as depth interviews, which involve intensive probing for hidden motives and attitudes of respondents and may take up to three hours. According to Dichter, "depth psychology teaches us that unconscious reasons are usually more basic and powerful than the conscious ones. Obviously, a direct question runs no chance of success in uncovering unconscious motivations."⁶ One depth interview, for example, revealed that eating candy was associated with mastering disagreeable jobs; the advertising theme was accordingly changed from "smooth, rich, creamy-coated chocolate—everybody likes 'em" to "make the tough job easier—you deserve M & M candy," and sales promptly soared.⁷ Another MR study solved the mystery of why a rationally designed advertising campaign to increase airplane ticket sales was failing miserably. The typical business executive who used that

airline somehow did not respond positively to the information that its new jets would get him speedily to his destination. The reason for this became clear after MR stepped in to investigate. It seemed that deep down these travelers felt guilty for leaving their homes and families for business (and perhaps for some fun, too). The advertising copy was subsequently changed so that it extolled the new jets which allowed the customers to quickly *return* to their points of departure. Sales rose promptly.⁸

MR has been subjected to repeated criticisms on moral grounds. Its methods raise the frightening specter of intrusion into people's privacy by means of depth interviews that go too far in probing into minds.⁹ In *The Feminine Mystique* Betty Friedan painted an alarming picture of MR as the front runner of a gigantic plot by businessmen to keep the frustrated housewife (euphemistically referred to as homemaker) imprisoned in her kitchen. For example, washing machines and electric ranges function best when operated with one or two control switches. Such simple operations are very frustrating to the college-educated woman, especially when she compares them to the complexity of her husband's work. The answer, according to MR, is to equip washers and ranges with complicated control panels not unlike those on air planes. They may be useless, but they certainly give the frustrated housewife a sense of achievement in overcoming a complicated set of operations.¹⁰

The furor and interest generated by MR has somewhat abated during recent years, particularly because of the popularity of experimental methods which involve observations in real-life situations (field experiments). For example, it is commonly believed that the introductory low price offer by marketers is related to the human need for acquisition. From the marketer's point of view, the low price offer works like this: The new product is offered for a low price for a short time; once the price is raised, profits will increase accordingly. The low price, however, will not only attract marginal buyers who will purchase other goods, but hopefully many of them will learn to like the product enough so they will continue to purchase it even at the higher price. Unfortunately for the marketer, this may be a vain hope according to a series of field experiments. Matched pairs of discount houses arranged to sell the same product (mouthwash, toothpaste, aluminum foil, light bulbs, and cookies) at either a discounted price or at the regular price for a short period of time. The prices were then made the same for all stores. Without exception, subsequent sales were higher for products which had initially cost more! As can be seen in the case of aluminum foil sales (see Figure 7-3) during the first three weeks consumers bought more low-priced aluminum foils than high-priced ones, although the latter were steadily gaining in volume of sales. Once the price change was instituted, the expected drop in sales of the initially low-priced materialized.¹¹

How can one explain the continuing increase in sales of the initially




Figure 7 3 The sale of low and high priced aluminum foil. After five weeks customers are hooked into brand loyalty to the high priced product (see text). Redrawn from Doob et al. 1969 by permission of the American Psychological Association.


high priced aluminum foil? According to the authors of the study, the most plausible explanation for this paradox can be derived from the theory of *cognitive dissonance*. According to this theory (which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8), the more effort a person exerts to attain a goal, the more dissonance and discomfort is aroused if the goal turns out to be less valuable than expected. One way of eliminating such discomfort is to attach greater value to the product, and to like it more. Thus, the consumer who initially

bought the high-priced aluminum foil (thereby putting in more effort) reacted to the lower-priced aluminum foil (which caused his brand to appear less valuable) by increasing his liking for the high-priced aluminum foil. This liking then developed into brand loyalty in the form of repeat purchases. The most interesting fact of course, is that at no time were the consumers aware of the underlying reasons for their paradoxical behavior.

While we are on the topic of awareness and attention it might be worthwhile to mention *subliminal advertising*. This somewhat faddish concept emerged about 20 years ago and has not ceased to fascinate people despite the fact that its effectiveness has never been fully demonstrated.¹² Briefly, subliminal (i.e. below the threshold of conscious perceptual awareness) advertising attempts to induce attitude and behavior change by communicating with the consumer at a subconscious level. Subliminal advertising came to public attention in 1957 through reports showing that when the phrases "eat popcorn" and "drink Coca Cola" were flashed at the speed of 1/3000 of a second on a movie screen before an unsuspecting audience, sales of the two products promptly increased. While such findings may bring joy to the heart of many a manufacturer, subliminal advertising can produce marketing problems (in addition to legal problems brought up by people who resent the questionable ethics of the technique). For example, a group of college students serving as a control group was shown a 16 minute movie on the psychology of learning. A similar group of students serving as the experimental group saw the same movie with the word "beef" superimposed every 7 seconds at the speed of 1/200 per second. At the conclusion of the movie, both groups filled out questionnaires and checklists concerning their food preferences in sandwiches (tuna, hamburger, cheese, steak, or roast beef), and their hunger state (on a 5 point scale ranging from not at all hungry to very hungry). There was no difference between the groups in their expressed preference for a particular type of sandwich, but the students in the experimental group rated themselves higher on hunger than those in the control group.¹³ These results are not too impressive. Moreover, for the purposes of national advertising they are practically useless. A subliminal advertising campaign urging the consumer to drink Coca-Cola would perhaps increase your thirst, but would have no impact on whether you chose to drink Pepsi, Cola, 7-Up, beer, juice, or plain water.

The Second Step: Presentation of Arguments

What you say in your persuasive message and how you say it are critical elements in any study on attitude development and change. Broadly speaking, your arguments can take the form of either rational or emotional propaganda or both. *Rational propaganda* attempts to persuade the audience that the advocated attitude is rational and logically sound. For example, certain tooth-



THE GROUP INSURANCE COMPANY
reminds you that your future is **our** interest

Figure 7-4 Fear—a powerful tool in emotional propaganda

pastes have been directly endorsed by dentists as successfully combating tooth decay, providing an advantageous rational appeal for the advertising of those toothpaste manufacturers. Too often however these rational approaches assume questionable pseudorational characteristics. You are undoubtedly familiar with TV commercial messages in which an imposing individual holding a leather-bound scientific report extolls the merits of his fortified product. The animated cartoons in which the advertised pill chases the competitor's pill through a maze of pipes purported to represent a stomach are just as pseudorational as the subsequent graphic representation that it arrived there first for quick relief.

Emotional propaganda tends to capitalize on evoked or existing feelings such as anxiety, shame, guilt, greed, and pride. Such feelings are powerful motivators. Because of their potency they can be effectively employed to change both attitudes and behavior. We shall take a closer look at these forces in the next chapter. In advertising of course emotional themes are all too familiar (see Figure 7-4). Threats that failure to use a certain toothpaste will result in bad breath or that the use of a wrong brand of coffee will wreck marriages are often substituted for convincing rational information.

Messages catering to prestige identifications with highly regarded reference groups or individuals (For those who think young or Billie Jean King drinks Carnation milk) are also loaded with emotional overtones. One noteworthy study in prestige identification described the personality stereotypes associated with five well-known automobiles. During 1956 and then again in 1957 college students were given a list of adjectives and asked to check those descriptions which they thought were typical of Cadillac owners, Buick owners, and so forth. The students were obviously not representative of the total consumer population, but it was thought that even in such a limited population any variation in the image of the owner of a particular make of car (from 1956 to 1957) may have some bearing on the type of advertising that had been used in promoting that car. As expected the Cadillac-Buick-Chevrolet comparison was strictly along class lines. In both 1956 and 1957, the Cadillac owner was perceived as rich, high-class, famous, important, fancy, proud, superior, and successful. The Buick owner was perceived as middle class, brave, masculine, strong, modern, and pleasant. The Chevrolet owner was perceived as poor, low-class, ordinary, plain, simple, practical, common, average, and friendly. There was however, a significant difference between the two years in the way the Plymouth owner was perceived. In 1956 the Plymouth owner had a stodgy image: quiet, careful, slow, silent, moral, fat, gentle, calm, sad, patient, honest, understanding, and content. To dispel this image the Chrysler Corporation started a 1957 campaign which described the new Plymouth as 'Three full years ahead—the only car that dares to break the time barrier!' The fabulous new Fury 301 V-8 engine ex-

hilarating sportscar handling dramatic Flight Sweep Styling The car you might have expected in 1960 is at your dealer's *now!* The effect of such high powered advertising was to completely shatter the old Plymouth image. The new image of the Plymouth owner consisted of six words: high-class, feminine, important, rich, different, and particular. The image of the 1957 Chevrolet, on the other hand, remained as nondescript as it had been in 1956, presumably because its advertising described it as sweet, smooth, and sassy, without the additional description of a dramatically changed automobile.¹⁴

The argument between those who think that advertising is a form of education aimed at promoting a better life-style or a fraudulent process promulgated by greedy promoters will probably go on for many years to come. But even the most dyed-in-the-wool opponent of advertising would have to admit that appeals to public opinion are a legitimate avenue for educating the public. In fact, he will have to resort to such appeals if he ever hopes to get across his message that advertising is corrupt. Surely then he could benefit from the knowledge of how to present his arguments in the most efficient and convincing manner.

Psychologists have devoted considerable time and effort to studying the process of public opinion and attitude change. More than 25 years ago Carl Hovland and his students at Yale University pioneered such efforts.¹⁵ Literally hundreds of studies have been published since then. It would be impossible within the confines of this book to describe the full scope of these studies. Instead, we are going to briefly list some advocated techniques for presenting effective persuasive messages (without necessarily citing in detail the studies which led up to them). In most cases from here on, you may also find it useful to put yourself in the place of a persuader addressing a somewhat hostile audience (if the audience is extremely hostile, you will probably never get a chance to reach it, and thus no attitude change will occur; if the audience is extremely friendly, little if any persuasion is needed to effect attitude change). Also, when we talk of attitude change as a result of persuasive efforts, you should not expect total conversion to your point of view. To the best of our knowledge, none of the hundreds of studies on attitude change have ever reported such unqualified success. At best, they report a shift in the direction of the advocating message after it was presented. In our model, for example, you might wish to picture yourself as advocating a message to a high school audience. The gist of the message is that the minimum age for obtaining a driver's license should be raised to 18. You can expect the audience to be somewhat hostile to the idea, to say the least. If your presentation makes so much as a dent in the students' attitudes, consider yourself a successful persuader. The techniques listed below are aimed at making dents in attitudes.

and the bigger the dent the better. Most research studies suggest the following:

- 1 ***Do not let facts speak for themselves*** Many persuaders are tempted to be so factual in their presentation as to exclude even a hint of what they are advocating. They assume that since the facts in their possession are so clear and unequivocal, there is no need to tell people what to think. Letting the facts speak for themselves also has the appearance of greater objectivity. The procedure is nevertheless ill advised.¹⁶ Just because the facts speak clearly to you does not necessarily mean that they speak as clearly to your audience. Even if they do, there is always the risk that the conclusions drawn by your listeners will be different from those that you advocate. State your conclusions explicitly and use the facts to buttress your arguments.
- 2 ***Forewarn your listeners that you are attempting to change their attitude*** There is no need for the sake of apparent objectivity to hide the fact that you are embarking on a course of attitude change. Your listeners will find it out anyway. If you forewarn them explicitly, there is evidence of subtle psychological forces at work. Your listeners want to avoid the possibility of appearing gullible (both to others and to themselves) should they be convinced by your persuasive message. By forewarning them, you allow them time for anticipatory adjustment to avoid a possible loss of self-esteem.¹⁷
- 3 ***Do not use humor or satire in your major argument*** Do not let your dread of sounding dull tempt you to use humor and satire as a steady diet. For one thing, what is funny to you may not be funny to others. You may emerge with an even duller image than you feared. Satire in particular is an ineffective tool. Cutting down people and issues earns few dividends. It may, in fact, increase resistance to what you advocate. Humor and satire are no substitute for substantive arguments.¹⁸ However, opening jokes or occasional forays into humor are not only permissible, but advisable.
- 4 ***Gauge the timing of your major argument to audience interest*** Your major argument is the most precious weapon in your arsenal. Do not waste it. If initial audience interest does not seem to be high, present your major argument early. If initial audience interest seems to be high, save your major argument for the end. Initially disinterested listeners need something to arouse and maintain their interest. Initially interested listeners, upon hearing your major argument early in the presentation, will expect even more important

arguments as you proceed. Since you will not be able to present them with any, they may become disappointed and lose interest. In any event, do not present your major arguments in the middle of a communication. Used that way, they are least remembered and have the least impact.¹⁹

- 5 ***Begin by endorsing some audience view*** This technique, also known as flogging a dead horse, calls for the endorsement of some audience views not related to the issue being advocated. For example, in addressing high school students about increased age requirements for getting a driver's license (to which they are hostile), you may begin by coming out in favor of greater freedom in course selection (knowing that they are almost unanimously in favor of it). Many persuaders shy away from this approach, either because they think it is irrelevant to the topic at hand or because they are afraid that they will be perceived as trying to ingratiate themselves with their audience. But it works!²⁰
- 6 ***Advocate extreme changes*** This statement needs to be qualified. If you advocate something totally distasteful to your audience, they may not even let you communicate with them in the first place. In fact, you may create a boomerang effect which will backfire into the direction opposite to that intended in your message.²¹ If, however, the changes that you advocate are within reason, you are better off advocating extreme changes than moderate changes. The larger the change advocated, the greater the change produced.²²
- 7 ***Present two sides of the argument*** This does not necessarily mean that you should treat the two sides evenly. You are expected to allocate more weight, time, and effort to the side advocated by you. But to totally ignore the opposite side of the issue provides you at best with temporary attitude change, primarily in friendly audiences.²³ With more hostile audiences, one-sided presentations are rejected as arrogant and narrow-minded (see p. 217).
- 8 ***Encourage active participation by the audience*** No matter how brilliantly executed your appeal, it may fall short of its goal if the audience is merely a passive recipient. Discussions, role playing—in fact, any kind of involvement demanding some effort on the part of your audience—will enhance your chances of succeeding to get your point across more effectively.²⁴

The Third Step: Knowing Your Audience

Some people are easier to persuade than others. (If you are one of these people, you may not necessarily be aware of it.) Psychologists Janis and Field

found that self-ratings of subjects on susceptibility to influence had little bearing on their actual attitude changes during an experiment ²⁵) If some people are more persuadable than others what are the characteristics of persuadable audiences? Psychological research on personality and persuasibility is extensive but as we have pointed out several times already it is also quite contradictory. Nevertheless, it is possible to extract several broad principles which may provide some help in how to persuade audiences with different characteristics

- 1 ***Try to establish patterns of similarity between yourself and the audience*** If you are out to persuade a group of people the chances are that they differ from you on various dimensions. You can however demonstrate certain attitudes and behaviors which would lead to greater communality between you and your listeners (e.g. interests, hobbies, mannerisms, etc.) Whether such similarities are based on reality is beside the point. As long as your listeners perceive themselves as somewhat similar to you, a multitude of halo effects (see p. 26) will emerge. Since you are perceived as similar, you will also be perceived as more attractive, more sincere, and more of an expert ²⁶. Your chances as a successful persuader increase accordingly.
- 2 ***Gear your level of presentation to the listeners' self-esteem*** As a rule, people with low self-esteem are easier to manipulate than people with higher self-esteem ²⁷. Make sure however to present your arguments clearly to listeners whom you suspect of being low in self-esteem. By clearly we mean that your arguments must be presented in an easy-to-follow manner, even at the risk of resorting to very rudimentary forms of communication. Your listeners must understand your message, because if there is one thing people with low self-esteem dread, it is failure. However plausible your message might be, if it is difficult to understand it raises the possibility of failure to the audience. When this occurs, people with low self-esteem will be the hardest audience to persuade ²⁸.
- 3 ***Let the intelligence level of your audience dictate your use of appeals*** Unsupported generalities will not help you to convince people with high critical abilities. If you want to base your case on such generalities and on emotional slogans, you are better off addressing an audience of lesser intelligence. The higher the intelligence level of the audience, the greater the need for sound logical messages to get the job done ²⁹. Intelligent audiences are also resistant to persuasion attempts which are too obvious ³⁰. They

do not mind being forewarned that you are about to engage in attempts to change their attitudes, but they are resistant to arguments which obviously try to persuade

The Fourth Step Gaining and Maintaining Credibility

Arousing, substantive and well presented persuasive messages to selected audiences can lead to attitude change in your listeners provided they also perceive the source of the message in a positive manner. To be successful people have to believe in you. Without this credibility your efforts may be in vain.

Credibility consists of two components. In one, your expertise is at stake. Your audience must be convinced that you have the knowledge and experience in the field about which you are speaking. In the other your trustworthiness is appraised. Bear in mind however that just because you are the expert does not necessarily mean that your audience is confident that you are going to present your message honestly and objectively.³¹ Moreover the moment you stray from your specific area of expertise your prestige tends to drop sharply and your credibility may suffer.³²

As a persuader what can you do upon encountering lack of faith in your credibility from your audience? Not much really. For one thing, you are probably deserving of it. You either showed that you did not know what you were talking about or you did not attempt to communicate the assertions you considered most valid. In such cases there seems little you can do short of resorting to deliberate misrepresentation. For example, flashy presentations of messages with meaningless content have been shown to be effective as long as the persuader faked his credentials as an expert.³³ Then there is the *sleeper effect*. For many years psychologists took it for granted that a communication works while the audience sleeps on it. As a result it was suggested that with the passage of time people tend to forget *who* presented the argument (the source) more rapidly than *what* the argument (the content) was all about.³⁴ If this were true the implications would be clear. Non-substantive but flashy presentations by a low-credibility persuader have a better chance to be remembered than dull presentations by a high credibility persuader. This apparent advantage of style over substance opens the specter of the 'big lie' technique as used by Nazi Germany propagandists. Malign a person long enough with catchy demagogic phrases and people will eventually believe you regardless of your credibility. Recent research findings however, clearly and unequivocally demonstrated that the sleeper effect does not exist. Seven replications of the original sleeper effect study (a flimsy study to begin with) failed to show that there is such a phenomenon.³⁵

Conflicting results are the rule rather than the exception in studies of attitude change. This holds particularly true for the area of persuader credi-

bility and attractiveness. The problem with focusing on the persuader is that it may involve personality variables which are difficult to pin down. Obviously the more attractive you are as a persuader the more effective you become in influencing your listeners. There are however some situational factors which seem to operate across the board. This means that you may be recognized as a high-prestige expert or even be perceived as personally honest and objective and still lack credibility. It all depends on what and whom you represent. For example although given identical communications about the effects of smoking on health subjects' attitudes changed more in the advocated position when the alleged message was cited from the Surgeon General's Report on Smoking and Health than from a popular magazine article and even more so than when cited from an advertisement by the American Tobacco Company.³⁶ Similarly a purported prosecuting attorney and a purported criminal 'Joe the Shoulder, who presented messages advocating more or less power to prosecutors and police gained equal credibility as long as they were advocating positions opposed to their own interest.³⁷ Perhaps there is less suspicion about the motives of a communicator about to embark on an unpopular course or he may be admired merely for his courage. In either case, his credibility and effectiveness as a persuader increase considerably.

Most of the research done by psychologists has focused on persuaders' attempts to gain and maintain credibility. One interesting study dealt with attempts to *restore* credibility. Psychologist Marriana Torrano presented her subjects with a tape-recorded session of a purported faculty-student campus committee. The committee was part of a progressive campus and enjoyed the credibility of the students. In the first part of the experiment subjects were told of a decision by the committee regarding two students who had been engaged in a demonstration involving some turbulence and slight damage to dormitory buildings. The decision was to give the students an official reprimand on their transcript, and to irrevocably dismiss them from the college. The seemingly harsh and unjust decision led to a considerable drop in credibility ratings that subjects gave to the committee. In the second part of the experiment the coordinator of the committee tried to restore credibility by taking one of the following steps (each step corresponds to an experimental condition)

- 1 ***Denial of wrongdoing*** The coordinator simply reaffirmed the committee's original decision. He pointed out that he and his colleagues were elected to the committee because of their expertise and personal integrity, and on that basis their decision should be accepted unquestioningly.
- 2 ***Denial of wrongdoing, with information withheld*** The coordinator

reaffirmed the committee's original decision but pointed out that the decision was made on the basis of additional information which could not be divulged without hurting people needlessly

- 3 *Denial of wrongdoing, with information divulged* The coordinator reaffirmed the committee's original decision but presented further facts which for ethical reasons, could not have been divulged previously. The two accused students were now reported as having been engaged in far more serious activities than a protest march. They had been paid by an off-campus group which intended to foster dissension on campus in order to disrupt the faculty-student co-operation program. Furthermore, the students had previously been involved in embezzlement of campus funds and had been well aware of the consequences of their activities.
- 4 *Admission of wrongdoing* The coordinator stated that the committee was reversing its original decision. The students were found to be innocent. The coordinator announced that the committee was willing to assume responsibility for a decision that it sincerely regretted as unfortunate.
- 5 *Admission of wrongdoing, with information withheld* The coordinator announced that the committee had reversed its unfortunate original decision on the basis of additional information. He explained that this information could not be disclosed for fear of hurting people needlessly.
- 6 *Admission of wrongdoing, with information divulged* The coordinator announced that the committee was reversing its unfortunate original decision because additional information showed that the students' involvement though real, had been an effort to stem the riot rather than to aggravate it.

Before we get to Torrano's results, let us present an analogy from a political leader who has lost credibility and wants to restore it. Former President Nixon's declarations after the Watergate incident and late President Johnson's Vietnam policy are cases in point. To paraphrase Torrano's six experimental conditions, here is what these leaders could say to us in their attempts to restore credibility:

'I am right. Trust me. (1)

'I am right and have additional information to prove it, but for certain good reasons (national security) I cannot divulge it.' (2)

'I am right, and here are the facts to prove it.' (3)

'I was wrong. It was a mistake. (4)

' I was wrong and there was a reason for it but in the interest of your welfare I cannot reveal why (5)
 I was wrong, but this information I'm giving you will explain why (6)

As a good citizen what would you want your leader to do? Presumably you would prefer full information (3) if he claims he is right and full information (6) or at least repentance (4) if he admits that he was wrong. According to Torrano, however, complete denial of wrongdoing without barely a justification (1) is the most effective way to restore credibility.

The fate of former President Nixon seems to justify Torrano's findings (her study incidentally was conducted before the Watergate incident). In the early phases of the Watergate incident even with the common knowledge that potentially condemning tapes did exist, Nixon flatly denied any wrongdoing (1) and stated that the tapes have been under my sole personal control and will remain 'so'. He may have been better off maintaining this stance even with the potential risk of having to destroy the tapes. Instead, he subsequently shifted to evoking national security reasons (2). He finally released what he labeled supporting evidence (3), which sealed his fate. Nixon's only possible consolation could lie in the fact that he refused to listen to those who recommended that he should admit wrongdoing. According to Torrano, admissions of wrongdoing are ineffective in restoring credibility. Total repentance (4) in particular was found to be ineffective (as the repentant late President Kennedy found out when he lost some credibility upon the failure of the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion).

The sad but true fact is that consistency (even when in the form of flat denials of wrongdoings) is often perceived as truthfulness. Fortunately, as Torrano pointed out, flat denials of wrongdoings are only relatively effective in attempts to restore credibility. They are a more effective technique than others, but the gains are exceedingly small. It seems that once credibility is lost, very little can be done to restore it.³⁸

The Final Step: Immunization Against Counterpropaganda

When you catch the flu, contract measles, or come down with a viral infection, it is often because at a given time your resistance happened to be low. It is therefore sound practice to take early preventative steps to minimize your chances for contracting the disease. Supportive therapy would suggest that you engage in daily exercise, maintain a proper diet, and get plenty of rest. But you could also be immunized by being inoculated with a weak virus of the very disease you may contract, because it helps to mobilize your body's defenses. When both types of therapy are available and appropriate, inoculation is superior to supportive therapy.

Psychologists William McGuire and Demetrios Papageorgis used this analogy from medicine in order to demonstrate that the effects of one-sided persuasive arguments are generally short-lived whereas two-sided arguments inoculate listeners against future counterpropaganda. As an example they cited the furor in the United States after the Korean War, when it became public knowledge that some American soldiers had been successfully brainwashed by their Chinese captors (see p. 240). To many a Congressman both the diagnosis and remedy were simple. Those who were brainwashed it was suggested succumbed because they were not patriotic enough or lacked convincing evidence for the superiority of the American way of life. The remedy therefore should be in the form of supportive therapy. Subject the soldiers to massive doses of what is commonly referred to as Americanism and thus avoid future incidents of successful brainwashing (counterpropaganda). Contrary to this advocated one-sided approach, McGuire and Papageorgis argued that the soldiers would be more resistant to counterpropaganda if they were properly inoculated. In practice this would mean that the best way to combat brainwashing and other forms of counterpropaganda (the disease) is to use two-sided arguments. The major and stronger argument should be supportive (e.g., pro-American) while the minor and weaker argument (e.g., pro-Communist) would act like a virus in helping the soldiers to mobilize their defenses against future attacks. McGuire and Papageorgis supported these contentions in a series of interesting psychological laboratory studies.³⁹

We have done our best in this chapter to present you with some (by no means all) of the more important findings in the area of attitude development and change despite the wealth of conflicting evidence. As we pointed out earlier even if the evidence were more conclusive attitude studies would still be plagued by the nagging question: Is what a person says or thinks (attitude) predictive of his actions (behavior)? Because of this problem we found it best in the next two chapters to gradually move away from the study of attitudes to the study of behavior.

Perhaps the best way to conclude this chapter is to cite an experience of ours which demonstrates both the usefulness and futility of studying attitude change. Despite the wealth of conflicting evidence, some psychologists succeed from time to time in gathering enough information to establish unique but effective techniques for changing attitudes. One such psychologist Jacobo Varela from Montevideo, Uruguay, put together an amalgamation of findings from attitude research studies and used them effectively to overcome sales resistance by retailers to wholesalers.⁴⁰ The most intriguing part of Varela's technique consisted of choosing attitudes which the persuader knew the

listeners favored anyway and denouncing these attitudes. When that occurred the listeners, as expected, disagreed with the persuader. Without being aware that they were led, the listeners gradually began to negate *everything* that the persuader said, including statements that incorporated the very attitude that the persuader wanted to change in the first place. It is a truly fiendish technique because it makes you appear fair and objective while you are playing devil's advocate.

When we described Varela's technique to our students, many of them became intrigued and wanted to try it. At that time the war in Vietnam, with all its ramifications, was at its peak. One student, initially skeptical of the method, eventually agreed to try it to change the attitude of his uncle. That gentleman was a crusty retired Army general who seemed to differ with his nephew on practically every dimension that a generation gap could produce. In particular, the nephew was irritated by the continuous discrimination that the uncle, now the head of a prospering business, seemed to practice against young people (not hiring long-haired or informally dressed job applicants, etc.). At that time, too, General Hershey headed the army draft board. This was particularly galling to war resisters who regarded Hershey as an inflexible ancient relic who was sending young men to die.

With the help and advice of his classmates, the nephew decided to change his uncle's attitude with regard to the Army draft system. Following Varela's procedure, he noted several of his uncle's attitudes and arranged them on a favorable-unfavorable continuum as follows:

- Modern army is blessed with fantastically high morale (uncle expected to disagree most vehemently with this statement)
- Modern army stresses physical fitness (uncle expected to disagree with this statement, but somewhat less vehemently than with the preceding one)
- Modern army stresses patriotism (uncle expected to mildly disagree with this statement)
- Modern army is effective primarily due to its draft board (uncle expected to mildly agree with this statement)
- Modern army should have only men over 40 on its draft board (uncle expected to strongly agree with this statement)
- Modern army has the best draft system (uncle expected to vehemently agree with this statement, reflecting the attitude which the nephew wanted to change)

The next step was to carefully choose an appropriate setting. It was finally decided that an impending dinner party would serve best, since if

changes in attitudes are pronounced publicly they are more likely to persist
 As reported by the nephew to his classmates the conversation with his
 uncle went something like this

Nephew *Maybe there are at least some views on the military with
 which both of us agree The morale of the modern army is fantastically
 high, don't you think so?*

Uncle (as expected) *You call this morale? What do these young
 soldiers know about the American way, about the privilege of being
 a member of the armed forces? There is no morale period!*

Nephew (goadingly, pretending surprise) *You may be right, but at
 least admit that there is considerable emphasis on physical fitness now*

Uncle (increasingly angry) *You call that program physical fitness?
 These soft punks who only sleep and drink? Now when we were
 young soldiers we ran ten miles daily, come rain or shine We
 were hard as nails!*

Nephew *Really? At least we agree on this the modern army stresses
 patriotism*

Uncle (still angry) *Never! The modern army has newfangled useless
 ideas about everything including patriotism*

Nephew *You can kick the modern army as much as you like, but I
 know it is great Why? Because of its current draft board*

Uncle (mockingly) *Since when do you know what makes an Army tick?
 There are other things besides draft boards, you know*

Nephew *Is that so? Well even you will have to admit that it is good
 to have only men over 40 on the draft board!*

Uncle (sneeringly) *Why 40? Why not 20, or 30 or 50, or 60? What is
 so magical about 40? It is the men, not the age, that counts*

Nephew *I guess you are right on that point But I am surprised Next
 thing you're going to tell me is that the modern army's draft system
 is not the best!*

Uncle (with finality) *Well, I will It is a poor system It needs over-
 hauling As it is now, the draft system is for the birds!*

Well, finally, there it was! The impossible achieved as the exultant
 nephew told his classmates, the first step in his uncle's 'rehabilitation' At
 the end of the semester the crestfallen nephew reported to the class that
 nothing had really changed The uncle was as hawkish as ever on the war
 and his discriminatory practices continued as before The only change was
 that on that specific point the draft system the uncle was relatively mute
 Which is precisely the point we have been raising all along It is possible,
 perhaps even probable in some cases that changes in attitude will lead to

corresponding changes in behavior. Certainly the avenue of changing attitudes should not be closed in attempts to change behavior. But as we shall see from here on, such changes require additional study.

IN CONCLUSION PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

The present chapter and the two which follow deal with manipulation. For those who are offended by the term we suggest the terms "influence" or "persuasion." As we already pointed out, these are semantic exercises which do not change the essential fact of life, namely, that people manipulate one another all the time.

At the beginning of this chapter we also expressed doubts that attitudes can always be related to behavior. Too often what people say they will do is not necessarily reflected in their actual behavior. Moreover, the studies on attitude change are often contradictory. At best, they show that a persuader can cause a shift in the direction he advocates. Rarely can he affect a total conversion to his point of view.

Nevertheless, we felt it was useful to present you with the five steps toward attitude change, provided that you understand that there is nothing magical about the number or sequence of steps. The five steps by no means exhaust all the possibilities for achieving attitude change, as the two following chapters will show. You can also employ the steps in any order or manner you wish. Our order—arousal and attention, presentation of arguments, knowing your audience, gaining and maintaining credibility, and immunization against counterpropaganda—was decided upon in a strictly arbitrary manner. The same goes for the eight pointers on how to present your case (pp. 215–216). While we are sure that you will find them helpful, you should keep in mind that they can be used to the degree and in the order which you desire.

The problem of manipulation and what it connotes becomes more obvious within the context of personal and social adjustment. Problems are created when significant people in our lives try to exercise control. Too often a parent, a spouse, or a boss will try to get you to do something you do not want to do. Control is a form of manipulation, and there are a lot of people around us who thirst for this type of control.

Even friends get into the act. One way friends or family may attempt to control your behavior is through the advice that they give you. The essence of the manipulation—to get you to accept the advice—will not vary in intent (after all, it was given for *your* benefit!). What may vary is its format. Your friend may use rational arguments or plead with you or call you a fool or express disappointment in some way (e.g., exasperated shrug of the shoulder that implies, "It's *your* life, after all").

If you go to a professional counselor or therapist, there are additional

operating factors position, role, and status. The moment you enter a so-called therapeutic relationship, the role boundaries are very well defined. The expectations of whose problem is dealt with, at what time, for how long, and at what cost are clearly spelled out.

Whether or not the degree of manipulation is spelled out clearly is open to debate. Nobody denies that both parties want something from each other. Many clinicians, however, will vehemently deny that they are manipulative (or directive or persuasive or trying to impose their will). Ironically, the same clinicians will frequently not hesitate to attribute manipulateness to their patients or clients.

We have no quarrel with those clinicians. We are convinced that in their own minds they are indeed nonmanipulative. Considering that many therapists are directive and even manipulative in the worst sense of the word, anyone who is, or wants to be, less manipulative is at least going in the right direction. We do wonder, however, if anyone in the business of solving adjustment problems can truly be nonmanipulative. For this reason we would like to introduce you to the controversial concept of social influence therapy.

Psychologist John S. Gillis, the chief proponent of social influence therapy, is a controversial person. His views have been endorsed as fantastic, intriguing, and revealing, or dismissed as deceptive and dishonest⁴¹—all this because he embraces the concept of manipulation in therapy.

We too have some reservation about the type of therapy advocated by Gillis, yet we do not think that a blanket indictment of him is justified. It is quite possible to accept many of Gillis's basic premises without necessarily arriving at the same conclusion that he did.

In an article called "The Therapist as Manipulator," Gillis stated his case as follows:

All modern psychotherapists, whether they know it or not, engage in maneuvers and manipulations that add to their power over the patient.

This seems to be a factual statement. He then continues:

The social influence position not only recognizes this very human fact, but embraces it.

What does this mean for the therapist-patient relationship? According to Gillis, it is up to the therapist to change the patient's attitudes and beliefs by effective means, be they directive or even devious.⁴²

Can the manipulation techniques described in this chapter (and the two following it) be considered appropriate for social influence therapy? Not

necessarily. It is one thing for the therapist to be *aware* of the manipulative power inherent in the therapist role but quite another thing to deliberately decide to *apply* manipulative techniques. To the contrary, awareness of the role and knowledge of the techniques may help nondirective therapists in their efforts to *reduce* manipulation.

Awareness and knowledge of what constitutes manipulation can help both patient and therapist regardless of their orientation or expectations. You may not agree with the therapeutic techniques which Gillis advocates yet still find little fault with his basic premise.

Psychotherapy is not the unique relationship that many therapists think it is. Instead, it resembles various ordinary social interactions particularly those that involve authority, power, and influence. When the therapist manages to give peace of mind to the anxious and the fearful, he's doing things that happen every day outside their offices. He's using techniques that have developed over thousands of years in law, politics, religion, education, commerce, and advertising (emphasis is ours).

The techniques presented in this chapter are of the same variety as those to which Gillis is referring.

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8

ON THE USE OF POWER

POWER

Practicing and Preaching

Six Power Plays

Does Power Corrupt?

COMPLIANCE

Fear It Does Strange Things to You

Guilt Do It for Mother!

Sympathy Have a Heart!

Force The Stick and the Carrot

Guile A Foot in the Door

Concession A Door in the Face

Impugnment The Art of Name Calling

Hypnosis A Matter of Concentration

OBEDIENCE

Following Orders The Road to Atrocity

Breeding Grounds for Blind Obedience

CONFORMITY

Can You Be Your Own Person?

Breeding Grounds for Conformity

Profiles in Conformity

IN CONCLUSION. PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

POWER**Practicing and Preaching**

When discussing attitudes we often assume that the sentiments we express are directly related to actions we may take. Positive feelings are related to getting involved in an action that expresses these attitudes. If you favor one political candidate you are more likely to go to work for him than you are to go to work for his opponent. Similarly, negative feelings toward somebody may get you involved in action. If you dislike a political candidate, you might go out and campaign against him.

Psychologists have shown that even though we say that we will behave in certain ways, our stated attitudes are not always predictive of how we actually behave. Preaching is not necessarily practicing. No matter how many times you can make another person say "I prefer Coca-Cola," the ultimate test is whether he will drink Coca-Cola if given the opportunity. You can make many men speak glowingly of their preference for equalitarian relationships. But when these men live with their wives or girlfriends, the real question is who does the dishes? Sharing in household duties which are usually assigned to women would be a behavioral manifestation of the men's expressed attitude.

A study on nurse-physician relationships dramatically demonstrated the differences between practicing and preaching. Boxes containing pills (actually placebos which are harmless pills) were labeled "Astrogen, 5 mg" and placed in 22 wards in a public and in a private hospital. A man who curtly identified himself as Dr. Smith telephoned each ward and ordered the attending nurse to give a certain patient 20 milligrams of Astrogen. This was to be done at once, the doctor explained, since he was in a hurry and could not do it himself. Standard rules dictate that nurses do not take orders over the phone, especially from physicians they do not know. Moreover, clearly marked on the pill box was the notice that the maximum daily dose of the drug was 10 milligrams. Observers stationed near each medicine cabinet recorded that 21 out of 22 nurses promptly complied with the unfamiliar doctor's order. It was obvious that the *behavior* of nurses was in compliance with the telephoned orders of an unknown physician.¹

Would the conclusions have been the same if the investigators had simply asked nurses what they would do in such a situation? When graduate nurses were presented with the same hypothetical situation (or given the exact details of the situation created for the experiment) 21 out of 22 claimed they would have refused to carry out the order without written instructions. The lesson from this experiment is obvious. There may be a considerable discrepancy between the attitudes people express and the behavior in which they engage. Psychological and sociological literature abounds with other

examples of this phenomenon. In this chapter and the next chapter we will gradually turn our attention away from attitudes toward actual behavior.

Six Power Plays

If we want to exert influences over somebody, we usually try to use some form of manipulation. Psychologist Bert Raven and his associates have identified six types of social power. Let us take a brief look at their formulations:

- Informational power* occurs when you are manipulated by what a message says. It has nothing to do with the person who presents the message or with the style in which the message is delivered. The content of the message as such carries the power.
- Coercion power* occurs when the manipulator is able to control punishments. You yield to coercive power because you do not want the power agent to hurt you.
- Reward power* occurs when the manipulator is able to give you rewards for going along with him.
- Legitimate power* stems from an internalization of values advocated by an authoritative source. You yield to the manipulator by virtue of his recognized authority.
- Referent power* occurs when you yield because you recognize and respect the prestige of the manipulator.
- Expert power* does not depend on the content of a communication. You yield to the manipulator because of his credentials as an expert.²

Table 8-1 shows how the six forms of social power might be used by parents in an attempt to influence their children not to smoke marijuana. Figure 8-1 illustrates how the six forms of power are reflected in the relationship between officers and enlisted men and between college professors and students.

Does Power Corrupt?


A British statesman, Lord Acton, once made the well-known observation that "power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Philosophers, clergymen, economists, and many great thinkers throughout the ages have pondered the same issue. Psychologists have begun to grapple with this problem only recently. The results of all these deliberations are markedly similar. A majority believes that power corrupts; a minority believes that power can produce beneficial changes.

The course of history, as well as of documented research, does little to substantiate the minority view that power is ennobling. You may, of course, accept Rousseau's idea that a person is a noble savage at birth and what-

TABLE 8.1 SIX POWER PLAYS HOW PARENTS MAY USE POWER TO INFLUENCE THEIR TEENAGE CHILDREN NOT TO SMOKE MARIJUANA

Type of power	How it would be stated
Information	Smoking marijuana is not good for you
Coercion	If you smoke marijuana I can have you arrested and sent to jail
Reward	If you don't smoke marijuana I will increase your allowance
Legitimate	As your parent I have the right to make you stop smoking marijuana
Referent	O J Simpson is down on people who smoke marijuana
Expert	Scientific research shows that smoking marijuana causes a decreased white blood cell count and poorer health

ever corruption there is can be found in society. You may even accept more recent suggestions that the burden of power produces compassion and understanding.³ Then there is the more jaundiced view that at least some power-holders act in a benevolent way because they were deprived of affection as children.⁴ One study even showed that college students choose not to exercise power unwisely when given the opportunity to do so. In that study one of the experimenters posed as a professor. Previous ratings by students had established her as an exceptionally good or an exceptionally bad professor (depending on the experimental condition). The students were subsequently given the opportunity to decide on the future of the professor. The results indicated that there was a significant gap between the rhetorical demand for and the exercise of student power. As expected, when the professor was "good" everyone agreed to hire or maintain her. When she was rated "bad" a curious thing happened. When the professor had given her "bad" lecture to illustrate what some professors do, the students were unanimous in their harshness. They decided that this kind of professor has no place in a university. But when they thought that the "bad" lecture came from a real-life faculty member (or applicant for the position), they suddenly turned lenient and were willing to give that professor a chance to continue teaching. Considering that the teaching to which they had been subjected consisted of monotonous mumbling and pointed references to go to the library to those who dared to ask questions, the students' compassion was remarkable. The results, however, did not necessarily indicate that their noble behavior was related to benevolent exercise of power. As the authors of the study point out, it could have been a function of apathy, fear of retaliation by faculty, buck-passing, or a lack of credibility in the experimental situation.⁵

POWER'*in the military*

This officer enlisted man relationship may involve the following

INFORMATION POWER

Rank seniority gives officer more information about certain military practices

LEGITIMATE POWER

Rank seniority empowers officer to control enlisted man in certain areas

REWARD POWER

Rank seniority allows officer to reward enlisted man with assignments and promotion

COERCIVE POWER


Rank seniority allows officer to punish enlisted man with assignments and promotion

REFERENT POWER

Rank seniority may induce personal respect

EXPERT POWER

Rank seniority may indicate differences in ability and expertise

in the classroom

This professor student relationship may involve the following

INFORMATION POWER

Professor role gives teacher more information about certain campus policies

LEGITIMATE POWER

Professor role empowers teacher to control range and topic of course

REWARD POWER

Professor role allows teacher to reward student with grades and attention

COERCIVE POWER

Professor role allows teacher to punish student with grades and inattention

REFERENT POWER

Professor role and status may induce admiration and respect in student

EXPERT POWER

Professor role may make teacher to be perceived as more knowledgeable than student

Figure 8-1 Examples of social power

There is, alas a formidable array of evidence to justify James Madison's plea in the Federalist Papers that access to power should be limited because of potential ambitiousness and vindictiveness in power-holders. Long before the infamous Watergate incident during the Nixon presidency, there were political ideologies which actually advocated corruption as a justifiable means and end (see Machiavellianism, pp 317-320). And why not? If the power holder finds that he is able to influence others because of the power he holds he is likely to believe that his ideas and views are superior to those of others. Moreover he will do everything that he can to increase the social distance between himself and those others.⁶ Other studies especially in military and industrial settings have clearly demonstrated that a power-holder rewards subordinates not because of feelings of gratitude and affection on his part, not even because he perceives subordinates as a threat to his position, but simply because the subordinate has engaged in *ingratiation behavior*. This includes a whole array of demeaning buttering up tactics aimed at pleasing the power-holder.⁷ Sad but true is the fact that flattery seems to get you everywhere with your boss—or nearly everywhere. Even if your boss is a good and honest man, he may find himself in a situation where he simply cannot adhere to the rules of conventional morality. As economist John Kenneth Galbraith has pointed out, managers in large corporations are forced to make decisions which minimize risk to corporate investments, even if such decisions break the law and are against the interest of public welfare.⁸

COMPLIANCE

Fear It Does Strange Things to You

The dictionary defines the term *compliance* as 'yielding as to a request, wish, desire, proposal or demand'. How do you get another person to comply? Whatever you do, there must be some motivation on the part of the other person to yield. You can ask, beg, cajole, or flatter him. But if every thing fails, you can always threaten him. Threat induces fear and fear, since time immemorial, has been used by some people to get other people to comply. Priests, shamans, and gurus of all denominations have often promoted the concept of the god-fearing person. The impact of such practices has even filtered down to present-day child-rearing practices. For example, a comprehensive analysis of 367 families revealed that parental control via coalition with God (that is, a parent tells a child that God will punish him if he does not comply) does in fact occur quite frequently.⁹

Psychologists have been less interested in the ethical aspects of threatening others than in the effectiveness of this method in achieving compliance. More than 20 years ago psychologists Irving Janis and Seymour Feshbach conducted a study to demonstrate the effectiveness of threat in inducing attitude change. High school students were given an illustrated lecture aimed

at promoting better dental hygiene. The subjects were randomly divided into three groups, with each group listening to a different fear arousing threat aimed at producing a more positive attitude toward oral hygiene. Mild threat (pain from toothaches) produced 37 percent attitude change in the desired direction, moderately intense threat (having cavities filled or sore swollen inflamed gums) produced 22 percent change, and extremely intense threat (having teeth pulled or cancer paralysis or blindness) produced only 8 percent change. Clearly, the likelihood for compliance to occur decreased as threat intensity increased.¹⁰

Subsequent studies have generally supported the original Janis and Feshbach findings.¹¹ Others, however, have found that the higher the induced fear level of a communication, the greater its acceptance.¹² Much of the confusion is probably due to the fact that what one experimenter perceives as extremely frightening may only be moderately fear arousing to another. Most likely the relationship between fear arousal and attitude change is curvilinear. Up to a certain point, the more fear inducing a message is, the more attitude change it will evoke, after that point its effectiveness will decline.¹³

The experiment by Janis and Feshbach brings up several interesting points. It shows that fear does strange things to people. When a threat becomes too frightening, so much fear and anxiety is generated in individuals that they may defensively avoid the message altogether. Moreover, severe threats are often perceived as implausible and are therefore ignored by the listener. It is very likely that 20 years ago the high school students in the experiment simply did not believe that failing to brush their teeth would lead to blindness, paralysis, or cancer. It is equally likely that today's adolescents are immune to the threat that the use of marijuana inevitably leads to the use of heroin, as so many of the messages presented to them imply.

It seems, therefore, that a moderately intense threat (if some sort of consensus of what constitutes 'moderate' can be reached) is effective in inducing attitude change. But does attitude change mean compliance? Recent studies have shown that the two are not necessarily one and the same. Psychologist Howard Leventhal suggested that compliance to threat will occur only when fear is attached to the actions to be avoided and when the desired actions and attitudes are fear reducing.¹⁴ For example, if you want your child to comply with your demand that he brush his teeth daily, it is not enough to provide him with the fear inducing message that otherwise he will have sore and swollen gums. Such information may change his attitude, but not necessarily his behavior. To achieve the latter, you must provide your child with specific information on how and when he should brush his teeth. To demonstrate this point, Leventhal and his associates tried to persuade college students to take tetanus inoculations under a variety of conditions. The dependent measure was the number of students who actually appeared at the

student health center to be inoculated. Some of the subjects were exposed to a high-threat communication that maintained that tetanus is easily contracted. These communications described in gory detail the most distasteful aspects of tetanus symptoms. The subjects were also shown color photographs of a tetanus patient receiving a tracheotomy and having tubes inserted in different parts of the body. Other subjects were given low fear instructions. These subjects read a message with the same content but with a less vivid and shocking description of the disease. In addition, some of the subjects in the high-fear group and some of the subjects in the low fear group were given specific instructions about what course of action to take. These instructions went so far as to tell the student to check his schedule to determine what times of day he passed near the health center, and provided a visual aid which showed the location of the health center in relation to other campus buildings.

The results of the experiment were quite interesting. Subjects exposed to a strong fear arousing message were more likely to report that they intended to take the shots than those exposed to a nonarousing communication. Specific instructions had no effect on verbal reports of intentions to take the shots or fear about tetanus. The effects of these two manipulations appear different, however, if action rather than words is counted. When records were examined to determine who actually came for the shots, it turned out that getting specific instructions was more important than fear arousal. Of those given specific instructions, 29 percent reported for the inoculation. Only 3 percent of those not given specific instructions came for the injections. However, all of the groups subjected to threat complied with the recommendation more than control groups who received no fear instructions.¹⁵

Taken together, these results are important for several reasons. First, some fear arousal appears to increase compliant behavior. Second, specific information aids in changing behavior but has little effect on attitudes. Fear arousal thus changes attitudes, but is not too effective in increasing compliance unless it is paired with a specific plan of action. In these days of fear arousing doomsday campaigns in many vital areas such as consumerism, ecology, and birth control, this two step process between attitude change and actual compliance should be kept in mind.

Guilt Do It for Mother!

A husband sends his wife a beautiful bouquet of flowers. If this is an uncharacteristic gesture on his part, should the wife worry? If the guilty feeling principle is operating, she should. The wife wants flowers from her spouse. He knows what her desire is, but is not too motivated to do anything about it. Then he does something which makes him feel guilty. Afterward, bingo—off to the florist shop!

Guilt has a powerful effect on people. Among other things, it can be manipulated to get you to comply. Several studies have demonstrated this rather conclusively. In one such study, subjects operated a machine which could be used to give electric shocks in the context of a learning experiment. It required a teacher to administer various degrees of shocks to learners whenever the latter made mistakes. The subjects in the experiment were always in the role of a teacher, and a confederate always drew the role of a learner. Half of the subjects were led to believe that they were really giving electric shocks to the learner, while the other half knew they were not shocking the confederate. After the supposed learning experiment, the confederate would turn to the subject and ask him if he would be willing to volunteer some time for a campaign to save California's redwood trees.

According to the experimenter's hypothesis, the subjects who thought they had shocked the confederate should feel a little guilty. It was predicted that these subjects would be more willing to comply than the subjects who did not think they had shocked the confederate. This is precisely what happened. Seventy-five percent of the people who were made to feel guilty (or had delivered shocks) agreed to work for the campaign. Among those who had not been made to feel guilty, only 25 percent complied with the confederate's request.¹⁶

The previous study suggests that one way to manipulate people is to make them feel guilty. Of course, advertisers are only too well aware of this principle. TV commercials often butter us up for a big pitch by making us aware of something we should have done. For example, the telephone company tries to get you to spend money on long-distance phone calls by asking you when the last time was that you talked to your family (especially your mother). You may not have talked to them in a while. Being reminded, you feel guilty and head for the telephone.

Sympathy: Have a Heart!

Sympathy, as well as guilt, will increase compliance. This was demonstrated in an experiment conducted during five wet days in Toronto by psychologist Vladimir Konecni. The carefully planned scene went like this: A man walks down the street and drops some computer cards on the wet ground. The cards are always dropped just as a pedestrian approaches the scene. When the pedestrian closes in, the man who has dropped the cards says, 'Please don't step on them' (the cards). The pedestrian is eventually asked to help pick up the cards.

Prior to the request for help, however, several experimental manipulations take place. One condition attempts to induce sympathy in the pedestrian-subject. Just before he approaches the scene, he sees another person (actually a confederate of the experimenter) slam into the man with the com-

puter cards. That other person neither apologizes nor offers to help pick up the cards—just walks away briskly. Another condition aims at instilling a generalized feeling of guilt in the subject. Before reaching the man with the computer cards, an experimental confederate carrying a set of expensive-looking books bumps into the subject. The books are dropped, but before the subject can help, the confederate scoops them up while scolding the subject for his carelessness. After this incident, the pedestrian-subject encounters the man with the computer cards.

In the sympathy condition, 64 percent of the pedestrian-subjects complied with the request to pick up the computer cards. The generalized guilt condition was also effective in getting people to comply. In this condition, 42 percent of the subjects complied. These figures are in contrast to the 16 percent of the subjects who complied in a control condition where neither guilt nor sympathy were aroused. The results of Konečni's study suggest that both guilt and sympathy can increase compliance.¹⁷

One of the most interesting examples of the use of generalized guilt to manipulate people comes from an analysis of brainwashing techniques used by the Chinese during the Korean War. American soldiers in prison camps were encouraged to confess all misdeeds. At first the soldiers only confessed small things, but with encouragement they began to confess greater transgressions. After a while they began to confess all sorts of very personal thoughts about themselves, their fellow soldiers, their captors, and their country. Because of these confessions, the soldiers developed tremendous feelings of guilt. Once the soldiers had been made to feel guilty, the captors were more able to get their prisoners to comply with their requests.¹⁸

Force: The Stick and the Carrot

Can you imagine being paid \$20 to carry out a boring task which makes no sense? This is what psychologists Leon Festinger and J. Merrill Carlsmith paid students to do. The task consisted of such activities as packing spools and turning screws. After they had packed the spools or turned the screws, the experimenter explained to the subjects that he was studying the effects of preconceived notions upon the performance of dull tasks. Each subject was therefore asked to tell another subject that the task had been a very enjoyable one. In other words, subjects who had just participated in a boring task were asked to tell someone else that it really was exciting. For telling this lie, the experimenter offered some of the subjects \$1 and other subjects \$20. Most of the subjects accepted the offer and went on to tell the next subject that the task had been exciting. Then the subjects were asked how much they themselves had enjoyed the task.

Before we continue on this track, we must take a short side trip into the realm of theory. Leon Festinger introduced his theory of *cognitive dissonance*

in 1957. In its formulation it is similar to Fritz Heider's balance theory (see Chapter 2) but seems to be more appealing because of its elegant simplicity. Festinger suggested that every time a person is confronted with a logical inconsistency—for example, with a discrepancy between what he believes and what he does—cognitive dissonance occurs.¹⁹ If you are a heavy smoker and believe that smoking leads to cancer, you experience cognitive dissonance. If you stuff yourself with fattening food and believe that obesity causes health or social problems, you experience cognitive dissonance. It is an unpleasant state which people tend to avoid at all cost. One way to regain consonance is to change the original belief. If, for example, you can somehow convince yourself that smoking does not necessarily lead to cancer, your cognitive dissonance will disappear. The American Tobacco Institute can probably provide you with such information. If you are convinced, you can go on smoking with impunity. You are once again at peace with the world.

What has all this got to do with being paid \$20 for a boring task and then being asked to lie about it to boot? The answer is that Festinger and Carlsmith proposed that their experiment was a test of the differences between dissonance theory and learning theory. Learning theory argues that the greater the incentive, the greater the attitude change. In other words, the more you get paid for lying, the more you will begin to believe your own lies. Thus, those who were paid \$20 were expected to believe their lies about how enjoyable the task was more often than those who were paid a mere \$1 for it. Dissonance theory predicts the very opposite. It suggests that when the subjects realized that they were engaged in a boring task for the measly sum of \$1, they experienced dissonance. To relieve this dissonance, they had to justify their actions. By attributing greater importance to the task than it really deserved, the subjects could regain consonance. So they would lie more often for \$1 than for \$20. And then they would believe their lies.

Now let us get back to the original experiment. The results showed that those who were paid \$20 for lying did not believe what they were saying. They expressed virtually the same feelings as a control group of subjects who were not asked to lie. Those who said that they enjoyed the task most were the ones who had been paid \$1.²⁰

These results are in line with many other findings supportive of cognitive dissonance theory. People who find themselves committed voluntarily to behavior inconsistent with their beliefs are likely to experience dissonance. To relieve this dissonance, they will go to great lengths to justify their behavior. Horseplayers committed to betting on a certain horse attribute better qualities to it.²¹ New car owners avoid reading advertisements of similar cars by another manufacturer lest they encounter features that are missing in their own cars.²² Shoppers discovering that their favorite brand product costs more nevertheless continue buying it because of its presumed superior quality.²³

Prospective group members increase their liking for the group that puts forth the greatest obstacles for joiners²⁴ Young men with a negative attitude toward marriage who subsequently become engaged increase their expressed affection toward their fiancées²⁵

There are however other explanations for the results of Festinger and Carlsmith's experiment One of the more interesting has been provided by psychologists Irving Janis and John Gilmore They described the results of the Festinger and Carlsmith experiment in terms of *discombobulation* That's right, discombobulation According to Janis and Gilmore it means interfering response The discombobulation hypothesis was developed to explain why there was no attitude change in the high incentive (\$20) condition According to the hypothesis being paid \$20 to do a boring task may have made the subjects suspicious about being exploited by the experimenter In addition, the subjects in this condition may have felt more guilty about telling lies to another student Because of this suspicion the subject would not change overt compliance (telling a lie) into private acceptance (believing the lie)²⁶ Although discombobulation is a fancy word experiments have been unable to confirm this theory as a plausible explanation of the now-classic \$1 and \$20 study²⁷

Remember however that the studies cited so far had one thing in common The subjects in them had *voluntarily* committed themselves to engage in something they really did not believe in and hence they experienced dissonance Clearly if you lie for a measly sum of money you would want to justify your behavior You therefore change your original belief and begin to believe your own lies This should not happen if you are *forced* into doing something you do not believe in (e.g. saying that a boring task has been enjoyable) In that case you can always shift the blame for your predicament onto the people who forced you into it There is simply no compelling reason for you to lie about how you feel about what you are doing

The moral of this is that if you want another person to comply, using force is not as effective as handing that person enough rope to voluntarily hang himself Unfortunately it is virtually impossible to conduct experiments where you can force people into doing something they dislike Subjects in psychological experiments know very well that they can quit and go home anytime The experimenter has no stick to yield to make subjects participate He can however, yield different sorts of sticks once the subjects are ready to participate For example it is one thing if the subject is told repeatedly that he can quit at any point in the experiment It is quite another thing if the experimenter tells the subject in a matter-of-fact tone of voice to do this or that While it is true that in both cases the subject has the ultimate choice of quitting there is nevertheless a lack of choice of sorts in the second condition In any event it can be shown that the first condition (absolute free choice) pro

duces different results than the second condition (relative lack of choice) we can justifiably say something meaningful about the use of force in inducing compliance

Psychologists Darwyn Linder, Joel Cooper, and Edward Jones conducted an experiment which proceeded precisely along those lines. In the free decision condition each subject was told repeatedly, "I want to explain to you what this task is all about. I want to make it clear, though, that the decision to perform the task will be entirely your own." In the no-choice (force) condition each subject was merely told, "I want to explain to you what this task you have volunteered for is all about. The task itself was assured to be unpleasant to the subjects. They were asked to write an essay *in favor* of a speaker-ban law on campus (previous informal opinion polls, fortified by the plausible expectations that as college students themselves the subjects would oppose the freedom to restrict their right to listen, led to the assumption that the subjects would strongly oppose the speaker ban law). In addition, two types of incentives were offered to the subjects for complying: low (50¢) or high (\$2.50). At the end of the experiment an attitude scale was administered to all subjects to find out how they felt about the speaker-ban issue. The results showed that the free choice condition coupled with the low incentive produced the highest amount of attitude change in favor of the speaker-ban position. Yielding a stick (not giving free choice) was clearly ineffective. But giving subjects all the rope they needed (free choice) evidently caused them enough dissonance about their behavior (writing an essay opposing the speaker ban for a paltry 50¢) to make them justify that behavior (by beginning to favor the speaker ban).²⁸

The previously cited study is one of many on the topic of *forced compliance*. We have already pointed out that the term "force" is rather relative. Moreover, most of these studies offer various kinds of incentives (money, grades, etc.) for complying. They present what is popularly known as the stick and carrot technique for achieving compliance. This mixture of force and bribery seems to work very well with stubborn mules. With people, the process is somewhat more complex. It depends on how the stick is applied and on the size of the carrot. To demonstrate this point, psychologist Merrill Carlisworth and his associates forced subjects in an experiment to comply, but also offered them various sums of money for acting this way. The subjects were first given reams of pages with random numbers and instructed to engage in the task of crossing out all the 2s and 6s. As part of the experiment, they were subsequently induced to say that they enjoyed the task. Some of the subjects were allowed to do so by writing anonymous essays on the joys of crossing out numbers. The other subjects were expected to express the same attitude in a face-to-face confrontation with their peers. In addition, there were three kinds of payoff. One-third of the subjects received \$5 each for their

participation another third of the subjects received \$1.50 each and the final third of the subjects received 50¢ each.

By way of analogy it can be said that the experiment featured two ways of applying the stick (anonymous essays and personal confrontation) and three carrots differing in size (\$5, \$1.50, 50¢). The ultimate test was the extent to which the subjects believed their own lies. This was done by asking the subjects how much they had enjoyed the task.

The results showed that in the essay condition, the stick and carrot combination was very effective. As the payoff increased so did compliance. While 50¢ caused very little compliance, payoffs of \$1.50 and \$5 resulted in increasingly in statements that crossing out numbers was fun. These results were expected because the relative safety in which the subjects had expressed themselves earlier (anonymous essays) minimized cognitive dissonance. In the face-to-face condition the very opposite occurred. With increased payoff, compliance decreased. The idea of telling a lie for money was evidently inconsistent (dissonant) with the subjects' beliefs of being good and honest persons.²⁹

What does this experiment tell us for our day-to-day living? You may have heard the old saying: If you tell a lie long enough you will start to believe it yourself. There are many situations in which a person could be paid well for lying to others. In these days of political hush money and cover-ups we are all too often aware that people will tell lies for the right fee. Whether or not they begin to believe in what they say depends on the degree of cognitive dissonance that these lies produce. If we are being paid off to tell a little white lie that is not likely to cause much harm we might begin to believe this lie ourselves. If we are forced into an open confrontation with others we are less likely to believe our own lies regardless of payoff.

Guile: A Foot in the Door

Have you ever heard about the foot-in-the-door technique of salesmanship? Two psychologists, Jonathan Freedman and Scott Fraser, ran a series of interesting experiments to show how people can be made to comply with a minimum of pressure. The guiding principle of their research is based on dissonance theory and goes as follows: If you can get someone committed to do a minor favor for you, his refusal to perform a greater favor for you will arouse dissonance in him. To avoid this unpleasant state, he will comply again. Thus, commitment to do a favor will lead to more commitment which in turn will lead to more commitment and so on.

To demonstrate this foot-in-the-door technique, Freedman and Fraser ran two experiments. In both experiments subjects were asked to comply with a small request and some days later to comply with a larger request. In the first experiment citizens randomly chosen from the telephone directory

in Palo Alto California were called by California Consumers Group (a made-up cover name) and asked to provide information for a survey about household goods. Those citizens who agreed to respond were then asked a series of eight innocuous questions about soaps. The caller thanked them for their cooperation and hung up.

A few days after the initial contact, the purported California Consumers Group recontacted the citizens and presented them with a larger request. This time the citizens were asked to participate in a more involved survey. Five or six men were to enter the subject's home for about two hours in order to enumerate and classify all of the household products. These men were to have full freedom to go through all cupboards and storage places. The information they collected was to be used for a public service publication.

In addition to the citizens who were contacted twice, another group of people was only confronted with the second, larger request. In summary, there were two groups of subjects. One group was given a small request and then presented with a larger request. The other (control) group was only presented with the second or larger request.

The results of the experiment clearly showed that subjects were more likely to comply with the larger request if they had formerly agreed to a lesser request. Of those contacted twice, 53 percent agreed to the large request. Only 22 percent of those who had been contacted once (control group) agreed to comply with the large request. The foot in the door technique was thus shown to work.

Freedman and Fraser then ran another even more conclusive study. Experimental groups were once again contacted prior to the large request, while the control group was contacted only once for the same request. Depending on the experimental conditions under which they were placed, subjects were asked either to sign a petition to keep California beautiful, put up a sign in their windows which said "Keep California Beautiful," sign a petition about traffic safety, or put up a sign in their window which said "Drive Carefully." Later, all subjects were presented with the same large request. So were the control subjects who had not been asked to comply with any prior requests.

The large request was a tall order indeed. It called for the subjects to place in their front yards a big ugly sign which read "Drive Carefully!" To make this large request even less attractive, a sample picture was shown to the subjects. It showed the sign obscuring much of the view of an attractive house.

The results of the study were nothing less than astonishing. As expected, the control condition yielded very little compliance. Only 17 percent of the people who were asked directly to put up the ugly sign were willing to do so. The experimental conditions, however, yielded entirely different results. Sof-

tened up by the foot-in-the door technique, subjects in those conditions were quite willing to comply with the request to put up the ugly sign. This was particularly evident in the case where both the issue (driving carefully) and the task (displaying a window sign) was similar for the two contacts. Under those conditions 76 percent of the people were willing to put up the ugly sign in their front yards. This means an almost fivefold increase in compliance!

Freedman and Fraser chose to interpret the results as follows. What may occur is a change in the person's feeling about getting involved in action. Once he has agreed to a request, his attitude may change. He may become, in his own eyes, the kind of person who does this sort of thing, who agrees to requests made by strangers, who takes action on things he believes in, who cooperates in good causes.³⁰ Important for our interest is the finding that any involvement in action may stimulate a person to be compliant in future action.

Concession: A Door in the Face

Involvement in action can take a different turn. Suppose you want someone to do you a favor. What would happen if you first present this person with an outrageous request (which he is sure to reject) and *then* ask him to comply with your original favor? This approach is diametrically opposed to the foot-in-the-door technique. In fact, you may label it the door-in-the-face technique. Under certain circumstances it can become very effective.

A group of psychologists headed by Robert Cialdini demonstrated this technique in a series of experiments conducted at Arizona State University. Subjects were male or female students who happened to be walking alone on campus during daylight hours. They were approached by another student (always of the same sex as the subject) and asked to volunteer as a nonpaid counselor for the County Juvenile Detention Center. The position, the subjects were told, would require about two unpaid hours per week for a minimum period of two years. As expected, not a single subject complied with this extreme request. The subjects were subsequently presented with a smaller request, namely, to act as a chaperone for a two-hour trip to the zoo with a group of children from the County Juvenile Detention Center. Some of the subjects were presented with both requests and asked to perform either one, while other subjects were faced first with the large request, and then with the small request. In addition, a group of subjects was presented only with the small request in order to establish a control baseline. The results showed that when subjects were asked to perform the smaller request (chaperone duty) only about 17 percent complied. When they were given a choice of either chaperoning or taking the two-year position, 25 percent of the subjects agreed to perform chaperone duty. But when they were first exposed to the extreme request for the two-year commitment and *then* asked to perform

chaperone duty 50 percent of the subjects were willing to act as chaperones. The door-in-the-face technique increased compliance from 17 percent to 50 percent!

Cialdini and his associates had a ready explanation for these findings. They suggested that the reason for the increased compliance of the subjects was their perception of concession on the part of the person making the request. In other words, since they realized that the person making the request lowered the ante—so to speak, from a two-year service to a two-hour service—the subjects in turn felt obligated to make some concessions as well; hence the increased willingness to comply with the small request. To make sure that it was this process of reciprocal concessions that accounted for their results, Cialdini and his associates repeated the experiment with one person making the extreme request, thanking the subject and walking away; then *another* person made the small request. Under these conditions, subjects did not perceive the request for the smaller favor as a concession offered by the requester. Accordingly, only about 11 percent of the subjects complied with the small request, as opposed to 55 percent with the door-in-the-face technique (where both requests came from the *same* person).³¹

The door-in-the-face technique for achieving compliance has not as yet been investigated as thoroughly as its counterpart, the foot-in-the-door technique. It has been limited to face-to-face interaction, with the interactants being of the same sex and the requests being prosocial in nature. Both techniques seem to demonstrate that if you simply ask people outright for a favor, you are less likely to obtain compliance than if you involve additional requests for action.

Impugnement: The Art of Name-Calling

The techniques for achieving compliance listed so far may be complex, but they all share a logical basis. It is reasonable to assume that if you capitalize on fear, guilt, sympathy, force, or guile, you may eventually get other people to comply with your wishes. Psychologist Claude Steele has now added another dimension which really stretches the imagination. If you want people to comply—insult them! To understand this strange suggestion, let us use Steele's own words:

One day a liberal person was called a racist. The liberal was, of course, very hurt by this name and wanted to argue the name-caller into retracting it. But the name-caller went away before the liberal had a chance to speak. The liberal was left alone to brood. Another day, soon after, the liberal was asked by a friend if he would contribute some of his time and money for the development of a project to help the disadvantaged members of another race. The liberal paused for a

*moment And then he remembered that he had been called a racist
He also recalled the bad feeling that the name had caused him Thus
he looked at his friend and with the poise of a man with great conviction
agreed to his request*

The logic of all this, according to Steele, is that when a person is insulted he loses in self esteem In order to avoid any further threat to his positive self-regard he will begin to comply with requests which restore and enhance his image To support his contention Steele asked a group of 60 homemakers selected from the Salt Lake City telephone directory to answer a few questions in a preliminary poll taken by "Bill Glass of the National Polling Institute While talking to the women the bogus pollster told some of them that it was common knowledge that she (the homemaker) was not particularly oriented toward the betterment of others that she was known to be self centered and smug and so on Other homemakers were given a diametrically opposite treatment that is, the bogus pollster complimented them on their concern cooperation, and helpfulness Two days later the women were contacted once again and asked to prepare a lengthy list of food items and household goods for the purported establishment of a food cooperative for the needy in lower-income neighborhoods This list was to be compiled within three days and the experimenter actually called for it Thus the experimenter had in his possession not only the number of women *willing* to comply, but also those who *actually* complied In either case insulting the compliers produced superior results When insulted, subjects were both more willing to comply (93%) and to actually comply (66%), than when praised (65% and 57%, respectively)

One of the implications of Steele's study is that it would be a smart move on the part of extremists to insult their lukewarm supporters in order to get them to comply with requests for additional support Calling liberals racists or male chauvinist pigs could pay dividends to the Black Power or Women's Liberation movements just as labeling moderate conservatives Communists could pay dividends to members of the John Birch Society This can also be effective on a more personal level, provided the insulted party lets you have your say or does not knock your teeth out Perhaps it all depends on the style and delivery of the insult In the previously described experiment all insults were delivered politely and smoothly and, according to Steele the bogus pollster was "almost never" interrupted before completing his entire message³²

Hypnosis A Matter of Concentration

Down in San Diego where we live there is an exciting nightclub act It features an entertainer who puts people from the audience into a trance and then

TABLE 8.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF HYPNOTIZED SUBJECTS

-
- | | |
|---|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1 | <i>Lack of initiative</i>
The subjects do not initiate activity but wait for the hypnotist to give them directions |
| 2 | <i>Selective attention</i>
The hypnotist makes the subjects pay attention to a specific matter ignoring everything else |
| 3 | <i>Reduction in reality testing</i>
The subjects are willing to accept hallucinations uncritically (e.g. a chicken is sitting on your shoulder) |
| 4 | <i>Readiness for role enactment</i>
The subjects are willing to enact roles of others as well as their own at different stage of development (e.g. childhood or adolescence) |
| 5 | <i>Openness to suggestion</i>
Less hesitation in accepting suggestion than they would ordinarily exhibit |
| 6 | <i>Selective memory</i>
Some subjects are able to forget what transpired during the hypnotic session if they are told to do so |
-

Adapted from Hilgard Atkinson and Atkinson 1975

commands them to perform some unusual behaviors. He puts them horizontally between two chairs and stands on their rigid bodies or tells them to laugh and to cry. He even tells them that they are famous nightclub entertainers and then lets the audience watch as they make fools of themselves at tempting to perform. Characteristic of the people in the act is that they comply with everything the entertainer requests.

As you have probably guessed, the trance we are referring to is part of the process of *hypnosis*. Hypnosis is commonly thought of as a form of sleep. Although the term *hypnosis* comes from the root *hypnos*, which is Greek for sleep, we know now that the hypnotic trance is not ordinary sleep. When brain wave recordings are taken from hypnotized people they look more like those of people awake than asleep.

Psychologist Ernest Hilgard of Stanford University has spent many years studying the phenomenon of hypnosis. He and his colleagues have compiled a list of characteristics of the hypnotic state (see Table 8-2).³³

Psychologists have disagreed among themselves about many aspects of hypnotism, as well as on the methods by which it should be studied. Despite these disagreements, students of hypnotism seem to agree on certain points. The American Society of Clinical Hypnosis, in its *Handbook of Therapeutic Suggestions*, lists the subject's ability to concentrate as the primary factor in inducing hypnosis. Hypnotists must capture the subject's attention; the handbook warns because when attention is concentrated on an idea, the idea tends to be realized.³⁴

A recent review describes some other points about which students of hypnosis generally are in agreement. First and foremost it is understood that people who become hypnotized are willing to be hypnotized. If you do not want to go into a trance you need not worry about someone sneakily putting you into one. Most theoretical treatments of hypnosis assert that those who become hypnotized are motivated to become hypnotized.

Once hypnotized you will comply with the most dangerous demands—or so it seems. This was demonstrated in an experiment where subjects were hypnotized and asked to engage in dangerous behavior. Naturally, the experimenter-hypnotist had taken all the necessary precautions so nobody would get hurt. The hypnotized subjects, who did not know this, were nevertheless willing to handle rattlesnakes in a cage, dip their hands into a beaker of nitric acid, and even throw the acid in the experimenter's face. But so did subjects who were told to pretend that they were deeply hypnotized and subjects who were merely told that they were in an experiment (without mentioning hypnosis). Hypnotized or not, the subjects simply refused to believe that the conditions were for real. They took it as part of the experimental game, unlike another group of subjects who were not told that they were in an experiment. In that group, not a single person complied.³⁵

Because of such findings, some people tend to dismiss hypnosis as nothing more than role-playing. The interesting part about all this is that people's belief (or lack of it) in hypnosis is closely related to their susceptibility to the trance state. Those who are given positive information about hypnosis become more susceptible than those given no information, while those given adverse information became less susceptible.³⁶

Another common finding is that hypnotic suggestions are more likely to be experienced when the subject has been stimulated to use his imagination. If imagination is directed along specific channels with which the hypnotist wants to induce compliance, the latter is more likely to occur.³⁷ For example, if you want a person under hypnosis to experience anesthesia, you will be more successful if you ask him to imagine novocaine being injected into his body than you would be if you had just asked him not to experience pain. It was also found that subjects who were asked to imagine anesthesia, stiffening of limbs, and arm levitation were more likely to comply with the hypnotist.

In summary, hypnosis can be an effective way of getting people to comply, but it is not capable of doing what some people think it will do. First, a hypnotic subject must be ready and willing to be hypnotized in order to go under. Second, what one experiences is greatly influenced by the skills of the hypnotist and the subject's capacity to concentrate and imagine. Thus, hypnosis as a device to get people to comply can be regarded as effective only in a limited number of cases and under very special circumstances.

OBEDIENCE**Following Orders The Road to Atrocity**

During the years 1933 to 1945 millions of innocent people were killed in Nazi Germany's gas chambers. The deaths of these people were engineered by a single person who through a series of commands gave orders to have these grim deeds carried out. The fabric which binds command to action is *obedience*. According to psychologist Stanley Milgram, Obedience is the psychological mechanism that links individual action to political purpose. It is the dispositional cement that binds men to systems of authority.³⁸

Because people tend to obey orders, history has been the witness of many atrocities. Some historians suggest that during the course of history more hideous crimes have resulted from obedience to authority than from any type of rebellion.³⁹ The problem with obedience to authority is age-old and has been recognized for thousands of years. Obedience to authority is treated in the biblical story of Abraham and discussed in philosophical terms by Plato and Hobbs. Hobbs, for example, argued that the responsibility for crimes committed on command rests with the authority rather than with a person who carries out the order. The problem of obedience to authority is still very much with us. An example of this is the following chilling interview between CBS reporter Mike Wallace and a participant in the recent My Lai incident during the war in Vietnam.

- Q** *How many men aboard each chopper?*
- A** *Five of us. And we landed next to the village, and we all got on line and we started walking toward the village. And there was one man, one gook in the shelter, and he was all huddled up down in there, and the man called out and said there's a gook over there.*
- Q** *How old a man was this? I mean was this a fighting man or an older man?*
- A** *An older man. And the man hollered out and said that there's a gook over here, and then Sergeant Mitchell hollered back and said shoot him.*
- Q** *Sergeant Mitchell was in charge of the twenty of you?*
- A** *He was in charge of the whole squad. And so then the man shot him. So we moved into the village and we started searching up the village and gathering people and running through the center of the village.*
- Q** *How many people did you round up?*
- A** *Well, there was about forty, fifty people that we gathered in the center of the village. And we placed them in there, and it was like a little island, right there in the center of the village. I'd say*

And

Q What kind of people—men, women children?

A Men women children

Q Babies?

A Babies And we huddled them up We made them squat down and Lieutenant Calley came over and said You know what to do with them don't you? And I said yes So I took it for granted that he just wanted us to watch them And he left and came back about ten or fifteen minutes later and said 'How come you ain't killed them yet?' And I told him that I didn't think you wanted us to kill them, that you just wanted us to guard them He said No I want them dead' So—

Q He told this to all of you or to you particularly?

A Well I was facing him So but the other three four guys heard it and so he stepped back about ten fifteen feet and he started shooting them And he told me to start shooting So I started shooting I poured about four clips into the group

Q You fired four clips from your

A M 16

Q And that's about how many clips—I mean, how many—

A I carried seventeen rounds to each clip

Q So you fired something like sixty seven shots?

A Right

Q And you killed how many? At that time?

A Well I fired them automatic so you can't—You just spray the area on them and so you can't know how many you killed cause they were going fast So I might have killed ten or fifteen of them

Q Men women and children?

A Men women and children

Q And babies?

A And babies

Q Okay Then what?

A So we started to gather them up more people and we had about seven or eight people that we was gonna put into the hootch and we dropped a hand grenade in there with them

Q Now you're rounding up more?

A We're rounding up more and we had about seven or eight people And we was going to throw them in the hootch and well we put them in the hootch and then we dropped a hand grenade down there with them And somebody holed up in the ravine, and told us to bring them over to the ravine, so we took them back out, and led

them over to—and by that time we already had them over there and they had about seventy seventy five people all gathered up So we threw ours in with them and Lieutenant Calley told me he said 'Soldier we got another job to do And so he walked over to the people and he started pushing them off and started shooting

Q Started pushing them off into the ravine?

A Off into the ravine It was a ditch And so we started pushing them off and we started shooting them so all together we just pushed them all off and just started using automatics on them And then

Q Again—men women and children?

A Men women and children

Q And babies?

A And babies And so we started shooting them and somebody told us to switch off to single shot so that we could save ammo So we switched off to single shot and shot a few more rounds

Q Why did you do it?

A Why did I do it? Because I felt like I was ordered to do it and it seemed like that at the time I felt like I was doing the right thing because, like I said I lost buddies I lost a damn good buddy Bobby Wilson and it was on my conscience So, after I done it I felt good, but later on that day it was getting to me

Q You re married?

A Right

Q Children?

A Two

Q How old?

A The boy is two and a half and the little girl is a year and a half

Q Obviously the question comes to my mind the father of two little kids like that how can he shoot babies?

A I didn t have the little girl I just had the little boy at the time

Q Uh-huh How do you shoot babies?

A I don t know It's just one of these things

Q How many people would you imagine were killed that day?

A I'd say about three hundred and seventy

Q How do you arrive at that figure?

A Just looking

Q You say you think that many people and you yourself were responsible for how many?

A I couldn t say

Q Twenty-five? Fifty?

A I couldn't say Just too many

- Q *And how many men did the actual shooting?*
 A *Well I really couldn't say that either. There was other there was another platoon in there, and but I just couldn't say how many*
 Q *But these civilians were lined up and shot? They weren't killed by cross fire?*
 A *They weren't lined up They [were] just being pushed and they were doing what they was told to do*
 Q *They weren't begging or saying No no or*
 A *Right They were begging and saying No no. And the mothers was hugging their children and but they kept right on firing. Well, we kept right on firing. They was waving their arms and begging*

You may be wondering whether these agonies of war bear any relationship to obedient behaviors in our everyday lives. The situations in My Lai or in Nazi Germany were obviously quite different from the ordinary situations most of us encounter. And of course it is easy to rationalize that the Nazi executioners were different sorts of people from us. But you still must ask yourself the question: Would I blindly obey an authority even though I knew I might be harming somebody innocent?

Breeding Grounds for Blind Obedience

In the early 1960s Stanley Milgram set out to explore the phenomenon of obedience. Before then obedience had been widely recognized as an essential element of social life yet nobody had attempted to study obedience systematically.

Milgram has now completed 18 separate experiments on the topic. In all of these experiments the procedure has been quite similar. Let us imagine that you are a subject in one of the experiments. You just answered an ad in your local newspaper asking you to participate (in exchange for \$4) in a scientific study of memory. When you arrive at the laboratory you are introduced to another subject. This other subject is a likable, mild-mannered 47-year-old Irish-American accountant. Although you are not told this, this man is not really another subject. He is an actor working for the experimenter. After you meet this purported subject, the experimenter explains to both of you that the study you are involved in is about the effects of punishment on learning. One of you will be the teacher and the other will be the learner. To determine who gets to play each role, you draw from a hat. You are allowed to draw first and you pull out the word "teacher." Actually, this has been a rigged drawing. Both of the pieces of paper in the hat said "teacher" and since you drew first you were assured of being assigned that role.

You watch as the learner (the actor) is taken to another room. He is first put in a chair and then strapped down to prevent excessive movement. As an electrode is strapped to his wrist, he is told that he must learn a list of word pairs. Each time he makes a mistake he will receive an electric shock of increasing intensity.

Now you are taken to another room and placed in front of a large and impressive-looking shock generator. The machine has 30 switches labeled 15 volts, 30 volts, 45 volts, and on up to 450 volts in 15-volt increments. Near the switches for lower voltages is the label "slight shock." On the other side of the machine, near the switches associated with higher voltages, is another label— "danger—severe shock." Your task is to give a learning test to the other subject. Each time he gives a right answer, you are to go on to the next word. Each time he gives a wrong answer, you are to punish him. The first time he misses an item, you are to give him a 15-volt shock. The next time you must give him a 30-volt shock. You are to continue and use a shock 15 volts higher than the preceding one each time the learner makes an error.

Things start out well, but soon you begin to realize that this is an uncomfortable situation. When you get to 75 volts, you hear the learner grunt. By the time you get to 120 volts, he has loudly complained about the situation. When you get to 150 volts, he wants to quit the experiment, and by the time you get to 285 volts, he screams in pain when you give the shock.

What would you do in this situation? Would you give the shocks? Probably you would first complain to the experimenter. The first time you complain, he says, "Please continue," or "Please go on." The next time he says, "The experiment requires that you continue." The third time he says, "It is absolutely essential that you continue." If you continue to object, he will tell you,

"You have no other choice; you must go on." If you express worry about being liable for the learner's personal injury, the experimenter says, "Although the shocks may be painful, there is no permanent tissue damage, so please go on."

How many shocks would you give to the learner before refusing to go on with the experiment? Go ahead and write the number in the margin of this book. Now let us see how your estimate compares to the predictions made by psychiatrists, college students, and middle-class adults.

Figure 8-2 shows a diagram of the control panel. There were 30 shock levels. The arrows point to the places that the three groups chose as predicted cut-off points. These are the points at which these people thought most subjects would say, "I will not go on with the experiment." Notice that the psychiatrists were the ones who expected the subjects to be the most defiant. Everyone in each of the groups also predicted that the subjects




Figure 8 2 How far would you go? This is a diagram of the control panel used in Milgram's experiments (see text). The top row of numbers shows the levels of shock. The next row shows the voltage associated with each shock level. The strength of each level of shock is also indicated. The arrows show how far psychiatrists, college students, and middle class adults thought the average subject would go. What is your estimate? From Milgram, 1974.

would protest and stop the experiment before they had administered the 450-volt shock. Now that you have had the opportunity to review the predictions made by others, you might wish to revise your own predictions. You can do this by drawing an arrow on Figure 8-2 to show your own expectation.

Now that we have your prediction, we can let you in on a secret. The learner in this experiment does not really receive shocks. The electrodes attached to his wrists do not actually deliver the electrical jolt. Any response he makes (such as yelling) is merely to make the subjects believe that they are really delivering the electric shocks. As a subject, you would think you were delivering the shock. You would have no idea that you are not really hurting the learner.

In his first experiment, Milgram found out something that should startle you. Sixty-five percent of the subjects obeyed the experimenter's demands and continued to give shocks until they had reached the final level—450 volts! No subject stopped the experiment before the 300-volt mark. At this point, they heard the learner pounding in agony on the wall of his room. Only

12½ percent of the subjects who heard this refused to go on. The rest continued to obey.

All this is not to say that the task of obeying was easy on the subjects. Many of them protested, fumbled for cigarettes, mopped their sweating brows, and nervously turned in their chairs. Nevertheless, they continued to obey the orders. Remember, these were not war criminals. They were ordinary citizens like you or me.

Once Milgram had found this shocking evidence, he continued his research in order to find out exactly what conditions are most likely to increase or decrease obedience. Table 8-3 summarizes many of these experiments.

Looking at the results of the Milgram studies, we can draw several conclusions about obedience to authority. To begin with, the closer the subject was to the victim, the less likely was the subject to obey. When they were required to put the victim's hand onto the shock plate, subjects became increasingly defiant. Another aspect of obedience to authority concerns the authority as such. Obedience was less likely to occur if the authority was not forceful (experiment 8), if he was absent from the room (experiment 12) or if a nonauthority figure gave the commands (experiment 13). When the authority himself was the victim, there was no obedient behavior (experiment 17). Obedience was also reduced when the authority's credibility was taken away by moving his laboratory out of a prestigious university into an unattractive downtown office complex (experiment 7). All subjects stopped giving shocks before they hit the 450-volt mark when the authority wanted to halt the experiment at a lower shock level (experiment 18), or when there were two authorities and one wanted the experiment stopped (experiment 16). Most of these experiments suggest that the word of an authority is taken seriously and that we are frightfully subservient to authority figures.

One of the most disturbing results of Milgram's experiments was discovered in experiment 1. In this experiment, the subject played a secondary role while another subject (really a confederate) actually administered the shocks. In this situation, 92.5 percent of the subjects stood by without protest until the final 450-volt shock had been administered!⁴⁰ In our modern bureaucratic society with its military organizations, most people do not actually engage in destructive behavior. Instead, they occupy secondary roles. People load guns, design weapons, provide support, shuffle papers, and so forth. Clearly, these people are part of the destructive effort. Yet, like the subjects in Milgram's experiment, they are not likely to do much about the wrongs they observe.

The Milgram experiments have been criticized because they may have been unethical and because they may lack relevance to the real world.⁴¹ Nevertheless, they say something profound and frightening about human nature. Their message is one we should all reflect upon with deep concern.

TABLE 8 3 SUMMARY OF STANLEY MILGRAM'S RESEARCH ON OBEDIENCE ^a

Condition	Percentage obeying all the way
1 Subject plays subsidiary role to another subject (a confederate) who obeys Subject can still refuse to obey at any point	92 5
2 Victim is in a separate room but can be heard pounding on the wall	65 0
3 Victim (with heart condition) is in a separate room but can be heard pounding on the wall	65 0
4 One experimenter gives the orders another experimenter acts as victim	65 0
5 Subjects are women rather than men	65 0
6 Victim is in a separate room but his vocal complaints can be heard	62 5
7 Location of experiment is moved from prestigious Yale University premises to rundown industrial downtown area No connection with the university is mentioned	47 5
8 Experimenter is not very forceful and victim is rugged-looking	
9 Victim and subject are in the same room	40 0
10 Victim stipulates at onset of experiment that he expects it to be halted upon his command because of his heart condition	40 0
11 Subject is required to place victim's hand on a shock plate	30 0
12 Experimenter is not in the room	20 5
13 Experimenter leaves room and appoints another subject (a confederate) to act as experimenter	20 0
14 Subject sits with 2 peers who refuse to punish victim	10 0
15 Subject has choice of shock level for any trial	2 5
16 One experimenter demands subject stop another experimenter urges subject to go on	0 0
17 Experimenter turns into victim and another subject gives orders	0 0
18 Experimenter stops at 150 volts but victim demands to go on	0 0

^aThe left hand column describes the experimental condition The right hand column shows the percentage of subjects obeying *all the way* to the command to shock the victim with 450 volts

Adapted from Milgram 1974

CONFORMITY

Can You Be Your Own Person?

Do your own thing! That is the type of advice we get from friends, counselors and the Dear Abby column Today people in all walks of life take pride in being resistant to the influence of others Movies and TV shows abound with young heroes bravely resisting evil influences to conform As the heroes strike out on their own and tell others where to get off, the audience rewards

them with frequent applause. In the boxoffice hit movie *Serpico* the audience is dazzled by the true story of a New York policeman who resists tremendous pressures to conform to a corrupt system. For his lack of conformity he becomes disliked by the bad guys and admired by the good guys. Another area in which people like to proclaim their independence is politics. After the infamous Watergate incident the most common cry from campaigning politicians was, "I am my own person," or "I am not influenced by big money or political favors."

To put things in proper perspective we must realize that very often conformity is the most adaptive form of behavior. Let us first look at the different definitions psychologists have given to the term conformity. Some psychologists arrive at a definition by pointing out what the term does not encompass. For example, to believe that the earth is not flat is uniformity, not conformity; or for men to wear pants rather than dresses is conventionality, not conformity. By the same token, excessively long hair in males is not necessarily an indication of independence. It could be a manifestation of rebellion (counterconformity), recently accepted conventionality, or even conformity to a counterculture.

Other psychologists make a distinction between information-seeking conformity and norm-seeking conformity. Norm-seeking individuals are true conformers. They conform because of the fear of exclusion, ridicule, or ostracism by others. Information-seeking individuals conform because they are confronted with unstructured or illogical situations which supply them with little or no information.⁴² In a sense, such people only appear to conform. If you walk on a busy street and suddenly stop and glance up intensely at a tall building, it will take very little time for many others to conform to your behavior. Once they find out what it is all about, they will make up their own minds whether to continue with such behavior.

Sometimes the distinction between the two types of conformity is not entirely clear. The TV show *Candid Camera*, where people were photographed without being aware of it, once provided a classical example of what appeared to be a display of conformity. The innocent victim was waiting on the second floor for an elevator to take him to the fifth floor. As the door opened, he saw three other passengers already occupying the elevator, which was on the way up from the first floor. The three people (confederates of the producer of the show) stood silently—facing the back wall of the elevator. The victim, faced with the strange sight of three immobile backs, first seemed hesitant. Then he shrugged his shoulders, pressed the button to the fifth floor, resignedly turned around, and rode the elevator up to the fifth floor in the same position. If such behavior was motivated by fear of being ridiculed by the others, it would fall under the category of norm seeking. It is far more likely, however, that such behavior was spurred by the unstructured situation which

simply did not convey enough information. As such, it would fall under the category of information-seeking conformity.

A widely accepted definition of conformity is that offered by psychologists Charles and Sara Kiesler. They suggest two forms of conformity: *compliance* and *private acceptance*. Compliance refers to actual changes in behavior in the direction that is desired by the influencing source. It does not take into consideration whether or not the conforming person believes in what he is doing. Private acceptance refers to the internalization of group pressure. It occurs when the conforming person's beliefs and attitudes become the same as those of the influencing source.⁴³

Compliance does not necessarily involve private acceptance. Imagine that you bump into someone while walking down the sidewalk. The person you bumped into turns and yells, "You bumped into me! Apologize, you dirty!" You might apologize and be on your way, thus complying with what was asked of you. There are several good reasons why you would want to handle the situation the way you did. Perhaps you did not want to make a scene. Or you might have been afraid of getting beaten up. Whatever the reason, if there was no private acceptance, your behavior is not going to change much. Your contacts with people in the street on future occasions will remain about the same. When the same situation occurs and involves your private acceptance, however, you would consider yourself clumsy and inconsiderate. Not only would you apologize but you would also be likely to change your behavior so that similar confrontations would be avoided in the future. After all, admission of clumsiness and inconsiderateness are damaging to your self-esteem. It is a painful process which one tries to avoid.

Let us now look at some of the research psychologists have done on conformity. You will soon find out that being your own person is easier said than done.

Look at the lines displayed in Figure 8-3. First look at the line in the left half of the figure. Now look at the three lines labeled comparison lines. Which of the comparison lines is the same length as the standard line?

Before you make your choice we should tell you more about the situation. You are in a group consisting of eight students. All of the students will judge the length of the lines and you will be the eighth person to respond. The first person chooses line 3. An honest mistake, you think, as you wait for the response of your next classmate. But he also chooses 3, and so does the third, fourth, and fifth student. Could this be, you ask yourself? Am I going crazy? After a few more students claim that 3 is the same length as the standard line, your turn comes. Which line do you choose? If you are like many of the people in an experiment conducted by Solomon Asch, you probably swing with the crowd and say that line 3 is the same length as the standard line. Actually, line 2 is the same length as the standard line, and the




Figure 8.3 A set of sample stimuli used in Asch's experiment on conformity. The standard line is the same length as #2. When the experimental confederates said that either #1 or #3 was the same length as the standard line, subjects would conform by choosing the same incorrect line.

people who claimed line 3 was correct were confederates working for the experimenter. Asch found that 76 percent of his subjects made at least one error if an incorrect majority had made some incorrect choice before. Of course, there is the possibility that humans do not make judgments about lines too accurately. To determine whether or not this was so, Asch included some subjects who were not exposed to group pressure. Among these people, 95 percent judged the length accurately.⁴⁴ Thus, there is solid evidence that people are easily influenced by pressures brought on by others.

Now that we know that you or your classmates would probably conform in the face of group pressure, you might be wondering *why* you would do it. Is it because you really believe that line 3 was the correct choice, or is it because you know line 3 was wrong but you did not want to rock the boat by deviating from the others? Some of the subjects in Asch's experiments provided evidence for the former. They began to wonder about the adequacy of their eyesight or whether they were following instructions correctly. But many subjects knew they were giving the incorrect response yet went ahead with it because they did not want to openly disagree with the others. For example, in one of Asch's later experiments, he found less conformity if subjects responded privately.

If studies on line judgment conformity do not overly impress you, consider the studies of psychologist Richard Crutchfield. He developed a mechanical device where people recorded their judgments and in turn were presented with the purported judgments of others. The advantage of this

device was that it allowed for the expression of judgments in the choice of pictures facts opinions and beliefs For example the statement "I doubt whether I would make a good leader" was rejected by every single army officer under study Under unanimous peer-group pressure (i.e., when he was led to believe that fellow officers had endorsed this statement unanimously) 37 percent of the officers expressed agreement with the statement⁴⁵ As an enlightened student you may consider yourself immune to conformity If so you may be interested to know that college students under unanimous peer group pressure have been known to agree to rather bizarre statements that 60 to 70 percent of all Americans are over 65 that the average American male is about 8 to 9 inches taller than the average female but has a life expectancy of only 25 years that the average American eats 6 meals a day but sleeps only 4 to 5 hours a night and so on⁴⁶

Breeding Grounds for Conformity

What maximizes conformity? As we shall see later some people are more conforming than others It is part of their personality makeup But there are also situational factors which operate across the board Chief among those situational variables are the size of the pressure group its degree of *unanimity*, its *competence* and its general *cohesiveness*

In Asch's original experiment seven confederates served as the pressure group which tried to influence the subject to make an incorrect statement Asch found out that with three confederates he achieved essentially the same results While more recent evidence indicates that as the size of the pressure group increases so does conformity to its norms⁴⁷ the magic number of three still remains Two people are not sufficient to induce conformity

A more important characteristic of the pressure group is its degree of unanimity Remember that in the Asch experiment all the confederates gave the same wrong answer But just one dissenting opinion will greatly reduce conformity Asch found that when just one of the eight people broke rank and gave the correct response for each trial the percentage of conforming subjects dropped from 32 percent to 5 percent A more recent study showed that even if the dissenting person's judgment could be perceived as highly questionable the ensuing drop in conformity was still maintained The dissenting person who broke rank and gave the correct answer was squinting through very thick glasses The conclusion that this person may possibly be in error due to his poor eyesight did not faze the subjects It still helped them to resist pressure to conform to the majority of the (no longer unanimous) group⁴⁸

A person's appraisal of the members of the pressure group will also affect the probability of conformity If you were told that the others are very

competent in judging lines (e.g. you are told that they have been 90% correct on preceding trials) you are more likely to conform. If on the other hand you were told that the others are incompetent (e.g. that they have in the past been wrong in 90% of the trials) you might be apt to *counterconform*. Counterconformity is not necessarily true independence of judgment. It is a deliberate disagreement with the group.⁴⁹

Finally, your degree of conformity depends to a large extent on how you feel about the group as a working team. Groups where members feel close to one another and are functioning well together are known as cohesive groups. In such groups, members tend to feel loyal and dedicated to group goals. Former President Nixon considered public officials who conformed with a cover-up plot to deceive the public 'good team players'. Since Nixon's group was originally cohesive, many high-level officials did conform.

The case of former President Nixon is an example of how people will conform the more support they get from other group members to do so. Such support, however, is only one form of security. What happens when you know that other people in the group will like you or dislike you regardless of your intended course of action? Under such conditions, you are less likely to conform indiscriminately. One study demonstrated that subjects who felt most accepted or least accepted by the group conformed less than those who felt somewhat accepted.⁵⁰ Thus it seems that fear of rejection may make you more conforming. This fear may increase in groups toward which you feel a special sense of closeness.

Profiles in Conformity

Apart from situational factors, there are many personality characteristics associated with conforming behavior. Emotionally stable and intelligent people are most likely to resist group pressure to conform.⁵¹ Individuals who perceive themselves as competent are less likely to conform than those who doubt their competency.⁵² Females generally conform more than males, but it is primarily a function of the degree they acquiesce to the traditional female role. Females who experience conflict about such a role or who reject it, show a marked degree of independence.⁵³ An interesting, if somewhat complicated, relationship exists between achievement motivation and conformity. It was found that those with high motivation to achieve resist group pressure in unambiguous situations, but conform more than unmotivated individuals as the situation becomes ambiguous.⁵⁴ In other words, as long as people are uncertain about the situation they tend to depend on others in their judgment; as their certainty increases they begin to depend on their own judgment. These findings provide further support for the need to separate information-seeking conformity from norm-seeking conformity.

TABLE 8-4 SOME CONFORMITY VARIABLES

You are likely to conform if	You are less likely to conform if
<i>You see yourself as</i> modest tactful kind mannerly obliging helpful patient	<i>You see yourself as</i> moody optimistic logical rational demanding humorous original
<i>Personality tests measure you as</i> submissive-restrained cautious-controlled theoretical-intellectual	<i>Personality tests measure you as</i> outgoing-sociable intelligent self-confident high in need-achievement
<i>The experimenter tells you that</i> your intelligence is being assessed you will be shocked for mistakes your group will be rewarded for cooperation	<i>The experimenter tells you that</i> you will be competing for an individual reward
Adapted from DiVesta, 1958	

Table 8-4 summarizes some self-perception patterns related to conformity

IN CONCLUSION PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

This chapter extended some of the ideas presented in Chapter 7. It presented studies which showed how compliance can be induced by playing on people's fears, guilt, or sympathy. Other studies showed that compliance can be achieved by getting people to comply initially with small requests and subsequently increasing demands (foot-in-the-door). Another approach involved doing the opposite: first asking for an unreasonably large request and then conceding the point of what was wanted in the first place (door-in-the-face). Among the more esoteric techniques, we listed a mixture of pressure and promise (stick-and-carrot), name calling, and hypnosis. All these techniques work at one time or another, given a particular set of circumstances. Most of them, however, have their limitations. This is especially true of the most mystical technique, hypnosis (pp. 248-250).

From a broad humanistic perspective, the studies of obedience (p. 258),

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9

ON MODIFYING BEHAVIOR

SOME PRINCIPLES OF LEARNING

Classical Conditioning Learning the Passive Way
Operant Conditioning Behaviors that Pay Off

MODIFYING INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR

Operant Procedures Shaping Things Up
Systematic Desensitization Ease Your Fears Away
Aversion Therapy A Shock for Your Problem
Observational Learning Person See Person Do
Self-Control A Contract with Yourself
Token Economy Token Learning?

MODIFYING COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Therapeutic Communities and Sick Societies
Disarming the Population Bomb
Cash for Trash
Nutritional Balance Acts
Modifying the Energy Crisis
Walden II The Illusion of Freedom

IN CONCLUSION. PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

SOME PRINCIPLES OF LEARNING

Not too long ago one of us attended a clinical staff conference at a community mental health center in his capacity as consultant. The discussion centered around the chartered course of psychotherapy for several previously diagnosed patients. Although the patients differed somewhat from one another in the diagnostic labels assigned to them, it was obvious from listening to those who had made the diagnosis that they considered their patients to be aggressive. Some of them spoke of dangerous aggression, and several even went so far as to mention homicidal forms of aggression.

At that point someone suggested that the *behavior* of the aggressive patients be described. It soon became increasingly evident that many of the participants had used the identical label aggression for a variety of behaviors. The behavior of a child who threw temper tantrums was labeled aggressive. A supercritical father who belittled his son was labeled aggressive. A middle aged handball player who played to win rather than for sportsmanlike competition was labeled aggressive. He was also considered to be aggressive in his (perfectly legal) business transactions. A high school student who engaged in senseless acts of property destruction was labeled aggressive. A young girl who kicked her parents' furniture was labeled aggressive, as was a man who on several occasions had wielded an ax over his wife's head. Naturally the chartered course of psychotherapy, as well as the prognosis for these patients had to differ considerably.

Does this mean that the term 'aggressive' is useless and should be abolished? Of course not. Labels after all are functional because their brevity eliminates the need for lengthy and cumbersome communication. Besides, one could turn the description of behavior into an absurd game. What does 'wield' mean? What size ax? What furniture was kicked around? and so on. Still, clinical conferences like the one described here go on all the time. On the basis of labels such as normal or schizophrenic, people's futures can be sealed for a lifetime. Psychiatrist Thomas Szasz suggested that the labeling process can turn mental patients into powerless things at the mercy of the classifiers.¹ The far-reaching consequences of classifying mental disorders were demonstrated in a study in which college students from a major university were asked about their reactions to the term 'schizophrenia'.² The respondents voiced general agreement that individuals diagnosed as schizophrenic are dangerous, cannot be held accountable for their acts, should not marry, should have no children if married, can never hold a job, and will always remain different from normal people.³ Since patients are treated by others according to a label (with all the popular misconceptions that the label involves), they may ultimately accept the sick role thrust upon them, get worse, and resignedly leave the responsibility for cure up to the professionals who had labeled them in the first place.

Because of such far-reaching consequences those who advocate the description of behavior deserve at least to be heeded

An individual may do something (e.g. verbalize hallucinations hit a person collect rolls of toilet paper, refuse to eat, stutter stare in space, or dress sloppily) under a set of circumstances (e.g. during a school class while working at his desk, during a church service) which upsets, annoys angers or strongly disturbs somebody (e.g. employer teacher parent, or the individual himself) sufficiently that some action results (e.g., a policeman is called seeing a psychiatrist is recommended, commitment procedures are started) so that society's professional labelers (e.g. physicians psychiatrists psychologists judges, social workers) come into contact with the individual and determine which of the current sets of labels (e.g., schizophrenic reaction, sociopathic personality, anxiety reaction) is most appropriate Finally there follow attempts to change the emission of this offending behavior (e.g., institutionalization psychotherapy medication) ³

The importance of behavioral terms is by no means limited to clinical situations Over the course of the last quarter-century there has been a dramatic growth in approaches to psychology which focus on behavior and minimize the role of thoughts internal forces and personality traits B F Skinner has been the major advocate of behavioral psychology He and his followers (generally referred to as behaviorists) believe that internal feelings thoughts and dispositions cannot be directly observed cannot be measured accurately and have no place in a scientific discipline such as psychology Instead psychologists are urged to study the relationship between the organism and its environment in stimulus and response terms, using precise behavioral descriptions to achieve this end To say, for example that you are hungry is meaningless for research according to Skinner To say that the stimulus is hunger and the response is eating is also not enough In Skinnerian terms your hunger must be described in terms of the elapsed time since you ate last Eating must be described in terms of the amount of food consumed Only with such rigorous descriptions behaviorists say, is it possible to make predictions about the causes and effects of behavior Table 9-1 lists several examples of behavioristic terminology

Skinner is among the more radical behaviorists His work has been frequently criticized as has the method of manipulation that behaviorists use Known as *behavior modification* (or behavior mod to the in crowd) this method has lately assumed an all-powerful mystique which it may not deserve ⁴ We shall address ourselves to this question later in the chapter Regardless of such criticism however, there is no denying that Skinner has had a

TABLE 9 1 TALKING IN BEHAVIOR TERMS BEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGISTS DEFINE BEHAVIOR IN TERMS OF THE OPERATIONS NEEDED TO OBSERVE IT BELOW ARE SOME EXAMPLES OF SUCH OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

Behavior	Operational Definition
Hunger	Number of hours of food deprivation
Affection	Intensity of hugging response
Anxiety	Number of drops of sweat secreted onto palms of hands
Aggression	Frequency of hitting pushing or shoving
Fear of heights	Number of steps a person will climb
Fear of dogs	Number of inches a person will allow between him self and a dog
Intimacy of a couple	Amount of time spent in mutual eye gazing


tremendous impact on contemporary thought. His ideas have influenced such diverse fields as engineering, navigation, educational technology, psychotherapy, philosophy, and literature. But to understand Skinner and behaviorism in general, one must first of all have a rudimentary knowledge of some principles of learning.*

Classical Conditioning: Learning the Passive Way


When a light is shined in your eyes, what do you do? You blink. The light is a *stimulus*. The blinking is your *response* to the stimulus. What happens to your blinking response if another stimulus is presented—say, the ringing of a bell? Whatever your response, blinking is not likely to be it. Suppose, however, that each time the light was flashed in your eyes, we rang a bell one second before the light came on. After a few rings, you would begin to blink your eyes as soon as you heard the bell. Getting you to blink your eyes when the bell is sounded is called *classical conditioning*, a method first developed around the turn of the century by a Russian physiologist named Ivan Pavlov. In classical conditioning, the stimulus which naturally evokes a response (in our example, the flash of light) is called the *unconditioned stimulus*, or UCS. The response (in our example, eye blinking) is called the *unconditioned response*, or UCR. The UCS leads to the UCR without any training. Shining a light leads to blinking; presentation of food leads to salivating. After we find a UCS which produces a UCR, we can pair another stimulus with the unconditioned stimulus. This stimulus (in our example, the ringing of the bell) is called the *conditioning stimulus*, or CS. The CS may be associated with many re-

*You may find the number of unfamiliar terms condensed in the next few pages somewhat overwhelming. Don't let this discourage you, because even if you have a problem remembering them, you will be able to finish the chapter with little difficulty.

1 UCS naturally leads to UCR



2 CS is paired with UCS



3 CS elicits CR similar to UCR




Figure 9 1 An example of classical conditioning. The unconditioned stimulus (UCS) naturally produces an unconditioned response (UCR). By pairing the conditioned stimulus (CS) with the unconditioned stimulus (US), CS comes to elicit a conditioned response (CR).

sponses, but it does not naturally lead to the response we wish to condition. Ringing a bell does not ordinarily lead to blinking, sounding a buzzer does not ordinarily lead to salivating. After we pair the conditioning stimulus with the unconditioned stimulus for several trials, the CS comes to elicit a response similar to the UCR. This response is called the conditioned response, or CR. The CR is similar to the UCR in many ways, but it is not exactly the same. Figure 9-1 shows an example of classical conditioning.

What happens when we stop pairing the CS with the UCS? That is, what would happen if we stopped pairing the flash of light (UCS) with the bell (CS)? Probably the CS would gradually lose its ability to evoke a conditioned response. You would gradually stop blinking when the bell sounded or stop salivating when the buzzer sounded. This process is called *extinction* because the potency of the CS gradually diminishes.

If bells, flashes of light, and eye-blinkings do not excite you because their laboratorylike aspects are too scientific, consider an analogy from daily life. If you were the advertising director of a cigar company, one of your expected duties would be to get potential consumers to like your product. Suppose your company and your product, the El Bueno Cigar, are new and unknown. You show your cigar for the first time on a TV commercial. It is a

stimulus presented to many viewers among them potential buyers but you have no way of knowing what kind of response this stimulus elicits. You are even less sure whether the responses were the kind that you had hoped for, such as liking or admiration. You know, however, that there are certain stimuli which are almost guaranteed to evoke liking or admiration in TV viewers—a celebrity for example. Your interest of course is in a celebrity who evokes admiration in people who are cigar smokers or at least potential cigar smokers. This limits it mostly to males over 30. Your celebrity therefore is not going to be Bozo the Clown or some character from a Walt Disney movie. You pick a well-endowed, sexy actress who among other things evokes admiration in your intended audience. You have found your UCS (the actress) who produces the UCR (admiration).

Now you pair the CS (El Bueno Cigar) with the UCS (the actress) for a well-done commercial. Admiration is assured if not for your cigar, then for your actress. You continue to pair them all the time achieving the UCR of admiration. Then one day you show only the CS (El Bueno Cigar) *without* the UCS (the actress). According to the concept of classical conditioning the viewers' response will still be admiration (CR). The stimulus El Bueno Cigar which before did not evoke the response that you wanted is now admired by all. Of course if you let go of the actress entirely the CR may eventually face extinction. You run the danger that showing the El Bueno Cigar without the actress may eventually lead to indifference. Just to make sure once in a while you renew the conditioning process by re-pairing the CS (El Bueno Cigar) and the UCS (the actress). Congratulations! Your potential customers are 'learning'—the passive way from the recesses of their armchairs with their eyes glued to the TV screen—that El Bueno is a product to be admired.

There are cases that do not extinguish that easily. These cases are interesting for the study of personal adjustment. Conditioned fear is a case in point. Fear it is believed can be acquired in a manner analogous to classical conditioning. How for example, does a child learn to be afraid of burners on stoves? For little Johnny exposure to intense heat naturally leads to pain. The heat is the UCS and the agony that follows is the UCR. The burner on the stove, however, does not by itself naturally evoke a response similar to agony. When Johnny puts his hand on the hot burner he is in fact pairing the CS (burner) with the UCS (heat) before screaming in agony. On future occasions the burner itself will produce a response of agony, and Johnny will avoid touching it. In demonstrating avoidance behavior Johnny has developed conditioned fear. Conditioned fear can be acquired in a single exposure and it does not necessarily extinguish according to the usual rules.

Operant Conditioning Behaviors that Pay Off


In classical conditioning the learner is passive. The learner be it a person, an animal or any living organism can also be active. Organisms emit be-

havior which in effect perform some operation on the environment. The operation is called a response and the learning process is known as *operant conditioning*. For example, a rat in a box with several levers in it seems to wander aimlessly around. Sooner or later it hits one of the levers. Whether this response will occur again under the same circumstances depends largely on whether it is reinforced. Technically, a *reinforcement* is anything which when presented after a response strengthens that response. If the rat was hungry (and you know for how many hours it has been deprived of food) and if the lever-hitting was followed by a food pellet, you can be sure that the lever will be pressed again and again. Your rat has learned to press a lever. Just make sure that the lever-pressing will be followed by a food pellet at all times (*continuous reinforcement*) or sometimes (*partial reinforcement*). If no more pellets follow, the chances are high that the newly learned response will extinguish rapidly.

The process of operant conditioning can best be explained in simple terms to those who have unknowingly exercised it. Did you ever teach a dog to sit? Suppose that Spot, your beautiful St. Bernard, is big, clumsy, and dumb. You are determined to teach him the sitting response each time you present the stimulus word 'sit'. The first time you present Spot with the stimulus word 'sit', he may make all sorts of responses. He may display a rolling response, a barking response, or a flea-scratching response. After a while, perhaps with the help of your heavy hands, Spot performs the sitting response. Immediately he is rewarded with a dog biscuit. After a few hours and a good number of dog biscuits, Spot has learned to sit each time you tell him to do so.

Let us look more closely at some of the terms that would be used to describe the training of Spot. First, Spot's desire to get some dog biscuits would be called a *drive*. A drive results from some deprivation and serves to motivate the learned response. The word 'sit' is called a *discriminative stimulus*. Sitting is an *operant behavior*. If Spot emits the sitting response in the presence of the discriminative stimulus or immediately after, he will get the reinforcement. When he emits the sitting response and you have not said 'sit' (i.e., you have not presented the discriminative stimulus), then Spot will not get the reinforcement. The dog biscuit serves as a *reinforcer* or *reinforcement* for the response of sitting. During the learning process, you have trained Spot to sit each time you present the discriminative stimulus in the form of the command "sit". In operant terms, you have brought sitting behavior under *stimulus control*. You have made Spot's sitting behavior *contingent* upon a certain environmental condition.

So far we have been discussing reinforcers as things that alleviate hunger or thirst. Hunger and thirst are *primary drives*. By primary drives, we mean drives which involve some tissue deficit.⁵ These include hunger, thirst, sleep, and so on. Reinforcers which satisfy primary drives are called *primary rein-*



*Boy do we have this guy conditioned
Every time I press the bar down he drops a pellet in*

forcers A characteristic of primary reinforcers is that they operate on a deprivation-satiation function. To be *satiated* means you have no need for a substance you would ordinarily consume. If you have a satiated food drive, for example, you have had enough to eat. When primary drives are satiated we will not learn in order to get primary reinforcers. If Spot is not hungry, he will not learn in order to get the dog biscuit.

Besides primary drives, there are *secondary drives*. Secondary drives are learned or acquired drives. These include the drives for power, achievement, affiliation and approval. One of the most important drives for humans is based on the need for approval. Although it was once believed that you can satiate a child's need for social approval,⁶ recent evidence suggests that social approval drives in children are not subject to satiation.⁷ Thus social approval can be one of the most effective forms of reinforcement because it is not affected by overuse.

Another principle of learning is *generalization*. Generalization occurs when we respond to a stimulus which is similar to but not the same as the stimulus we were trained on. For example, suppose you had learned to be afraid of a German Shepherd after it bit you. Generalization would refer to the extent to which you respond with fear to other dogs. Probably you would show the most fear in the presence of other German Shepherds.

To a lesser extent, you might respond fearfully to all dogs. Behaviorists point out that generalization is one of the bases of prejudice. If we have had a bad experience with one black person, we might generalize our negative response to other persons with similar skin coloration.⁸

The opposite of generalization is *discrimination*. Discrimination occurs when responses are stimulus-specific. If you are afraid of the German Shepherd that bit you but are not afraid of any other dogs, you are demonstrating discrimination. Discrimination would occur if you respond to members of ethnic groups as individuals rather than generalizing the behaviors of one to others of the same group. (Ironically, 'discrimination' as used by behaviorists can thus lead to the very opposite behavior of what the term usually connotes in race relations.)

The process of operant conditioning is far more complex than indicated in the above examples. It involves an extensive terminology and a variety of conditions. Although an in-depth treatment of the process is beyond the scope of this book, there are numerous excellent textbooks available on the topic of operant conditioning and behavioral psychology in general. For the beginning student, we strongly recommend a modest but thorough paperback text by William L. Mikulas, *Behavior Modification*.⁹

MODIFYING INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR

Behavior modification refers to a variety of techniques for the application of learning theory to the change of behavior. Since the early 1960s, the growth of the movement has assumed astronomical dimensions. Leonard Ullman, one of the leaders in the area of behavior modification, has pointed out that the spread of the growth of behavior modification techniques has been like the development of a social movement.¹⁰ At the same time, it has also come under criticism for a variety of reasons. Traditional psychotherapists have attacked behavioristic approaches as being too simplistic, treating symptoms rather than underlying disturbances or disorders. Other psychologists have rejected the behavioristic notion that cognitive processes (e.g., opinions, judgments, decisions) are of little consequence. There is also a general uneasiness in public opinion about the use of behavior modification in prisons, mental institutions, and the like. It has sinister, dehumanizing overtones that conjure thoughts of control, punishment, deprivation, and shades of the oppressive society of Orwell's *1984*.

Behaviorists have become acutely aware of these feelings. Recent publications by leaders in the field warn their colleagues to use the technique of behavior modification judiciously, to be aware of its limitations, and to engage in an active educational campaign to alleviate some of the common misperceptions about it.¹¹ There is little doubt, however, that behavior modification techniques do work. The problem, as we shall see later, is in deciding who

does the manipulating, and what is to be manipulated in order to maximize individual benefits and public welfare

At this point in time behavior modification is not a single technique but a series of methods which draw upon clinical, social developmental, and experimental psychology. Psychologist Leonard Krasner has listed at least 15 streams of development in the field of behavior modification. Since the late 1960s the streams have come increasingly together under the collective label of behavior modification. The merger of streams is not yet complete, and many of the approaches still remain distinct from one another.¹² The rest of this chapter will be a brief examination of some of the most common forms of behavior modification.

Operant Procedures Shaping Things Up

The principles of operant conditioning can be applied to an endless variety of behaviors. For illustrative purposes we shall present you with examples from the areas of child-rearing practices, social interactions, and clinical situations.

The usefulness of operant procedures in eliminating unwanted behavior in children is based on the simple fact that behaviors which are rewarded are more likely to occur again. Rewards can be dispensed until a behavior fits into the mold which was designed for it. Psychologist Gerald Patterson has demonstrated how parents can teach their children to be less aggressive. In the first phase of the program the parents are taught to observe their children and record in detail both the child's behavior and their own responses to its problematic aspects. During the second phase the parents are taught to dispense reinforcements contingent upon appropriate behavior. Since the recorded observations revealed that parental attention followed aggressive behavior, attention as such was chosen as the appropriate reinforcer for future modification. But instead of using attention to maintain aggressive responses, parents were taught to use it for rewarding behavior that they wanted to strengthen. They could, for example, begin to pay attention when their child was playing quietly—which is one of the situations in which most parents blissfully ignore their children.¹³

Another frequent problem facing parents is temper tantrums. If you are a parent, think about what is happening each time you give in to a temper tantrum. You are most likely reinforcing that tantrum behavior. Of course the antecedent condition for the tantrum might be that your child is being ignored. A functional analysis of the situation might help to identify the problem and suggest its solution. However, once a course of action has been decided upon, it must be followed systematically. Improvised variations can only lead to further aggravation of the problem. Psychologist Carl Williams demon-

strated this point with his own 21-month-old child. The child, having been ill for the first 18 months of his life, had been showered with attention that probably built up his dependency needs. When he became well and his parents tried to withdraw some of the attention given to him previously, he responded with intense demands for reinforcement by crying, demanding parental presence at bedtime, and frequently having temper tantrums. To extinguish the temper tantrums, the child was put to bed in a leisurely and nonpunitive fashion, but the bedroom door was firmly closed and the raging and tantrums were ignored. A sharp drop in the duration of the tantrums occurred almost immediately, and within a few days the previous behavior almost completely disappeared. Unfortunately, Dr. Williams's well-laid plans were inadvertently upset by the child's aunt, who showed attention to the child upon the few occasions that the tantrums recurred. The original tantrum behavior reappeared at once. It took a second and far more laborious series of measures to eliminate the child's undesirable behavior.¹⁴

Let us now turn to a case of child-rearing which is more complicated, has clinical overtones, and carries with it serious ethical dilemmas for parents and society at large. The case of Keith, a five-year-old boy, was recently reported by psychologists Ivar Lovaas and George Rekers. Keith was like no other boy you ever saw. He wore dresses, used makeup with great skill, played house with girls (always assigning the role of mother to himself), and had an uncanny way of aping a male homosexual in drag. Clinically speaking, Keith was a transsexual. While at the age of two his curtsies and limp wrists were thought to be cute by those around him (who therefore may have inadvertently reinforced Keith's effeminacy), by the time Keith was five years old he was a constant source of embarrassment to his parents and virtually a social outcast among his playmates. He was frequently ridiculed, beaten, and on one occasion thrown 20 feet from a tree-house by other children for making an effeminate gesture of which he was barely conscious. Various attempts by parents and psychiatrists to effect a masculine change in Keith had failed. Behavior modification was the last resort offered to the parents to achieve such changes.

Keith's parents agreed to have him treated by behavior modification. Would you have done the same in their place, knowing what such treatment entails? As Keith's parent, would you have taken notice of him only on the rare occasions when he picked up a 'masculine' toy such as a rubber knife or dart gun? Would you have endured his anguish when you completely ignored him as he joyfully ran to show you his favorite doll? Would you have administered the barrage of punishments which the all-out assault on each and every one of Keith's 'feminine' acts demanded of you? Would you have systematically and consistently deprived your child of TV time and family ac-

tivities, or administered corporal punishment for engaging in behavior of which he was barely aware? Keith's parents followed the behavior modification program to the letter.

Twenty months later Keith was masculine. From his walk to the inflection of his voice, from the things he said and the games he played, and from the selection of his playmates, it was evident that he seemed well on his way to becoming the toughest kid on the block. At the same time, his popularity soared. Not only his playmates, but his own family warmed toward the new Keith and was eager to spend time with him in enjoyable pursuits such as camping trips. Keith himself seemed no longer to be a social isolate, and from all appearances was, and still is, a happy child.¹⁵

From a broad, somewhat philosophical perspective, Keith's treatment was clearly a violation of human individuality. Moreover, it is not even clear at this point what kind of adult Keith will turn out to be. But what were the alternatives? Obviously, Keith was too young to make the choice for himself. As his parents, would you have sat by idly and seen your child suffer? But then again, would you have made him suffer for what you consider a necessary treatment of a maladjustment? It is an agonizing choice.

In Keith's case you may have objected to the modification of individual behavior just so that some questionable cultural values of the 'proper' sex role be satisfied. Bear in mind, however, that our entire process of socialization from birth to maturity involves a learning process of what is proper. Despite the negative connotations that the word 'manipulation' arouses, this is precisely what happens to us in our daily activities. As long as humans have a need for approval, such manipulations will continue to be a part of our lives. Moreover, as we pointed out earlier, recent evidence suggests that the need for approval is not subject to satiation. It can serve as a most effective form of reinforcement because it rarely can be overused.

Several studies by psychologists have clearly demonstrated how our need for approval is manipulated in our daily interactions with others. You may have never heard of the *Greenspoon Effect* or the *Method of Successive Approximation* in conjunction with the need for approval. We shall dutifully explain these terms and describe the experiments that brought them about. Somehow, however, we have a feeling that as you are reading along you will come to realize that both terms are actually part of your daily routine, even though you may have been unfamiliar with their assigned technical labels.

Psychologist Joel Greenspoon assigned 75 college students to five different groups of 15 subjects each. The students were individually asked to say all the words they could think of, but to refrain from using sentences or phrases. The sounds "mm-hmm" and "huh-uh" made by the experimenter served as the intended reinforcing stimuli. The reinforcing stimuli were introduced in Group I ("mm-mm-hmm") and in Group II ("huh-uh") following each

plural response during the first 25 minutes of the testing sessions. Similarly they were introduced in Groups III and IV, but following each nonplural response. A fifth group served as a control since no sounds were introduced during the entire session. Responses were scored in time-blocks of 5-minute periods each. The results indicated that the *huh-uh* stimulus (presumably implying disapproval) tended to decrease the frequency of the plural responses while the *mm mm-hmm* stimulus (presumably implying approval) tended to increase the frequency of both plural and nonplural responses.¹⁶

How important is the Greenspoon Effect which is the common term used to describe the above findings? The fact that sounds of approval or disapproval can significantly alter the rate of another person's uttering of plural or nonplural words (in most cases, without that person being aware of the reason for the change) is, in itself, not very earthshaking. Its implications and generalizations, however, are of considerable importance. If sounds of approval or gestures of approval such as headnodding or smiling can systematically alter *other* behaviors as well, then the Greenspoon Effect is a milestone in social behavior modification. The evidence clearly points that way. For example, in one study 24 college students attending an experimental psychology class were chosen to reinforce the 550 students of their school by complimenting each student when wearing clothes of a particular color. Reinforcement took place at lunchtime and every five days the inspection of clothes for color took place. The color blue was reinforced daily for about four weeks (from 25% of the students wearing blue to an average of 38% after the first five days) then extinguished (to 27%) then reinforced again to 38%. Similarly, the color red was reinforced within five days (from 13% to 22%).¹⁷

The fact is that most of us simply do not realize the reinforcing potential of smiles, headnodding or sounds of approval. The secret of course is to administer these reinforcers judiciously and systematically. Constant smiling and headnodding (continuous reinforcement) are not as effective as occasional gestures of this sort (partial reinforcement). In any event the effects of these reinforcers are astonishing. If you observe successful salespersons you will see a most effective use of a variety of such reinforcers (even though the salespersons themselves may not be aware that they are administering systematic reinforcement). If you are ever in the position of having to address a group of people, you will find out immediately how important it is to see some of your listeners nodding their heads or smiling whenever you are trying to make a point. The most cruel joke anyone could play on you would be to preinstruct your listeners to gaze blankly at you, registering neither approval or disapproval. You are guaranteed to perspire and feel uneasy within a short time, and if your frantic search for at least some sort of reinforcer is in vain, you will begin to fumble for words. We are reminded of the time when mem-

bers of a class taught by one of our colleagues decided to modify his behavior. The professor had the annoying habit of constantly pacing back and forth across the width of the room while lecturing. To modify his behavior, the students decided to smile or nod their heads only when the professor stood near his lectern. Every time he strayed from that location, he was met with blank stares. Within two weeks they had him practically glued to the lectern. Most significant of all, until he was told about the students' behavior, he did not realize what was going on. His lectures incidentally dealt with the topic of behavior modification.

Closely related to these antics is the method of *Successive Approximation*. Before we describe the original experiment in this area, let us take you back to elementary school. At one time or another during those days, you and your friends were actually engaged in applying the method of successive approximation. The scenario may have been something like this. It is a beautiful spring day, the sun is shining, and you are aching to be outside playing. Somehow you are not in the mood to engage in serious study. Not too surprisingly, when the teacher announces that today's topic will be the structure of minerals, there is a collective groan from the class. The teacher has barely begun with "There is a considerable deposit of minerals in Mexico," when bright-eyed little Johnny's hand is up, inquiring whether the teacher has ever been to Mexico. Of course, says the teacher. Really, exclaim some amazed students, and did he, the teacher, actually watch a bullfight? Of course, says the teacher, enjoying the excitement generated by his statement. When little Jane bemoans the fact that bullfighting is so cruel, the teacher tells her that it does not have to be so. When he was in Portugal, he saw bullfights that were bloodless. Another collective gasp of admiration. The teacher, basking in that admiration, tells the class how he backpacked across Portugal. An intense discussion of the relative merits of backpacking versus motoring follows. Then the features of the latest car models are discussed. Pretty soon the bell rings. The class ends on a happy note. Whatever the topic of discussion, the structure of minerals was not it.

Was the teacher aware that his students conned him, so to speak? Some teachers are aware but do not mind. Other teachers are not even aware of it. In either case, the student produced stimuli (eagerness, interest, smiling, headnodding) satisfied the teachers' needs for approval. With some teachers, of course, you cannot get away with it. They will stick to the topic of the structure of minerals, just as there are some satiated rats who will not press a lever when the food pellet appears. Yet sooner or later, when those rats are deprived of food, or when the food pellet is especially delectable, they will press the lever. By the same token, sooner or later, circumstances will make those stubborn teachers succumb to the delectable reinforcement of student admiration, interest, and gestures of approval.

Now for the experiment proper. Twenty-four individuals were administered worded reinforcements by 17 psychology students who were their roommates or friends, during ordinary conversation. Once the conversation started, the experimenter tried to refrain from making any response to the subjects' expressed opinions for the first 10 minutes; during the following 10 minutes every expressed opinion was positively reinforced by such exclamations as 'You're right,' 'Yes, that's so ' or by paraphrasing aloud the opinion that the subject had just expressed. During the last 10 minutes extinction was attempted (once more, no responses were made to the expressed opinion of the subject). A control group was established in which the first 10-minute treatment (aimed at establishing a baseline) was eliminated, so that order effects were under control. In both groups the administration of reinforcement significantly increased the number of expressed statements. The content of the conversation was thus manipulated by administering interpersonal approval and disapproval. The implication of the findings is clear. It is possible to set in advance a given target topic and by successively administering the proper verbal reinforcement, to approximate the achievement of that target.¹⁸

Systematic Desensitization: Ease Your Fears Away

The term *systematic desensitization* refers to a procedure that aims at gradually substituting one response for another. The unfavorable response is usually associated with tenseness and anxiety, whereas the favorable response is associated with relaxation. Psychiatrist Joseph Wolpe, the originator of the process, refers to it as 'the breaking down of anxiety-response habits in a piece-meal fashion.'¹⁹

Let us assume that you went to a behavior therapist because of your intense fear of heights. Here is what would happen to you if you were in for a session in systematic desensitization. First, you would be asked to make a list of situations involving heights, ranging from the least to the most fear-producing. Your fear hierarchy might look something like this:

Acrophobia (fear of heights)

- 1 Looking down from a height of about 10 feet
- 2 Looking down from a height of approximately 20 feet
- 3 Sitting on a wide ledge about 35 feet from the ground
- 4 Seeing someone jump from a 50-foot diving board
- 5 Looking down from a height of about 55 feet
- 6 Sitting on a narrow ledge at a height of 60 feet with a safety net a few feet away
- 7 Looking down from a 60-foot balcony
- 8 Sitting high up on a grandstand during a football game
- 9 Looking down a well

- 10 Looking down from a height of 80–100 feet
- 11 Seeing films taken from an airplane
- 12 Looking down from a very high building ²⁰

After you have completed the list you would be taught to relax. This might be achieved through hypnosis, but not necessarily. Your behavior therapist has a variety of techniques by which he can get you to relax your muscles upon presentation of certain stimuli at his disposal. Once you have learned to relax, you are asked to imagine the least fear-producing item on your list—looking down from a height of about 10 feet. It is a fear-producing stimulus, but of such low intensity that it is not likely to evoke a full-blown fear response. While you are imagining this scene, you are also presented with the stimulus which produces relaxation. The two stimuli are incompatible with one another, and the stronger relaxation response will eventually extinguish your fear response. When this happens, that particular scene will no longer bother you. You are now ready to move on to the next step on your hierarchy. Gradually you can relax in more fear-producing situations, but if at any point in the training you cannot relax when the therapist asks you to imagine a particular scene, you are asked to return to think about the less threatening situations. Eventually you will be able to calmly imagine yourself looking down from a very high building.

At this point treatment is usually terminated. However, to insure a carry over into real-life situations, your therapist may have to confront you with some. For example, he may take you to a football game and seat you on the grandstand, or he may actually take you to the top of a tall building.

The above example is typical of the treatment of *phobias*, which are marked by excessive fears of a particular situation (e.g., heights, enclosures) or objects (e.g., spiders, snakes). But what if instead of such specific fears you experience a more generalized anxiety, as for example, whenever a significant person criticizes you? This type of neurosis is more difficult to list in a hierarchy form, but it is not impossible. It simply demands more probing on your part and on the part of the therapist. The list below is an example of an actual case.

Anxiety Neurosis (The patient experiences anxiety whenever criticized by a significant person)

- 1 Your mother reminds you that you have not yet sent a thank-you letter to a relative from whom you received a gift
- 2 Your uncle wonders out loud why you don't visit him more often
- 3 Your mother notes that you haven't been to church with her in quite a while

- 4 Your mother comments that it has been a long time since you have visited your grandmother
- 5 Your mother criticizes a friend 'She just makes herself at home'
- 6 Your stepfather says that he can't understand how anyone could be so stupid as to be a Catholic
- 7 You return an overdue book to the library. The librarian looks at you critically
- 8 Bill looks over your shoulder as you are writing, and comments that it doesn't look very neat
- 9 Bill criticizes you for being quiet on a double date
- 10 You are at a party given by one of Bill's friends. You mispronounce a word and Bill corrects you
- 11 Your mother comes into a room and finds you smoking ²¹

The technique of systematic desensitization is currently widely employed in the treatment of phobias and anxiety neuroses and in some psychotic disorders as well. Judging by the evidence, its success can hardly be disputed. Notice that there is little or no attempt to eliminate the patient's fears by going into his past history, to change his attitudes or values, or to bring unconscious material to the surface. Wolpe himself reported an amazingly high record of 90 percent recovery among 210 patients ²². Recent reports on the application of systematic desensitization techniques by different therapists to nearly 1000 patients tend to substantiate Wolpe's claims about the benefits of the technique for those suffering from a broad range of distressing problems in which anxiety is of fundamental importance ²³.

Aversion Therapy: A Shock for Your Problem

A few years ago members of a Gay Liberation group attended the convention of the Western Psychological Association. Among the various exhibits by commercial firms, there was one display of equipment and materials aimed at curing homosexuality. The equipment was designed to shock a homosexual each time he responded with delight to a picture showing a nude member of his own sex. The incensed visitors responded by chanting and demonstrating. As a result of this protest, the displaying firm was unable to peddle its equipment.

The equipment in question is just one of many similar types used in the practice of *aversion therapy* (see Figure 9-2). This form of psychotherapy is often used to treat people who respond positively to stimuli which typically evoke neutral or aversive reactions among other members of their culture. This does not mean that those people's responses are bad or wrong. The



Figure 9 2 Quit smoking or else An electrode attached to the woman's hand is used to deliver a moderately painful electric shock each time she puffs on the cigarette Eventually the unpleasant reaction to shock comes to be associated with smoking

behavior therapist does not (or at least is not supposed to) decide that some responses are good and some responses are bad. Classifying responses that way involves value judgments which have no place in behavior therapy. But if the patient (and eventually the therapist) comes to the conclusion that the patient could adapt better if responses to certain stimuli were modified, then it is up to the therapist to use the most effective techniques at his disposal. In the final analysis, it is up to the patient to decide if he wants his responses modified so that they become more similar to those of other members of society.

Homosexuality is a case in point. Although the homosexuals who demonstrated against the behavior modification displays at the psychology convention felt no need to modify their sexual responses to members of their own sex, there are many homosexuals who no longer wish to respond as homo-

sexuals Should they be denied their wish? Another sexual behavior which people often wish to modify is *fetishistic behavior*, involving for example, sexual responses to objects such as shoes or underwear These responses may be pleasurable to the person with the fetish but they may also have negative consequences The person might experience guilt and shame while being condemned by others around him Take the case of a person who responds sexually to tennis shoes Not only does he become excited every time he goes into a gym, but eventually others notice his excitement Soon he is branded as a peculiar person and is shunned by everyone If he chooses to go to a behavior therapist for help he will most likely be treated by aversion therapy During a series of visits the therapist will repeatedly present that person with the stimulus which evokes the positive response (a tennis shoe or a picture of a tennis shoe) along with other stimuli which evoke extremely negative reactions For the latter, the therapist will probably choose a painful electric shock Upon repeated pairing of these two stimuli the positive stimulus (the tennis shoe) will gradually evoke the same unpleasant emotional reaction as the noxious stimulus (electric shock) Eventually the sexual attraction to tennis shoes will fade away

Aversion therapy is often used to treat alcoholics In some areas for example the courts may require people who have alcohol problems to take a drug called Antibus This substance makes the person sick to his stomach each time he consumes alcohol According to advocates of aversion therapy this should be effective for eliminating drinking behavior

In his recent book on behavior modification, psychologist Albert Bandura summarized 15 studies in which aversion therapy was used to treat alcoholics Some of these studies involved the treatment of hundreds (in one case 4096) of alcoholics The results showed that aversion therapy was successful in most but not all, cases The cure rate (defined by abstinence) ranged from 23 to 96 percent After close examination of the data Bandura concluded that the effectiveness of aversion therapy for alcoholics depended upon a variety of factors Most important of these seemed to be whether or not people continued to seek conditioning after their initial set of experiences²⁴ In one study, those who came for four or more supplementary conditioning sessions achieved 100 percent abstinence Motivation to seek more help, therefore, seems to be related to the effectiveness of the treatment²⁵ Once again it depends on how much the individual *wants* to change Whether mandatory court-assigned treatments such as Antibus are at all effective is questionable because some people are simply not motivated to stick with the therapy

Many people have campaigned against the use of aversion therapy treatments because of the pain and discomfort that it involves If people are lucky enough to make their own decisions and they choose to undergo these



Figure 9 3 Imitate your fears away This series of pictures shows a child who was apprehensive about dogs engaging in fearless interactions with dogs after exposure to a series of models (From Bandura & Menlou 1968)

treatments, they are likely to find them effective It would be difficult to fault them for their own decisions When someone else makes the decision for the person because the latter presumably is incapable of making it as in the case of committed mental patients, the procedure raises some very grave ethical considerations So far, no satisfactory solutions to this moral dilemma have been forthcoming

Observational Learning Person See, Person Do

One way in which children learn aggressive behavior is imitation, as documented in various studies of subjects attacking a Bobo doll Those studies, you may recall were used to demonstrate aspects of the theory of *social learning* and *imitation* (See p 134) Advocates of this theory claim that we learn behavior patterns by observing others performing them The person we observe is referred to as the *model* Whether or not we imitate the model depends upon what happens to the latter as a consequence of performing the response If good things happen to the model we are likely to go ahead and perform the same response If the consequences for the model are negative we are not likely to engage in the same behavior

Recently clinical psychologists have demonstrated that fears and other types of emotional reactions can be modified by having people observe a model handling the fear-arousing situation One of the most famous demonstrations of this principle was reported in a study made by Bandura and his associates at Stanford University They used as subjects a group of preschool children who were intensely afraid of dogs These children who would have

never come near a dog themselves were persuaded to watch (at a safe distance) a model interacting with a dog. At first the children saw the model (another child) merely petting a dog locked in a playpen. Over the course of eight sessions the model gradually showed bolder behavior toward the dog. In the final session the model was happily playing with the dog inside the playpen. During this session the model hugged the dog affectionately and fed him from a milk bottle. Compared to children who had not witnessed a model playing with the dog, the children in the study showed less fear and approached dogs more often.²⁶ (See Figure 9.3) Other research has shown that modeling may be an effective way to rid people of their fears of snakes²⁷ and may even ease the fear of going to the dentist.²⁸

Why do these treatments work? According to Bandura it is because people come to recognize the association between the stimulus and the response. Bandura believes that the reflexive nature of human learning is a myth. When people do not recognize that stimulus and response events are related, they do not learn.²⁹ In observational learning we do not get direct experience with the reinforcement, but we do learn about the connection between responses and their consequences.

If you accept Bandura's hypothesis, there are some far-reaching implications. According to traditional behavior psychology, if you want to teach someone a particular behavior, you reward or punish each bit of behavior you wish to modify. Social learning theory shortens the process considerably. All you have to do is expose the learner to the consequences of such behaviors by having him watch others. This form of learning, however, inevitably involves cognitive processes such as thinking, drawing of conclusions, and decision-making. Ironically, and to the chagrin of many crusty behaviorists, the ill-defined concept of "mind" may have wormed its way back into behavioral psychology.³⁰

SELF-CONTROL A CONTRACT WITH YOURSELF

Dr. Donnell D. Etzwiler is a pediatrician currently specializing in the treatment of diabetes at the St. Louis Park Medical Center in Minneapolis. Like many other physicians, Dr. Etzwiler became distressed because many of his patients did not follow his orders. The reasons for Dr. Etzwiler's distress is that there are many medical treatments which require total compliance by patients. If you have an infection and the doctor prescribes an antibiotic drug, he will probably tell you to take the pills until they are gone. He means to take them until they are gone! When you stop taking the pills right after the symptoms go away, you may still maintain a low-grade infection. This low-grade infection could last several years and eventually wipe out one of your kidneys. Dr. Etzwiler and other medical people have, therefore, been very interested in techniques for eliciting compliance among their patients.³¹

Dr. Etzwiler tried to do something about the problem. His tactic was to get his patients to negotiate a written contract. He asked a sample of 100 patients to take daily urine tests and report the results to him. Half of the patients were simply asked to do so, and they agreed. The other half signed a written contract committing themselves to follow Dr. Etzwiler's instructions. Only 20 percent of those who made verbal pledges to comply actually followed through. In contrast, 62.5 percent of those who signed the contract took the daily urine samples and reported the results to Dr. Etzwiler. The doctor concluded that the written contract approach may increase compliance with treatments for a variety of illnesses including alcoholism, obesity, and diabetes.³²

Actually, Dr. Etzwiler did not discover anything new. Social psychologists have known for some time that public commitment produces behavior change.³³ What the good doctor discovered was a way to motivate self-controlling behavior. People often want to develop some sort of self-control, yet they are unable to stick with self-regulatory programs. How many times have you started a diet, tried to quit smoking, or started a new exercise program? Do you remember your last New Year's resolutions? Did you stick to them? How many times have you abandoned these new self-regulatory programs after a few days? Developing self-control obviously requires a considerable degree of stick-to-it-ness.

Increasingly, psychotherapists are finding that patients who sign contracts are more likely to stick with constructive behavior change programs.³⁴ Contracts have been shown to be useful for getting people to do things such as fighting fair in marriage³⁵ and sticking with New Year's resolutions.³⁶

Why do contracts work? There are a variety of explanations. One of these explanations is that *demand characteristics* are the most important aspect of the contracting situation. Demand characteristics refer to aspects of a situation which allow you to figure out what is desired of you. For example, suppose you are in an experiment in which someone presents a ridiculous, one-sided argument about some absurd topic and then asks you to fill out some questionnaires about the same topic. You might see through the guise of the experimenter and recognize that he is studying attitude change. Psychologist Martin Orne has done extensive research on demand characteristics in psychological research. He found that subjects in psychological experiments display remarkable tendencies to behave in ways they think will validate the experimenter's hypothesis.³⁷ The more transparent the experimenter's hypotheses were, the more likely compliance was achieved. Studies on demand characteristics have shown that more behavior change was accomplished if directions were made explicit for the subjects. The more certain you are about what you are committing yourself to, the more likely you are to be influenced by your own commitment.³⁸ In the contract situation, the therapist's

demands are made explicitly clear. We are not confused about what he wants. There is little or no ambiguity. We knew precisely what is expected of us.

There are probably other reasons why the use of contracts produces behavior change. We have already learned that commitment leads to more commitment (the foot-in-the-door technique). A massive amount of research by psychologist Charles Kiesler has shown that commitment produces behavior change and self-control.³⁹ Your commitment not only produces behavior consistent with the commitment but also reduces the chances that you will submit to counterattitudinal pressures. Another factor influencing commitment and behavior change is *ego involvement* in the task. This means that you are more likely to change your behavior if you think that what you are doing is meaningful and important. Finally, for situations in which you feel that you have some *volition* (choice) about what you are committing yourself to, the act of commitment will have more effect.⁴⁰ Explicitness, importance, and volition then are three factors which may mediate the relationship between commitment and behavior change.⁴¹

Behavior theorists have also been able to explain the effects of contracts. These psychologists explain that contracts produce self-control because they establish criteria for one's own behavior. We provide our own standards for self-evaluation and self-reinforcement; the statements contained in the contract function as verbal operants. These statements are a necessary condition for the promised action to be completed. Although they are a necessary condition, they alone are not a sufficient condition. The act of signing becomes part of a response chain which, in the final link, will lead to reinforcement. Your contracts will be more effective if (1) there has been only a short delay between the time you sign a contract and the time when it is executed, (2) the chances are good that the contract will be executed in the first place, and (3) there are no apparent aversive events associated with signing the contract.⁴²

Token Economy Token Learning?

A poker chip as such can hardly be considered a reinforcer for behavior. In a poker game, however, it assumes an entirely different dimension. You are going to work hard for it because it can be exchanged for money. Money is something which motivates most of us. Unlike primary reinforcers such as food or water, money falls in the category of secondary reinforcers such as prestige or approval. Under most circumstances, secondary reinforcers are just as effective in modifying behavior as are primary reinforcers. Money, in fact, is the token we exchange for most of the things we want. It reduces many fundamental drives, and unlike primary reinforcers such as food or water, the drive to obtain these tokens is less easily satiated.

The use of primary reinforcers for the modification of behavior can often

be bothersome. Training is interrupted because ongoing behavior must be interrupted while the reinforcement is consumed. Moreover, there is the problem of satiation. For example, if you have just consumed a huge lunch, you are not likely to work in order to get some food. You might, however, work to get something you can exchange for food later in the afternoon. Tokens thus provide a time-bridge between the emission of behavior and the time when the reward is consumed. The attention of the behavior modifier and the learner need not be distracted. Training can continue without having to wait for the reinforcement to be consumed. It also gives the behavior modifier more opportunity to systematically observe what is going on.

Tokens have been used in various institutional settings in the form of *token economy*. Tokens are used to reward certain behaviors, and the tokens can be exchanged for primary rewards. In a sense, a token economy is a small-scale model of the real world where work is done for money and money is exchanged for desired goods and services. Token economies have been found successful in modifying behaviors in settings as diverse as school classrooms⁴³ and psychiatric wards in hospitals.⁴⁴

One of the most impressive applications of a token economy was carried out in a psychiatric hospital ward by psychologists Teodoro Ayllon and Nathan Azrin. The program involved many patients who had been labeled as schizophrenics. It is widely believed that it is difficult, if not impossible, to modify the behavior of certain schizophrenic patients, since they will not pay attention to reinforcements. Ayllon and Azrin were able to get around this problem by simply observing which things the patients were most likely to do if given a free choice. For example, they noticed that when given a free choice, the patients liked to talk to the ward doctors or chaplain, to eat candy, or to smoke cigarettes. They also prized the privilege of choosing their dining partners, watching television, and getting passes. Once Ayllon and Azrin learned which behaviors were likely to occur, they used access to these behaviors as reinforcers. The opportunity to watch TV, for example, was made contingent upon other behaviors. The behaviors which were rewarded included working in the laundry, washing dishes, and scrubbing the floors. In addition, many self-care activities were rewarded.

Ayllon and Azrin demonstrated the effectiveness of their token economy in a series of six experiments. In one of these experiments, mental hospital patients were given token rewards for performing various duties in the hospital. At first, each patient selected a chore from the list of duties which could be rewarded with tokens. After ten days, the patients were told that their current jobs would no longer pay tokens and that they must switch jobs in order to continue receiving the rewards. Seven of eight patients immediately switched to a new job, and the eighth patient switched a few days later. This experiment demonstrated that mental patients can adapt their behaviors to

changing reward contingencies. When the original jobs once again paid tokens, all of the patients switched back to their prior jobs.⁴⁵

One of the major problems with mental patients who have been hospitalized for long periods of time is that they become apathetic. For many of them, life is no longer interesting. They stop taking care of themselves and appear to have given up on life. Because of this apathy, they lose many of the skills which are needed to survive outside the walls of the institution. In order to help apathetic mental patients, a token economy was implemented at Patton State Hospital in California. Apathy was defined as a limited response to the environment. In comparison to the other patients, some patients were found to be less engaged in singing, listening to the radio or to records, watching television, or talking to other patients. Since these patients' behaviors fitted the definition of apathy, they were chosen as the targets of manipulation by means of token rewards. After several months of exposure to the behavior modification program, the patients were observed every half hour of a five-day work week. During this period, the number of nonapathetic responses (talking, listening, etc.) increased significantly. To be certain that it was not chance that accounted for the change in apathetic behaviors (mental health patients often improve spontaneously), a control group of 20 apathetic patients who had not been exposed to the token economy program was also studied. Among these patients, only slight improvement was observed. It should be noted that other approaches to the apathy problem had been notoriously unsuccessful.⁴⁶

Another set of experiments with token economies in Veterans Administration Hospitals in California showed that responsiveness to the environment could be greatly enhanced by the appropriate use of reinforcements. In these programs, responsible acts were reinforced. Responsible behaviors included dressing oneself neatly, keeping a living area tidy, or working at a job. In addition, these programs paired social reinforcements with token rewards. Each time a token reward was distributed, the attendant would say, "Good" or "I'm pleased with you." In this way, the patients learned to respond to ordinary social rewards as well as to tokens. Observers' ratings showed that the token economy had brought about significant changes in the behaviors of the patients. Most notable were changes in the appearance of the ward. Not only did the token economy benefit the patients, but it appeared to have a therapeutic effect on the hospital staff. Staff expectations of what patients could do changed. Respect for the patients increased. Staff in other parts of the hospital began to envy those who worked on the token economy ward. Soon other wards in the hospital began to adopt the token economy strategy because of its apparent success.⁴⁷

The effectiveness of token economies in highly structured and controlled settings such as psychiatric wards is unquestionable. How about other struc-




Figure 9 4 More than just token success The above figure shows the dramatic changes in the behavior of institutionalized retarded adolescents after the introduction of a token system From Lent Leblanc & Spradlin 1970

tured and controlled settings, such as in the area of education? On the surface the evidence is quite impressive ⁴⁸ Token economies have been used successively to reduce disruptive classroom behaviors⁴⁹ or to establish instructional programs for autistic children ⁵⁰ Manuals are available for parents and teachers about token economies aimed at eliminating fear hyperactivity and negativistic behavior in children ⁵¹ One program even showed that token economies may be an effective tool for increasing racial integration among children ⁵²

Despite such glowing reports the enthusiasm over token economies has recently diminished somewhat It seems that behaviors acquired in the token economy situation do not seem to generalize well to situations in which the token economies are not in effect People will learn new behaviors in order to receive tokens but will not perform those behaviors when the tokens are no longer available Token economies are especially ineffective where people show intrinsic motivation or work for their own satisfaction A child with intrinsic motivation to keep a room clean might tidy the area for his own satisfaction Token economies merely teach us to work for more tokens If a child is taught to clean his room for a certain number of tokens he may also learn to leave his room a mess once tokens are no longer available Any of the furious parents who has faced a what have you done for me lately complaint by their children can attest to that fact

There is even evidence that behaviors learned in token systems during one part of the day may not spontaneously occur during the other part of the day ⁵³ Although token economies may cure disruptive children in the classroom the disruptive behavior comes back when the tokens are no longer available ⁵⁴ In one school children who learned task-oriented behavior in a token program were identified as needing the same kind of help a few months after the program was over ⁵⁵ Autistic children who are greatly helped by a token economy also lose some of what they have learned when the program ends ⁵⁶

It is clear that the procedures used in token economies are efficient methods for manipulating the behavior of others But in order to take full advantage of these procedures, we must establish how behavior learned in token economies can be maintained after the token program has ended At present the state of token economies is best summed up by psychologists Frederic Levine and Geraldine Fasnacht who state Tokens do lead to powerful learning but the learning may, in fact be token ⁵⁷

MODIFYING COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Therapeutic Communities and Sick Societies

Behavior modification involves the manipulation of others through the manipulation of their environment In the section on token economies we dis-

cussed the manipulation of contingencies within a small community such as a hospital ward or a classroom. Another approach has been to provide a total environment which may have therapeutic effects. Psychologist George W. Fairweather has made some attempts in that direction.

Fairweather was aware of two problems with our current mental health system. First, that mental patients upon their release from institutions are often ill equipped to function outside of them. After years of hospitalization they have lost the skills necessary to make it in the cold, competitive atmosphere of society. Second, that at a certain point patients must learn to function with minimal assistance from mental health professionals.

Fairweather was aware that sending patients directly from the hospital into the community was a serious mistake. Many of the patients lasted only a short time before they returned to the hospital. As an alternative, Fairweather created a community lodge that functioned as a half-way house between the hospital and the community. Located in the community, the lodge was collectively run and operated by the patients with minimal intervention by the hospital staff.

Before going to the lodge, patients gathered at the hospital and as a group were required to make decisions about rules for their future community. Initially, the decisions were about simple things such as grooming and self-care. Later, they involved important aspects of community management. The patients as a group were held responsible for the behavior of each member. A series of graded steps was established, with each step requiring more responsibility. When success at one step had been achieved, the group was reinforced by being allowed to go on to the next step (and have more responsibility).

Eventually, the group moved into the lodge. At first, they were assisted by hospital personnel. Gradually, as the group became more self-sufficient, these hospital employees were replaced by volunteers from the community. The group began to organize several activities which would teach them the necessary skills to become self-sufficient. Some members hired themselves out as janitors, while others kept the records and managed the project. All members of the community had some responsibility. When the community had been in operation for three years, all of the external assistants were removed. The community established its own self-management and business structure.⁵⁸

Evaluations of the *therapeutic community* concept showed it to be successful along a variety of dimensions. After five years of operation, lodge patients were compared to patients who had not been sent to the lodge. Those participating in the therapeutic community were more satisfied with their setting, made better impressions upon the hospital staff, were more capable of obtaining employment, and were less likely to require further hospitalization. Besides being a treatment success, the lodge was considerably less

expensive than hospitalization. The average daily cost for a patient to stay in the lodge was less than \$5. At the time the experiment was conducted hospital costs were from three to ten times this amount; today they would be even more. The community lodge experience demonstrated that with the creation of a therapeutic environment, former mental patients can treat themselves while enjoying the advantages of first class citizenship. In therapeutic environments they can determine their own destinies and function as productive members of society. All of this is achieved for a fraction of the cost of traditional therapy.⁵⁹

If communities can serve as therapeutic entities, what about sick societies? People who apply that label are actually engaged in diagnostic work. Just as doctors examine their patients and determine that they have the flu, people examine society and explain that it has a population explosion, an energy crisis, or stagflation.

There are, however, some differences between the way your doctor treats you and the way we treat society. When you are ill, the doctor usually has some remedy that he is willing to try. For society's ills, however, things tend to come to a dead end at the point of diagnosis. An example of this was provided shortly after President Ford took office. The President was greatly concerned about the economy. Inflation was getting out of control, while at the same time a recession seemed imminent. As a new president, Mr. Ford knew he must get the problem diagnosed. Columnist-humorist Art Buchwald was quick to make the analogy between a sick person and a sick economy. He explained that the economy had to go to the doctor because its inflation had risen steadily overnight and it could not move its Gross National Product. To assess the problem, the President called the nation's leading economists to a summit meeting. The economists disagreed on many issues. 'Galloping inflation,' said one. 'Ordinary growth and business cycles,' said another. 'Nonsense,' said a third. 'It is stagflation.' All of these were diagnoses. Some of the diagnosticians used standard terms to describe the situation. Others invented new terms. Although each diagnostician at the summit suggested some worthwhile treatment, the meeting closed without a clear-cut plan of action.

Behaviorally oriented psychologists suggest that we should get away from diagnosing society's illnesses. Instead, they recommend a *functional analysis* to examine behavior in terms of its antecedents and consequences. A functional analysis of economic conditions, for example, could involve society as a whole, as well as the behavior of the individuals in it. Consider the inflationary practice of price-raising by store owners. Among the possible antecedent events, one could list employee demands for higher wages or increases in wholesale costs. Among the possible consequences of the price hike are customers' anger or even boycott of the store. If the consequences are



Figure 9 5 Cash for trash When these children are rewarded according to behavior modification principles for cleaning up they can become an effective labor force

severe enough (people stopping to buy) the storeowner's behavior (raising prices) will not occur. A somewhat simplistic solution to inflation, to say the least.

Disarming the Population Bomb

Another area where functional analysis could be of use is the current societal problem of population overgrowth. Psychologists Steven Zifferblatt and Carroll Hendricks started with the belief that the goal of family planning should be the solution of the population problem rather than the development of a theory of what causes it. Their action-oriented approach to societal problems is heavily infused with behavioral concepts. In order to eliminate unwanted births Zifferblatt and Hendricks maintained one must first identify problem behaviors and appropriate behaviors. These behaviors cannot be considered "good" or "bad," since they have to be viewed within the context of a given society. What precedes sexual intercourse in one culture, for example, might be quite different from the antecedents of intercourse in another culture. In Malaysia, where families are crowded in a single room, intercourse might occur spontaneously when there is privacy. In rural Canada, where people enjoy plenty of privacy, the antecedents of sexual behavior might be quite

different. There the climate and those long winter nights may be the antecedents triggering sexual behavior. If we train health workers to identify such antecedents, it becomes possible to modify the consequences (the population explosion).⁶⁰ Again, a very simplistic solution.

Cash for Trash

Functional analyses for the solution of formidable societal problems seem to be oversimplified to the point of being ludicrous. Some of them may indeed very well be so. It would, however, be a serious mistake to dismiss them all offhandedly. Some of them do work. You can talk about ecology forever, just like you talk about the weather. But what can you do about it? For example, is there too much trash lying around in your town? For most of us there is. A major factor in environmental deterioration is that trash is left everywhere. Since all of us want a beautiful environment, why is it that campaigns to clean up parks and roadsides of beer cans, lunch bags, and coke bottles have been only minimally effective? The recent 'you got to pitch in to clean up America' effort provided catchy jingles for radio commercials, but otherwise had little effect on the amount of trash left around. Another approach has been to pay children in neighborhoods to pick up trash. Despite overtones of behavior modification, paying these children seemed to have little effect on the amount of trash remaining around.

Enter now the behavioral psychologist and his functional analysis. He defines exactly what behaviors are to be rewarded. He notices that the children were highly rewarded for picking up large pieces of litter and less rewarded for turning in small, but still unsightly, items. He also notices that some of the craftier children found out that they could be rewarded for raiding trash cans or industrial trash bins. And so he develops specific rates for cleaning specific areas. Used this way, the procedure led to effective litter reduction in an urban high-density area.⁶¹ It also shows that children between the ages of four and thirteen can be an effective labor force in solving the mounting urban trash problems.

Nutritional Balance Acts

While we are on the topic of children, there is a critical problem in our society involving nutrition. People of lower socioeconomic status do not get proper nutritional balance in their meals. Beyond the problem of good food being unavailable to minority children is the fact that children will not consume unfamiliar food. Experience with Head Start programs bears this out. The normal diets of children in these programs were deficient in nutritional requirements, so these rural and economically impoverished children were provided with free breakfasts which contained adequate nutrition. Unfortunately, the children found the nutritionally adequate food unfamiliar and often refused to eat it.

To remedy this problem one group of researchers had teachers reward eating behaviors with sugar-coated cereal, small candies, and praise. Children who finished their entire meal were given more goodies and praise than those who had not cleaned their plates. This simple behavior technique greatly increased the proportion of meals consumed and the number of children who would eat.⁶²

Modifying the Energy Crisis

Let us now look at behavior modification and another societal problem, the urban transportation issue. Because of the energy crisis it is very important that we conserve fuel in every way possible. One way to do this is to increase the utilization of public transportation systems. In view of the notorious love affair between the average American and his automobile, this seems to be an almost insurmountable task. Despite a widely publicized educational program and various price reduction gimmicks by bus companies, public transportation is still vastly underused. A recent experiment by a group of behavioral psychologists may provide some answers to the problem. In that study tokens were given to all persons who rode on a campus bus. The tokens could be exchanged for a variety of items such as ice cream, beer, pizza, flowers, records, and the like. In addition, a token could be exchanged for another bus ride. The introduction of the token system increased ridership by 150 percent! Moreover, most of the people exchanged their tokens for another bus ride, thus insuring continued bus operation. Although it may seem expensive to pay people for riding the bus, the token system appeared to be less costly than other approaches aimed at increased bus utilization.⁶³

Walden II: The Illusion of Freedom

The manipulative aspects of behavior modification may attract you or repel you. In the final analysis, it remains an individual judgment; each of us has to make. The question, however, is whether we are really free to make any judgments. B. F. Skinner's novel *Walden II* about a hypothetical society may give you some food for thought in this matter. The main character in the novel is Frazier, a benevolent dictator. Frazier controls the people in this utopian society by dispensing positive reinforcements. People in the society behave in appropriate ways in order to get these reinforcements. Money is a secondary reinforcer or a token which can be stored and used on later occasions. Some people in the society accumulate the tokens rather than enjoying immediate pleasures. Toward the end of the book, Frazier proclaims that he has discovered the key to cultural design. Positive reinforcement works and negative reinforcement does not. Since people seek positive reinforce-

ment they still have the illusion of being free. After all, nobody is forcing them to do anything. It is their own choice. There is no need to rebel.⁶⁴

Think about it. Or better yet, read *Walden II*. We highly recommend it.

IN CONCLUSION: PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

In this chapter we have presented you with what has become an increasingly important—and controversial—approach to the understanding of human behavior.

The 'understanding' part of behavior theory based on principles of learning has invoked little if any controversy. It has been amply demonstrated that people can learn passively (classical conditioning) by engaging in behaviors that increasingly pay off (operant conditioning) or by observation (imitation). We have presented you with a brief outline of these types of learning at the beginning of the chapter (pp. 272-277, 288-289).

The controversy starts when psychologists begin to apply these principles in order to modify individual behavior. Most of the criticism has been directed against clinical psychologists who have used behavior modification techniques on their patients (or clients). This is hardly surprising since it conjures the picture of a manipulative ogre attempting to mold a helpless victim to what the manipulator thinks is best, regardless of what the patient wants or really needs. As a result, behavior theory and its applied offshoot, behavior therapy, have been subjected to frequent condemnation.

Behavioral psychologists sometimes appear to be as omnipotent as the theory that they espouse. One does not have to be an experienced clinician to realize that such apparently arrogant behavior grates on people's nerves and makes them antagonistic. Nobody really likes to hear that everything we do is the result of the proper stimulus operating under a certain set of conditions, with us having little say in the matter. Nobody likes to hear that we really have little influence on our own decision-making process or that exercising free will is merely an illusion of freedom. Above all, there is nothing as galling as listening to the dispassionate claims of experts (complete with charts and figures) trying to show that the most human sentiments are nothing but predictable sequences of stimuli and responses.

All this may be true, but the trouble is that the experts are often right. Often—not always (see, for example, the matter of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, p. 295). It is also interesting that very few people would criticize the effects of operant conditioning in social situations such as demonstrated by the Greenspoon effect (p. 280) or the method of successive approximation (p. 282), or the exercise of self-control (p. 289). These are situations which *everyone* has experienced at one time or another, be it as the manipulator

or the manipulated party. Criticism is also muted when behavioristic principles are applied to such areas as overpopulation (p 298), ecology (p 298), nutrition (p 299) or the energy crisis (p 300) be it only because the behavior modifiers were successful there when all other persuasive approaches had failed. In the clinical area there is little doubt that behavior therapy is an effective treatment for a wide range of problems. Some of the effective procedures which were mentioned included operant procedures which shape behaviors, systematic desensitization which is used to decondition anxieties, aversion therapy, which is used for counterconditioning and observational learning, in which people learn behaviors by just watching.

Despite the increasing popularity of behavior modification these techniques remain as controversial as ever. There is little doubt that behavior modification techniques in clinical settings can pose a problem. This is especially true in institutionalized settings, where inmates have little say in what is being done to them. Systematic rewarding or punishing of patients or prisoners under such circumstances poses serious ethical questions. The same goes for minors whose parents make the decision for them, as in the case of the young child Keith which we described in this chapter (p 279). Under such circumstances it is up to any responsible person in power to put judicious restraints on overzealous behavior modifiers.

It is also true that there are many techniques other than behavior therapy available for the practicing clinician. Many of these techniques have been shown to be quite effective without carrying with them the depersonalized overtones of behavior therapy. But then again, many of these techniques have failed where behavior modification succeeded. In the final analysis, we cannot help but agree with psychologists Terence Wilson and Gerald Davison, two ardent proponents of behavior therapy, who claim that behavior therapy is really a collection of principles and techniques *how* to change behavior, it says nothing about *who* should modify *what* behavior, or *why* or *when*.⁶⁵ These psychologists maintain that clients of behavior therapists should be able to choose their own goals. Thus, they argue, behavior modification is less manipulative than other treatment regimens.⁶⁶

Provided the ultimate choice of therapist and therapeutic objectives remains in the hands of the patient we can find little fault with behavior modification techniques.

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UNDERSTANDING

10

ON MORALS AND ALIENATION

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MORALITY INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

Moving Through Stages

Question (to the reader) *Are you a liar?*

Answer (indignantly) *Of course not!*

Question *Have you ever lied?*

Answer *Well*

Question *Yes or no?*

Answer *Yes, on occasions*

Question *Doesn't this make you a liar?*

Answer *Of course not! Everyone lies once in a while. Didn't you ever hear of "white lies?"*

Question *What are those for?*

Answer *If you don't want to hurt someone's feelings or in a case where lying won't cause as much harm as telling the truth*

Congratulations! You have just demonstrated that you are past the stage of *moral realism*. According to psychologist Jean Piaget, up to age seven or eight your conception of justice is based on rigid and inflexible standards of right and wrong. Lying is wrong under all circumstances. As you grow older, the absolute standards of moral realism turn into those of *moral relativism*. Your concept of justice becomes tempered with notions of equity and fairness. You realize that under certain circumstances lying is justified. You may lie to save others embarrassment. You may lie to prevent a worsening situation from turning into a disaster. You recognize the utility of fibs and white lies.¹

Piaget's original formulations have recently been extended by psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, who suggests that there are three general levels of moral development, each marked by two stages.

Preconventional, Stage 1 This stage is characterized by punishment and obedience. You do the right thing because of fear of punishment. Your morality is determined by the physical consequences of your action. Typical age: up to about 7.

Preconventional, Stage 2 Your morality is determined by your personal needs and satisfaction. It is a selfish approach which considers the needs of others only to the extent that favors will be returned. It is a 'scratch my back and I'll scratch yours' type of morality. Loyalty, gratitude, and justice hardly enter the picture at this stage. Typical age: 7 to 10.

Conventional, Stage 3 Your morality is determined by conventional role expectations. You do what a good boy or a nice girl should do. Typical age: 10 to 13.



Figure 10 1 Sorry he is not here. He is already on his way and will be there shortly. This little white lie is unacceptable to the young moral realist. As he grows into a moral relativist, such lies are accepted as a matter of course.

Conventional, Stage 4 This stage involves broader concepts such as conventional rules of behavior, community standards, and the requirements of law and order. Your morality is determined by duty, respect, and maintenance of social order. Typical age: 13 to 16.

Postconventional, Stage 5 Moral codes are no longer perceived as absolute. If they can be amended to serve the good of the community more adequately, they should. Your morality is determined by conventional rules serving as means to an end, not ends in themselves. Typical (ideal) age: Adulthood.

Postconventional, Stage 6 Your morality is determined by universal principles of justice and human rights. Typical (ideal) age: Adulthood.²

Kohlberg does not suggest that all of us go through this sequence. In fact, *relatively few people ever reach stage 5 and even less so pass into stage 6*. Many adults remain fixated at certain levels, and many others often regress to lower levels. Kohlberg's method of scoring people's responses is also very complicated and cumbersome. To simplify matters, psychologists Karen Maitland and Jacqueline Goldman have recently come up with a Moral

Judgment Scale (MJS) and an abbreviated scoring method³ First, consider the following situation

Your mother is near death from a special form of cancer There is one drug that the doctors think might save her It is a form of radium that a druggist in your town has recently discovered The drug is expensive to make, but the druggist is charging ten times what the drug cost him to make He pays \$200 for the radium and charges \$2000 for a small dose of the drug You have gone to everyone you know to borrow the money but you can only get together about \$100 which is half of what it costs You tell the druggist that your mother is dying and ask him to sell it to you cheaper or let you pay later But the druggist says ' No, I discovered the drug and I m going to make money from it ' So you get desperate and break into the man s store and steal the drug for your mother Why shouldn t you steal the drug?

Notice that the question refers to why you should *not* steal the drug It does not necessarily assume that you will do so The six listed answers below according to Matland and Goldman, correspond to the six stages of development formulated by Kohlberg For greater clarity we have italicized key phrases for each stage

- (1) I am quite desperate in this situation and I may not truly realize I'm doing wrong when I steal the drug *But I ll certainly know I ve done wrong after I'm punished and sent to jail I ll always feel guilty about being dishonest and breaking the law (the effect of punishment)*
- (2) I may not get much of a jail term if I steal the drug, but my mother will probably die before I get out, so *it won t do me much good* If my mother dies, I shouldn't blame myself, it isn t *my* fault if she has cancer (self centered needs)
- (3) I'll get caught and sent to jail if I do If I get away, *my conscience will bother me thinking how police will catch up with me any minute* (not living up to role of honest citizen)
- (4) It isn t just the druggist who will think that I am a criminal, *everyone else will too* After I steal it, I ll feel bad thinking *how I brought dishonor on my family and myself* I won t be able to face anyone again (regard for social convention)
- (5) If I stole the drug, *I wouldn't be blamed by other people, but I'd condemn myself* because I wouldn't have lived up to my own standards of conscience and standards of honesty (disregard of social convention)

- (6) I would lose my standing and respect in the community and *violate the law* I'd lose respect for myself *if I'm carried away by emotion* and forget the long-term effects of my action (total adherence to the justice principle)

In comparing Piaget's and Kohlberg's notions of moral development you may be wondering who is more inflexible the immature youngster who condemns lying under *all* circumstances or the adult in the exalted sixth stage who would *never* steal a drug for his fatally ill mother. It is clear though that the morality of young children is based on primitive conceptualizations. Consider the following two situations

- 1 John is in his room when his mother calls him to dinner. John goes down, and opens the door to the dining room. But behind the door is a chair and on the chair is a tray with 15 cups on it. John does not know the cups are behind the door. He opens the door the door hits the tray, bang go the 15 cups, and they all get broken.
- 2 On a day when Henry's mother is out, Henry tries to get some cookies out of the cupboard. He climbs up on a chair but the cookie jar is still too high, and he can't reach it. But while he is trying to get to the cookie jar he knocks over a cup. The cup falls down and breaks.

Clearly, John's and Henry's positions are not alike. John has committed a well-intentioned act (following mother's call for dinner) which however, resulted in considerable damage. Henry has committed a transgression (trying to get to the cookies while his mother was absent) which resulted in only minor damage. According to Piaget young children under about the age of eight display a strong tendency to ignore the intent behind an action. In their rigid way, they espouse *objective responsibility*. That is when faced with the John and Henry situation and asked 'Who did the naughtier thing?' they regard John as the real culprit simply because of the great damage he had caused. Older children on the other hand endorse *subjective responsibility*. Despite the fact that he had caused so much damage, John is seen as less guilty than Henry, since John's good intents are weighed heavily in this case.

In all fairness to the rigidity of Piaget's morally realistic youngsters it must be admitted that the greater flexibility of the morally relativistic older children and adults is not always colored by noble motives. That is, not all one's fibs and white lies are caused by a wish to protect others from harm. A selective process seems to be operating because of possible conflict over what constitutes a transgression. Consider, for example the moral dilemma of

preadolescents At this age youngsters are already past their rigid morally realistic code They nevertheless face a serious problem when they learn that one of their peers has committed a transgression On the one hand, there is the implicit commandment, "Thou Shalt Tell Authority (parent, teacher law enforcement agency, etc) When Your Peer Does Wrong " On the other hand, there is the well-known norm of 'Thou Shalt Not Fink On Your Friend "

One of these writers along with psychologist John McDavid, conducted a study which forced preadolescents to make this moral choice Two experimental confederates were recruited among the youngsters to act as transgressors One of them was very popular with his peers, and as such was assigned to be the high-status transgressor The other confederate was not very popular with his peers and thus was assigned to be the low-status transgressor The witnessed transgression was either theft of money from the teacher or a deliberate erasure from an important series of tapes In both staged transgressions the malicious intent of the transgressors was obvious The subjects were then called in by adult authority (school principal) and interrogated about their knowledge of what they had witnessed earlier ⁴

What does a youngster do under the circumstances? There is good evidence that the moral judgment of children can be modified into various directions by adult models⁵ even more than by peers ⁶ Since the model in this case (the principal) indicated that transgression must be reported, the subjects could be expected to do so They did indeed—as long as they were interrogated alone *Then* all subjects finked freely about both transgressors, regardless of their status When interrogated in pairs however, the subjects showed a curious type of flexibility They protected the high status transgressor to the end by refusing to divulge any information to the adult authority Little of this consideration was evident when they were queried about the low-status transgressor They reported his transgression without hesitation The motive for this kind of behavior is obvious Since the subjects were interrogated in pairs, each subject knew that his behavior could easily become common knowledge among his peers Finking on a popular peer can lead to unpleasant results The unpopular peer can be thrown to the dogs, so to speak

This twisted type of morality is by no means limited to children and adolescents Adults excel in it too Psychologist Karen Dion showed adults pictures of children who had previously been rated as physically attractive or unattractive The subjects were then told that the children had committed various transgressions such as torturing a dog or deliberately injuring another child Compared to the unattractive children for identical transgressions, the attractive children fared much better in the adult evaluation The attractive children not only received less blame, but their transgressions were seen as less severe ⁷

What causes this curious morality? Once again, the theory of cognitive dissonance (see Chapter 8) offers a fascinating explanation

Justice Who Deserves What?

In the course of a person's lifetime, many things over which he has no real control can happen to him. He may be bitten by a mosquito while he is working in his backyard. He may slip on a banana peel and sprain his ankle. He may step on a rusty nail and develop blood poisoning. His house may be razed by a hurricane. He may develop a debilitating disease. He may become the crippled survivor of an airplane crash.*

What can these unfortunate people expect from you? Not much, really. They all had misfortunes. They are the helpless victims of fate. Surely, though, they can expect to get your sympathy. This is what our moral code dictates. After all, nobody likes to see innocent people suffer.

Not quite. You are likely to sympathize with the person who got bitten by the mosquito or the one who slipped on a banana peel or the one who experienced some familiar *small* misfortunes. But as you ponder about the more serious cases, you begin to have a vague feeling that perhaps the misfortune was not beyond control. Perhaps the victim's house could have been saved if the weather warning service would have been more efficient. Perhaps the patient's doctor was a quack. Perhaps the pilot of the crashed plane faked his way through a qualifying health examination.

Why this urgent concern to pin the responsibility for the accident on *someone*? Why not accept it as unavoidable fate? The reason, according to psychologist Elaine Walster, is that your acceptance that this is the kind of thing that could happen to anyone comes dangerously close to an admission that a catastrophe of such magnitude could happen to *you*. Pinning the responsibility on someone for a serious accident makes you feel more comfortable because it supplies cues for future action on your part. It prepares you to watch for certain danger signals. When Walster presented her subjects with a hypothetical car accident, the more serious the consequences were for the victims, the less the accident was attributed to fate.⁷

From this point on, things move on with a relentless logic. Suppose that *no one* can be held responsible for the victim's plight. Suppose the weather warning service had been issuing the proper bulletins, the patient's doctor has a fine reputation, or the airline pilot had passed his health examination with flying colors. What then? At that point, according to Walster, you begin to take a closer look at the victim. If, in some way, you can pin the responsibility

*As previously stated, masculine pronouns (he, his) are used here only to avoid the incorrect usage of plural pronouns (they, their) or the awkwardness of his/her. Sexism is not intended.

on *him* it is reassuring. You can then reassure yourself that you are a different kind of person from the victim or that you would behave differently under similar circumstances. Thus, if the victim would not have been walking so carelessly, he would not have stepped on a rusty nail. If he would have had the sense to buy a sturdier house, it would have withstood the hurricane. If he would have been smart enough to undergo an annual checkup or eat his vitamins, he would not have had this terrible disease. If instead of flying in such bad weather he would have taken the train, he would not be a cripple today. With such reasoning you feel protected from catastrophe. In her experiment Walster found that the driver of the car was judged as more responsible for the accident when consequences were severe than when consequences were trivial.⁸

Now that the responsibility is pinned on the victim, the next step is inevitable. You begin to put distance between yourself and the victim. You consider him somewhat clumsy, perhaps stupid, perhaps even deserving of his fate. This, too, can be reassuring. Oddly enough, all this is done without violating any moral principle. In fact, it is based on moral principles of the highest order: your belief in a *just world*. The process, according to psychologist Melvin Lerner, works as follows:

We do not want to believe that (disasters) can happen, but they do. At least we do not want to believe they can happen to people like ourselves—good, decent people. If these things can happen, what is the use of struggling, planning, and working to build a secure future for one's self and family?

What I am postulating here is that for their own security, if for no other reason, people want to believe they live in a just world where people get what they deserve.⁹

To sum it all up, anything that jeopardizes our belief in a just world where people get what they deserve produces dissonance. To solve this dissonance we must attribute responsibility to someone, even if it is a hapless victim of circumstances. This moral concept employs a circular logic of sorts: *People get what they deserve—and deserve what they get!*

Paradoxically, the widespread belief in a just world can put a severe strain on equity and justice. Psychologists Cathaleene Jones and Elliot Aronson point out the startling fact that the more respectable a victim of disaster is, the more fault is attributed to him.¹⁰ For example, what does a bystander say when a person known to be a heroin pusher, child molester, or wife beater walks across the street, steps in an open manhole, and fractures both his legs? Probably, "Aha, the bastard got what he deserved." But what if the

same thing happened to a gentle, caring underpaid welfare worker? To maintain his belief in a just world the bystander must invent some justification for the tragedy which he can attribute to the victim. For example: He should not have walked without a flashlight; he was distracted; he was preoccupied with the troubles of others; he had one martini too many before dinner; and so on. The point is that more responsibility (fault) is attributed to the more respectable victim.

Jones and Aronson then proceeded to describe to their subjects a victim in a rape case. Depending on the experimental condition, she was described as being either married, a virgin, or a divorcee. The case itself was described (again depending on the experimental condition) as either an attempted rape or an actual rape by a muscular man, 5 feet 10, 175 pounds, 26 years old, working as an auto mechanic at a local service station. Following a detailed description of the incident, the subjects were asked to act as judges and determine the number of years of imprisonment the defendant rapist should receive (ranging from less than 1 to more than 40 with 5-year intervals marked). As a corollary activity, the subjects were also asked to rate on a 21-point scale how much of the crime was the victim's fault.

What does common sense—and justice for that matter—dictate in this case? First, a somewhat more lenient judgment for the defendant who attempted the crime than for the defendant who perpetrated the crime. Second, in either case, the fact that the victim was a virgin, married, or divorced should be of no consequence. Rape is rape, and as such should be judged on the circumstances.

Unfortunately, old-fashioned sexist norms combine with the exalted belief in a just world to produce an uneven distribution of justice. As expected, the average punishment for the defendant in the actual rape case (16 years) was more severe than in the attempted rape case (10 years). But in both cases the status of the victim played an important part in the subjects' decision. The more respectable the victim was, the harder was the assigned punishment for the criminal. Since in our society married women enjoy the highest status, closely followed by virgins, with the divorcee at the bottom of the pole, the rapist of the married woman received 18 years, the rapist of the virgin received 15 years, and the rapist of the divorcee received 14 years. In the attempted rape case, the criminal received 11 years for attacking the married woman or the virgin, but only 8 years for attacking the divorcee. As if this twisted morality is not enough, it was in direct contrast to the amount of fault attributed to the victim. The pious belief in a just world dictates that the more respectable the victim, the greater the need to attribute fault to her actions, since it is difficult to attribute fault to her character. Accordingly, the married women were faulted more than the virgins, and almost twice as much as the divorcees, for their part in the crime. This was bad enough. The fact that sub-

sequent punishment of the criminal was most severe in the case of the married woman defies both common sense and justice

While the belief in a just world can lead to distorted judgments, the opposite holds true as well. Several studies have shown that less fault is attributed to the victim of a serious misfortune than of a small misfortune.¹¹ The judges in those cases, however, were not necessarily more accurate and equitable in their perception. Rather, they displayed what is known as *defensive attribution*. The defensive attribution hypothesis suggests that instead of believing in a just world, people sometimes find it advantageous to believe in a *capricious* world. The desire not to attribute a severe accident to chance is overridden by the desire to avoid being blamed for an accident. The thinking in such cases may go as follows: 'I may cause a similar accident in the future if I do. I will want people to think chance is responsible and not I.' The apparent sympathy for the victim (who is blamed less than chance) is really not sympathy at all. It stems from the desire to avoid potential trouble should one find himself in a predicament similar to that of the victim.

It is possible to continue almost endlessly with the strange logic of believers in a just or capricious world. For example, what could be expected of young men's reactions to the military draft lottery numbers allocated to their peers during the height of the unpopular war in Vietnam? When 19-year old males listened to a live broadcast of the 1971 national draft lottery, the overall reaction was one of sympathy for those who drew bad lots (high-priority numbers) as opposed to good lots (low-priority numbers). Still, a considerable number of subjects showed little sympathy for those who drew high-priority numbers. Not too surprisingly, these were the same people who on previous test measures had made it clear that they believe that the world is a just place where good people are rewarded and bad people are punished.¹²

Twisted morality, however, is not necessarily limited to a pervasive belief in the justness or capriciousness of our world. Take the case of shoplifting, for example. The evidence shows that the number of people who report shoplifters after witnessing the crime is incredibly low (from 6% to 28%).¹³ This breach of the moral code should not be too surprising in view of the fact that corporate victims arouse little sympathy.¹⁴ Ripping off the corporation is more often than not perceived as a righteous act by the exploited against the exploiter. Even if you condemn shoplifting and do not want to fault the victim, you can always minimize the transgression. You can argue that if the crime would really have been serious, the store's security forces, who use a one-way observation window for scanning the area, would have arrested the thief without waiting for anyone to report him. Besides, the potential rewards for reporting shoplifting are notoriously minimal. Corporations offer little if any monetary rewards or generous expressions of thanks for the conscientious

customer who reports the crime. On the other hand, taking action is bound to be time-consuming, inconvenient, and perhaps even dangerous.¹⁵

Machiavellianism: Any Means to an End

Throughout history, many prominent people have taken a rather jaundiced view of morality and conscience. Charles Peirce, the well-known American physicist and logician, suggested that because morality and conscience mean nothing more than blind obedience to the traditional maxims of one's community, 'morality is—I will not say immoral, that would be going too far—composed of the very substance of immorality.' Friedrich Nietzsche, the German philosopher, equated conscience with stupidity because 'at every failure, conscience finds an excuse as an encouragement in itself.' That is why there are so many conscientious and so few intelligent people.' Fyodor Dostoyevski, the Russian novelist, bemoaned the fact that freedom of conscience is not only seductive, but nothing is a greater cause of suffering. The notorious German leader, Adolf Hitler, simplified the entire problem by promising his followers: 'I am liberating man from the degrading absurdity known as conscience.'

Despite their frontal attack on morality, none of the above men ever took the time for a systematic promotion of *immorality* as a political philosophy. That dubious honor remains with Niccolò Machiavelli, the Italian statesman and political writer (1469–1527). Machiavelli's cynical views of how leaders successfully manipulate their followers suggest that immorality can be elevated to a fine art. The ideal leader, according to Machiavelli, should know how to color his nature well and how to be a great hypocrite 'for men are so simple and yield so much to immediate necessity.' Moreover, since 'common people are always taken by appearances and results' 'as long as the leader pretends to be on a friendly footing with the vulgar mass that constitutes the world,' he can be sure that 'the means which he employs for his end will always be accounted honorable, and will be praised by everybody.' Open force should be used sparingly as a means to an end, not because of *moral reasons*, but because 'I do not believe that there was ever a man who from obscure condition arrived at great power, but there are many who have succeeded by fraud alone.' As a final exercise in utter perversity, Machiavelli recommends that moral beliefs should be promoted in the interest of immorality: 'Anything that tends to favor religion (even though it were believed false), should be received and availed to strengthen it 'for it is easy to keep the people religious and consequently well conducted.'¹⁶

Turning back to present times, it would be a mistake to assume that morality and conscience are on the way out. Granted, the morality of believers in a just world or a capricious world is obviously based on some twisted

logic. But it is also a tortured morality, in the literary sense of the word. The derogation and loathing of an innocent victim is not done out of joy or as a result of deliberate planning, or because of some deep-seated personal philosophy. It is the result of anxiety, guilt, shame, or fear for one's fate. All these are part of what is known as 'conscience'. To label such people (who, in fact, constitute a majority) as immoral would be incorrect.

Still, there is a little bit of Machiavelli in all of us. Psychologists Richard Christie and Florence Geis have used simple paper and pencil tests to measure Machiavellian attitudes. You can test yourself on the sampler provided in Table 10-1.

One of the more encouraging findings by Christie and Geis was that by and large, most of their subjects were able to strike a reasonable balance between expressing high and low Machiavellian attitudes.¹⁷ High Machiavellians were more likely to be males than females, to come from urban backgrounds and to be relatively young members of society. They tended to be cool and detached, resistant to social pressures, rational and logical. They were able to cheat on tests and deny it and stare the accuser coolly in the eye.¹⁸ When given the chance for offensive manipulation, such as license to confuse or distract other subjects engaged in a complex embedded figures test, low Machiavellians were simply no match to high Machiavellians for devilish ingenuity. The low Machiavellians came up with a limited number of tactics which, as they later reported, they did not even find enjoyable. The high Machiavellians greatly enjoyed innovative manipulations such as using makeshift springs to send ballpoint pens flying across the room, knocking over tables to send papers flying in all directions (while profusely apologizing at the same time), tapping pencils rhythmically on the table, jingling contents of pockets noisily, and so on.¹⁹

One of the most interesting findings by Geis and Christie was that professions that involve manipulating people tend to have high Machiavellian clusters, for example, psychiatrists as opposed to surgeons, social psychologists as opposed to physicists, and so on. The cynical view reflected in the stereotype of the American politician is, of course, not new. In view of recent events, from the packaged *Selling of the President*²⁰ through the sordid Watergate affair during former President Nixon's reign, Machiavellianism seems to have made a remarkable comeback. Even American business and industry may have to take a second look at their highly touted job enrichment programs. The purported aim of such programs has been to humanize the dreary boredom of routine jobs (e.g., the assembly line) by providing the workers with some interesting and meaningful, if costly, additional activities. Laurence Zeitlin, an industrial psychologist, tells us now that a little larceny can do a lot for employee morale. After reviewing the pilfering and cheating by employees in jobs ranging from bakeries through clothing stores to toll

TABLE 10 1 ARE YOU A MACHIAVELLIAN?^a

	Disagree a lot	Disagree a little	Neutral	Agree a little	Agree a lot
1 The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear	1	2	3	4	5
2 When you ask someone to do something for you it is best to give the real reasons rather than giving reasons that might carry more weight	5	4	3	2	1
3 Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble	1	2	3	4	5
4 It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there	1	2	3	4	5
5 It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a chance	1	2	3	4	5
6 One should take action only when sure it is morally right	5	4	3	2	1
7 Most people are basically good and kind	5	4	3	2	1
8 There is no excuse for lying to someone	5	4	3	2	1
9 Most men forget more easily the death of their fathers than the loss of their property	1	2	3	4	5
10 Generally speaking men won't work hard unless they're forced to	1	2	3	4	5

^aCheck the point on the scale that most closely represents your attitude. To find your Mach score, add the numbers that you have checked in each column. The National Opinion Research Center, which used a form very similar to this in a random sample of American adults, found that the national average was 25.

Source: Reprinted from *Psychology Today*. Adapted from Richard Christie and Florence L. Geis, *Studies in Machiavellianism* (New York: Academic Press, 1970). © 1970 by Academic Press.

booths. Zeitlin claims that not only do employees find such activities highly enriching and satisfying, but management gets a bargain to boot. Theft serves as a safety valve to employee frustration, and is costing the management, on the average, no more than \$1.50 per worker a day. Permitting a controlled

amount of theft can thus get management off the hook from such costly items as job enrichment or wage increases.²¹ The perfect Machiavellian solution!

MORALITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Law and Order Versus Personal Conscience

From the evidence presented so far you may have concluded that morality is a relative matter. Despite individual fluctuations, however, the overall framework is quite stable for our society. The Judeo-Christian code of justice and compassion for others is accepted as a product of normal social development. Differences of opinion are largely confined to *how* to best implement this code of ethics.

The law and order viewpoint is best summarized by Sigmund Freud:

*Human life in common is only made possible when a majority comes together which is stronger than any separate individual and which remains united against all separate individuals. The first requisite of civilization, therefore, is that of justice—that is, the assurance that a law once made will not be broken in favor of an individual.*²²

The personal conscience viewpoint is put forth by Carl Jung, a disciple of Freud who later parted ways with his teacher:

*Morality was not brought down on tables of stone from Sinai and imposed on people, but is a function of the human soul as old as humanity itself. We have it in ourselves from the start—not the law, but our moral nature without which the collective life of human society would be impossible.*²³

These two viewpoints are, of course, diametrically opposite. They exemplify two extreme philosophies which serve as rallying points for all shades of in-between opinions. Psychologists Robert Hogan and Ellen Dickstein have developed a measure which can assess your own viewpoint in this matter. For example, if you are a strong law-and-order advocate you are likely to endorse an item such as 'Right or wrong can be meaningfully defined only by law.' If you believe in a personal conscience, you are more likely to endorse items such as "All civil law should be judged against a higher moral law," or "An unjust law should not be obeyed."²⁴

There is evidence in support of both viewpoints. Those who believe in a personal conscience can cite a remarkable survey on morality among college students. The survey was taken on various college campuses throughout the nation during the years 1939, 1949, 1958, and 1969. On all occasions, the students rated the wrongness of 50 acts, all of which could be considered

immoral. Examples of the acts included killing a person in defense of one's life, forging a check and advertising a medicine to cure a disease known to be incurable by such a remedy. Sexual behavior, religious behavior, corporate responsibility and a host of other topics were covered as well.

The alarming decline in morality frequently cited by the law-and-order proponents was not reflected in this survey. In fact, throughout the many years there was a remarkable stability in the expression of high moralistic principles. Frowned-upon behavior ranged from misrepresentation (e.g., a student allowed to grade his own paper reports a higher grade than one he earned) to the immorality of war (e.g., nations at war using poison gas on the homes and cities of its enemy behind the lines). The only marked change was in the area of sexual morality (e.g., having sex relations while unmarried). As expected, contemporary college students did not rate these items as severely as their predecessors did at the time. The ratings on this topic by contemporary students suggested that both males and females tended to reduce the previously held double standard in sex roles. However, in the overall ratings of the items the females tended to be more severe than in males. This too was in line with previous findings.²⁵

In contrast to this optimistic view of morality, proponents of law and order pointedly refer to two recent studies on morality among college students. The first study shows that college students experience moral conflict in a variety of areas, but are highly selective in which area to apply mature solutions. Reported conflicts with moral overtones were in the area of social relations (35%), honesty (19%), sexuality (14%) and politics (12%). In line with Kohlberg's previously discussed model, the quality of solutions were found to range from the immature, selfish type of preconventional morality to the noble, selfless type of postconventional morality. The findings also indicated that the students were willing to apply mature solutions in the rather detached political/ideological conflict areas. When it came to personal and concrete areas of conflict such as honesty, solutions were more often marked by selfish immaturity.²⁶ According to the law-and-order proponents, these results should not surprise us. When college students were put in a position where they could cheat in class, moral appeals to refrain from doing so were totally useless. On the other hand, there was a 'clear and substantial effect' when threat of sanction was invoked.²⁷ Sanction, as defined by the dictionary, means 'making certain that the law will be obeyed.'

Morality, Politics, and Religion

To apply lofty principles of morality to the game of politics is either futile, as many cynics contend, or downright stupid, as practical Machiavellians will readily tell you. Political ideology, however, is a horse of a different color. All of us have certain ideas of what good government is or should be, which is

what political ideology is all about. Even those who are so alienated as to drop out from the political scene express, as we shall see later, a political ideology of sorts.

Psychologists, unlike political scientists or sociologists, are understandably more interested in various personality characteristics used to express political beliefs. One of the earliest studies was conducted in the 1950s by a group of psychologists at the University of California headed by T. W. Adorno. Their findings, summarized in *The Authoritarian Personality*, were based on a comprehensive study of college students, public school teachers, public health nurses, prison inmates, mental patients, veteran groups, labor union members, and members of the Kiwanis Club. The study originally was aimed at investigating the roots of anti-Semitism, but as time went on it became increasingly evident that extreme anti-Semitic attitudes did not exist in isolation. Closely related to such attitudes was an implicit antidemocratic ideology which, among other things, advocated political and economic conservatism, antagonism to out-group members (e.g., minorities), unbounded patriotism, and a reverence for power.²⁸

The morality of the authoritarian personality is exemplified by some of the statements he endorses (see Table 10-2). The authoritarian person is clearly a strong believer in law and order, but he also advocates values which supposedly are part of one's personal conscience, such as strong belief in the perfection of the American way of living. The overall profile of the authoritarian person is not very flattering, though. He emerges as a rigid, power-oriented, crusty, right-winger. This is precisely one of the reasons why the findings of Adorno and his colleagues have come under increasing criticism. Obviously, there are many law-and-order conservatives who do not fit this caricature of rigidity, just as there are many extreme liberals who do. Thus, psychologist Milton Rokeach prefers to deal with the term "ideological dogmatism," a relatively rigid outlook on life with intolerance toward those with opposing beliefs. Rokeach found that both authoritarian left-of-center groups (Communists and religious nonbelievers) and authoritarian right-of-center groups (devout Catholics) tend to embrace similar dogmatic values (see Table 10-2).²⁹ Rokeach's reasoning seems to be based on solid foundations. Evidently, political extremism has an appeal for its own sake. A poll by the American Institute for Public Opinion in 1971 among a wide sample of college students and a standard sample of the United States adult population showed that a significant portion of sympathizers with far-right organizations such as the John Birch Society and the Ku Klux Klan gave favorable ratings to far-left organizations such as the Students for Democratic Society, the Weathermen, and the Black Panthers, and vice versa.

The same survey also produced the encouraging findings that, by and large, the American public rejects extremism. Both far-left and far-right ex-

TABLE 10 2 TYPICAL STATEMENTS ENDORSED
BY AUTHORITARIANS AND DOGMATISTS

AUTHORITARIANS

Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn

Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down

Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question

When a person has a problem or worry it is best for him not to think about it but to keep busy with more cheerful things

Nowadays when so many different kinds of people move around and mix together so much a person has to protect himself especially carefully against catching an infection or disease from them

Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an earthquake or flood that will destroy the whole world

People are divided into two distinct classes the weak and the strong

Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished

The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared to some of the goings-on in this country even in places where people might least expect it

Certain religious sects that refuse to salute the flag should be forced to conform to such patriotic action or else be abolished

America may not be perfect but the American Way has brought us as close as human beings can get to a perfect society

DOGMATISTS

Most people just don't give a damn for others

It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future

It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward

If I had to choose between happiness and greatness I'd choose greatness

Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop

I have often felt that strangers are looking at me critically

To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side

It's all too true that people just won't practice what they preach

There are two kinds of people in the world those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth

Adapted from Adorno et al 1950 Rokeach 1960

tremists were rejected by an overwhelming margin (95%) The morality of extremists should thus be kept in proper perspective because they appeal to a relatively small segment of our society As for most of us consider the following items

Duties are more important than rights
You can't change human nature

The heart is as good a guide as the head
 No matter what people think a few people run things anyway
 Few people know what is in their best interest in the long run

Do you agree with the above statements? Do they constitute part of your value system, which guides your moral code? You may be interested to know that authoritarian and dogmatic individuals generally endorse such statements. If you did so does this label you as an authoritarian or dogmatic person? Of course not. Even if you endorsed some of the items in Table 10-2 you do not necessarily qualify as a highly authoritarian person. The key word obviously is *highly*. Authoritarianism is a matter of degree with very high scoring individuals comprising a minority segment of the population.

If political ideology is not sufficient to effectively promote equality and brotherhood, righteousness and justice, humanitarianism and compassion—what else is there? The obvious answer that comes to mind is religion. Few people will disagree that religion performs a key role in our society. Philosophically speaking, the disagreement may center on whether religion as sociologist Emile Durkheim claimed maintains social solidarity by 'sacredizing' the structure of society³⁰ or as Karl Marx maintained by being a corrupting opiate of the people.³¹ Psychologists, however, are less interested in philosophical speculations than in the personality and behavioral correlates of religious beliefs and practice. Here we encounter what psychologist Gordon Allport has called the great paradox. While many great figures whose lives embodied the highest moral precepts—Christ, St. Ambrose, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and many others—were religiously motivated, religious practice as such has consistently been associated with rigidity, intolerance, and downright bigotry.³²

To begin with, religious people in general have been found to be less humanitarian than nonreligious people. They have more punitive attitudes toward criminals, delinquents, prostitutes, homosexuals, and those in need of psychiatric treatment.³³ If this sounds similar to the description of the authoritarian personality, you are on the right track. One of the major characteristics of the latter is the expression of deep religiosity and unbounded faith (see Table 10-2). On the average, religious people show more intolerance than nonreligious people not only toward ethnic groups, but to any ideological group which does not conform to in-group standards.³⁴ It has also been shown that while frequent church attendance is associated with high socioeconomic status and college education,³⁵ highly educated nonattenders are less prejudiced than attenders.³⁶ Clearly, the poor humanitarian record of the churchgoer cannot simply be attributed to low education.

Fortunately, the dismal picture of religion and morality is open to further interpretation. Think, for example, of some religious people that you know and




Figure 10-2 Church attendance and prejudice among faculty members of a midwestern university Adapted from Allport & Ross 1967

ask yourself are their religious beliefs *intrinsic* or *extrinsic*? Allport who coined these phrases, suggested that *intrinsic* believers *live* their religion since they have fully internalized religion's high moral precepts. They are practicing what religion preaches but they do so out of deep moral convictions rather than as a means for their own ends. *Extrinsic* believers *use* religion for a variety of needs—to provide security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-justification, and so on. Other investigators using similar descriptions, such as *nuclear devout*, *associational* (seeking the deeper value of faith), *modal* or *communal* (for the purpose of sociability and status), have shown that the *intrinsic* believer is *not* prejudiced or intolerant.³⁷

Let us now reexamine the findings of the relationship between prejudice, intolerance, lack of humanitarianism and the personal practice of religion. *Extrinsic* believers attend church infrequently—just enough to satisfy their personal or social needs. *Intrinsic* believers attend church regularly because it is part of their internalized code of living rather than a means for their own ends. Thus the overall findings that church attenders are more prejudiced is only true up to a point. Statistically speaking, this is known as a *curvilinear* relationship. It means that while it is true that most attenders are more prejudiced than nonattenders, a significant minority of them are *less* prejudiced (see Table 10-3 and Figure 10-2).

In summary, the evidence suggests that those who have either given up on religion or who cynically disparage it may be acting too hastily. Religion can be an effective vehicle for promoting human welfare and morality. The behavior of the devout, *intrinsic* believer is living proof of this contention.

TABLE 10 3 CHURCH ATTENDANCE AND PREJUDICE AMONG FACULTY MEMBERS OF A MIDWESTERN UNIVERSITY

Frequency of attendance (times per mo)	N	Prejudice score
0	261	14.7
1	143	25.0
2	103	26.0
3	84	23.8
4	157	22.0
5-7	94	19.9
8-10	26	16.3
11 or more	21	11.7

Adapted from Allport & Ross 1967

ALIENATION

Getting Away from It All

Those were the days, the gold old days!" is a stock phrase with which you are undoubtedly familiar. Sooner or later somebody you meet will extol the merits of the past, when men were men (whatever that means), when the family gathered around the piano in close harmony, when house doors remained unlocked, and when trust, honesty and the fear of God were the order of the day.

Many people, disenchanted with the lack of old-fashioned virtue and morality in our present society, yearn for those good old times. Just how good those times really were is open to speculation. Nostalgia has a way of making things seem better than they were. It is true, however, that our complex technological society carries with it the potential of *alienation*. There is increasing evidence of *powerlessness*—a feeling of inability to understand or to influence events occurring in the mass societies of the twentieth century, of *normlessness* (*anomie*)—a lack of purpose and direction to life, and of social isolation—a feeling of separation from society and its standards.³⁸ Many political writers, philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists have addressed themselves to the problem of alienation. It has become almost routine to define all of our troubles, and to seek solutions, in the language of alienation—so routine, in fact, that some writers feel that the term "alienation" has been overrated, is of dubious validity, and should be divested of its mystique.³⁹

Be that as it may, there was a time when alienation could be dealt with in a relatively simple manner. Look at the previously described components

of alienation (powerlessness normlessness, and social alienation) Would you be surprised if you were told that these feelings increase with advancing age? Would you be surprised if you were told that with higher levels of occupational prestige education, and income, there is less alienation? Probably not Indeed, until recently, alienation was seen as the exclusive domain of the aged the poor, and the uneducated

Until the 1960s, that is At that time *youth* began to enter the picture It was the decade of the counterculture which dictated Don't trust anyone over 30' It was the decade of a pointless war in Vietnam of long hair of the Woodstock festival of rejection of traditional values of the generation gap Suddenly alienation was no longer limited to the old and the poor Psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists and educators vied with each other in invoking the concept of alienation to explain the baffling behavior of the young affluent, college-educated rebels

What was myth and what was reality about the alienation of young people in the 1960s? Even now, in the calmer, post Vietnam era of the 1970s it is still difficult to separate the two One of the reasons is that there existed a curious paradox in the life-style of the young rebels of the 1960s On the one hand there were feelings of alienation from society, which dictated apathy, withdrawal, "doing one's own thing" On the other hand, it was the time when student activism to produce social change was at its peak Prodded by the injustices of the Vietnam war and the hypocrisy of their elders student activists literally mounted the barricades to achieve the kind of world they wanted The content industrious, apathetic, and somewhat ridiculous party-raiding student of the 1950s simply disappeared The newly emerging activists as described in the glowing accounts of those who studied them were liberal intelligent, tolerant, and sensitive to poverty injustice and the misfortunes of others ⁴⁰

There were, of course, some discordant notes here and there Political activism can easily produce extremism, and, as we have already seen extremism of both the far left and the far right is often associated with rigidity and intolerance Several studies had also shown that the so-called generation gap came close to being a myth One such study involving over 3000 young people between the ages of 12 and 18 from all walks of life, showed a remarkable amiability in the relationship between young people and their parents ⁴¹ Other studies showed a marked similarity between young people and their parents on practically every aspect of daily life ranging from ways to raise children, career choices, religious beliefs, and voting behavior ⁴² It became increasingly evident that, at best the student activists represented a rather narrow segment of the college population While their impact upon fostering an ideological gap was undoubtedly great, the generation gap as such may not have been as formidable as it appeared to be

Another discordant note was in the findings that alienation and violence were often closely related. This paradoxical finding was clearly established in a study of black males between the ages of 18 and 35. Unlike middle-class blacks who participated in organized civil rights protests, the population in this study (65% of which fell in the "highly alienated" category) seemed to have lost faith in their leaders. They had little hope for improvement through organized protest and viewed violence as the only realistic recourse for obtaining racial justice.⁴³

While student activism is presently in decline, there is little doubt that the young counterculture of the 1960s has left its impact. To some extent, alienation is part of that legacy. An extensive survey of American college students between the years 1950 and 1970 on what constitutes "the good life" provides some insight in this matter. The major finding of the study is that there has been a continuous rejection of what the authors call "conservatism in the finest sense" — the idea that in order to preserve the best man has attained, it is best to exercise social restraint, self-control, and to avoid radical changes in society. There was also a continuous tendency among the students to favor withdrawal ("meditating on the inner life") and self-sufficiency ("cultivate independence of person and things"). Almost one-half of the respondents did not believe that present-day American society is favorable for realizing the life they would like to live.⁴⁴

Recent studies in alienation have turned from the problems of society to problems of individual adjustment. Alienation is now being studied primarily in the context of depression, narcissism, aggression, suicide, and a variety of other psychiatric disorders.⁴⁵ This brings up a final point. Since the 1960s it has been common practice to link alienation and drug abuse, in line with the dropping out and turning on syndrome of the counterculture. Several studies have documented the fact that heavy users of marijuana and psychedelic drugs experience alienation.⁴⁶ It is important, however, to make a distinction between societal alienation and personal alienation. A recent study of marijuana usage divided 168 college students into four categories: nonusers, experimenters, recreational users, and potheads. Alienation from conventional standards was directly associated with degree of marijuana usage. But this collective alienation from socially accepted goals and standards (*societal alienation*) is not the same as *personal alienation*, which is marked by individual feelings of isolation, remoteness, cynicism, distrust, and apathy. Such personal alienation, with its clinical overtones, is unrelated to either marijuana usage or the use of hard narcotics. The student who uses marijuana does not necessarily view himself as different from the nonuser, nor does he feel any more personally estranged and isolated. The most that can be said about him is that he operates within a 'hang loose' ethic marked by a degree of societal alienation which causes him to reject some conventional social norms.⁴⁷

IN CONCLUSION PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

Of the many facets of human nature none is as critical to the understanding of individual behavior as is the moral code which guides it. Morality is the set of rules which binds the individual to society. Violations of the moral code can have disastrous effects on the individual producing guilt, shame, and anxiety as well as condemnation and possible punishment by others. Our conscience, or the superego, as Freud called it, is the sum total of what can bring about either peace of mind or problems of personal and social adjustment.

Morality is complex and relative. You may be perplexed, or even amused, by the moral outrage of what seems to you the excessive zeal of a crusader against pornography. Rest assured, however, that sooner or later you will run across somebody who will laugh away *your* moral indignation at something else. To a large extent such individual differences in morality are merely stages of growth and development. In early age the inflexible standards of what is right and wrong leads to 'moral realism.' Only later in life do these standards become tempered with notions of equity and fairness, culminating in the more flexible 'moral relativism' (p. 310). Even then there are subtle differences in degree (see Kohlberg's six stages, pp. 310-312).

Our first white lie signals the demise of our early absolute standards of morality. To some people it is also a signal that the time has arrived when morality can be exploited for one's selfish interest. They become cynical Machiavellians (p. 319). While most people are immune to such cynicism, some people of the highest moral caliber often display a twisted sort of morality. Such individuals tend to believe in a circular logic which dictates that people get what they deserve, and deserve what they get. Even though this belief is based on moral principles of the highest order—belief in a just world—it is a distorted view which puts a severe strain on equity and justice (p. 316).

Despite individual fluctuations in manifestations of moral behavior, the overall societal framework is relatively stable. There are differences of opinion about *how* to best implement a moral code, ranging from Freud's advocacy of law and order (p. 322) to Jung's emphasis of personal conscience (p. 322). Translated into the realities of daily life, these differences involve such areas as politics and religion, which are of interest to all social scientists. We preferred to stay within the confines of psychology, presenting you with psychopolitical studies of authoritarianism and dogmatism (p. 325) as well as some psychological aspects of religion (p. 326-328).

Problems of personal and social adjustment are frequently marked by displays of guilt and alienation. The desire to get away from it all is quite understandable in view of the increasing feelings of social isolation and

powerlessness that mark our complex technical society (p. 328). The resulting process of alienation *could* be a source of adjustment problems even though it does not occur as frequently as it is generally assumed (p. 329). Moreover, the dropping out and turning on symptoms of many alienated individuals do not necessarily indicate the existence of personal adjustment problems. Studies on marijuana users are a case in point (p. 330). They show that societal alienation (rejection of socially accepted standards) does not necessarily lead to personal alienation (isolation, remoteness, depression, apathy, etc.).

If and when personal alienation eventually occurs, it results in a clinical problem of moderate to severe proportions. To many social psychologists, alienation may be as formidable a clinical problem as the existence of guilt feelings. Guilt, however, seems to be an integral part of what constitutes and regulates the daily behavior of normal people as well. People capitalize on it in their attempts to manipulate one another (see Chapter 8) and it often leads to defensive behavior in which scapegoats are abused.

Recently there has been a rash of books, articles, and workshops on "assertion training." At first glance, assertion training is a somewhat superficial technique for teaching people to stand up for their rights. As such, it is a passive type of manipulative technique. The "broken record" device presents a polite and firm way of saying no to those who bother you or make demands of you. The "I understand what you are saying, *but* . . ." device allows you to maintain your stance firmly without putting the other person down. "No explanation" teaches you to ask for what you want without elaborating your reasons or offering justifications.

You can readily see that the entire thrust of assertion training is to make one able to say without feeling guilty or embarrassed. The promised payoff—increased poise, confidence, and assurance—is socially desirable, which explains the popularity of assertion training. Women tend to outnumber men in assertion training workshops, sometimes turning them into an extension of the traditional feminist consciousness-raising courses.

Not all is rosy, however. There is a thin dividing line between teaching people to get what they want without harming others (as assertion training claims it does) and teaching them to become sociopaths. To be told over and over again that guilt is something for each individual to define (rather than what others project on the individual) can readily lead to unscrupulous behavior where everyone sets his own personal standard of morality. Such overassertive individuals are at best a pain in the neck, and at worst turn into dangerous sociopaths.

Some noted authorities on assertion training have become aware of these dangers. Bruce Leckart, the originator of the highly popular Assertion Unlimited workshop on the West Coast, is one of the psychologists who has put assertion training in its proper perspective. He readily acknowledges the

popular expected benefits of assertion training such as poise and self-confidence. His main message to his trainees, however, deals with a more subtle benefit—the removal of defensive behavior. In our frantic endeavors to *deny* shortcomings or guilt feelings, we also deny ourselves the opportunity to calmly analyze our feelings. The resultant defensive behavior is usually maladaptive. Assertion training, according to Leckart, makes us *acknowledge* such feelings (without necessarily accepting or rejecting them) and then judge them on their merits. In other words, Leckart suggests that successful coping with one's shortcomings and guilt feelings makes for personal and social adjustment.

Which is precisely what traditional clinicians, including Freud himself, have maintained all along.

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11

ON COPING AND ADJUSTMENT

THE NATURE OF STRESS

Frustration, Conflict, Pressure, and Anxiety
Stress Kills!

THE CAUSES OF STRESS

Psychological Goal Approach and Goal Avoidance
Environmental Future Shock and Assorted Pollutants
Physical Genetic Makeup

COPING WITH STRESS

Coping by Thinking Know It, Forget It or Daydream It Away
Coping by Feeling Nurse It and Then Release It
Coping by Controlling Zen to Biofeedback
Coping by Adapting Nature's Own Way

WHEN COPING FAILS

Alcoholism
Drug Abuse
Suicide

IN CONCLUSION· PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

THE NATURE OF STRESS

Frustration, Conflict, Pressure, and Anxiety

Psychological stress is something that all of us have experienced at one time or another. It is virtually impossible to escape its effects. No matter who you are or where you are, sooner or later stress will bear down on you. It can come in many forms, depending on the situation. Its intensity may vary. But its effects are never in doubt. It will force you to change, to adapt, or to cope with the situation facing you. And when the cumulative effects of frustration, conflict, and pressure reach a certain point, stress can even kill you—*literally*, not just as a figure of speech.

Psychologist James Coleman considers frustration, conflict, and pressure to be integral parts of psychological stress.¹ *Frustration* occurs when you are blocked from obtaining something you want. It may take different forms, but the principle remains the same. If after being a pre med student for four years you are rejected by all major medical schools, you become frustrated. If you want to get into a rock concert and the doorman refuses to honor your ticket, you become frustrated. You may become aggressive as the result of these frustrations (see Chapter 4), but, as we shall see later in the chapter, there are more constructive ways to cope with such situations. We shall also take a close look at how you can most effectively cope with *conflict*, a type of stress which occurs when a choice must be made between two or more important goals. Finally, we shall deal with stress caused by *pressure* to speed up activities. This could be in the form of external pressure, as when your professor assigns a lot of extra reading right before the midterm exam, or in the form of internal pressure, as when no such reading is assigned, but you take it upon yourself because it fits your style and aspirations.

Then, of course, there is always *anxiety*. The term anxiety usually refers to observable reactions to stress. It is an unpleasant emotional state marked by worry, apprehension, and tension. When you are *anxious*, your autonomic nervous system becomes activated. Your heart beats faster, your pulse goes up, your hands tend to sweat. The amount of anxiety you experience will, in part, depend on the intensity of the stress-producing stimuli as perceived by you. How potentially harmful is the situation? How threatening? How dangerous?²

Actually, there are two types of anxiety. Anxiety as described in the last paragraph refers to *state* anxiety. State anxiety is an emotional reaction to a situation, and will vary from one situation to another. *Trait* anxiety is a personality characteristic, reflecting the noticeable differences among the frequencies and intensities of peoples' emotional reactions to stress. For example, it was shown that patients who had undergone major surgery showed less state anxiety after they had been told they were recovering well than

they did before the operation. Trait anxiety was not affected by the situation; it remained the same before and after surgery.³ People high in trait anxiety simply continue to respond in an anxious way even in situations which evoke little or no anxiety among people low in trait anxiety.⁴

Both types of anxiety are closely related to effective coping with life situations. People who are high in trait anxiety are prone to look at the world as a threatening and dangerous place, which is similar to the perception of many psychoneurotic individuals.⁵ State anxiety can turn into an acute *traumatic neurosis*, a temporary or permanent personality change due to some emotional shakeup (e.g., involvement in an accident or escape from one). This emotional shakeup is not necessarily the result of a one-time experience. It could very well be the accumulation of several less traumatic experiences. Psychologists suggest that most of us have or will experience some form of traumatic neurosis during our lifetimes.⁶

Much of what we know about traumatic neuroses comes from studies of American soldiers during World War II. Battlefields breed all sorts of trauma (psychological and/or physical damage). The condition experienced by these soldiers was battle fatigue or shell shock, which affected the men in different ways. There were those who wandered around the battlefield all day long not knowing quite where they were or what they were doing. Others went into fits of rage, attacking anything in sight. Still others went into panic and fled from the battle area. After this initial reaction to the stress, a variety of symptoms followed. The three types of symptoms observed most often were

1. Spells of uncontrollable emotion—usually anxiety but sometimes rage and depression
2. Sleep disturbance, including insomnia and terrifying dreams in which the traumatic event is relived
3. Blocking or partial loss of various personal skills, inability to concentrate and loss of other ego functions.⁷

The bulk of the evidence from other studies related to war situations indicates that severe anxiety reactions were observed in soldiers exposed to front-line combat, in pilots flying combat missions and in people whose relatives were killed in air raids.⁸ Some lasting effects of wartime stress are described in Figure 11-1. It is noteworthy that 70 percent of those who had anxiety reactions were still experiencing some symptoms 20 years later. Evidence from Korean War veterans also suggests that combat anxiety may interfere with activities later in life. Men who had experienced anxiety during combat were more often unemployed years after returning to civilian life.⁹




Figure 11.1 Lasting effects of wartime stress Twenty years after World War II, many veterans still suffer from stress. Notice especially the lasting symptoms of combat neurosis patients. Adapted from Archibald & Tuddenham 1965

One could argue that the type of person who experienced combat anxiety would have developed these problems anyway. This is entirely possible. But the fact that such problems were less frequent among noncombat psychiatric patients suggests that combat neuroses will endure and cause continued adjustment problems. A more important question is whether reactions to traumatic catastrophes such as earthquakes, fires, and automobile accidents are grossly different from reactions to battlefield traumas. The most common symptoms among survivors of such catastrophic events are nausea, diarrhea, short temper, and the inability to sleep and concentrate.¹⁰ Fortunately, these symptoms are usually short-lived, do not affect realistic responses to the disaster, and rarely lead to chronic states of severe mental disturbance.¹¹

Stress Kills!

Let us turn from battlefields and earthquakes to more common affairs of daily life. Johnny Jones wanted to do well on his final exams. He studied hard. He also worried a lot. On the day of the exams he felt reasonably ready. Then just as he was preparing to answer the first test question, he became engulfed in a wave of nausea. He could not concentrate. He sat frozen at his desk, but finally managed to leave the room. The test questions remained unanswered.

Was Johnny merely the victim of fate? Perhaps so. But we do know that our defenses against disease are not very efficient when we are under stress. We also know that many disorders are caused or aggravated by emotional upset. Among problems which have been linked to stress are tension headaches, warts, hives, stomach ulcers, high blood pressure, heart attacks, and a host of psychological disorders.

More than three centuries ago French philosopher Rene Descartes wrote about the connection between mind and body, being aware that one could affect the other. Since he was a religious man, Descartes thought of the mind as man's soul—his link to the divine. He postulated that the nonphysical mind made connection with the physical body through the pineal gland in the brain. Man could thus be viewed as being partly divine (through the soul) and partly a member of the animal world (through the body). Physiologists later showed that Descartes' theory about the pineal gland was quite wrong. Nevertheless, he was influential in getting people to consider ways in which the mind affects the body, and vice versa.

In a recent best-selling book *Type A Behavior and Your Heart*, the authors argued that certain individuals maintain a life-style into which stress is practically built in. Typical of such people is the hard-driving, competitive individual whose calendar shows something scheduled for every hour of the day. Over a period of ten years, the authors were able to predict with great accuracy the number of heart attacks these people would suffer. Slowing

down saved the lives of some. For others, however, stress was such an integral part of their life-style that staying away from the office produced even more stress than working.¹²

The most notorious product of stress is still the stomach ulcer. Considering its painful symptoms and potential dangers, it seems incredible that having an ulcer was once considered a badge of honor among business executives—a testimonial to their dedication to their work. Hopefully, such stupidity in value judgment is no longer around. Just consider what happens when you develop an ulcer.

Whenever you are under stress, your body is likely to produce excessive amounts of hydrochloric acid (HCl), which is normally used in the process of digesting foods by breaking it down into substances your body can use. In addition, HCl activates other digestive enzymes.

The worst combination for you is stress and the consumption of acid-producing items such as spicy foods and coffee. The resulting 'acid stomach' and heartburn cause considerable discomfort. When the acid gets out of control, there is insufficient mucus production to protect your stomach lining from small sores or lesions. When those occur, you have developed an ulcer.

Having an ulcer is not fun. You must avoid spicy foods, coffee, and other matters which irritate the lesions. Milk or antacids usually help to alleviate discomfort somewhat. But ulcers can be very dangerous—the lesions can erode a blood vessel, causing internal bleeding. Even worse, ulcers can get so bad that they gnaw a hole through the gastric wall of the stomach, allowing its contents to empty into the abdominal cavity. This is a very dangerous condition which can cause infection of other internal organs and eventually death.

Although stress is probably not the sole cause of ulcers (genetic factors may be involved—see p. 353), it is a potent factor in causing the disorder. Experiments have shown that ulcers can be produced in rats in as short a period as two weeks. The rats were deprived of food and water in order to make them hungry and thirsty. When food and water was made available, shocks were given each time a rat tried to eat or drink. Thus there was a conflict between the tendency to approach food and the tendency to avoid shock. Not only did the rats rapidly develop ulcers, many of them died of internal hemorrhaging within a few weeks.¹³

As a postscript to the topic of ulcers, you might be interested in the following observation. Franz Alexander, a proponent of psychoanalytic theory, believes that ulcers are caused by the conflict between the need for love and affection and the need to be strong, assertive, and independent. This is the reason, according to Alexander, that men have been more likely to develop ulcers than women. The liberation of women may change all that. It may create some of the same conflicts and pressures upon women that men have

experienced in the past (e.g. one study showed that the proportion of ulcers among men greatly increased during the stress-producing years of the depression years of the 1930s) ¹⁴ Thus with equal rights we may also attain equal ulcers ¹⁵

THE CAUSES OF STRESS

Psychological Goal Approach and Goal Avoidance

Listed below are four situations involving Jane a college student who has just finished the fall semester and is eager to leave town for a well earned spring vacation. Can you tell what is common to all four situations?

- 1 Jane likes to ski Jane likes to swim Jane has money in excess of her living expense budget to indulge in one of the sports
- 2 Jane likes to ski Jane's living-expense budget for the spring equals the cost of a skiing trip
- 3 Jane does not like to work Jane does not like to loaf around Jane has just enough money to cover her living expenses but cannot afford a vacation
- 4 Jane likes the company of young people Jane likes to see the world Jane has just enough money to cover her living expenses Jane is offered a free trip to the Grand Canyon with the College Mountaineer Club or a free trip to Rio de Janeiro on a cruise chartered by the Senior Citizens Club

In all four situations Jane must make a decision. If she chooses one alternative she may as well forget about the other. In the first situation Jane must make up her mind whether she wants to spend her vacation skiing or swimming. In the second situation she must decide whether it is worthwhile to blow her entire spring budget on one glorious vacation. In the third situation all she can do is choose between the lesser of two evils since she does not have the money to take a vacation. In the fourth situation she must decide on joining young people on an ordinary vacation or elderly people on an extraordinary vacation.

Sometimes such decisions are easy to make. Sometimes they are harder producing considerable uneasiness. The uneasiness is the psychological stress produced when there is a conflict between two or more goals. The four situations facing Jane illustrate four basic types of conflict.

Approach-Approach conflicts occur when you are faced with a choice between two desirable alternatives and you can only pick one. Even though you like both choices, you can still let these decisions torment you. Examples: when you have enough money to see only one movie and there are two good ones playing in town, when you must

decide what to order at a good restaurant, or when you are trying to decide where to go for a vacation

Approach-Avoidance conflicts occur when you desire an alternative but the choice may have consequences that you want to avoid

Examples When you want to let your dog run loose but the dog catcher is in the area when you want to buy something which will put you greatly in debt

Avoidance-Avoidance conflicts occur when you are forced to choose between the lesser of two evils Each alternative is undesirable

Examples when you are not science-minded and you must take either physics or chemistry as a graduation requirement, when the traffic judge tells you to pay a \$50 fine or go to driving school

Double Approach-Avoidance are the most complicated but also the most realistic type of conflicts They occur when you are caught between two alternatives each of which has some advantages and some disadvantages Example when you have been offered an interesting, high-paying summer job with a big company in Nome, Alaska or an ordinary-paying job at a hamburger joint in a resort area near your home town If you choose to take the job in Alaska, you will make more money, have more prestige and gather more unique work experience (approach) You will also be far away from your friends spend more money on food and lodging, and can expect a dull social life (avoidance) If you go to work for the hamburger place you will make little money, have little prestige and be bored a good part of the day (avoidance) At the same time your home is close enough to enjoy your friends, and the resort atmosphere has great potential for an exciting social life (approach)

During the 1940s psychologist Neal Miller at Yale University developed an impressive theory on how conflict affects behavior Miller's conflict theory rests on the following five basic premises assuming that the goal is both desired and feared

- 1 The nearer you get to a goal, the more likely you are to approach the goal The increased likelihood of approach is called the *gradient of approach*
- 2 The closer you get to something you want to avoid, the more likely you are to avoid it This is called the *gradient of avoidance*
- 3 When you get near a goal, the tendency to avoid increases faster than the tendency to approach
- 4 Your motivation to approach or avoid the goal will affect your overall approach or avoidance tendency

- 5 When there is a conflict between two response tendencies the stronger tendency will win out¹⁶

Miller's theory on conflict has received support from a variety of sources. One confirmation of the theory came from a unique animal study. Rats were kept hungry or shocked to varying degrees in order to establish different levels of motivation. Following these procedures the rats were made to pull harnesses toward either the location (goal) where they had previously been fed (approach), or where they had previously been shocked (avoidance). In both cases the closer a rat came to a goal the greater was the approach or avoidance tendency. The gradient of avoidance was greater than the gradient of approach. These and other outcomes fully supported Miller's predictions.¹⁷

In summary, conflict and frustration result when we are blocked from achieving a particular goal. Pressure is the force which pushes us toward the achievements of the goals. Sometimes the pressure is put upon us by external sources. Your boss wants you to try harder, your parents want you to make better grades, your wife wants you to make more money. Other pressures come from within. You want to get into medical school, you want to become rich, you want to make the football team. When the pressure is on we may try to work harder and produce more. In fact, a little pressure seems to improve performance. Too much pressure, however, can destroy all of our organized behavior (see Figure 11-2).¹⁸ It is obvious that pressure has the potential to aggravate the stressful effect of conflict and aggravation. In short, if you are blocked from a goal for which you are under high pressure—watch out!

Environmental Future Shock and Assorted Pollutants

Society is changing and changing fast. We are a society on the go—much more so than in any other period in history. Throwaway containers save the time spent on washing dishes, car radios give the news while we are traveling between activities, and jet planes deliver us in a few hours to places which formerly required months of travel. While we are bouncing around from one place to the next we can drive through the bank, the hamburger place, and in some cities even through the mortuary. There has been an increase in mobile homes and portable buildings. People used to want to settle in one place forever; now it is not uncommon to have several homes in different locations, such as a cabin in the mountains and an apartment on the beach. Some people live in one place and work in another. One Wall Street executive lives in Columbus, Ohio, and travels between his home and New York each week. A retired Stanford University professor leaves his California home each Monday to travel to Ohio State University. He teaches a class there and returns home the next day. Love is also an inspiration for




Figure 11 2 A little stress is best The hypothetical relationship between stress and performance of a learned task Performance is best at moderate levels of stress

travel A romance was reported in which the man lived in San Francisco and the woman lived in Honolulu Each weekend one or the other would board a jet plane to cross the 2000 miles of water so they could be together again ¹⁹ In short, our world is becoming one in which time means everything and distance means nothing

What effect do all these changes have? According to journalist Alvin Toffler, they cause a psychological state called "future shock " Future shock is caused by the inability to adapt to the rapid rate of change in the pace of life As Toffler puts it

Future shock will not be found in Index Medicus or in any listing of psychological abnormalities Yet, unless intelligent steps are taken to combat it, millions of human beings will find themselves increasingly disoriented progressively incompetent to deal rationally with their environments The malaise, mass neurosis, irrationality, and free-floating violence already apparent in contemporary life are merely a foretaste

of what may lie ahead unless we come to understand and treat this disease ²⁰

Toffler explains that the changing world makes reality seem like a kaleidoscope run wild. The resulting future shock is manifested in many symptoms. Some 12-year-old children act like adults and some 50-year-old adults act like 12-year-olds. Simple pleasures are no longer exciting. They are being replaced with cocaine, Zen, porn movies, tranquilizers, Playboy Clubs, pop art. Future shock has been proposed as the cause of fractured families, psychological confusion, wife swapping and flipping out. It has created business for hard-drug dealers, psychotherapists, and those who sell unique experiences. The long and the short of it is that the change in the pace of life is a stress that can be expected to get increasingly worse in the future.

Let us personalize the concept of life change for you. Take a look at Table 11-1. Go down the list of life change events and put a check mark beside each event that happened to you during the last six months. For each of these events look up the corresponding Life Change Units (LCU) in the right-hand column. Now add up these scores.

How high is your score? The higher your score the greater the likelihood that you will become ill. If your life change score is between 0 and 100 you would, on the average, probably report around 1.4 illnesses during the last six months. If your score is higher, say 300 to 400, you would probably report more illnesses (around 1.9 on the average). Perhaps there have been a lot of life changes for you during the last six months and your score is between 500 and 600. In this case you would be likely to experience even more illness (an average of 2.1). These predictions have been taken from the actual findings of investigators studying the effects of life change. These investigators demonstrated that people who have had many life changes packed into a short period of time are more likely to develop symptoms of physical illness and stress than those who have experienced fewer life changes.²¹

In order to get the values listed in Table 11-1 under the heading LCU, social values had to be measured. It is easy to see that all of the events listed in the table represent life changes. But obviously each life change event cannot be counted as having the same effect. Getting a traffic ticket cannot be considered as disrupting as getting a divorce. To determine how much weight each of the events had, the investigators had people of different social backgrounds rate the degree of turmoil, upheaval, and social readjustment each of the events would require of a person. Each event was rated in comparison to the life change of getting married, which was arbitrarily assigned the score of 50. For example, people were asked to give a number to the

TABLE 11.1 VALUES OF LIFE CHANGE EVENTS ^a

	LCU values
FAMILY	
Death of spouse	100
Divorce	73
Marital separation	65
Death of close family member	63
Marriage	50
Marital reconciliation	45
Major change in health of family	44
Pregnancy	40
Addition of new family member	39
Major change in arguments with wife	35
Son or daughter leaving home	29
In-law troubles	29
Wife starting or ending work	26
Major change in family get togethers	15
PERSONAL	
Detention in jail	63
Major personal injury or illness	53
Sexual difficulties	39
Death of a close friend	37
Outstanding personal achievement	28
Start or end of formal schooling	26
Major change in living conditions	25
Major revision of personal habits	24
Changing to a new school	20
Change in residence	20
Major change in recreation	19
Major change in church activities	19
Major change in sleeping habits	16
Major change in eating habits	15
Vacation	13
Christmas	12
Minor violations of the law	11
WORK	
Being fired from work	47
Retirement from work	45
Major business adjustment	39
Changing to different line of work	36
Major change in work responsibilities	29
Trouble with boss	23
Major change in working conditions	20

TABLE 11 1 (Continued)

FINANCIAL	
Major change in financial state	38
Mortgage or loan over \$10 000	31
Mortgage foreclosure	30
Mortgage or loan less than \$10 000	17

Scoring directions Mark the changes which may have happened in your life within the last six months. Add up the Life Change Unit (LCU) values associated with each of the events you have checked. People who experience the most life changes also experience the most illness (see text).
From Rahe 1972

readjustment needed by the death of a spouse (if the amount of readjustment necessitated by marriage is 50). Remarkably there was little disagreement about these values among raters differing in age, sex, marital status, education, social class, race and creed. In addition there was substantial agreement among people from different cultures. Swedes, Danes, Japanese, and Americans appear to regard the impact of life changes in similar ways. Once the scoring system had been developed it was possible to create life stress scores and to compare these scores to types and amounts of illnesses contracted.²²

In one study conducted with U.S. Navy personnel, life stress scores were obtained for entire crews before their vessels were sent out to sea. After six months the sailors and their health records were examined. It was observed that sailors who were in the top 10 percent in life change scores were twice as likely to become ill as sailors in the bottom 10 percent. Life crises may have weakened the bodies of those sailors and made them easier targets for disease.

One of the most interesting aspects of the life change studies is that positive as well as negative life changes are considered to be potentially hazardous. We have all heard that people can die of broken hearts. This research shows that too many positive changes (getting married, outstanding personal achievement, starting a new job, etc.) may add up to produce the same effect.

Recently some of the work on life change and onset of illness has come under attack for methodological reasons.²³ Nevertheless it is an exciting and interesting line of research which can at any point become focal to people's well-being.

Another stress-producing aspect of modern society is increased urbanization. Living in the city means living with noise. The 87 million cars and

nearly 20 million trucks in America are all equipped with loud engines and ear piercing horns. Motorcycles (2.6 million of them) are pound for pound the highest noise pollutants. Airplanes at takeoff produce a sound level of 105 decibels at a distance of 1000 feet. We are also confronted with the loud sounds of construction (a jackhammer produces 98 decibels at 50 feet), the sounds of garbage trucks, dog barks, and human voices. Even within our own homes we are confronted with the sounds of vacuum cleaners, food blenders, and garbage disposals (all producing between 60 and 94 decibels at 3 feet).²⁴

Psychologists David Glass and Jerome Singer have made extensive studies on the effects of noise upon the human psyche. They concluded that urban sounds are arousing, annoying, and stress-producing. Too much noise can affect your performance on the job, shake up your emotions, and cause physiological disturbances.

For many of their experiments Glass and Singer created a simulation of a 108-decibel sound by tape recording some common noises superimposed upon each other, such as a typewriter, a desk calculator, a mimeograph machine, and several people talking in foreign languages. Subjects were seated in front of a panel of lights and buttons. For some of the subjects the noise was presented in bursts occurring at predictable times and durations. Other subjects experienced interruptions of unpredictable duration on a random time schedule. To determine the effects of exposure to noise, Glass and Singer took a variety of physiological measures, including electrical conductivity of the skin, muscle tension, and the constriction of blood vessels in the finger. All of these measures are commonly used as indicators of stress.

The results of the study were somewhat perplexing. Initial noise exposure clearly produced stress, as indicated by the physiological changes in the responding subjects. Upon repeated presentation, however, stress responses diminished until they reached a point where there was no difference between being exposed to noise and not experiencing noise at all. It also made no difference whether noise exposure was on schedule or unpredictable, or whether the subjects thought they could control the noise.²⁵

If all this causes you to rush to your stereo set for some blasts of loud rock music without fear of consequences—beware! While it is true that Glass and Singer demonstrated the remarkable ability of people to adapt to noise, their findings about the *aftereffects* of exposure to noise spell out an altogether different message. They discovered a great number of detrimental consequences for those who had been exposed to noise, such as an inability to concentrate or tolerate frustration. And as far as your stereo set goes, there is evidence about the detrimental aftereffects of loud sounds.²⁶

In fact overindulgence in loud music can lead to temporary, and sometimes permanent hearing loss ²⁷

On the social side Glass and Singer found that noise especially when unexpected uncontrollable and perceived as irritating tended to decrease altruistic behavior Other investigators have shown that angry people are less able to deal with complex noises and that increased noise level can actually heighten aggressive behavior ²⁸

In conclusion here are some proposed explanations for the adverse effects of urban noise

- 1 Noise may disrupt ongoing thought Such disruptions could be frustrating because they block the attainment of a goal Frustration of course is a major cause of stress
- 2 Noise can disrupt a pleasant conversation When the noise level goes up, we have to either shout at one another or come so close as to feel uncomfortable
- 3 Noise interferes with sleep Most people's experiences tell us that sleep deprivation can lead to grouchiness and irritability Experiments have shown that people deprived of (complete) sleep begin to hallucinate within five days ²⁹
- 4 Noise is just plain annoying When we feel subjectively annoyed the negative effect will generalize to other thoughts and feelings ³⁰

Besides noise heat is another pollutant related to the stressful effects of urban living It is in the heat of the summer when riots are supposed to happen tempers expected to flare and people expected to lose their cool Journalists have speculated for years that intracity troubles are most likely to occur during the 'long hot summer' periods But if such city riots are primarily due to poor social and economic conditions of a population segment why this concern with summer months? The depressed conditions after all exist all year round

Research by psychologists tends to confirm the journalistic speculations A study was conducted comparing temperatures on days on which there had been riots to temperatures on the days before and after the riots occurred Also compared were the normal daily baseline temperatures from years in which there had been no riots The results of this study are listed in Figure 11-3 As can readily be seen temperatures on the days of the riots were much higher than on the preceding or following days Riot days were also warmer than their calendar equivalents in preceding years

These findings do not necessarily indicate that heat causes riots There are at least two explanations for the relationship between rioting and temperature One explanation suggests that high temperatures aggravate existing




Figure 11-3 Riots and the heat of the summer Riots are more likely to occur on hot days The dashed line shows average daily temperature on the 12 days before and 6 days after riots which occurred in 17 American cities during the summer of 1967 The solid line shows the average daily temperatures for the same calendar days during non-riot years From Goranson & King, 1970

conditions Added to the ongoing frustrations of ghetto life, heat just caused the pot to boil over The other explanation is that the heat caused people to get out of their homes into the streets The excess of people in the streets provided an available mob to get involved in even minor disorders³¹

The apparent relationship between heat and rioting suggests that heat can be a strong psychological stress agent This, in turn, brought social psychologists into the laboratory for a closer look at the heat-aggression relationship

In his first experiment psychologist Robert Baron placed angered or nonangered subjects into either a hot (80° F) or a cool (69° F) room Each room contained an aggression machine (see Chapter 4) When Baron asked the subjects to operate the aggression machine, he found just the opposite of what he had expected Subjects in the cool environment gave shocks of greater intensity than subjects in the hot environment One possible explana-

tion was that the subjects in the hot room were so uncomfortable that they did not want to concentrate on the game³²

Thinking over his results and looking back at the riot situation, Baron reasoned that hot temperatures alone may not cause aggression but that heat may make people more susceptible to the influences of a model. In his second experiment the subjects were either exposed or not exposed to an aggressive model (see Chapter 4), and then allowed to use the aggression machine. The results showed that hot temperatures decreased aggression when there was no model but increased aggression when there was a model. These findings allow for certain speculations about the relationship between heat and riots. Hot temperatures may drive people into the streets where they are more susceptible to the influences of rioting models³³

Physical Genetic Makeup

There is little doubt that psychological factors such as conflict and environmental factors such as life event changes are closely related to stress and its detrimental effects. It was pointed out earlier in this chapter that there is no way of knowing whether the soldiers who experienced combat neuroses and the business executives who developed ulcers would not have had these experiences regardless of the circumstances facing them. It is a fact that when two people are exposed to the same amount of stress one may develop psychological and physiological symptoms from it and the other may not. Clearly there could be something in people's genetic makeup to account for such findings.

The development of ulcers is a case in point. Often a person will develop an ulcer under conditions that another person can cope with rather easily. In the case of peptic stomach ulcers the genetic factors might be the amount of pepsinogen secreted into the stomach. Pepsinogen is secreted by the peptic cells of the gastric glands in the stomach and converted into an enzyme called pepsin. Pepsin aids in the digestion of proteins and, in combination with hydrochloric acid (HCl) is the most active component of gastric juice. When you have an 'acid stomach,' it is partly because your level of pepsinogen is high.

We know that people differ in their pepsinogen levels from birth onward. One researcher has shown that there are marked differences between infants' pepsinogen levels as measured by chemicals found in the umbilical cord. The newborns with the highest levels of pepsinogen tended to be from families in which many members had ulcers³⁴.

A predisposition for high pepsinogen level alone will not cause ulcers. The high level may, however, make you more susceptible to ulcers. This was demonstrated in a study of 2073 newly inducted members of the armed

services. All of the men were tested for pepsinogen levels. Two smaller groups were formed for intensive follow up: a group of 63 men with the highest levels, and a group of 57 with the lowest levels. None of these men had ulcers prior to their basic training. At the end of 16 weeks of basic training, 9 men in the intensive follow-up groups had developed ulcers. All of these men had originally had high pepsinogen levels. This study demonstrated that the combination of stress and a genetic predisposition to secrete large amounts of pepsinogen will produce ulcers³⁵. Most probably, people with genetic predispositions toward ulcers secrete more gastric juices during times of stress, and the acids in the juices produce the lesions.

COPING WITH STRESS

What is the *best* way to deal with psychological stress? No one seems to know the answer. It is easier to describe the nature and causes of stress than to tell people what to do about it. We do know, however, that people under stress have several options open to them. They can do something about it, they can do nothing about it, or they can enlist someone else to do something about it. In this section we shall examine some of the techniques for coping with stress derived from these options. We are not going to advocate one technique over another, we shall merely describe them in light of the existing experimental evidence. You can then make your own choice accordingly.

As for the first option, which suggests that people mobilize their own resources to combat stress, there is an almost automatic tendency to think in terms of the traditional *defense mechanisms*. Chief among such mechanisms are

Rationalization—seeking relief by blaming the predicament on other people or circumstances (e.g., not being invited to a dance, you say, 'I would not have gone anyway because I don't like some of the crowd.')

Projection—seeking relief by attributing undesirable characteristics to others (e.g., not wanting to think of yourself as stingy, you attribute an exaggerated amount of stinginess to others)

Reaction-formation—seeking relief by concealing undesirable motives through opposite behavior (e.g., really hating your child, you smother it with excessive kindness)

Repression—seeking relief by denial of predicament (e.g., having just witnessed a traumatic event, you promptly forget it)

Sublimation—seeking relief from social condemnation by engaging in socially acceptable behavior (e.g., not being able to gratify your sexual impulses, you write poems or start painting)

The above defense mechanisms and others like them are largely governed by *unconscious* processes. This is consistent with the psychoanalytic orientation of their originators Sigmund Freud and his disciples. If you want to know more about this topic we suggest that you consult any traditional textbook in introductory or abnormal psychology.

When we talk about people's option to do something about their stress situation, we have in mind something other than Freud's defense mechanisms. The usefulness of those defense mechanisms is too short lived to effectively combat prolonged stress. Moreover, they are likely to be put to excessive use. The resulting situations, with their heavy clinical overtones, more often than not provide proof of failure to cope with stress. We are therefore, going to add another dimension. The situations to be described will be more typical of daily activities, and the coping processes will involve people's *conscious* attempts to control stress.

The two remaining options (to be discussed later in the chapter) simply boil down to doing nothing about the stressful situation, which is tantamount to letting nature take its course, or letting others do something about it, which involves some sort of direct manipulation (e.g., behavior modification, biofeedback).

Coping by Thinking: Know It, Forget It, or Daydream It Away

When you realize that you are under stress, you may be tempted not to think about the situation. "Forget all your troubles" is advice frequently given to those who suffer. Is it really possible to deliberately engage in controlled forgetting and thus find relief from stress?

Twenty five years ago the psychologist team of John Dollard and Neal Miller suggested that *avoidant thinking* was a way to cope with stress. People can avoid stress, they suggested, by turning their attention away from the stress-causing situations and by thinking about other things.³⁶ More recently several studies have lent initial support to the notion that avoidant thinking may be a useful coping strategy. In one such demonstration subjects were told that they would receive electric shocks. They were not told, however, when they would receive the shocks or how often they would get them. The subjects' self-reports about coping strategies indicated that the use of avoidant thinking was associated with less psychophysiological activity and distress than was paying attention to the threatening situation.³⁷

Unfortunately, there is also evidence to the contrary. In one experiment subjects were informed that they would receive a shock at some time within a 6-minute period. Once again they were not told when within the period they would receive the shock. The uncertainty, as expected, was stress-producing. The subjects were then given an opportunity to either engage in an avoidant-thinking activity (listening to music) or to attend to the threat (listening for a

tone which was emitted 5 seconds before each shock was presented) The results indicated that those who chose to avoid thinking about the shock showed the greatest amount of psychophysiological activity and distress³⁸

Since the findings of those experiments had been contradictory, psychologists Kent Houston and David Holmes decided to devote more study to the issue They were aware that the earlier studies had been correlational in nature, with the question of causation remaining largely unanswered That is it was not quite clear whether avoidant thinking caused psychophysiological distress or if psychophysiological distress caused avoidant thinking

To clarify the causal relationship Houston and Holmes began with the hypothesis that avoidant thinking is an effective coping mechanism Subjects were told that they would either receive or not receive electric shocks at some time during the experiment For half of the subjects distraction was created by having them read an interesting story while they were waiting for the experiment to get under way Reading the stories it was presumed, would cause avoidant thinking The other half of the subjects did not read the distracting material Among the subjects who thought they were to receive the shocks, psychophysiological reactions were highest for those who had read the distracting story These findings were just the opposite of what was expected After further analysis Houston and Holmes discovered that those who were not given the distracting reading material used the time to reappraise the seriousness of the threat Upon reappraisal, their stress level went down Subjects who had engaged in avoidant thinking did not have the opportunity for reappraisal and, therefore their stress level remained high In any event, it became clear that avoidant thinking seemed to increase, rather than decrease stress reactions³⁹

If, as the evidence seems to indicate avoidant thinking is not very effective for coping with stress, what about meeting the threat head on? In other words rather than avoiding information about the stress-producing situation how about gathering *more* information about it? Medical and dental examinations are cases in point How many times have you gone in for those examinations almost scared out of your wits? Your fears need not even be groundless It is quite possible that in at least some cases you would be subjected to painful experiences, such as being jabbed by a needle or cut by an instrument How then would you react if you were told in advance the gory details of the forthcoming experience? 'I don't even want to hear about it' is a common response The evidence suggests that you should listen—information is one of the best treatments for stress

Psychologist Jean Johnson has probed deeply into mechanisms for coping with pain and distressing experiences Her belief is that fear comes about as the result of inaccurate expectations about the sensations we experience In one experiment she exposed two groups of subjects to blood pres-

sure tests. She told one group that the cuff used in the blood pressure tests would cause pressure, tingling of the hand, aching, and blueness—which in fact, it does. These people were given accurate information. The other group was told how the cuff would be placed on and inflated, but was not told exactly what sensations to expect. Those who knew what sensations to expect gave significantly lower ratings when asked to indicate how distressful the situation had been.⁴⁰ In a similar experiment it was shown that subjects were less distressed by an electric shock if they had accurate expectations of what the shock would feel like.⁴¹

One detailed study examined reactions to an endoscopic medical examination. The endoscopic examination is a noxious and distressing procedure in which a tube is sent down the throat in order to allow visual and photographic inspection of the upper gastrointestinal tract. If you were to go in for this test your throat would be swabbed with an anesthetic, followed by an injection directly into a vein, then a tube would be sent down your throat, and you would be asked to hold the tube there for 15 or 20 minutes. Under any circumstances, it would not be much fun. In a study on reactions to endoscopic examinations, Jean Johnson and Howard Leventhal prepared 48 hospitalized patients for the procedure by giving them either one of two types of preparatory instructions: both types of instructions, or no instructions at all. One type of instruction described the specific set of sensations that would be experienced: what would be seen, heard, felt, and tasted. The other instructions told the subjects what they would have to do during the examination: that the chin should be kept down, and that swallowing motions should be made. These were called danger control instructions.

The results of the experiment showed that the instructions giving a description of the expected sensations reduced scores on selected measures of emotional stress. The danger control instructions were only successful when they were used in combination with the sensory description instructions.⁴² These findings show how simple and accurate information can increase coping with potentially stressful situations.

Another benefit of information, also in a medical setting, has been described by psychologists David Vernon and Douglas Bigelow. These investigators tested the effect of giving accurate information about a hernia-repair operation to 80 men who were about to enter such surgery. They found that those given the information (1) were more able to concentrate on the specific problems involved in the operation, (2) had greater confidence in the physician, and (3) were less likely to have fits of anger after the operation. However, the instructions did not immunize the men against fear and worry.⁴³

Since it is difficult to forget troubles, and since additional information about potentially stressful situations is not always available, how about day-

dreaming your troubles away? Surely you remember the story of Walter Mitty. Plain Walter it seemed lived in a fantasy world of heroic achievements. Perhaps the reason that the Walter Mitty story has always been so popular is that there is a little Walter Mitty in each of us. Almost everyone occasionally drifts into the world of make-believe. Reports show that people daydream a little every day with an upsurge of daydreams at bedtime. The topics of the fantasies vary considerably. Women tend to daydream more about personal matters and body-centered experiences; men are more likely to drift off into the world of heroic achievement and athletic accomplishment.

Not all of us experience the same type of daydream, however. Psychologist Jerome Singer has identified three types of daydreams and daydreamers. The first category consists of flighty daydreamers who spend a lot of time in fantasy but are unaware of the content of their daydreams. This pattern is characterized as mindwandering, which frequently is marked by fear. The second pattern is associated with the unpleasant psychological states of guilt, anxiety about failure, and self-torment. Also included in this daydream category are inclinations toward aggression and hostility. People characterized by this pattern are inclined toward self-doubt, anxiety, hysteria, or obsession.

The category of interest to us involves the third pattern, which might be called happy daydreaming. The happy daydreamer has a positive orientation in his daydreaming pattern. The content of his daydreams often involves a curiosity about relationships with others. The fantasies contain vivid imagery and may be used for purposeful future planning. Thus the happy daydreamer uses fantasy in a constructive way to entertain himself and to prepare for future events. These people are less likely to be troubled by emotional problems.⁴⁴

It seems that happy daydreaming is an effective way to cope with stress. Those who daydream a lot (high daydreamers) have fewer nervous breakdowns than those who daydream very little (low daydreamers).⁴⁵ It has been suggested that high daydreamers can use fantasy to escape boredom, conflict, pressure, and frustration. This is particularly important when there are long periods of time which must be spent alone. High daydreamers can use fantasy to create a time bridge. Low daydreamers are much more likely to crack under the stress of loneliness. Some evidence provided by former prisoners of war suggests that those with the greatest capacity for fantasy were those most likely to escape psychological injury.⁴⁶ It has also been shown that one of the most effective treatments for anger is to get people to engage in neutral, nonaggressive, or distractive fantasy.⁴⁷

Most psychotherapeutic methods, in fact, require their patients to use some mental imagery. Freud used the association method to get at the roots of fantasy. Behavior modification methods such as systematic desensitization (see Chapter 9) require people to create imagery while they are being de-

conditioned. Other methods such as Gestalt therapy and insight therapy, are largely techniques for increasing patients' sensitivity to their inner feelings and thoughts. Everything seems to point to the fact that successful fantasy is equal to successful coping.⁴⁸

Before we leave the topic of fantasy, let us look at the origins of daydreaming. Although there is very little data on fantasy and make-believe in children, it does appear that children engage in make-believe play by the time they are three or four years old. Even with nursery-school age children, daydreaming has been shown to be related to coping. Nursery school children who claim to daydream a lot have been found to demonstrate positive emotionality, while children for whom fantasy is rare are more inclined toward overt aggression.⁴⁹ Children who are high daydreamers have also been shown to be more likely to engage in interesting play with an ambiguous toy.⁵⁰

Since fantasy is such a good coping device, it would be worth our while to discover how we can help people develop positive daydreaming capacities. Recent research has shown that certain make-believe exercises can stimulate the development of fantasy. In one study, New York City ghetto children who had been given a series of make-believe exercises showed marked improvement in their imaginativeness and enjoyment of play. No such improvement was noticeable among youngsters who had received attention from their teacher but had not engaged in the fantasy exercises.⁵¹

How to start with your own child? We do have some notion of what breeds a good fantasy life. First, fantasy is most likely to develop if the child is stimulated. It occurs most often in families where parents tell stories to their children and where the children have access to stimulating materials (books, pictures, ambiguous toys, etc.). Secondly, fantasy seems to develop more efficiently in children who are first stimulated and then allowed to go off somewhere by themselves (such as a private bedroom) to ponder what they have seen or heard.⁵²

Coping by Feeling: Nurse It and Then Release It

So far, our discussion of the mobilization of individual resources to combat stress has dealt primarily with thinking, knowing, and fantasy. Some psychologists think that such cognitive processes are desirable, but insufficient for the development of effective coping techniques. Sometimes known as humanists, phenomenologists, or existentialists, these psychologists believe in the general philosophy of *humanistic psychology*.

Humanistic psychologists contend that people have trouble coping with stress because they are not in touch with their inner beings and feelings. In humanistic psychology, the history and causes of psychological stress are considered to be of relatively little importance. Stress is accepted as a fact of life. It is seen as a strong and dynamic force which is continually growing.

striving, and changing. At the same time, stress can be detrimental to the growth of individual potential because it holds the latter in check. Humanistic psychologists suggest that successful coping is the result of uncaging the self toward the actualization of human potential. As far as stress is concerned, they suggest that you accept it, know it, feel it, nurse it, and then release it so that you can rise freely to the level which will bring you self-fulfillment and ultimate happiness.

What is self-fulfillment and ultimate happiness? You must discover this for yourself. Just remember that the entire thrust of humanistic psychology is toward feelings and self-exploration. It is very difficult to verbalize this philosophy since its major requirement is that you *experience* it. No matter where you live, there must be some growth center or encounter group nearby. By joining them, you will get the experience that humanistic psychology regards as its cornerstone. You may find, as you engage in frank discussions and open expressions of feelings, that stress will gradually be displaced by heightened sensitivity toward self and others (for the drawbacks and potential dangers of this experience, see pp. 39, 196). Within our limited space, the best we can do is to briefly mention some of the most influential thinkers in the field of humanistic psychology.

Abraham Maslow, a well-known humanist, has emphasized the need for self-actualization. He outlined a hierarchy of basic human needs, arranged from the most potent to the least potent, as follows:

- The physiological needs (hunger and thirst)
- The safety needs (security)
- The love and belongingness needs (security and affection)
- The esteem needs (affection and regard)

Once these basic needs are fulfilled, we can attend to needs beyond the basic ones—the self-actualization needs (self-fulfillment). In order for self-actualization to occur, we must also successfully cope with stress. This can be done by achieving ‘peak experiences’ marked by spontaneity, creativity, and integrative functioning. One way to achieve such peak experiences, according to Maslow, is through the study of the lives of great (self-actualized) persons such as Beethoven, Einstein, or Eleanor Roosevelt.⁵³

Carl Rogers, the founder of nondirective psychotherapy, believes that people are basically good and strong. Occasionally, though, stresses build up which prevent them from realizing their potential. To cope with these stresses, Rogers believes, people must get in touch with their own feelings. The psychotherapist helps by providing the clients with a warm climate of unconditional positive regard, never telling them what to do, merely reflecting their statements back to them. In this warm setting, the clients eventually

come to know their inner selves and pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. Stress will diminish and the external world will be seen as less threatening.⁵⁴

Rollo May is perhaps the most popular of the existential humanists. He contends that the 'dressings' of society such as weddings, confirmations, bar mitzvahs, and so on, are rituals which no longer serve the function of introducing youth into the adult world. These outdated rituals are stresses of life and create a lonely, meaningless vacuum for young people. To combat these problems, May suggests that people must develop a coping strategy that includes the ability to love and to exercise free will.⁵⁵

Coping by Controlling Zen to Biofeedback

In trying to cope with stress you may wish to enlist others for help. This does not necessarily mean that you intend to remain totally passive. All it means is that if you wish to control stress, it is easier to achieve this goal by submitting yourself to an expert who knows just what to manipulate and when to control. Behavior modification is among the few proven techniques for helping people to cope with stress. Since these techniques were discussed in Chapter 9, we shall not refer to them again here. Instead, let us acquaint you with some experts who can teach you how to exercise control over your own body.

Did you ever experience the tightness of a stiff neck? Were you ever anxious enough to experience butterflies in your stomach? When these things happened you probably knew quite accurately what was causing the discomfort. But it was very hard to do something about it. Unless, of course, you could control your body.

The Zen masters in Asia have for centuries known how to control aspects of their musculature through meditation and exercise. People in western cultures have had little success with controlling their reactions. Nowadays, however, psychologists can teach you to achieve such controls. The technique which involves a minimum of training is called *biofeedback*.

If you were going for biofeedback training you would have yourself hooked up to an apparatus such as the one in Figure 11-4. Electrodes, used to monitor electrical activity in your brain which are part of an apparatus called an electroencephalograph, would be attached to your scalp. The brain waves picked up by this machine are converted into tones which you can hear through a pair of earphones. Thus, you have continuous feedback about the electrical activity in your brain.

During different phases of mental activity your brain sends out distinctly different waves. One type of wave is called the alpha wave, or the alpha rhythm (some of the different types of waves are shown in Figure 11-5). The alpha wave is associated with psychological states in which the person is awake but is so relaxed as to not respond to any external form of stimulation.



Figure 11 4 Try electric zen! An example of biofeedback. Electrodes are attached to the forehead and the EEG (or brain waves) are monitored on a polygraph machine. When an alpha state is achieved, the machine converts the brain waves into a tone.

In biofeedback you simply learn to produce a rhythm which comes close to the alpha wave (your teacher will use a technique similar to operant conditioning).

Besides its effectiveness as a successful controller of stress,⁵⁶ biofeedback has been shown to be a useful treatment for tension headaches⁵⁷ and certain cardiac conditions.⁵⁸ There are even indications that biofeedback may be effective for treating such chronic conditions as high blood pressure⁵⁹ and epilepsy.⁶⁰

For deep-rooted psychological problems the combination of biofeedback and insight psychotherapy seems to be most effective. A case history illustrates how these two procedures might be combined. The case involved a 29-year-old unmarried engineer. Because of reported stress and tension, the man was unable to sleep. He had been in psychotherapy for three years and




Figure 11 5 Brain waves EEG tracings are shown for different states of consciousness. The tracings are not drawn to scale in this drawing as can be seen from the 50-microvolt measurement to the right of each tracing. From Jasper 1941

had gone to at least three different therapists. None of the therapists had been successful in relieving the burden of his tensions. Before the man was referred for biofeedback treatment, his therapist had told him to 'try it a few times, and if it doesn't work—forget it.'

A few months after he started biofeedback, the man had learned to relax his muscles. The problem, however, was that he was still unable to sleep. He reported that at bedtime he could make his body relax, but that his mind would race way ahead of him. It was then that he realized what had caused the fear he had been experiencing. A psychotherapist helped him recognize a strange but powerful fear of his father. When the man had been a boy, his father had repeatedly threatened him with ominous future encounters. His fears thus aroused, the man used to lie awake at night and be watchful. The combination of biofeedback to make the man relax his muscles and insight therapy to help him recognize the source of his anxiety was successful in eliminating the problem.⁶¹

Coping by Adapting Nature's Own Way

We arrive now at the last approach to coping with stress: the do nothing option. This is really a misnomer, because it suggests that nothing happens

In fact, plenty does—only it is an automatic process involving biological and physiological functions well beyond your cognitive control

Hans Selye has been a pioneer in the field of stress research. An endocrinologist and physician, Selye published his views nearly two decades ago in a book called *The Stress of Life* which has remained a classic to this day. In it Selye proposed that we adapt to stress by manifesting a set of reactions labeled the *General Adaptation Syndrome* (G A S). The sources of stress may vary according to Selye—they could be too many life changes, too much frustration, too much heat, or anything else—but the reaction will vary little. The G A S is specific and its reactions are essentially always of the same pattern.

Let us look at the characteristics of the G A S through its three well-defined stages: alarm, resistance, and exhaustion. This sequence describes the manner in which your body adapts to stress. Before we describe the phases, however, it will be necessary to give you some information about the major mechanisms of adaptation.

Selye is an endocrinologist and therefore, is most interested in the operations of glands which secrete hormones into the blood stream. For coping with stress, one hormone is very important. This is the adrenocorticotropic hormone, better known as ACTH. The release of ACTH by the pituitary gland stimulates the adrenal cortex, which in turn releases two hormones. One of these hormones produces inflammation of tissue and the other leads to reduction of inflammation. Inflammation can occur anywhere in the body, it is a natural process which functions to check an attacking agent and prevents it from spreading to other parts of the body.

During the *alarm* phase of the G A S, a considerable amount of ACTH is released into the bloodstream. Large portions of the body are affected, but no specific organ is as yet involved.

The second phase is *resistance*. During this stage ACTH secretion drops a little below normal. Only those organs and systems which are most appropriate to cope with a particular stress agent become activated. As a result, resistance to a particular disease may go up during this phase. At the same time, however, the resistance to disease in general tends to decrease.

The last phase is *exhaustion*. This phase occurs when the organ system which is handling the stress gets tired and breaks down. ACTH secretion occurs while the specific organs are relieved of their workload. Nonspecific body areas take over once again, as in the original alarm phase.

In case you are wondering how all this ties in with psychological stress, it is because psychological stress manifests so many similarities to biological stress. The G A S has been observed in rats that had their legs tied or had been exposed to variations in temperature. The autopsies of the animals

which had experienced these stressful conditions showed enlarged adrenal glands and bleeding ulcers in the stomach linings and intestinal tracts

Selye is convinced that many disorders which are attributed to psychological stress occur because of exhaustion of the G A S mechanism. He contends that high blood pressure, allergic reactions, ulcers, sexual malfunctioning, and various mental disorders are associated with general nonadaptation to stress. Since G A S reactions are specific and predictable, it should be possible to deal more effectively with the stress-producing situations.⁶²

But what happens if the original stress-producing situations are not easily identifiable? This is particularly true in medicine, which accounts for the fact that the G A S was for many years largely ignored as a diagnostic tool by physicians. If, as Selye contends, all stresses produce essentially the same reaction, no clues are provided about the specific irritating agent. Selye's model has also been criticized for its lack of a description of specific reactions to social psychological events.⁶³ Nevertheless, Selye's theory has revolutionized many aspects of medical practice and reflects one of the best attempts to integrate the disciplines of psychology, physiology, biochemistry, and medicine.

WHEN COPING FAILS

There are certain strategies for coping with stress which are effective when used in moderation, but which can turn into stress-producing agents if overused. In the next sections we will look at the overuse of alcohol and the abuse of drugs. It is important to note that these discussions will not pertain to people who occasionally drink or smoke marijuana as a means of relaxing. To the contrary, there is at least some evidence suggesting that occasional usage of these substances may be beneficial.⁶⁴ The discussions will relate to people for whom drug or alcohol use have caused severe problems of adaptation.

Alcoholism

Alcoholic beverage consumption has been a part of the human experience for as long as the record of history extends. Archaeologists have found evidence of the use of wine and beer in records of the oldest civilizations. Speculation has it that prehistoric man accidentally left fruits and berries sitting around. In combination with a warm atmosphere and the action of airborne yeasts, the juices from the fruits and berries fermented into a crude wine. Our ancestors who accidentally discovered this beverage must have noticed that it had more interesting effects than ordinary liquids. Even in early societies primitive ways were devised to convert the starch in grains into the production of beer.⁶⁵

Wine and beer had no difficulty finding their way into religious practice. Since alcoholic beverages help to create moods of mystification and ecstasy, it is not surprising that they also created the illusion of psychic communication and omnipotence. Thus, consumption of alcohol became a part of nearly all early religious faiths.⁶⁶

Early societies not only had drinkers—they had drunks, too. People have been aware of the potential dangers of excess alcohol consumption for more than 2000 years. It seems that problems have always arisen when alcohol is used as a coping strategy. The advice of King Lemuel's mother to "give wine unto them that be of heavy hearts" (Prov. 31:6), was widely accepted in those times. Ancient Hebrews and Greeks used wine and beer to have a good time as well as to lift heavy hearts. There is clear historical evidence that personal excesses in drinking caused social problems among early Greeks, Jews, Persians, Indians, and Chinese. In ancient China the government tried to control alcohol abuse through total prohibitions and harsh threats of jail sentences. As was the case when similar measures were taken in our recent history, such prohibitions did not work.⁶⁷

In contemporary America liquor is a fact of life. Family meetings, social gatherings, holidays, and nights out on-the-town all include booze. Weekend football and a can of beer go together as naturally as horse and carriage. Most people drink. In 1970 it was estimated that 65 percent of adult women and 80 percent of adult men in the United States were drinkers. Figures suggest that people are drinking more than they did 20 years ago. On the average, each American drinker consumes 3.93 gallons of absolute alcohol each year.⁶⁸ Surveys of high school students suggest that 57 percent of boys and 43 percent of girls between the ages of 15 and 20 are drinkers.⁶⁹ In 1970 it was estimated that the number of American drinkers age 15 and over exceeded 95,648,000.⁷⁰

In most cases consumption of alcohol is not detrimental. In fact, it may be a reasonable way to relieve minor tensions. For many individuals, however, alcohol is a negative rather than a positive coping device. When consumption of alcohol interferes with the execution of someone's social roles, that person becomes an alcoholic. Estimates of the number of problem drinkers in this country differ widely. A 1971 U.S. government report estimated the number of alcoholics to be about 5 million, with an additional 4 million people classified as alcohol abusers. One recent study on U.S. Army personnel reported an alarmingly high rate of alcohol abuse among young soldiers. Nearly two out of every five men in the service were classified as either alcoholics, borderline alcoholics, or potential alcoholics. Not only did these men use alcohol as a coping device, but many felt that alcohol was of great benefit to them. At least 50 percent of the alcoholics and borderline alcoholics believed

that their on-the-job performance either benefitted or was unchanged when they were drunk ⁷¹

Excess drinking does have its costs. Each year millions of working hours are lost due to hangovers or on-the-job drunkenness. Alcoholism has been listed as one of the major causes of family problems including divorce. Besides personal grief and economic loss, drinking on the job has been blamed for accidents, absenteeism, and hazards to other employees. In an automobile, a drunk driver is always a potential for suicide or homicide. Statistics compiled by the U.S. Department of Transportation show that each year 25 000 deaths and 800 000 accidents are attributable to drunk drivers and pedestrians ⁷²

There are many prescribed treatments for alcohol problems. Some of them were mentioned in Chapter 9. At present the effectiveness of most of these treatments remains to be demonstrated ⁷³

Drug Abuse

Drugs are biologically active substances used to alter body functioning. This broad definition includes aspirin, alcohol, and pills for colds, as well as drugs specifically designed to alter behavior. Drugs which have their primary effects on thoughts, perceptions, moods, or behaviors are called *psychoactive* drugs.

The use of drugs to alter our state of mind is not a product of any one generation. In the preceding section we learned that alcohol has been used for thousands of years. The record of history indicates that drug use was also characteristic of many early civilizations. The first recorded description of a marijuana high can be attributed to Shen Nung, a Chinese emperor who ruled in about 2700 B.C., the emperor noticed that smoking the grass caused a pleasant state of mind in which his ideas became disconnected, his moods changed, and hallucinations occurred. The early history of India and Pakistan included many descriptions of the use of *cannabis* (another name for marijuana or hashish) for medical purposes.

Most hard drugs are derivatives of opium. There is evidence that opium was used by both the ancient Greeks and Romans. No one knows how its use spread to other parts of the world, although there is speculation that traders brought opium to China by 900 A.D. and to India by around 1500 A.D. In India opium quickly became a profitable crop and it was soon being raised for export to China. By the nineteenth century the government in China was anxious to stop the drug traffic. The British, who controlled their colony of India, wanted the drug traffic to continue because they were making huge profits from it. This difference of opinion resulted in two wars between Great Britain and China ⁷⁴

Around the eighteenth century opium found its way into the United States. It is most likely that these drugs were introduced to our society by Chinese and Indian immigrants and by people who had traveled to those regions. Morphine, an opium derivative, was used in the Civil War as a pain killer. Morphine and the related Demerol are still used in medical practice. Heroin, which is another opium derivative, is a drug which is commonly used today and is of great concern.

Most of us use some drugs occasionally. This might involve taking aspirin, cold pills, smoking marijuana, or drinking. A drug is said to be *misused* if its consumption is not for a medically valid purpose. It is not surprising that drugs are misused in the United States because advertisements continually prod us to take the drugs even though they may not be necessary.

The term "drug abuse" is confusing because it has so many definitions. From the medical standpoint, a drug is abused when it produces an impairment in physical or psychological functioning. The social viewpoint emphasizes that drug-taking is considered drug abuse if society at a given point in time views it as such. This point of view suggests that identical behavior could be regarded as pathological in one society and normal in another. Legal definitions dictate that abuse is anything outside of the law. Thus, smoking even one joint of marijuana is drug abuse since marijuana is illegal.

Space does not enable us to discuss all of the different drugs people might use in order to cope with stress. Briefly listed here are some major categories of drugs which are commonly used to escape the pressures of life.

- 1 **Hallucinogens** These include LSD, psilocybin, and mescaline. You might also know them as acid or sugar mushrooms. These drugs, which can cause unusual visual imagery, awakening of the senses, anxiety, and nausea, are less dangerous than previously thought. The once widely circulated belief that LSD causes genetic damage has not been substantiated.⁷⁵ Some studies have even shown that LSD enhances creativity, is beneficial in the treatment of alcoholism, and may bring insight to dying people. The dangers are that hallucinogens may aggravate existing psychological problems and that they may produce reactions of extreme fear and panic.⁷⁶
- 2 **Cannabis** This category includes marijuana and hashish. The substance is usually smoked (although it can be put in liquid or food) and generally causes a relaxed feeling accompanied by increased appetite, poor coordination, a distorted sense of time, and an inability to process information quickly. Few people, however, voice complaints about poor reactions. There are some reports showing successful medical usage of marijuana for the treatment of de-

pression, appetite loss, and high blood pressure. More recent reports claim a variety of adverse reactions to marijuana use, ranging from lowered blood count to breast growth in men. Most of these claims are not supported by sound experiments; we must wait for further research to substantiate the validity of these claims.

- 3 **Narcotics** The narcotics include, among others, opium, heroin, codeine, percodan, demerol, and methadone. These are all dangerous drugs. They can produce euphoric feelings to make you forget about life for a while. They can also produce severe dependence, addiction, and misery.
- 4 **Stimulants** In this category are amphetamines such as Benzedrine, Methedrine, and Dexedrine (or speed, uppers, bennies, etc.) and cocaine. When used moderately, these drugs can make you feel good, alert, and active. When overused, they can cause restlessness, irritability, and extreme weight loss. After continued use, they can cause paranoid reactions. The longer these drugs are used, the more painful it is to kick the habit.

Suicide

This year more than 200,000 Americans will attempt to put an end to their lives. Twenty-five thousand of them will succeed. Calculated another way, a suicidal death occurs on the average of once every twenty minutes.

Women attempt suicide three times as often as men. Suicidal deaths, however, are three times as high among men. What may be confusing here is the distinction between attempted and completed suicide. Women attempt suicide more often while men are more likely to die from their self-inflicted wounds. This discrepancy is probably due to the characteristic methods of suicide chosen by the two sexes. Women tend to take overdoses of barbiturates, which often do not result in death. Men, on the other hand, tend to shoot themselves with guns—and this usually works.”

Suicide has been a topic of discussion for philosophers and social scientists for centuries. One of the first investigative studies of suicide was conducted by the famous sociologist Emile Durkheim around the turn of the last century. Durkheim studied records of suicide from many countries and from different periods in history. On the basis of these studies, he concluded that there are three types of suicide: egoistic, altruistic, and anomic.

Egoistic suicides occur when people feel alienated and cut off from others. The feeling that there is no social support, Durkheim believed, causes people to give up on life.

Altruistic suicides occur under different sets of circumstances. These

self executions happen when people feel close to their social group. The suicide is a sacrifice for the good of the others in the group. Buddhists who set themselves on fire in protest over the Vietnam war and Japanese kamikaze pilots who during the Second World War crashed their planes into enemy ships were committing altruistic suicide.

Anomic suicides result when individuals are unable to cope with rapid changes in their relationship to society. These might follow a business disaster, a disabling injury, a loss of employment, or a divorce.⁷⁸

Even though suicide has been studied intensely since Durkheim's time, we still do not know too much about it. Many things which in the past were believed to be true about suicide have been found not to be so. For example, people once believed Catholics did not commit suicide as often as members of other faiths. This is not so. Suicide occurs in all religions, as well as all age groups, and it happens among people of every socioeconomic background.

Complex personality tests are of little benefit in detecting those who will kill themselves. Although the majority of severely depressed people consider suicide, people often take their own lives when they are not depressed. Some experts are convinced that suicidal people do not particularly want to die; they just have stopped caring about whether or not they are alive.⁷⁹

Although it is not too clear what drives certain people to commit suicide, we do know a few general behavior patterns characteristic of suicidal individuals. Three-quarters of the people who commit suicide discuss their intentions beforehand. Often suicide notes are left, describing in detail how survivors should carry on. Some examples of suicide notes are shown in Figure 11.6.

Not only do suicidal individuals communicate their intentions, but they do so in some detail. In one study actual suicide notes were compared to notes written by nonsuicidal people who were playing the role of those about to kill themselves. When trained judges analyzed the notes, it was found that the genuine notes gave more explicit instructions about taking care of unfinished business, such as getting rid of the body.⁸⁰ Another study found that more than half of the suicide notes contained statements of positive feelings ('I'll always love you . . . you did so much for me').⁸¹

Suicide is a bizarre, frightening, and poorly understood phenomenon. Fortunately, many cities now have suicide prevention centers which have met with some success in talking people out of suicide. Since people are often ambivalent about killing themselves, trained suicide prevention workers can sometimes help the potential victim through the immediate crisis. Hopefully, more research on suicide, as well as improved suicide prevention facilities, will help to limit the number of suicides in the future.

George Smith

PS I love you Junior and thank you
Daddy for all you've done for me and Junior.
Love Daddy

Betty

I hereby will all the property to my wife anything that you can get as Jen did not have anything in that place. She just took me to ride. It is good you are the big and I can sit has checked p Jim and I t + then. So just o Mr Sweet She will tell you he like g that Chas a d her have been l y together out of her place as man and wife Al g to the Beach and see how I g her a d I m I ved here as man and wife. You know who I said t look I have 2 small picy (that is a ce l me) they made out to g u

William B Smith

Figure 11 6 Examples of suicide notes Notice the detailed instructions for taking care of unfinished business and expressions of positive feelings
From Shneidman & Farberow 1970

IN CONCLUSION PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

In past summaries we attempted to relate chapter content to problems of personal and social adjustment. In the present chapter we are spared this task. Its title—"On Coping and Adjustment"—speaks for itself.

Frustration, conflict, and anxiety are inescapable facts of life. The causes of stress may be psychological (e.g., approach-avoidance conflicts p. 343), environmental (e.g., excessively rapid pace of life, urbanization, noise pollution, (p. 345), physical (e.g., ulcers, genetic impairments p. 353) or a combination thereof. Whatever its cause, stress produces problems of personal and social adjustment. In extreme cases stress will kill—literally!

How to cope with stress? As an initial step we suggested that you consider three broad options: actively engaging your own resources, enlisting the help of others, or doing nothing.

In exercising your first option, the major self-initiated coping activities are thinking and feeling. You can engage in positive daydreaming to alleviate your stress (p. 358). You can also make a conscious effort to confront your thoughts (rather than engage in avoidant thinking) by increasing your information about potentially stressful situations (p. 357). Coping by feeling, on the other hand, minimizes the importance of thought processes. Your basic guide is what you experience: love, warmth, relatedness, and self-actualization (p. 359). You could also practice various forms of meditation, although the chances are that you may have to enlist the aid of someone else (at least initially).

If you decide to exercise the second option—enlisting others to help you—self-initiated coping will of necessity be somewhat restricted. It does not have to disappear, however. Even if you enlist the aid of a behavior therapist, *you* are the one who initiates the therapeutic contact and spells out the therapeutic goal (unless you are a minor or are institutionalized, when there is danger that your exercise of free will may be jeopardized). The same goes if you choose a biofeedback specialist (page 362). Needless to say, if you choose help from such nondirective experts as Rogers (p. 360) or May (p. 361), the pace of self-initiated coping activities is sped up considerably.

Your third option—doing nothing about your stress—is of questionable value. It depends on the severity of your stress. If it is moderate, your GAS mechanism (p. 364) may regulate itself, or your defense mechanisms (p. 354) may turn into effective coping mechanisms. Under severe stress, however, there is always the danger that your GAS mechanism will become exhausted, and that your defense mechanisms will turn into neurotic syndromes.

We concluded this chapter on a somewhat somber note, citing various instances of failure to cope, including drug abuse, alcoholism, and suicide. We tried to avoid being alarmists or assuming the role of preachers. The

material was presented in the form of a sociological survey letting the facts speak for themselves

In conclusion we hope that we have presented you with enough evidence to convince you that the discipline of psychology has made remarkable progress in finding out how people perceive each other interact with each other, manipulate each other and understand each other If you found the information useful you may in a sense exercise a fourth option increase your sensitivity to your own needs and of those around you attain your goals of personal and social adjustment and experience the joys of effective living

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NOTES

You may find these pages useful for rating tasks